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August of 1973 will witness the centenary of an 
organization whose involvement in the financial life of 
many nations has been substantial, and yet whose role in 
these affairs has rarely been fully appreciated. The in-
stitution under discussion is the Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders, first established in London in 1868 as the 
Council of Foreign Bondholders, a body created to champion 
the contractual rights of the holders of non-domestic 
securities against the caprices of defaulting goveniments. 
Potentially the two most important weapons in the 
arsenal of the Cotmcil were goveniment interposition and 
the support of public opinion. By determining the degree 
of efficacy of these approaches, it will be possible to 
appraise the nature of this organization. One might be 
tempted to describe it as a pressure group. But this would 
be incorrect., Of course it is true that "politics of 
national states is polities not only of the governments 
of the states themselves but also of numerous organized 
citizens' groups."1 Yet there is a difference between 
an "interest" and a "pressure" group. 
1nonald c. Blaisdell, "Pressure Groups, Foreign 
Policies and International Politics," Annals of the 
American' Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCXIX 
(Sept., 1958), 150. 
2 
The pressure group possesses the power of the 
"application, or threatened application, of sanctions 
should a demand be refused,"1 while the interest group 
does not. For the latter to be successful it must ener-
getically pursue tangible and realistic goals with a 
modicum of public approval, and, if possible, in tandem 
with organizations having similar ends. In light of this 
definition, it would be proper to say that the Corporation2 
was in fact an interest group. 
Unfortunately, the Corporation's situation was 
made difficult by internal dissension as well as by the 
generally unfavorable climate of feeling in the 1870's 
toward Britishers who invested in foreign stocks. The word 
.. bondholder" more often than not evoked great displeasure 
both in government and in the population at large,3 while 
less controversial bodies (such as the Royal Geographical 
1samuel E. Finer, "Interest Groups and the Political 
Process in Great Britain," in Interest Groups on Four Conti-
nents, ed. for the International Political Science Associa-
tion by Henry w. Ehrmann (Pittsburghs University of Pitts-
burgh Press, 1958), p. 118. 
2Throughout this text the words Corporation and 
Council will be used interchangeably to refer to the Cor-
poration of Foreign Bondholders (formerly the Council of 
Foreign Bondholders), When the title 'Council' appears in 
this form (i.e. with single quotation marks), it will refer 
to the ruling body (the Council) of the Corporation. 
Politics 
the 
Society, the Society of Arts, and the Statistical Society) 
engaged in expanding British trade and finance. usually 
encountered approbation.1 Between Government and the City 
there existed a positive chill which, reinforced by a social 
barrier, set the two apart. The money market was beyond 
the purview of Government's direct influence or close 
supervision--Birmingham might be protectionist, but London 
was not. 2 
Despite these encumbrances the Corporation of 
Foreign Bondholders, characterized by "doggedness and 
modera.tion, 11 .J managed to make progress as a "stubborn114 
defender of English interests. In time these character-
istics were appreciated, and it was observed1 
In-as-much as this body has had a long and success-
ful experience in the adjustment of bond defaults 
and has had the approval if not the support of the 
British Government, it has served as a model for 
other central national organizations of Bondholders.5 
1Blanchard Jerrold, i•0n the Manufacture of Public 
inion," Nineteenth Century, XIII (June, 188,3), 1089. 
2 Platt, P• 16. 
3Herbert Feis, Europe, the World's Banker, 18~0-
19141 An Account of European Fore!~ Inveetment and t e 
Connection o? World Finance with bf omacy Before the War (New Ravena Yale University Press, 9JO), p. 116. 
4 lBll•, P• 114. 
SEdwin M. Borchard, General PrinciSles, Vol. I of 
State Insolvency and Forei€Jf Bondholders, ~Y Edwin M. Bor-
chard and wiiiiam H. Wynne New Ha:veni Yale University 
Press, 1951), p. 20J. 
4 
our conce:rn here, however, is with the Council in its 
early years of development, from its fou.~der•s initial 
labors in 1868, to 1882, During this period the English 
foreign bondholder was beset by an epidemic of defaults 
and partial defaults which demonstrated the necessity for 
group action. High on the list of troublesome borrowers 
on the London Exchange was Egypt, and to its turbulent 
financial scene we are drawn, Here is found the exception 
to the normal pattern of events. Unlike the cases of 
Turkey, Peru, or Spain, the Egyptian bondholders fa.red 
comparatively well. Their exertions brought them palpable 
results and even the victory of General Wolseley at Tel-
el-Kebir appeared to some to be the capstone of their 
efforts. However, it does not follow that since a ••pro-
bondholder" policy evolved, it was necessarily the activ-
ities of the English investors which were the primary 
motivating force. Our objectives, therefore, will be 
to determine the impact of the Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders upon the affairs of Egypt as well as upon 
the diplomacy of England, and to estimate its success as 
a focal point for disparate bondholder grievances. 
The situation was complicated by the often vigorous 
intervention of other European states on behalf of their 
nationals. Of these, France was the most vocals the con-
cern for his countrymen expressed by M. de Ring, French 
agent in Cairo in 1879, was not an isolated phenomenons 
5 
The financial measures for the regulating of the 
.Egyptian debts must safeguard the credit of our 
nationals which form an important part of the 
French savings placed abroad.I 
Nonetheless, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that 
it was English capitalists and stockholders who made the 
first "encroachment" into Egypt. 2 In this initial thrust 
the Council was a ready instrument, composed of the 
largest and most influential bondholders, supported 
by a few of the· members of the leading contracting 
houses, and thus machinery was created by which 
pressure in favor of intervention might be brought 
to bear on the British Government.) 
The result of the Council's intervention in .Egyptian 
finance in 1876 may be observed in the ensuing years when 
it merged with a number of other currents forming the 
maelstrom which drew the British Government into an 
unwanted occupation. The Goschen Decree, the Commission 
of Inquiry, the Wilson-Nubar Ministry, the deposition of 
the Khedive Ismail. and the Commission of Liquidation were 
the most signal events of the chaotic years from 1876 to 
1882, but each was a step which drew Great Britain more 
deeply into the mire of .Egyptian indebtedness, hence into 
1Jean Bouvier, "Les Interets financiers et la 
Question d'!gypte (1875-1876)." Revue Historigue, CCXXIV (July, 1960), 102, 
JAbdel Hamza, Public Debt of ~ts 18~4-1876 {Cairoa Egyptian Government Press, 19 , p. l 8. 
6 
an ever closer proximity with the creditors. At the same 
time English policy in the Middle East was being reshaped 
as--by fits and starts--a new course was being charted 
which no longer relied upon a special relationship with 
the Porte. A so-called "Egyptian policy" began to be 
spoken of as a natural alternative to the traditional 
British posture in the Levant, particularly as the impor-
tance of the Suez Canal was made manifest. Downing Street 
became more alive to the value of British influence in 
Egypt and to the fact that economic matters were grist 
for the diplomatic mill. As long as the Khedivial Adminis-
tration could stumble from one financial crisis to another, 
major policy decisions could be postponed. But the Arabi 
rising of September, 1881, the result of the Fellah's head-
long plunge into the nineteenth-century world of finance-
capi talism, European legal codes and nationalism, made 
procrastination impossible. 
The published literature on the Egyptian question 
is significant but, unhappily, quite often single-minded. 
On the one hand were the apologists, the administrators 
such as the Cromers, Milners, and Colvins, who believed 
the occupation was an unpleasant but necessary action, while 
on the other were the Rothsteins and Blunts who saw an in-
choate national movement struggling to free itself from the 
trammels of European financiers and officialdom. The most 
celebrated of the genre of books which described the faceless 
7 
villains--the bondholders--luring the British Government 
into unwise policies was John A. Hobson's Imperialism, 
A Study. For this author the victory of the creditors 
occurred when they "succeeded in getting their Govern-
ment to enter a most unprofitable partnership, guaran-
teeing the payment of the interest, but not sharing in 
it."1 However, to Edward Dicey, a journalist and capi-
talist, there was another morals "the real permanent 
force in Egypt is that of European Capital which either 
directly or indirectly is interested in its welfare. 112 
Since a wide divergence exists between these perspectives, 
we shall take up our ground at an intermediate point. In 
doing so, it is not intended to diminish the importance of 
the argument, currently dominant, that it was consideration 
of imperial integrity and defense, focused upon the Suez 
Canal, which forced Britain's hand in 1882, What will 
be emphasized is the financial aspect of the problem 
and with it the triumphs and failures of the Corporation 
of Foreign Bondholders as it attempted to provide leader-
ship to a large segment of the investing public--the much 
maligned Egyptian bondholders. 
1 John A. Hobson, Imperialism, A Study (Jd entirely 
rev. and reset ed.s London1 George Allen and Unwin, 1938), 
p. 55. 
2Edward Dicey, "The Egyptian Liquidation," .fil:.n.!-
teenth Century, VIII {Sept., 1880), 471. 
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In 1882 Frederic Harrison, in discussing the age 
in which he lived, wrote1 
Surely no century in all human history was ever 
so much praised to its face for its wonderful 
achievements, its wealth and its power, its un-
paralleled ingenuity and its miraculous capacity 
for making itself comfortable and generally 
enjoying life.l 
This boundless confidence and faith in progress must have 
undergone a severe trial in the 1870's as the Great De-
pression slowly deepened in intensity. The seven good 
years which proceeded from the panic of 1866 were followed, 
in true Biblical fashion, by a like measure of poor ones, 
with 1879 marking the nadir. The immediate cause of the 
initial phase of the Depression, which lasted with inter-
mittent breaks until 1896, was a panic in Vienna which 
reverberated through the bourses of Europe. In the long 
view the English dilemma was one of decreasing prices and 
shrinking profits, Though growth continued, increments 
were smaller in comparison with her principal rivals. 
Though tonnage was up, the 1870's marked the first decade 
of the nineteenth century in which Britain did not raise 
at least half of the world•s coal supplyr though the 
production of iron expanded, steel was making inroads 
1Frederic Harrison, "A Few Words about the 
Nineteenth Century," quoted in The Victorian Frame of 
Mind, by Walter E. Houghton (New Havens Yale University 
Press, 1957), P• J9. 
9 
into its market1 and cotton, the backbone of her in-
dustry, was sluggish due to a decline in demand. These 
factors, combined with an attitude of complacency, a 
flight of talent to other shores, and stiff competition, 
added to the atmosphere of gloom. 1 
Monetary disorders were also in evidence in this 
period. The world's gold output, which had so stimulated 
the general prosperity, had dropped from an annual average 
of £29,176,ooo in the period 1852-56. to £18,713,000 in 
the triennium 1872-74. 2 The unstable financial situation 
was reflected by the numerous changes in the rates charged 
by the Bank of England--twenty-four in 187J and thirteen 
in 1874.3 Trade figures for the decade also told a dis-
appointing tale.4 Compounding the difficulties in trade 
and industry was the condition of agriculture. More and 
more, England's well-being depended upon the importation 
of cheap farm commodities, Due to technical and trans-
portational advancements, these foodstuffs were available 
1Robert c. K. Ensor, ~lands 18~0-1914 (Oxfords 
At the Clarendon Press, 1936)~hapter I (pp. 101-135). 
Much of the material used in discussing the Great Depres-
sion is drawn from this work. 
2Bankers Magazine, XXXV (Feb., 1875), 97. 
Jibid., 93. 
4Ibid., XL (May, 1880), 382. 
10 
at a time when rising population and a series of very 
poorharvests found the British agriculturalist unable 
to remain a competitor in the free trade market of the 
period. In 1868 Britain had produced 80 per cent of its 
food supply, but ~his had fallen to only 50 per cent a 
decade later.1 The result was that as exports slackened, 
food imports rose sharply. 
The early l870's had also been o! moment to the 
London money market, for in these years English capital 
attained its pre-eminence in international finance. Loans 
to governments and investments in foreign enterprise be-
came the business of the City to the practical exclusion 
of all else. 2 Walter Bagehot estimated that in 1873 the 
lending power (as measured by savings deposits) was 
£120 million for London, £40 million for New York, 
£13 million for Paris, and £8 million for Berlin, the 
latter three distant competitors.3 Again it is with 
estimates that one must deal when attempting to discover 
1Alexander K. Cairncross. "Did Foreign Investment 
Pay?" Review of Economic Studies, II (1935-36), 77. 
In-
11 
the actual amount of capital which Britain exported in 
this period. Depending upon the source, the sum of British 
capital assets abroad in 1870 might vary from £700 million 
to £1.1 billion. But whichever set of figures is selected, 
the story is the sames Englishmen were able and willing 
to lend their money on a scale which can never be dupli-
cated.1 J. A. Hobson•s widely cited statistics indicate 
a 45.6 per cent increase in foreign investment from 1862 
to 1872, and a 27.5 per cent increment for the next decade. 2 
The reasons for the rapid expansion of the English 
money market are several, some quite fortuitous indeed, 
such as the removal of Paris as a rival a:fter her defeat 
in the Franco-Prussian War--from that date the gold 
sovereign became the currency of the world.3 Yet the 
dramatic event ought not overshadow less glamorous ones, 
London for years had been a principal bullion market, 
plying its trade to good profit and escaping most of the 
2 J. A. Hobson, P• 62, 





instability and violence which had troubled the Continent. 
There were no laws which harassed the Jews from carrying 
on business or limited the size of meetings to a certain 
number. The aristocracy was also open to those who would 
aspire to it, and in turn the nobleman was not averse to 
venture both time and treasure in the hurly-burly of the 
market place. The demand for English funds brought into 
existence forty new banks from 1862 to 1863 to handle 
foreign securities.1 Close upon their heels came a crowd 
of credit companies--few of which were reliably managed 
or legitimate--with vague general aimss 2 but all were 
rudely shocked by the panic of 1866. This financial up-
heaval, like a bad dream, was quickly forgotten, and for 
the next seven years there was unbridled enthusiasm among 
the British investing public for bonds from abroad. This 
mania was fostered by an expanding and diversifying com-
munications network, new organizational structures, and 
the widening attraction of the Stock Exchange. 
By the 186o•s the revolution in communications 
was so well advanced that it seemed the Earth was all but 
1wilfrid T. c. King, Histo;a of the London Dis-
count M§rket (Londont George Routle ge and Sons, Ltd., 
19j6), P• 2j1. 
2some impetus toward foreign investment came from 
an organization established in 1863 called the Internation-
al Financial Society. It desired to stimulate investment 
abroad and was composed of such banking men as Fruhling 
and Goschen. 
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shrinking beneath one's feet. Trunk lines were being 
completed, steem was challenging sail for dominance of 
the ocean, gaps in the world's submarine cable system 
were being closed, and the engineering pride of the 
century--the Suez Canal--was moving toward completion, 
With the increasing rapidity of commercial news, the 
average businessman perforce needed to be well-informed 
to be successful. In this capacity the telegraph was 
vital for supplying journalists with the latest intel-
ligence. It also tightened the sinews of the diplomatic 
corps, bringing the far-flung agent into closer contact 
with home and with the business community. As for modern 
commerce, it is said to date from the submarine cable, 
which permitted the purchase and sale of goods before 
their arrival.1 Of even greater import to the English 
investor was the state of the press, Technically speaking, 
professional journalism was probably of higher quality in 
Great Britain than on the Continent, 2 and with the removal 
of the paper duty in 1861, as well as the reduced mailing 
1charles E. Carrington, The British 0Verseas1 
loits of a Nation of Sho kee ers (Cambrldge1 The 
u~1ivers ty Press, 9 0 , P• 7 , 
2Hyde Clarke, Sovereign and Quasi-Sovereign 
States1 Their Debts to Foreign Countries (Lonaon1 
Effingham Wilson, 1878) 1 p, • 
14 
rates for newspapers passed in 1870, the dissemination 
of knowledge was greatly enhanced, Advertisements of 
loans, reports of meetings, and price and share lists 
were readily available, as was a podium from whi.ch pub-
lic opinion might be aroused. By 1876 the United King-
dom maintained 1,642 newspapers (320 of these in London) 
and 675 periodicals. 1 The financial press likewise 
prospered, joining the Bankers Magazine and the Economist 
were a number of journals, the most important of which 
were the Money Market Review (1859), the Investor's 
Monthly Manual (186J), the Bullionist (1866), and the 
Financiar and Bondholders Register at the end of the 
decade, 
The rising organizational tendencies toward con-
solidation and concentration were mirrored in the foreign 
loan market, An innovation in the purchasing of securities 
occurred in 1868 with the appearance of the Foreign and 
Colonial Government Trust. The object of this institution 
was to tap the potentially vast reserves of the small in-
vestors by offering shares at a moderate price and investing 
this capital in blocks of securities purchased in the open 
market. In the first two years the Trust paid 7 per cent 
1Money Market Review. XXXII (Feb. 19, 1876), J20. 
The growth of journalism is illustrated in the comparison 
of the figures above with those of thirty years earlier; 
in 1846 the United Kingdom possessed 551 newspapers, 14 
of which were daily publications. 
15 
and was so well received that in 1871 a second issue 
for £1 million in £10 shares, guaranteeing 6 per cent, 
was offered. 1 The success of this enterprise was due 
both to the eagerness of the English public to reap large 
profits in a hurry, and to the Board which was selected 
to manage the organization's affairs. Among the most 
prominent of these gentlemen were Bertram Woodehouse 
Currie (of the private bank of Glyn, Mills, Currie and 
Company), Lord Westbury (a famous jurist), Philip Rose, 
and Eustice Cecil, M.P. 2 
Emulation being the hallmark of success, it is 
not to be wondered that imitators soon appeared on the 
scene in spite of the deep suspicion on the part of the 
Exchange, In 1872 the Government Stock Investment Trust 
was born, with a seasoned leadership at the helm and a 
responsible body of trustees.J While the Standard Trust 
XXXI (May, 1871), 469-70, 
Currie are discussed in 
Investment Trust included two 
(a member of the 
16 
Investment Corporation of the same year was floundering 
in obscurity, another company, the Government and Guar-
anteed Securities Permanent Trust, was making headway. 1 
With 1873 the loan market entered upon a downward course, 
but the trust movement persisted for some time longer. 
The Mortgage Debenture Govenunent Securities Trust was 
set on foot in l87J, and was followed a year later by the 
Omnium Trust. 
Here, of course, we are only enumerating the most 
important companies which dealt in non-domestic governmental 
stocks. There were many groups set into motion during these 
years involved in specialized investments, such as rail-
ways, deep-sea cables and municipal improvements. It will 
be necessary to return to these institutions again, for 
not only did their portfolios contain Egyptian securities, 
but their directors, in many cases, had ties with the 
Council of Foreign Bondholders. 
Another stimulant to the British market, already 
touched upon. was the credit and discount companies through 
which the small investors could save the expenses of the 
contractor and deal directly with the borrower, Joint 
stock ventures were aided by a widening of the limited 
liability legislation. These brash young firms bullied 
1A principal figure in this trust was Arthur 
John Otway, M.P., a man with large financial interests in 
Turkey who also served as a director of the Foreign and 
Colonial Government Trust. 
17 
their way onto the scene with abundant capital and 
offered the old regime, the "haute banque," competition. 
However, lacking the experience, the international con-
nections, and the image of confidence and discretion of 
the older firms, these new associations usually embarked 
upon more risky operations which did not interest the 
prestigious houses. 
As the l86o•s drew to a close, London's financial 
strength was being underpinned by the rising number of 
well-known Continental banking names which began to adorn 
City doorposts. Joining Fruhling and Goschen, the London 
House of Rothschild, the Baring Brothers. and others, were 
such newcomers as branches of Bischoffsheim and Goldschmidt, 
Erlanger•s, and de Worms. These merchant banks were usual-
ly family affairs with ties throughout Europe--their 
clientele select, their reputation worth money, and their 
demean.or cosmopolitan, which usually made the English 
suspicious. 
Although dealings in commodities might still be 
made to good profit, the real rewards lay in the floating 
of various government loans on Europe's bourses. Competi-
tion for these plums would have caused internecine struggles 
therefore, the contractors also began to draw together to 
form syndicates. The pressure to syndicate a loan also 
came from the increasing frequency of major operations, 
which made it hazardous for one house to gamble its position ' ,,
·\ 
! \ 
I \ \ \ 
~\ 
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on the reception of a single issue. By means of a syn-
dicate, several financial institutions would contract 
with a government to place its securities before the 
public at a certain price. The difference between this 
issuing price and the contract price formed the profit 
for the syndicate. Naturally enough, the disparity of 
the two prices was in direct proportion to the credit of 
the borrower. The syndicate would itself pledge to take 
a percentage of the securities "firm," as their respon-
sibility, but no member could negotiate his allotment 
until the combination disbanded. Initially, however, 
the loan was offered simultaneously on several bourses, 
with all transactions being carried out through the 
manager. At the conclusion of a stipulated period, the 
unsold stocks were divided among the participants, after 
which the price would begin to drop as each attempted to 
unload his shares for what they could fetch. 1 With 1873 
came the realization that the London market was saturated, 
and this method of governmental finance faded under the 
glare of notoriety. The Bankers Magazine declared that 
the process of issuing them [loans] under the aus-
pices of a syndicate has only recently come to the 
1
"A Sketch of the History of Foreign Loaris," 
Bankers lVJ!gazine, XXXVI (July, 1876), 519. This is one 
of the few articles on syndicates, and much of the above 
material is drawn from it. 
19 
knowledge of the public, and it is now no secret 
• • • that many of these bodies have yet on their 
hands large amounts of the various foreign loans 
of modern issue.l 
The Economist also frowned upon this modis operandi: 
A Syndicate issue is probably tainted in itself1 
there is some intrinsic vices and if it were not, 
the existence of the Syndicate ~ises a presumption 
that the price is much too high. 
To a great extent, the financial plight of Egypt in 
these years was traceable to this baneful mode of 
raising capital. 
At bottom it was the rapid maturation of the stock 
market which drew to itself an ever larger public interest. 
In 1825 the official list of the Exchange encompassed 
thirty-four issues, and the operation of the institution 
was under the control of a handful of brokers and jobbers.J 
The railway boom, the Limited Liability Acts of 1855 and 
1862, and the new demands for English capital had greatly 
altered the character of Capel Court. By the 186o•s, for 
many people Consols gave the temperature of the British 
Empire. It was to the Funds that the middle class first 
l~., XXXIII (Nov., 1873) t 1000. 
2Economist, XXXII (Jan. 17, 1874), 64. 
20 
looked for a secure investment. The Victorian bourgeoisie 
was a frugal lot, as the figures of the savings banks 
bear witnesss 1 they considered money placed beyond the 
pale of banks and Consols as nothing if not speculation. 2 
Advanced elements of the middle class were, however, being 
drawn into a wide range of investments, and this trend 
continued to broaden into the 1870's as new legislation 
in education and property rights began to take effect.J 
By prudent selection one could have purchased 
securities in the home market with an income equaling 
that to be derived from foreign stocks. But this mania 
which developed in the late 186o•s was not a matter of 
logic. It was difficult to resist the alluring prospects 
held out by such offerings as the "Iquique and la Noria, 
Pizagua and Obispo and J'W1.ction Railway," "Colorado 
Terrible Load Mining Company," or the "New Sombrero 
Phosphate Company." As competition increased, so did the 
risk to the buyer. This "unappeasable appetite for foreign 
stocks and securities"4 might be indulged in by private 
1Leland H. Jenks, Migration of British Capital 
to +_8,P (New Yorka Alfred A. Knopf, l9JB), p. 23:5. In 
1830ank deposits stood at £30 million, while in 1866 
they were £350 million. 
2 Powell, P• 465. 
)Ibid., P• 466. 
4
"English Capital and Foreign 




individuals, but was not to be countenanced as a safe 
banking practice. 1 The Economist also warned of the 
serious danger of rash foreign lending, 2 and thought 
the businessman should be content with 5 per cent in-
stead of potentially larger profits on the Exchange. 
Although deception and fraud were rife and many suffered, 
the figures for the 1870's show that one did not become 
rich by treading the safest paths. High risk brought 
high interest, and "despite the extensive def2ults of 
foreign government loans, it is probable that, prior to 
World War I, if not since, this expectation was on the 
whole realized."J Although the decade of the seventies 
was not particularly good for the investors, the average 
yield on non-domestic government bonds was 4.4 per cent, 
while the Funds paid J.8 per cent. 4 
As is so often the case, it is not the rule that 
beckons to one's interests, but the exception. Defaulting 
governments there were, ready enough to break faith, and in 
that knowledge lay the !:!l.son d'etre of the Council of 
Foreign Bondholders. 
1~ •• 627. 
2Economist, XXVII (April JO, 1870), 529. 
3 Borchard, p. xxvi. 
4cairncross,Home and Foreign Investment, P• 230. 
CHAP'rER I 
THE CORPORATION OF FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS: 
FORMATION AND OPERATION (1868-1876) 
The first foreign loan raised in England was done 
in the name of the Emperor of Austria in 1706 for £500,000 
at 8 per cent.1 Britain's purse was not at the disposal of 
every borrower, for under Walpole it became a crime to lend 
money abroad without Governmental authorization. This proved 
no particular handicap since, in balance, England was a 
debtor nation in the eighteenth century and was herself 
importing capital. 2 
The decade of the 1820's was a significant era for 
the foreign government securities market. From 1818 to 1830 
twenty-five government loans were enthusiastically received 
in London; this was the age of the triumph of nationalism 
1Money Market Review, XXX (March lJ, 1875), 310. 
2charles K. Hobson, "British oversea Investments, 
Their Growth and Importance," Annals of the American Academ* 




and liberalism, towards which Britishers were sympathetic. 
As matters fell out, sixteen of these loans went into 
default, with the result that this mode of investment 
sank into disfavor for many years. 1 This distrust was 
such that the policy of most savings institutions was to 
avoid the purchase of foreign securities, and in the case 
of the London Joint Stock Banking Company, the prohibition 
was included in its charter of 18J6. 2 
Until the advent of the Council of Foreign Bond-
holders the only recourse which ~reditors possessed in 
dealing with defaulting states was to unite behind a 
committee of defense.J These self-appointed bodies had 
little knowledge at their disposals being temporary, they 
usually commanded little backing and were often dominated 
by the contractor of the loan who, naturally enough, was 
torn between the holders' complaints and the defaulters, 
from whom future business was expected. In addition, the 
1Albert H. Imlah, Economic Elements in the Pax 
Britannica1 Studies in British Foreign Trade in the 
Nineteenth Centu1 (Cambridge. Mass,,1 Harvard University 
Press, 1958), P• 2. 
2wilfred F, Crick a~d John E. Wadsworth, A Hundred 
Years of Joint Stock Banking (Londona Hodder and Staughton. 
!9j6), P• 280. 
JMost defaults, at leas·t in these years, were not 
total abrogations of contractual responsibility by the 
borrowing state, but rather a partial default involving 
modifications or deletion of particular clauses. 
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contracting agent felt most fit to handle the problem, 
and wished to be on the spot to discourage any legal 
action involving his house. In other instances the bond-
holder might find more than one committee acting in his 
behalf. Speculators for the fall, often possessing none 
of the securities in question, might establish a committee 
sprinkled with a few well-known names, and attempt to 
come to an agreement which would bring profit only to 
the coterie whose scheme it was and to the defaulter. 
At any event, the decline in the value of stock which 
accompanied any suspension or irregularity in the pay-
ment of the dividends worked to the advantage of the 
speculator and debtor, who could make large purchases 
at low prices. Ad hoc committee solutions had shown 
themselves unsatisfactory, and the Money Market Review 
voiced the general belief that 
there are many objections to the system of relying 
exclusively upon special committees formed, from 
time to time, of holders of some special class of 
security. Such committees are rarely brought into 
existence until the evil which they are instituted 
to redress has been already done.l 
This dissatisfaction with the system of independent 
committees was the central consideration of the founder of 
the Council of Foreign Bondholders, Mr. Isadore J, Gersten-
berg. While gathering support for his projected organization, 
1Money Market Review, XVII (Nov. 7, 1868), 424. 
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Mr. Gerstenberg plumbed the attitudes of the investing 
community on several issues, The remarks upon the old 
methods of protection were pointed. In a letter of 
October 13, 1866, to Mr. Gerstenberg, William Hartridge 
remarked a 
Of Bondholding Committees, as ordinarily constituted, 
I may say that thirty years• observation has led me 
to the conclusion that they were merely representa-
tives of speculators.l 
Mr. Maxwell Turnbull, an erstwhile chairman of a Vene-
zuelan Committee of Holders, related how his efforts were 
made nugatory by internal dissension. 2 No wonder, then, 
that when the call went out for the framing of a bond-
holders• institution, these special committees should be 
characterized as bodies which "frequently failed to exer-
cise that influence on Foreign States, or obtain that 
attention, from the Home Government, which are indispen-
sable conditions in the complete fulfillment of their aims."3 
The growing importance to the nation of investments 
abroad, including those in government stocks, was becoming 
obvious, and the future members of the Council were ever 
1Isadore J. Gerstenberg, Suggestions for Forming 
a Council of Forei~ Bondholders (Londons Mann, Nephews 
and Co., 1869), P• 5. 
2Maxwell Turnbull to I. Gerstenberg, Dec. 9, 1867, 
~., P• SJ. 
Jill.!!•• P• J, 
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prepared to expound, by means of statistics. the con-
siderable interests which they claimed to represent. 
Considering the scope of foreign investments,1 it 
would have been most unusual had not some central 
society been erected, 
The year of the Council's birth, 1868, was marked 
by an in.tensive wave of speculation, 2 which doubtlessly 
aided the efforts of Mr. Gerstenberg. Not all of these 
offerings were sounds in fact, "there had taken place in 
a few years before 1872 1 frequent issues of loans for 
foreign countries so-called, which were only disguises 
to plunder the public ... 3 Matters were confused by a 
spectrum of opinion expressed by the journals, which 
perplexed rather than clarified, and by the woeful dearth 
of information possessed by the public on the existing 
loans.4 For some holders, 1868 proved an educational 
experience as Italy and, more importantly, Austria took 
steps to alter unilaterally their contractual obligations. 
The Money Market Review adviseda 
1Imlah, P• 75. The author has compiled a table 
for British foreign investments from 1815 to 1914, including 
estimates on yearly dividends, 
2Powell, P• 533, 
)Robert Giffin, Exchange, quoted in Clarke (p. 32). 
4Money Market Review, XVII (Nov. 14, 1868), 449. 
..... 
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Under any circumstances, we ought for the time to 
button up our pockets. We have been far too free 
with our money, as this growing spirit of repudia-
tion clearly shows, and we must teach the foreign 
debtor that there is a limit to our endurance., 
But this was merely knotting the purse-strings after 
the pound was gone. The remedy which was shortly to 
emerge was the Council of Foreign Bondholders. 
To the onlooker of 1868, it might have seemed 
surprising that the impetus behind a bondholders• society 
should be a man whose bread was ea:rned on the Stock Ex-
change. 2 Few then or later have impuned the sincerity 
of Mr. Gerstenberg•s motives, though subsequent experi-
ments in reshaping the lineaments of the organization 
were to generate hostile criticism. For some time 
Mr. Gerstenberg had been caught up in the plight of the 
English creditors, energetically championing their cause 
both in the press and at their meetings,3 Acquaintanceships 
1 Ibid., XVI (JW'le, 1868), 659. 
3As Chairman of the 1862 Venezuela Bondholders' 
Committee, Mr. Gerstenberg vigorously defended the credi-
tors with techniques which were anticipations of those to 
be used later. In these years prior to 1868~ ,.Gerstenberg 
and Mr. George Joachim Goschen first became acquainted 
when the latter took up the cause of the holders in 
Parliament (Money Market Review, XIV [May 18, 1867], 598). 
1111'"'" 
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with investors, fellow brokers and contractors were 
obvious assets when he began to gauge opinion as to 
the feasibility of establishing his proposed institution. 
The means of garnering support took the form of a letter-
wri ting campaign launched in July of 1866. From the mass 
of correspondence which was exchanged during the next two 
years, a pair of overriding questions thrust their way 
into the foreground, namely1 how was the Council to be 
financed, and what would be the character and nature of 
those who would fill an executive capacity. Mr. s. Vardon, 
in a letter to Mr. Gerstenberg, stated that despite the 
shortage of talented individuals who could donate their 
time to a bondholders• society. the problem of obtaining 
adequate funds would be worse.1 Eventually the thorny 
matter of money did become a most destructive issue in 
the Council's history, and led to deep division and open 
hostility, which greatly hampered the association's 
power of action. 
The suggestions which Mr, Gerstenberg reaped from 
his harvest of missives exhibited the broad scope of 
thinking on this topic. It was recognized by many that a 
general fund might be a necessity, 2 and that an obligatory 
1s. Vardon to I. Ger.stenberg, Sept. l. 1866, 
Gerstenberg, p, 39. 
2Lawford Richardson to I, Gerstenberg, July 19, 
1866, .!h19.·· p. 24. 
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"penny in the pound" might be "cheerfully" given to a 
Council as a good investment.1 Less optimistic ap-
praisals were advanced by the Rothschilds as they warned 
that voluntary contributions by the holders would be the 
wisest policyr 2 from Paris, M. Maurice Aubry advised that 
a tax for services rendered ought only to be resorted 
to when a loan had floundered.3 In the years that fol-
lowed, all of these ideas were adopted at one time or 
another, as the disbursement of funds for the Council•s 
operations grew ever greater. 
Those who addressed themselves to the question 
of the personnel of the contemplated organization agreed 
that there should be no remuneration for the staff. 
Mr. Moxon, himself a member of the original Council, 
argued for absolute honesty and no "jobbing", 4 others 
envisioned the executive body as a "court of' honor,"5 
1w. T. Ingall to I. Gerstenberg, Aug. 22, 1866, 
~·• P• 37. 
2Baron Rothschild to I. Gerstenberg, Aug. 9, 1866, 
ill.!S.•• P• JO. 
)Maurice Aubry (of Price and Devot) to I. Gersten-
berg, Sept. 29, 1866, ibid., p. 43. 
4Thomas Moxon to I, Gerstenberg, Aug, 14, 1866, 
ibid •• p. 33. 
5Maurice Aubry to I. Gerstenberg, Sept. 29, 1866, 
ill.!S.•• P• 4J. 
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or as "trustees"1 for all bondholders. Nurtured by hopes 
such as these, sentiments for the projected society 
began to mount. 
By the autumn of 1868 Mr. Gerstenberg had produced 
enough interest to warrant a general meeting to discuss 
the implementation of his plan, The tempo of events in 
this year had graphically illustrated the vulnerability 
of the English creditors. Spain, Venezuela, and Mexico, 
along with others, had already violated their bonds, and 
joining the parade were Italy and Austria, who had ar-
bitrarily modified their loa.~ contracts and had imposed 
special taxes of 8 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively, 
upon their fo~eign creditors. These partial defaults 
excited a general call for action. 2 Italian and Austrian 
bondholdgrs• c~mmittees were formed, and they, in concert 
with existing independgnt committees, fo\llld themselves at 
least temporarily in agreement with the concept of a uni-
fied authority, The Foreign and Colonial Government Trust, 
which held £1 million in securities of various descrip-
tions (including Austrian), also encouraged the formation 
1Edward Redman to I. Gerstenberg, Sept. 29, 
1866, ibid., P• 51. 
2Mr. Gerstenberg was personally interested in the 
Dual Monarchy and sat as a director of the newly-formed 
Anglo-H\lllgarian Bank (D. Morier Evans, ed., The Bankin 
Almanac Directo Yearbook and Dia for l Lon ona 
chard Groombr e and Sons, l 73 , P• 50 • 
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of the Council, and the collaboration between these two 
was such that the former was always heavily represented 
in the Council.1 
Another possible ally to the Council lay in the 
contracting houses and their agents, But to some of 
these gentlemen a bondholders' association posed a threat 
which could damage business. They wondered what pretensions 
Mr. Gerstenberg entertained. Mr. Edward Redman, one of those 
whose opinions had been solicited, wanied that it was tm.-
reasonable to require approval of loans by the Cotm.cil be-
fore issuance to the public. 2 This view was strongly 
seconded by Charles Bell3 of I. Thomson and N. Bonar and 
Company, a contracting establishments 
The Council would be beneficial, provided it were 
composed of influential persons, and • • • that 
interference with the nusiness Of loan contractors 
would be inadmissible. 
1 In addition to Philip Rose, the Foreign and·. 
Colonial Goveniment Trust supplied such Council me~bers as 
Francis Bennoch, Augustus Abraham, and George Bentinck. 
2Edward Redman to I. Gerstenberg, Oct. 19, 1867, 
Gerstenberg, P• 51. 
3charles Bell (1805-69), a Conservative M.P• for 
London, was chosen as a member of the first 'CounQil• for 
the bondholders (1~e Times of London, Feb. 11, 1869, P• 6), 
4Money Market Review, XVII (Nov., 14, 1868 H 45?. 
I c 
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Although such an idea had never been entertained openly 
by Mr. Gerstenberg, he was nevertheless looked upon with 
misgiving by many in the issuing business. The air was 
at last cleared when Gerstenberg wrote an open letter 
to The Times in which he statedt 
The cause of the Council has met with almost unani-
mous support, only some of the loan contracting 
houses seem to fear that it might interfere with 
them and look upon it fS a kind of supervision 
over their operations.-
This, he declared~ was not their objective• It was 
decided to invite all finns who would, to close ranks 
with the bondholders, and a motion to that effect was 
presented and assented to at the initial meeting on 
November 11, 1868,2 Such a decision was both wise and 
imperative, since several of these City men were sympa-
thetic to the aims of the new group, or if not that, 
considered it prudent to remain on amicable tenns with, 
or even to join with the bondholders, until the general 
drift of public opinion could be ascertained~ 
As a would-be organizer of an investors• protec-
l~he Times, Nov. 14, 1868, P• 8• 
2Money Market Review, XVII (Nov. 14, 1868), 457. 
This joumil covered In detail the General Courts of the 
~t~~f;t~~~ ~~i~!J.c~~~!~~~do~Yt~;·c~~~ii·~iwi~Yi~ 
Henryl3ishop~ The Corporation of Forei8£ Bondholderse 
A Narrative LLondon1 Effingham Wilson, 9oi], P• 10). 
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tive society, Mr. Gerstenberg recognized that the co-
operation of the "great" in the world of finance would as• 
sure success. On July 11, 1866, he sent a draft copy of 
his proposals to the House of Baring for their perusal. 
In two days their response arrived1 
As contractors of loans, and rerresentatives in 
many cases of Foreign Governments and of Bond-
holders, we do not think it is desirable for us to 
off er an opinion as to the expediency of the plan 
suggested or to make any observations which might 
in any way influance the decision of a matter which 
we think should be left to the spontanoous action 
of the Bondholders.! 
Despite this reply, Mr. Thomas Baring promoted equity 
for the bondholders and assisted them both before and 
after 1868.2 There was hope of much assistance from the 
London Rothschilds, but here too caution prevailed. 
While affirming their belief that many of the terms 
1Baring Brothers to I. Gerstenberg, July lJ, 1866, 
Gerstenberg, p. 2J. 
2For a time Thomas Baring was the chairman of the 
New Granada Bondholders• Committee, and in addition, his 
firm had aided Mr. Gerstenberg•s Venezuelan Committee by 
enlisting the Dutch Government in its behalf in 1866. 
Upon the death of Thomas Baring in l87J, the Council 
praised the assistance he had rendered in the formation 
of the Corporation (Corporation of Foreign Bond.holders, 
First Report of the Council of the Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders for 187~ [hereafter this and succeedli?*g 
annual reports of t e Council will be abbrevi · · 
For, Bondh, Rep,, date][London, 1874], P• 5 .~ 0 
v t.. 0 . . ; I,,,; .L" 
IJtvr Ydf~ '",,.p 
< ~,,..,, 
" . ~ .. a.ti. ~:T .. , 
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forced upon the creditors "would never have been listened 
to if such a Committee as you suggest had existed,"1 the 
head of this illustrious firm declined at the eleventh 
hour to chair the opening session of the Council~ But 
where the giants dared not walk the lesser came more 
readily. George A. de Worms,3 of the house of the same 
name, saw the projected association as a force to "strength-
en the hand of the contractor,"4 and hence he openly sup-
ported Mr. Gerstenberg. By late autumn of 1868, more 
backing had been gained by the adhesion of the General 
Credit and Discount Company, represented by Mr. J. Mac-
donald, its General Manager, as well as r. Thomson and 
N. Bonar and Company, Louis Cohen and Sons, and Messrs. 
1Baron Rothschild to I. Gerstenberg, Aug. 9, 
1866, Gerstenberg, p. 30, 
2The Times, Nov. 5, 1868, p. 5. The paper remarked 
that up to this date it had been expected that Baron Roth-
schild would hold the seat of honor. 
3aeorge A• de Worms was selected to sit upon the 
first Council of Foreign Bondholders but was forced to 
withdraw when the Government sent him on a mission to 
Austria in 1869, From this vantage, he continued to 
help the bondholders by transmitting messages to the 
London Committee from Vienna, (In all cases where source 
material is not indicated for biographical sketches of 
'Council' members, information has been drawn together 
from financial journals of the time,) 
4a. A. de Worms to I. Gerstenberg, Aug. 17, 
1866, Gerstenberg, p. 30. 
35 
Horstman and Company.1 Participation in the Council's 
activities did not mean that the loans which these houses 
had issued, or would issue, were any safer for the bond-
holding public. 2 
The greatest buttress, without exception, was 
the Stock Exchanger from its ranks came the majority of 
the organization's membership. The brokers certainly 
could provide needed information, wrote one of their 
number to Mr. Gerstenberg,3 and on November 12, 1866, 
the plan was laid before the Committee of the Stock 
Exchange. Mr. Francis Levien, Secretary of the Com-
mittee for General Purposes, respondeda 
Your communication enclosing a copy of your letter 
to Mssrs. Baring Brothers has been duly considered 
by the Committee for General Purposes. who have 
directed me to inform you that, in their opinion, 
the proposed council if properly organised and 
supported by influential capitalists, is calculated 
to be of very great advantage
4
to the interests of 
the holders of foreign bonds. 
1Money Market Review, XVII (Nov. 14, 1868), 457, 
Thomson, Bonar ana Company was well represented on the 
Council, with Mr, Gerstenberg himself having close busi-
ness connections with them. 
2Thomson, Bonar and Company had a discredited 
Peruvian loan on their hands, as well as the Guatemala 
6 per cent loans of 1869 which also went into default. 
Mr. Gerstenberg•s name appeared on the advertisement 
for this latter offering. 
)F. Campion to I. Gerstenberg, July 24, 1866, 
Gerstenberg, P• 28. 
4Mr. Francis Levien to I. Gerstenberg, Nov. 21, 
1866, ~., P• 47• 
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Since much of the new association's labor was complementary 
to that of the Exchange, and considering the number of 
brokers who were to hold positions on the Council, 1 it 
was only by chance that the Corporation was not completely 
absorbed by Capel Court. "Nothing but positive want of 
space," wrote the Money Market Review, "can have prevented 
the Stock Exchange from making necessary provision from 
its cwn staff, and on its own premises."2 
In one other direction, aid was to be found for 
Mr. Gerstenberg•s scheme, but although this assistance 
could be powerful, it was also mercurial. The financial 
press in this period was in general accord regarding the 
necessity for some protective society for English creditors 
of foreign governments. The Money Market Review, the most 
tenacious of the Council's defenders, first advocated a 
bondholders' league in 1867.3 When the Council became 
a reality, no other journal devoted more space to its 
affairs or stirred up more flagging enthusiasm than did 
this periodical. 
The ~conomist gave grudging approbation, although 
1see Table 1 in the Appendix. 
2Money Market Re~iew, XXIV (Jan., 1867), 64-65. 
31J?.!!!., XV (Sept. 28, 1867), J2J. 
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it feared that the holders' bellicosity might drag the 
1 nation into war. Even The Times appeared in the bond-
holders' camp and observed that honest countries would 
benefit from any measures which kept defaulters from the 
market. 2 Generally speaking, Mr. Gerstenberg was pleased 
with the publicity and acknowledged this by moving a 
resolution to thank the press at the meeting on Novem-
ber 11, 1868. 
All the principal publications had carried the 
announcement of the forthcoming assemblage of bondholders 
for November 11, and consequently the throng was such 
that many had to be turned away. Chairing the meeting 
was a man who had befriended the English creditors in 
the past, and whose path was to cross theirs again, 
Mr. George J, Goschen, M.P. J Having entered the family 
concern of Fruhling and Goschen in 1858, he acquitted 
himself so well in financial affairs that he was made a 
member of the Bank of England at the age of twenty-seven. 
1Economist, XXVI (Nov. 14, 1868), lJOO, 
2 The Times, Jan, 26, 1869, p. 5. 
JGeorge Joachim Goschen (18Jl-1907} was born in 
England of German Jewish parentage. After graduating 
from Oxford in 185J, he spent two years in Granada be-
fore returning to London to enter into business. But 
his calling lay in politics. By 1868 he had already 
held the posts of Secretary of the Board of Trade, Chan-
cellor of the Dl.Jchy of Lancashire! and Secreta~ pf the 
Poor Law Board (Dictiona of Nat onal B1o ra Lhere-
after D~B] Sup~. 2, Vol. II Londona Oxford Un versity 
Press, 917- J, 134-40). 
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In 186J, he successfully contested a City seat in 
Parliament and politically supported Lord Palmerston. 
While in Commons he demonstrated his sympathy with the 
Venezuelan holdersi thus, in all respects, the appearance 
of Mr. Goschen boded well for the nascent society. 
The outcome of this opening session was the 
unanimous adoption of four resolutions which set the 
machinery into motion for the creation of the bondhold-
ers' league. The first resolution, aptly enough, was 
proposed by the founder and chairman-to-be, Mr. Gersten-
berg, and reada 
That in the opinion of this meeting, the formation 
of a council for the purpose of watching over and 
protecting the interests of holders of foreign 
bonds is extremely necessary and desirable.l 
The next motion was proffered by Mr. H. B. Sheridan2 and 
called for the loan contractors to be welcomed into the 
new league. The third resolution which was presented by 
the most venerable of the advocates of creditor unity, 
Sir Provo Wallis, dealt with the financial aspect of the 
scheme under debate, and stated1 
1 The Times. Nov. 12, 1868, p. 4. 
2Henry Brindsley Sheridan, M.P., had assumed the 
Chairmanship of the Mexican Bondholders• Committee in 
1867. In the following year he was one of the key 
individuals who came forth to support tho Council. 
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That this meeting recommends and will support the 
adoption of any reasonable and practical plan for 
defraying the necessary expenses that may be sub-
mitted by the council hereafter and the holders 
of foreign bonds, when such council shall have 
been duly constituted.l 
Finally, Colonel Beaumont2 moved that those who had 
summoned them should constitute themselves as the first 
•council' with power to add to their number, and that 
they should set to work to prepare rules and regulations 
for the governing of the projected institution.3 
On February 2, 1869, the bondholders reconvened 
to approve the measures which had been educed from the 
resolutions of the previous year. The honorary chairman 
on this occasion was Mr. Robert w. Crawfordcwho, like 
Mr. Goschen, was an M.P. for London. The major items 
on the agenda were the ratifications of the by-laws and 
the confirmation of the first governing 'Council.' This 
1The Times, Nov. 12, 1868, p. 4. Sir Provo 
William Parry Wallis (1791-1892) was a naval hero of 
the Napoleonic Wars who lent color, solid respectablity, 
and a title to the makeup of the Council. he ran away 
to sea in 1804, and by 1877 he had risen to Admiral of 
the Fleet. Although he remained on the Executive Com-
mittee of the 'Council' until his eighty-seventh year, 
he seldom put in an appearance in London after 1870 {DNB, XX, oOJ-604r see also John G. Brighton, Admiral 
oft'he Fleet Sir Provo w P, Wa.llisa A Memoir Londona 
Hutch nson and co., 9 • 
2colonel (later Major General) R. H. I. Beaumont 
was another who added stature, to the first •council,' 
although not a City man. He did not participate actively 
in its functions but remained at his post until his death 
in 1874. 
3The Times, Nov. 12, 1868, p. 4. 
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was speedily accomplished. The •council' contained 
fourteen members, three of whom were Members of Parlia-
ment, and was a representative sampling of the main 
elements in the organization--large investors, brokers, 
and contractors--with the chairmanship accorded to 
Mr. Gerstenberg.1 
For the next few years until incorporation in 
1873. the Council tasted both success and discomfiture 
as it discovered the extent of its influence. Optimism 
and energy of purpose marked this period, as various tech-
niques and services to assist the bondholders were de-
veloped. Circumstances also reinforced the idea that in 
defending a particular interest, "ultimately a group seeks 
to influence those institutions which carry the power of 
decision upon its demands."2 But the influence necessary 
1The Times, Feb. J, 1869, p. 5. The first 'Council' 
was composed of the following membersa 
Col. R. Beaumont 
Charles Bell, M.P. 
G. Bentinck, M.P. 
E. Philip Cazenove 
George de Worms 
*Isadore J. Gerstenberg 
H. R. Jameson 




H. B. Sheridan, M.P. 
*Admiral Provo Wallis 
Thomas M. Weguelin 
Those with an asterisk were on the Executive Committee 
of the •council't Mr. Weguelin was added later in 1869. 
2John David Stewart, British Pressure Groupst 
Their Role in Relation to the House of Commons (Oxfordr 
Clarendon Press, 1958), P• 28. 
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to treat with a sovereign state removed the problem to 
the rarefied atmosphere of international law. The 
Bankers Magazine had definite ideas on the power to 
be exercised by the English holders1 
No more than moral pressure can ever be brought 
to bears yet this pressure, concentrated and intel-
ligently directed, is likely to achieve better 
results than threats or official action could 
accomplish.l 
Being the 0 conscience of the loanmongers"2 no doubt 
lent prestige to the body, but being pragmatic men, 
they also knew tthat self-interest caused defaults and 
only a larger draught from the same cup could alter 
affairs. To achieve this end, a variety of procedures, 
none of them foolproof, were available and upon these 
some time will now be spent. 
At first glance one might expect, as did many 
who purchased the bonds of foreign ';ove:nments, that 
the payment of the yearly dividends rested on a legal 
base and not merely upon the good faith of the borrower. 
In fact, however, the loan was only a debt of honor, for 
the contract could not supersede the sovereignty of the 
1Bankers W.iagazine, XXXII (Feb., 1872), 79. 
2 Jenks, P• 288. 
t . 1 na ion. 
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Other lines of argument (some of which were 
discussed at Council meetings) were advanced on the 
legal nature of such government borrowings, but all 
foundered on the shoals of state sovereignty. 2 Even 
the prospectus, although fraudulent, was adjudged an 
advertisement rather than a contract. and caveat emptor 
was in force. A state could, of course, allow itself 
to be sued in England, but in all particulars of the 
case, the law in the debtor country would be applicable.J 
But in the last analysis, no court decision can bind a 
country to any action it chooses not to take. 4 The most 
solid claims could be rejected by English courts on juris-
dictional grounds, while the cost incurred in obtaining 
the occasional victory over a broker. or agent, was repaid 
• 
only by the satisfaction of bringing a swindler to book.5 
Legal options were possible, however, where the borrower 
.. 
1rn 1877, the Court of Chancery supported this 
view in Twycross vs. Dreyfus. This decision was to have 
a direct impact on the Egyptian creditors (Borchard, 
PP• 155-56). 
2A discussion of this topic is available in the 
volume by Borchard (pp. 161-72). 
JThis was decided in 1869 in c. Weguelin {of 
I. Thomson and N. Bonar and Company) vs. Smiths see 
Bankers Magazine, XXIX (July, 1869), 762. 
4The case of Egypt which created much trouble 
for the Khedive Ismail is a peculiar exception to this 
rule. 
5Macmillan's Magazine, XXXII (May, 1875), 94, 
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was a municipality or other national political sub-
division. Many American states were counted among the 
defaulters in these years, which meant the Council 
could defend the holders• interests by appealing their 
cause as far as the United States Supreme Court. In 
such matters, Mr. Hugh McCulloch, who became a member 
of the •council' in 1873, and who was described as 
"unquestionably one of the highest f ina.'1cial authorities 
in the United States," was prepared to represent the 
English creditors. 1 When incorporation came, the group's 
concern in this direction was illustrated by its creating 
the post of Foreign Legal Advisor and appointing to it 
Mr. Aubrey Mauriarty of the Inner Temple. The following 
year the position of Standing Law Advisor was added. 2 
Of more immediate import to the Council was the 
success of the press in producing a favorable milieu in 
which the Corporation could operate. Upon the default 
1Mr. Hugh McCulloch {1808-95) was born in America 
and served as secretary of the Treasury under both Presi-
dents Andrew Johnson and Chester Arthur. He came to Lon-
don in 1870 where he established a banking firm, and, having joined the Council, made several trips to his homeland for 
the English creditors (The Times, May 27, 1895t p. 6). 
2rn 1864 Thomas w. Snagge {1837-1914) passed the 
bar. Ten years later he became Standing Law Advisor to 
the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, and from 1881 to 
1883 was junior counsel to the Board of Trade. 
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of a country, 1 the English creditors would make appli-
cation to the Council to take up the matter. Should 
these petitioners constitute a significant number of the 
holders, a meeting of protest would be convened, if size 
permitted at the Council headquarters. At these gatherings 
a committee of bondholders would be elected in conjunc-
tion with the Council which would guide their efforts 
towards a settlement, be they appeals on moral grounds, 
attempts at negotiations, or resorts to sterner measures. 
Through all of these phases the press played a vital role. 
By giving notice of meetings, by publishing letters and 
articles on the erring borrower, by reproducing the com-
plaints of the investors in full, and by supporting the 
decisions arrived at, the journals, if not supplying the 
bite, at least provided the bark for the creditors. 
Albeit special pamphlets and publications might 
be resorted to, the Council never forgot its vote of 
thanks to the press, and at the General Court of the 
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, February 29, 1876, 
the Deputy Chairman Sir John Lubbock observed that without 
1Max Winkler, "Defaults and Repudiations of 
Foreign Loans," Foreiftj Polic3 Association Information 
Service, J.V, No. 11 ( 928), 2 8. The author enumerates 
eleven types of default based mainly on modifications of 
either the interest, principal, or sinking fund. 
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journalistic exposure, the organization's usefulness 
would be greatly impaired.1 "Society cannot capitulate 
to one group,"2 but the "campaign," or appeal to general 
sentiment, was a natural aspect of interest group tactics. 
Channels of communication did not exist in the nineteenth 
century between Parliament or the Cabinet and the interest 
group, and therefore a greater emphasis was placed upon 
this mode of indirect pressure than was the case later.J 
The most injurious weapon the defaulter had been 
able to wield upon the ranks of its creditors was the 
sword of divisiveness. National organizations of bond-
holders generally were disinclined to act in harmony with 
their confreres in other lands, and so the borrower could 
play group against group, often with remarkable success. 
If international unity could be achieved and the wayward 
debtor be confronted by a phalanx of determined lnvestors, 
an agreement would be that much closer. Accordingly, 
Mr. Gerstenberg sought to prepare the soil on the Con-
tinent for movements similar to that which he was sowing 
1Money Market Review. XXXII (March 4, 1876), 28J. 
2 Stewart, p. 12J. 
J~.,pp. 120-25. Mr. Stewart argues that the 
"campaign" or appeal to the public is something which now-
adays is only undertaken as a last resort where large issues 
hang in the balance. 
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in England. Initial inquiries were promising. 
Mr. Prosper Vanda Velde of Paris thought the concept 
of a league of bondholders would meet with universal 
approval in France and elsewhere, 1 and in fact Le Fin-
ancier in 1868 urged that Frenchmen should heartily 
support the London endeavor. 2 Of greater value was 
the endorsement of the principles of the contemplated 
council by L. H. Weetzen, Chairman of the General Com-
mittee of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange,3 Less sanguine 
news arrived from Berlin where Mr. Gerstenberg•s cor-
respondent lamented that at the moment it was impossible 
to obtain either men or contributions1 nevertheless, 
as soon as a default to Prussian creditors should occur, 
a committee would no doubt be established and be placed 
in contact with London. 4 As time was to prove. national 
differences between fellow creditors were not to be re-
moved, and organizations similar to the Corporation were 
1aerstenberg, p. Jl. Prosper Vanda Velde, of 
the House of N. Herbault, !Bent du chan~e, Paris, wrote 
to Gerstenberg on August 11, 1866, to t ls effect. 
2 Hamza, P• 158. 
JL. H. Weetzen to I. Gerstenberg, Sept. 9, 1866, 
Gerstenberg, p. 41. 
4Julius Alexander to I. Gerstenberg, Aug. 21, 
1866, ibid., p. J8. 
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not to take root on the Continent for many years.1 
Although bondholder co-operation was not customary, 
still the Council continued its efforts in that direc-
tion. As it reported in 18731 
The Council have not been unmindful of invoking 
the attention of their continental allies to the 
common danger, and they believe that they are justified in stating that there will be full 
accord in dealing stringently with those who do 
not meet the claims upon th~m in a fair spirit 
to the best of their power. 
Within the reach of the vigilant creditors of 
a defaulted loan was always the possibility of closing 
the world's money supply to the offending nation. If 
achieved, this action could be extremely effective. In 
many cases default had occurred because poverty-ridden 
states had been duped by promoters, in others, the will-
ful violation of contract was the cause, and here the 
likelihood of settlement was in proportion to the damage 
done by the breach of contract. If internal pressures 
caused by the suffering of home commerce were severe, or 
if another loan was desired, an obstinate borrower would 
see the wisdom of removing the heretofore immovable 
1A Chamber similar to that of the Council of 
Foreign Bondholders was set up in Paris at the request of 
the Finance Minister in 1898, while in the same year a 
similar institution was established in Belgium. Germany 
did not acquire such an organization, however, until World 
War I (Borchard, p. 212). 
2 Corp. For. Bondh. Rep., 1873, p. 26. 
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obstacles to a rapprochement betvreen himself and the 
bondholders. This assumed, of course, that the British 
Stock Exchange would co-operate and that other bourses 
would follow suit, neither of which could be counted 
upon. Article 6J of the Rules of the Stock Exchange 
did provide the bondholders with a remedya 
The Committee will not recognize new bonds, stocks, 
or other securities issued by any foreign govern-
ment that has violated the conditions of any previous 
public loan raised in this country, unless it shall 
appear to the Committee that a settlement of existing 
claims has been consented to by the general body of 
bondholders. Companies issuing such securities ~ill 
be liable to be excluded from the official list,l 
As a matter of fact, the Exchange had been closed 
to certain offenders in the years preceding 1868.2 But 
on balance these seizures of activity were rare and 
occurred after much publicity or when it suited the 
brokers to intervene. Pleading a dearth of information, 
the sanctity of contracts, or the undesirability of their 
passing judgment upon the merits of a loan, the Stock 
Exchange Committee permitted states who had already 
broken faith to offer their wares to the British public, 
and only with the sudden demise of the loan mania did 
1norchard, P• 173. 
2Powell, P• 618. In 1866 Russia was dropped from 
the official list of the Exchange for tampering with the 
loan of 1859. In 1867 the State of Massachusetts was also 
refused a quotation. 
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Capel Court come under widespread criticism. As the 
British money market grew in stature, the weight of 
the Stock Exchange likewise grew in importance, and in 
the case of Egypt, the bondholders• position vis-a-vis 
the ~-chedive Ismail was greatly strengthened merely by 
the co-operation of Capel Court alone among the world's 
bourses.1 
Finally, the ultimate authority from whom the 
investors might expect aid against the defaulter was 
Her Majesty's Government. Unlike present-day politics 
with its proliferation of vocal interest groups, the 
nineteenth century did not afford any machinery for 
consulting with various factions of English opinion 
before embarking upon a chosen policy. In these cir-
cumstances, the Council was obliged to carry its cause 
to the Government's doorsill as well as it could. Per-
sonal interviews at the Foreign Office, correspondence 
with the secretaries, questions in the House, and publicity 
given to meetings of protest all were employed to catch 
1Nonetheless, should a country choose to defy 
its creditors, it could do so without retribution as long 
as an external loan was not needed. An illustration is 
the case of Mexico, who was closed out of the world's 
money markets by the Council's efforts from 1876 to 
1886 (Edgar w. Turlington, Mexico and Her Forei~ 
Creditors (New Yorks Columbia UniversltY Press, 9JO], p. 11. 
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the Government's attention. There were even plans for 
creating a permanent Parliamentary Committee to represent 
the holders, but this idea was never fully implemented. 1 
In general, the resort to Government was a step taken 
only after careful consideration; for the Council was of 
two minds as to what role, if any, Downing Street should 
assume in bondholder affairs. The Corporation usually 
requested introductions for bondholder representatives 
to foreign dignitaries preliminary to negotiations, and 
the transmission of memorials to defaulting states, and, 
on special occasions, importuned the Foreign Office to 
take up the cause of the English creditors in earnest. 2 
The latter course was definitely the exception, but deep-
seated clan and communal feelings made the individual 
bondholder believe that his government at the last would 
not turn its back on his distress, should trouble arise 
over a loan. 
Hence, the Council in 1868 could not entertain 
very hopeful views on the assistance which would be af-
forded from Her Majesty's Ministers, on the other hand, 
1Money Market Review, XXIV (Jan. 20, 1872), 90. 
2Many other services might also be provided by 
British agents abroad, such as collecting hypothecated 
funds for their nationals, or even acting as representa-
tives for bondholder committees, For a list of the officials 
whom the Corporation found most helpful, see Corp, For. Bondh. 
Rep., 1873, P• 50. 
51 
neither was pessimism in order. Although it was true 
that England's "response has been none too sympathetic," 
still "it has seldom remained completely indifferent to 
the treatment of its nationals by a defaulting foreign 
government."1 At the very least the Government normally 
wished to be kept informed of developments, and could even 
be induced to assume a decisive stance when it appeared 
that English creditors had been singled out as recipients 
of flagrant acts of injustice. 2 It was clearly under-
stood that these interpositions were unique, and that 
the British investor ought not turn to the Foreign Office 
every time a contract was violated. The attitude of the 
Government in these years was spelled out in the famous 
Palmerston Circular of 1848, which read in parts 
It is therefore simply a question of discretion with 
the British Government whether this matter should or 
should not be taken up by diplomatic negotiation, 
and the decision of that question of discretion turns 
entirely on British domestic considerations •• , • 
The British Government has considered that the losses 
of imprudent men who have placed mistaken confidence 
in the good faith of foreign governments would prove 
a salutary warning to others. and would prevent any 
foreign loans being raised in Great Britain, except 
by governments of lmown good faith and ascertained 
solvency.J 
1Borchard, p, xxiv. 
2Examples of British action on behalf of her credi-
tors can be cited in regard to Spain in 1824, Mexico in 
1861, and Venezuela in 1862. 
JBorchard, p. 2J4. 
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In the face of this situation, many adherents to the 
Council still felt that through the intercession of their 
new organization, Government would become more hospitable 
to investors' requests. 
Some representative opinions were reflected in 
letters to Mr. Gerstenberg by J. A. Franklin, Hyde Clarke, 
and E. Jeggins. Mr. Franklin was a firm proponent of 
"timely" appeal to Government and used his personal in-
fluence in behalf of the bondholders. 1 Mr. Jeggins, who 
was to become one of the perennial figures at Corporation 
meetings, expected that a watchful Council would assure 
that "British representatives at Foreign Governments 
would be more likely to render us energetic assistance, 
in compliance with the instructions from our Government. 112 
Mr. Hyde Clarke was not as confident, and thought more 
in terms of self-help, as he argueda 
Nothing can be a greater mistake than to rely too 
much on the sole exertions of Her Britannic Majesty's 
diplomatic agents, however able,~however willing, or 
however influential they may be.J 
Those most eager for diplomatic aid were men of strong 
character who had won their spurs by grappling with de-
1J. A. Franklin to I. Gerstenberg, July 5, 1866, 
Gerstenberg, p. 25. 
2E. Jeggins to I. Gerstenberg, Aug. 18, 1866, 
.!ill,., P• J6, 
)Hyde Clarke to I. Gerstenberg, Jan, 5, 1867, 
ibid., P• 48. 
53 
faulters in persons H. B. Sheridan, M.P. for Dudley, 
at the November, 1868, meeting termed "listless .. the 
Government's policy in defense of her subjects who had 
invested in foreign securities.1 Seconding Mr. Sheridan, 
and bringing the audience to life, Mr. Gerstenberg said 
that 
he certainly thought the rights of English bondholders 
ought to be protected by the Government of this co'W1.try, 
and he was sure such protection would be granted if the 
bondholders continued to demand it with perseverance 
and W1.animity.2 
Mr. Goschen, in his closing remarks as chairman of the 
meeting, said he believed that moral influence was all 
very well and good, but felt constrained to state that 
it would be dama.ging as regarded the result of the 
meeting if it was considered that the meeting had 
endorsed the opinion that it was the duty of the 
English Government to compel foreign governments 
to pay debts which they had incurred to British 
subjects.3 
With this remark the afternoon's activities terminated, 
leaving with the members the impres~ion that the Co'W1.cil 
was off on a proper tack. Mr. Sheridan, however, fearing 
lukewarm support from the new association, withdrew his 
1Economist, XXVI (Nov. 14, 1868), 1300. 
2Monei rv'Iarket Review, XVII (Nov. 14. 1868), 457 • 
.3~ •• 458. 
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Mexican Bondholders Committee within a few months 
and launched his own vigorous campaign. 
over the next several years a number of bondholder 
grievances were brought to the Council's notice and were 
handled with varying success. Government taxes upon 
stock purchases and the periodic rash of canards pub-
l ically telegraphed and posted to affect the securities 
market were matters which naturally interested the investor1 
but, as expected, the defaulted loan was the primary bugbear. 1 
In 1872, the Council compiled its first report, 
in which were outlined its achievements, as part of its 
propaganda effort to win .support for incorpGration.2 
The most successful of these operations was the settle-
ment of the Austrian loan. All the elements for a triumph 
were theres an energetic and experienced committee,J 
the closing of the Stock Exchange to the Dual Monarchy, 4 
1Winkler, P• 237. Writing in 1928, the author 
states that over half a century earlier, 50 per cent of 
the foreign government loans on the London Exchange were 
in some state of default. 
2A summary of the report m@.Y be found in the Money 
Market Review (XXVI [Jan. 18, 1873], 67). 
JThe chairman was rYir. Gerstenberg•s second-in-
command, Thomas M. Weguelin, and also present w. H. Bishop 
of the Exchange, and Drummond Wolff of Primrose League 
and Fourth Party fame, who was an able financier interested 
in Egypt. 
4Money Market Review, XVIII (June 5, 1869), 579, 
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a nation which was willing to negotiate, 1 and a person 
who devoted time and money to gain an arrangement. 2 
In addition, the aid of the Foreign Offlce was enlisted. 
The Counciltransmitted a memorial to Government asking 
for "friendly representations" at Vienna, which were 
given.J The arrangements were also quite remunerative 
to the Council, which received a commission, and this in 
turn had a direct bearing upon the reorganization of 
the society and its incorporation, for it was evident 
that protecting bondholders could bring handsome rewards. 
But this led to the tacky problem of which investors the 
Council represented. In an open letter Hyde Clarke laid 
the problem before the public.4 One million pounds sterling 
of the Austrian securities were held in England, yet only 
half of the holders had come forward to help in the common 
cause.5 Those who had been content with taking whatever 
1Actually it was half a state--Hungary wanted a 
settlement, for it wished to float a new loan immediately. 
2The hero of this episode was Mr. w. H. Bishop, 
who received profuse thanks from the Council for the part 
he played (Bishop. P• J6). 
)Money Market Review, XVIII (March lJ, 1869), 271. 
4 The Times, Dec. 21. 1871, P• 5. 
S"Certificates of claim" against the amount with-
held by the Austrian Government were given to those who 
participateds by presenting these later, the holder re-
ceived a cash payment. 
the Dual fi'Ionarchy gave now wished to share in the gained 
benefits. The resultant hard feelings all around were 
to be experienced again by other casts of characters, 
for financial necessity, spiced with a soup9on of avarice 
(according to the Council's detractors), forced the associ-
ation generally to act as an agent on commission in behalf 
of a minority of the holders. 
Other noteworthy successes were also won. In 1872, 
the hypothecatiOi.!S on two Turkish loans, guaranteed by 
the Porte in accordance with the contracts but ignored 
since their signing, were successfully contested by the 
Council, and a Commlssion was set up to assure that the 
breach would not be repeated.1 In this struggle the firm 
support of The Times was of great assistance. 2 In addi-
tion. a Roumanian Rail,Nay loan was settled with Bismarck's 
help, and an 18 per cent tax en Spanish securities was 
forestalled.3 Efforts also had been made in behalf of 
1committees for the Turkish 1858 and 1862 loans 
were to remain in London and be given the reports of the 
hypothecated revenues from the Imperial Ottoman Bank. 
Council members, including the secretary Hyde Clarke, were 
represented. 
2 The Times, Aug. 2, 1872, p. 10. 
Jibid., Nov. 18, 1871, p. 7. Clarke was able to 
bring the"'iiii'jority of European bourses into line for joint 
action against Spain. 
57 
the holders of Venezuelan, Liberian, 1 Italian, and 
Greek bonds, with little to show, 
If steady financial support was the dominant 
concern of the Council, the next highest requisite was 
the reorganization of the institution into a legal entity. 
The case of the Honduran Ship Railway Loan of 1872 pro-
vided an example of the sort of accusations which could 
be levelled at the Council upon this head. In May of 
1872, Mr, Clarke publically questioned the feasibility 
of the construction of a railway line across Honduras for 
the purpos$ of transporting steamships from ocean to ocean. 2 
Captain Bedford Pym,3 special commissioner for the Honduran 
Government, angrily attacked the Council at an assembly of 
holders which saw Mr. Clarke shouted down by those in atten-
dance. The glib Captain made the most of his situation 
and declared: 
Gentlemen, you must see which way your interests 
are served, and I have no earthly doubt you will 
1The activities of Mr. Clarke upon this loan are 
laid out in a series of letters between the Council and 
the contractors, Messrs. Holderness and Nott, which are 
reprinted in The Times (Dec, 25, 1871, P• 7). 
2~., May 25, 1872, P• 7, 
3captain Bedford Pym was shortly to be placed in a 
French prison for representing this loan in Paris. By the 
summer of 1872 most of the south American offerings were 
'beginning their downward trend. 
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act accordingly, but Gentlemen, I should not be 
acting with perfect frankness if I did not point 
out to you--painful as is the subject--the great 
mischief which has been inflicted on your property 
by the action of a self-constituted body styled the 
"Council of Foreign Bondholders."! 
But long before the summer of 1872, the machinery for 
change had been set in motion towards incorporation. 
As 1871 drew to a close Mr. Gerstenberg and 
company were busily engaged in the task of renovating 
their institution. The handicap of being a private 
group, coupled with the trickle of dependable income, 
forced the Council to the decision that a fund or trust 
must be created to meet the needs of the organization. 2 
1Money Market Review, XXV (July 27, 1872), lOJ. 
This criticism was expanded in a letter from the Honduran 
Minister Plenipotentiary, s. Carlos Gutierrez, to Mr. 
Clarke in which he said1 
·~beg to inquire whether the Council of Foreign 
Bondholders is an institution established or recog-
nised by the English law as having ex officio or 
otherwise a right to call for information from the 
representatives or the agents of any foreign Govern-
ment in regard to financial operations, or is it a 
mere private trading enterprise? Of whom does the 
Council consist? By whom, when, and how, is the 
Council elected? Are the duties and responsibilities 
of the members and the Council governed by any Royal 
Charter or other instrument to which the public can 
have access?" 
2The prospectus for the new society was published 
in 1871 and gives the regular income as three pence in the 
pound voted by the New Granada Committee, and one penny in 
the pound from the Turkish 1862 Committee. 
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A new sign was hung out-- 11 Foreign Bondholders 
Association"--and to advertise its altered character, 
a prospectus was issued in which subscriptions to the 
new league were solicited. A Councilhouse was also 
selected at 17 Moorgate Street, which was to remain 
the headquarters of the Corporation for almost a cen-
tury.1 The prospectus was an appeal for the laudable 
goal of bondholder solidarity, and indicated that all 
profits from loan settlements, commissions, and the like 
might be divided among the members. 2 The shares were 
offered at £100 apiece, definitely not for the small 
investor, and brought with them lifetime membership in 
the organization. A statement was procured from Lord 
Granville, the Foreign Secretary, that the Association 
would "be of great utility to the Foreign Office, by 
enabling it to treat with a responsible body,"3 and 
the financial press considered it a good thing. But 
subscriptions were slow in coming in, and only 10 per 
cent of the goal of 1000 members had been reached by late 
1The Times, Jan. 15, 1872, p. 7. The building 
was taken from Huth and Company on a forty-five year lease. 
2Money Market Review, XXIV (Jan. 20, 1872), 90. 
The prospectus pointed to the windfall received from the 
Austro-Hungarian arrangement and to a possible Spanish 
settlement which might produce as much as £75,000 for 
the Council's coffers. 
J~. 
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January of 1872. As in the past, the stock brokers, 
viewing this as a speculative venture, were the primary 
participants and as such stimulated the general tendency 
toward multiple purchases by partnerships and fwnily 
concerns. When it became known, however, that the 
Association was seeking a Royal Charter, interest in 
the shares immediately grew apace. 
Incorporation by Royal Charter was not to be 
realized, for although Lord Ripon (the Lord president), 
as well as other ministers, was disposed to help, the 
scheme perished in Cabinet.1 Despite this disappoint-
ment, another option was suggesteda that the Council 
might retain its profit-making intentions if a private 
bill providing limited liability could be gotten through 
Commons. Here, too, the way was blocked. As the solici-
tors reported to Gerstenberg1 
On one point, which was a sine gua non, viz., that 
th11 liability of the Members of the Corporation should 
be limited, we came to the conclusion that Parliament 
would not sanction such a condition, and after very 
careful search for precedents of any such conditions 
having ever been incorporated in a Private Bill, none 
could be found, and we are of opinion that such a 
1 Co~f For. Bondht Re~., 1872, p. 7, This docu-
ment, quote n Borchardp.05, n. 31), stated that 
"ihe petition was presented to Her Majesty, and referred 
to the Privy Council, but although severa: 'Tlinisters were 
in favor of granting it, the Cabinet dec!ctad agaiust 1 t, 
being unwilling to establish a precedent. " 
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condition will1not be likely to be permitted by Parliament, 
Affairs were now deteriorating rapidly. It was obvious 
to the Council that incorporation could only come about 
by constituting themselves a non-profit organization and 
notifying all subscribers to that effect. As the list of 
members shortened, 2 the founders quickly moved to save the 
situation, A license was procured from the Board of Trade 
under Section 23 of the Companies Act of 1867, By this 
means the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders was established 
for the public good and thus was allowed to enjoy a limited 
liability position without the word "liability" actually 
appearing. 
On August 1, 1873 1 the Corporation came into exist-
ence, replacing the old Foreign Bondholders Association. 
In many respects nothing had changed. Familiar faces still 
dominated the key posts, the powers of the new body were 
in no way enhanced by incorporation, and the meager assets 
with their concomitant claims, plus the Moorgate Street 
address, formed the patrimony. In general, then, the 
l ~·• p. 9 (quoted in Borchard, p. 205, n. 32), 
2According to w. H. Bishop (p. 16), one third of 
the subscribers withdrew on the rumor of a negative deci-
sion on the promised Royal Charter. 
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Corporation was the old Council writ large. The dif-
ferences which appeared lay in organizational form, the 
expansion of personnel, and the acquisition of the fund 
composed of the £100 subscriptions, each of these will 
be dealt with in turn. 
The documents which defined the objectives and 
organizational structure of the Corporation were the 
"Memorandum and Articles of Association," and the "Rules 
and Regulations" for 1873. 1 The Memorandum enumerated 
the objects for which the society had been formed and 
included a restatement of the posture of 1868. The 
first priority was still 
watching over and protecting the rights of the holders 
of Bonde, Obligations, Debentures, and other Securities 
of a similar character issued by Foreign Colonial Govern-
ments, Municipalities, Public Companies, and especially 
of Foreign Bonds negotiated and issued in London. 
Since adequate information was crucial to wise investment, 
a second object was "collecting and preserving full infor-
mation with reference to such securities, in the form best 
calculated to be clear and accessible to the public." The 
1corporation of Foreign Bondholders, "Memorandum 
and Articles of Association," Great Britain, Public Record 
Office (hereafter PRO), Board of Trade (hereafter BT) 
Jl/1884/7528. All references to the Memorandum or Articles 
are found in the source above. The "Rul~s and Regulations" 
of the Corporation for 1873 are to be found in the British 
Museum,, and, of' course, ref'erences to Rules are f'ound in 
this document (Col1?oration of Foreign Bondh"Jlders, "Rules 
and Regulations," LLondon, 187:3]). 
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Corporation undertook to collect money for the creditors 
and to obtain settlements with the help of the press and 
the Stock Exchange, and also intended to map out principles 
for future loans and for conversion of issues in default. 1 
At the heart of the Corporation was the governing 
'Council,' which was expanded from a dozen or so under the 
old system to a maximum of thirty members (Article J2). 
The Articles and Rules of the organization spelled out 
and fortified its dominant positiont the 'Council' was 
to be directed by a chairman and two deputy chairrren 
(Article 32) and was to remain in office for five years 
(Article J4), after which time half of its number were to 
retire, although all might be re-elected (Article JS), 
and thenceforth four of them must be reaffirmed each year. 
The •council' possessed the authority to fill its own 
vacancies, as long as thirty days' notice was allowed for 
the presentation of objections (Article J8). Aside from 
the General Court held annually, the •council' met quar-
terly for transacting ordinary business. Absenteeism was 
such that a quorum of seven was sufficient to carry on 
1The Memorandum contained six points, and they 
appear in various states of completeness in the financial 
press. The Money Market Review published a good account 
(Aug. 16, 1873, P• 21~). 
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the business of the 'Council' (Article 40). Under these 
circumstances the Executive Committee, consisting of no 
more than fifteen, with a quorum of five (Rule 10), had 
a virtual stranglehold on all aspects of the Corporation's 
activities, 
The 'Council' decided when a meeting of bondholders 
should be summoned (Rule J2), and possessed a preponderant 
influence upon the committee which was selected at such a 
gathering. Control over the committees was complete, and 
no independence of action was permitted, Men who wished 
to sit upon these bondholder committees had to submit 
their names in advance (Rule 39), so that the Corporation 
fathers could make their selection (Rule 40). To promote 
unity of purpose, the chairman of the organization was 
ex officio chairman over all committees (Rule 4l)s if 
this prerogative was not exercised, the chair was occupied 
by a gentleman appointed to that duty by the 'Council' (Rule 
4J). Tranquillity was further insured by the placing of 
'Council' members on all committees under its jurisdic-
tion, usually matching the financial interests of the man 
with the particular loan in default. Table 1 illustrates 
this system in practice.1 The average committee size 
was eighteen members--twenty or more if the group had 
1All tables appear in the Appendix. 
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been constituted outside the organization. closer to 
twelve when established by the Councils and with the 
chairmanship preordained and the ubiquitous Hyde Clarke 
as secretary, and the fact that all assemblages were 
held, when possible, at the Councilhouse, a fairly firm 
control over affairs could be maintained. In these 
isolated instances where committee opinion appeared 
mutinous, formal appeals could be made to the 'Council,' 
to a meeting of the holders involved, and if necessary, 
to a General Court of the Corporation (Rule 50). 1 
By maintaining an appearance of unity and by 
quieting their own carping committees, the Council hoped 
to entice the remaining independent bondholders• groups 
under the roof of Moorgate Street. 2 Some of the independ-
ent committees did prefer to remain alocf, but by 1872 
the Council had made common cause with nine committees. 
and this figure grew as the number of defaults 
1A rare example of the defeat of the wishes of 
the •council' occurred at a meeting of the Spanish bond-
holders. Mr. Gerstenberg and the committee were overruled 
by a vote of 700 to 9 on the issue of accepting half pay-
ment on three coupons in arrears (The Times, Jan. 2, 
1875t P• 7) • 
2co~. For. Bondh. ReR•• 1873, P• 51. The •council' 
did not ope y attack the Independent committees, but did 




The addition of personnel, as the second im-
portant modification of the Foreign Bondholders Associ-
ation, was accomplished by creating several posts which, 
albeit not demanding in their labors. could be useful to 
the membership. Of these the most important were the 
Advising Engineer, the Standing Law Advioor and Drafts-
man, the Notary, and some staff for the Secretary. 2 In 
the latter instance, by adding to the secretariat a 
greatly prized objective could be attained. namely the 
establishment of a Reading Room which would contain in-
formation, valuable to the members, on all descriptions 
of loans-. Countries were asked to donate any books, 
pamphlets, or other materials of interest to investors. 
to the Council's library, which in time received quite 
l Mone* Market Review, XXIV (Jan,. 20., 1872 )., 90. 
Among those w Ich remained apart were the Erie Shareholders• 
Protection Committee, the Peruvian Bondholders'' Committee (chaired by Sir Charles Russell, staunch friend of the 
English holders), and the Mexican Bondholders• Committee 
which had withdrawn from the bosom of the Corporation 
for a time. 
2Thomas Rumball initially held the position of 
Advising Engineer, but in 1874 he was also given the 
appellation of Legal Advisor. As a member of the staff 
he worked closely with the 'Council' and sat on bondholder 
committees. 
The first Standing Law Advisor and Draftsman was 
Thomas w. Snagge (see above, p. 11-3, n. 2). 
s. H. Schergis was made Translator and Superin-
tendent of Records, while two amanuenses were provided 
for Mr. C1a:r.·rn. 
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an extensive collection. This facility alone should 
have been sufficient to win the good will of the 
investing public, who were generally welcome. 
Abroad, too, the Corporation set about to extend 
its network of paid agents so that information could be 
made available to the membership as quickly as possible. 
With the aid of such gentlemen, letters of introduction 
might be obtained for those having business overseas, 
and if necessary, the agents might also serve as sen-
tinels over the creditors• interests. In several in-
stances, as in those of Colombia, Costa Rica, and Spain, 
agents of the British Government also assisted the bond-
holders by giving advice, transmitting communications, and 
even collecting money due on coupons. Votes of thanks to 
various Government officials were a regular occurrence, 
though only a few in the diplomatic service were con-
versant \Vi th or greatly interested in financial aff'alrs.1 
The agent for the Levant, including F..gypt, was a private 
person, Captain Stab. A former English officer in the 
Crimean War who had become a land owner in Smyrna, he 
10ne of the exceptions was A. H. Layard, the 
Ambassador for England to Spain during the early years 
of the Corporation. He helped found the Imperial Otto-
man Bank, then served as its first chairman, and while in 
Madrid he gave his fellow nationals helpful support in 
financial matters. 
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already had assisted the Council for some years. A 
later Chairman of the Corporation, Mr. Bouverie, described 
Stab as one who was "familiar with all the inner life and 
machinery of the Porte."1 It was from this source that 
the •council' gained local news of the Ottoman Empire. 
The greatest change in the Council's prospects 
lay in the financial condition of the institution. The 
Corporation came into existence with a fund of £60,280 
and every intention of husbanding their resources for 
the future. 2 As with all else in the Corporation, the 
'Council' had a tight grip on the common assets which 
were obtained from the sale of the £100 permanent mem-
berships in the organization, which would be redeemed at 
5 per cent per annum when surplus allowed. As indicated 
in Rules 8 and 23 through 25, the Finance Committee of 
the Corporation would be chosen from the 'Council,' 
would include the chairman of the organization, who had 
an extra vote in case of ties, and would meet monthly to 
administer the balance sheet. In addition (Rule 51), no 
debt could be contracted by a committee without the per-
mission of the 'Council.' 
1Bouverie to Granville, May 18, 1880, Great 
Britain, Granville Papers PRO FO J0/29/148. 
2 Corp. For. Bondh, Rep,, 1873, P• 4. 
It was hoped that ordinary expenses might be 
met, and a profit might also accrue to the Corporation, 
from various means. One idea was to offer lifetime and 
annual memberships at £120 and £10 respectively, although 
these would be in all ways inferior to the original per-
mar.ent certificates.1 A good return was also looked 
for by investing the fund in what Mr. Gerstenberg called 
"high class sAcuri ties. 112 The-:3e investments were r..ever 
itemized on the skimpy balance sheets laid annually before 
the General Court. and only after intensive questioning 
were facts pried from the tight-lipped executives. The 
•council• based its silence upon an unwillingness to be 
questioned on the merits of one security over another, as 
well as the potential repercussions in the investing com-
munity at large should it be known what lay in the Corpora-
tion's portfolio. What emerged in time was that part of 
the stock held by the Council was obtained as payment from 
defaulters for the settlement of bondholder grievances,J 
as will be noted elsewhere. Although the investments 
At the G!~~~!t ft'~~~to¥8Mi;w~ Xf~§, (~v~~i~8i~{A ~~t 
only £266 had been realized through lifetime and annual 
subscriptions up to that date. 
2!2.!£.., XXVIII (Feb. 28, 1874), 275• 
JAmong those securities held by the Council were 
Spanish 4 lJer cent, Colombian, and Venezuelan stocks. 
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seemed to produce a favorable remuneration, still the 
institution did possess its share of poor stock. 1 
Other services which were also to produce 
revenue were the hiring out of meeting rooms and staff. 
and agency work for loans done on commission. Most im-
portant, of course, were the rewards to be reaped for 
the settlement of bondholder claims. The question of 
payment was set forth in Rule 641 
The expenses incurred by the Corporation in the 
arrangement of a foreign loan under default, and 
a fair and moderate commission (applicable towards 
the public objects of the Corporation, and the 
gradual re-payment of the funds advanced by the 
permanent members of the Corporation), shall be 
paid by the Government with which the arrangement 
has been effected. In cases where that condition 
cannot be fully obtained from such Government, 
the Council will urge its partial compliance, 
failing therein, the expenses and commission shall 2 be paid by the bondholders, by pro rata contributions. 
This was the seed of eventual weakness. How were the 
holders to be prevailed upon to be eleemosynary when 
the defaulting government could not pay1 what was to be 
done with those bondholders who would not cooperate with 
1Money Market Review, XXXVI (May 4, 1878), 435. 
It was disclosed at the meeting of May 2, 1878, that the 
Corporation had suffered a loss of ~4,966 on its Peruvian 
holdings. Five years later at the March 1 General Court 
of 1883 the Chairman stated that three of seven securities 
they held were below par--Hungarian Bonds. Metropolitan 
3 Per Cent Stock, and Spanish 4 Per Cent. 
2corporation of Foreign Bondholders, "Rules and 
Regulations," p. 10. 
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the Corporation but would share in victorys and, should 
there be a profit, what was to become of it? But in 1873 
these problems were still at a distance, and the member-
ship were willing to wait and to read what they liked into 
the language of their leadership. 
Despite the legal obsta.cles to any division of 
profits under the arrangement of incorporation, some mem-
bers still believed that eventually a regular dividend 
would be forthcoming. This misunderstanding had stemmed, 
no doubt, from the Council's prospectus of 1872 which had 
proclaimed that the organization would be "not only self-
supporting, but [would] amply repay the members, 01 Although 
fully aware of the situation, Gerstenberg and others were 
not always clear upon the future of the organization's 
capital.2 
Thus far we have interested ourselves with the 
early history of the Council before 1868, the powers 
1circular issued by the Foreign Bondholders 
Association, London, 1872, quoted in Borchard, p. 204. 
2Money Market Review, XXVI (Nov. 29, 1873), 615. 
The chairman at the meeting on November 27, 1873, saids 
'''rhe question had been asked, •suppose a large 
amount should flow into the hands of the association, 
a.fter haYing paid off the original subscriptions with 
interest, what would you do with the money?' Well, the 
Council acted generally on this principle--'First catch 
your hare, and then eat it.'" 
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available to it for defending the English investments 
in foreign countries, its successes in the first four 
years of operation, and finally, the move to incorporate 
with its concomitant financial and structural effects. 
From time to time it has been necessary to introduce 
certain members of the 'Council' of the Corporation, 
but a closer inspection of its membership would now 
be useful. 
When the Corporation came into being in August 
of 187), there were 667 members1 with a single share per 
person, the stipulated maximum allotment, but, given the 
option, 119 had withdrawn by November. 2 With bonds of 
£100 each, the appeals of the association were not directed 
toward the general public or the small investor but toward 
an influential minority who would compose the cadres of 
leaders behind whom the ranks of the bondholders could 
form in case of default. To be a permanent member was now 
characterized as an honor,3 with the tender question of 
1Money Market Review, XLVI (March J, 1883), 357. 
The chairman at the 1881 General Court said there were 
658 ~ermanent certificate holders (ibid., XLII [March 5, 
1881J, 316). 
2corp. For. Bondh. Rep., 187J, p. 7. All those 
who had purchased more than one share or certificate of 
permanent membership were given the choice of electing 
another individual for each additional share, or returning 
the surplus shares to the Council for refund. Upon incor-
poration, 119 certificates were returned for refund. 
)Ibid. 
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undivided profits put well into the background1 membership 
was perpetual, transferable, and remained even after the 
bond had been drawn and the principal and 5 per cent in-
terest had been paid. Mr. Gerstenberg was optimistic in 
his goal of 5,000 additional annual and lifetime sub-
scribers for the near future. 1 No doubt this would have 
demonstrated real grassroots support within the investing 
community. The decline of the securities market which had 
already begun, the inquiries into the Exchange, and un-
complimentary publicity all were to dash such hopes. No 
attempt at a.n analysis of the entire membership of the 
Corpor-ation will be undertaken at this time. In the mai~· 
this body was comprised of brokers and private gentlemen, 
with clerics, doctors and retired military men being well 
in evidence. Real power did not reside in the general 
body, but in the 'Council,' and hence a discussion of 
its make-up would be more to the point. 
From 1869 to 1882, a total of forty-seven men sat 
on the governing body of the bondholders• organization. 
Before incorporation the leadership was maintained at about 
a dozen men, while the 1873 by-laws permitted an expansion 
to thirty. As the 1870's progresEed, the 'Council' was 
1 The Times, Nov. 28, 1873, p. 6. 
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slowly reduced again in size to about twenty, which 
seemed, by common agreement, to be a comfortable num-
ber with which to work. The average length of service 
was slightly over six years for the thirteen-year period, 
while the average age of a new member was fifty-four years, 
a time of life which could offer physical vigor with an 
admixture of experience.1 In selecting men for the 'Coun-
cil,' the organization sought out those persons who would 
be most helpful in the accomplishment of the goals of the 
society, Influence, a knowledge of the City, good charac-
ters these were the qualities which were most highly prized. 
In addition, a sympathy with the 'Council's' policy was also 
desirable so that internal friction could be kept at a mini-
mum. Table 2 indicates various careers to which •council' 
members had devoted their lives--where no occupation could 
be discovered, or where long retirement existed, the term 
"gentleman" has been used. Private investment bankers were 
the most numerous, with a total of seventeen, equalling the 
sum of the next two professions, gentlemen (nine) and stock 
brokers (eight). Roundh1,g out the list were five military 
men, three each in law and commerce, two government offi-
cials, and a railway contractor, The table further suggests 
1Table 2 in the Appendix lists the 
and their terms of service in this period. 
also included, for after the chairmanship, 
was next in importance. 
'Council' members 
Mr. Clarke is 
his position 
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the level of influence and responsibility which was at-
tained by many on the 'Council' in finance, as reflected 
by the number of posts which were delegated to their 
authority, the table also encompasses their membership in 
related non-profit organizations. Such connections with 
other societies demonstrated a diversity of interest and 
a potential for extension of influence and group cooperation. 1 
Another aspect of the 'Council' in these years that 
illustrated its potential weight was the high percentage 
of M.P.'s present at its board. As Table 2 shows, four-
teen of the 'Council' sat in Parliament between 1869 and 
1882. Determining the political complexion of the Cor-
poration fathers is difficult, but of those who can be 
identified, the Conservatives held an eleven to seven 
edge over the Liberals, with one Whig and one Unionist-
to-be, and two apoliticals from Canada and the United States. 
Interest groups then, even more than today, appreci-
ated men with governmental experience who could provide 
most valuable service to a society if for no other reason 
than by the prestige which redounded to the group. Unfor-
tunately, the parliamentary oratory of these M.P.'s was rather 
spare and was rarely addressed to issues which interested 
the Corporation. 
1such cooperation was evidenced at the end of the 
century when the Corporation was reorganizedr the London 
Chamber of Commerce as well as the London Bankers' Associ-
ation elected representatives to the 'Council.' 
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From the discussion of the development of the 
corporation of Foreign Bondholders thus far, it is clear 
that both in inception and in organization the group was 
instigated and maintained by a few individuals of energy 
who believed in the utility of what they did. Bearing in 
mind the anti-group feeling in the nineteenth century, 1 
and particularly the antipathy shown towards bondholders, 
it is not strange that a few members should hold a para-
mount position in an age when solidarity hinged upon the 
presence of strong personalities, Every association has 
its dominant spirits, a minority who contribute the driving 
force and who 
usually possess the intensive perspectives of their 
group, whereas the rank and file usually have sig-
nificanilY varied and split involvements in their 
groups, 
Albeit equality existed as far as the number of shares 
we~t, the concept of primo inter pares was at work. At 
the General Court of 1876, Mr. Dickson, a permanent certi-
ficate holder, took umbrage at the Chairman's assertion 
that some in the society had more influence than others, 
1Alfred de Grazia, "Nature and Prospects of Poli-
tical Interest Groups," s American Academ of 
Pol~tical and Social Science, CCCXIX Sept., 195 , 1 • 
2 Ibid.' llJ. 
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whereupon a deputy chairman, Sir John Lubbock, replied 
that those who labored most unceasingly for the organiza-
tion, and who consequently knew the most about international 
loans, did possess greater weight. 1 For no other person 
than their Secretary was this a more fitting description. 
Hyde Clarke (1815-95) was born in London, and was 
employed at an early age in diplomatic missions to Spain 
and Portugal. In 18J6 he turned his considerable talents 
to the planning. surveying, and engineering of the Glasgow 
and Southwestern Railway. and in the same year founded the 
London and County Bank. His interest in telegraphy led him 
in 1849 to accept a mission, from the East India Company, 
to India to report upon the subcontinent's communications 
network, where he not only became a supporter of Anglo-
Indian solidarity but also advanced his studies in lan-
gua,~es. His travels, which were extensive, led him many 
times through the Middle East, an area to which he devoted 
much attention in his writings (which included works on 
languages, political economy, statistics, railways, finance, 
and international law) and in his linguistic studies. 2 
1Money Market Review, XXXII (Feb. 24, 1876), 28J. 
2The Times, March 7, 1895, p. 10. 
Mr. Clarke was familiar with approximately 
and that those of the American Indians and 
were his specialties. 




Fully a decade before the Council was to become 
a reality, Mr. Gerstenberg had confided in Mr. Clarke 
his plans for a bondholders• association and had stated 
his conviction that the assistance of the latter in that 
event would be essential. 1 Clarke's interest in the pro-
tection of investors was not exclusively linked to the 
purchases of bonds, for in 1868 he joined the short-lived 
Shareholders' Protective Association, designed to safe-
guard the rights of owners of joint stock company shares. 
In early 1869, Clarke assumed his post as Secretary of 
the Council of Foreign Bondholders--replacing the tem-
porary office-holder, s. H. Schergis--and held it for over 
fifteen years. His labors on behalf of the bondholders 
were extensive2 and his letters were frequently seen in 
the financial columns of the press. With advancing years 
Clarke became less vocal, though he still strove for the 
protection of the English creditors, and on his leaving 
the office of Secretary in 1884, he still felt strongly 
about the organization's aimsa "An institution of this 
kind could not depend on any individual, but on the ap-
1Money Market Review, XLVIII (Feb. 23, 1884), 290. 
2For example, at the General Court of 1875 Mr. 
Gerstenberg remarked that their secretary had not had a 
holiday in the last year. 
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plication and observance of great principles."1 
Another member who played a large part in for-
mula ting the decisions of the Corporation was Francis 
Bennoch. He joined the 'Council' in 1873, and was im-
mediately admitted to the Executive Committee. This 
gentleman had pursued a literary career, having been 
on close terms with several of the famous poets of the 
previous generation,2 and had successfully combined 
finance with belles lettres. as the catalog of his 
directorships bears witness. By 1874, it was apparent 
that Mr. Gerstenberg's health was fast giving way, and 
at the General Court of 1875 the Chairman announced his 
retirement. The burden, although shared by the Executive 
Committee, was in the main assumed by Mr. Bennoch, who was 
appointed Acting Chairman. This situation was not altered 
tL~til 1876 when a new chairman was selected. Unhappily 
for the Council, it was during these years (1875-76) 
that a solid, dynamic, and unified hegemony was most 
needed. 
From 1873 to 1882, the two positions of Deputy 
Chairman were held by three individuals, all of whom sat 
in the House of Commons. Thomas M. Weguelin (1809-85) had 
1Money Market Review, XLVIII (Feb. 23, 1884), 290. 
2The Times, July 2, 1889, p. 5. 
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allied himself with Mr. Gerstenberg•s group in its 
infancy, taking a place on the Executive Committees 
upon incorporation, he was made an officer of the new 
organization. For years Mr. Weguelin had been a mer-
chant in the Russian trade, and had served as director 
of the Bank of England as well as Governor of that in-
stitution from 1855 to 1856. On retiring from Thread-
needle Street in 1866, he took a position in the bank 
of Robarts and Lubbock, where his generosity to the 
clerks was long re~embered. 1 From 1861 to 1880, he 
represented Wolverhampton in Commons for the Liberal 
interest and was magistrate in Surrey. 2 When the 
'Council's' motives were attacked from within by dis-
sident members, or whan castigated from without by the 
journals, Weguelin was ever vehement in the defense of 
the organization and its aims. 
By 1876 Weguelin's prolonged periods of illness 
made it necessar;y to select a replacement, which was done 
with the appointment of Richard Biddulph Martin (1838-1916) 
of the bank of Messrs. Martin and Company. He joined in 
1875, replacing his father Robert who retired from the 
l 
.l12.!5!•• April 9, 1885, P• 11. 
2Ibid,, April 8, 1885, P• 10. 
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•council,' bringing to the society wide business experi-
ence, a diversity of interest and civic and social con-
nections.1 In 1880 Mr. Martin was elected M.P. for 
Tewkesbury2 and where possible used his influence, es-
pecially after the occupation, to assist Egyptian holders. 
The last of this group to be mentioned is the 
second Deputy Chairman, Sir John Lubbock (1834-1913). 
Here, too, one finds a multi-talented individual whose 
interests ranged from finance to science. As a boy, he 
came into continual contact with Darwin, a friend of his 
father, and was employed at the age of fifteen in the 
family firm, Robarts and Lubbock. Lubbock's experience 
in the introduction of foreign loans via the family firm, 
combined with the difficulties encountered in his several 
capacities as representative of English capitalists abroad, 
led him, after long consultation with Mr. Gerstenberg, to 
utilize his influence for the formation of the Council of 
Foreign Bondholders. Robarts and Lubbock became the Cor-
poration• s bankers, and even tided the society over the 
1Richard Biddulph Martin was a member of the Anthro-
pological Institute (as was Hyde Clarke), was involved in 
the city administration in London, and was a member of 
the Executive Committee of the City and Guilds of London 
Institute. 
2 The Times, Aug. 4, 1916, P• 8, 
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hardships of 1872. Upon incorporation, Lubbock assumed 
his office, and hence forward was to "exercise a prepon-
derant influence in • • • large and important operations 
••• undertaken by the Council of Foreign Bondholders."1 
He devoted much of his attention to the creditors• wel-
fare and was angry when the disgruntled membership made 
sallies upon his reputation. He would not have joined 
the Council, said the Deputy Chairman at the 1876 General 
court, if it was a profit making group. 2 Lubbock main-
tained this opposition to a division of the profits des-
pite the fact that he a.~d his relatives would benefit 
directly since they held between one-fifth and one-sixth 
of the original shares.J But personal attacks upon Lub-
bock were rare, for he was well-liked and, as an opposi-
tion M.P. affirmed, "the honourable baronet was one of 
the most popular members of the House of Commons,"4 where 
he sat for Maidstone from 1870 to 1874, and then for the 
1sir John Lubbock, later the first baron Avebury, 
became famous for his articles and books dealing with in-
sects and plants. His correspondence throughout life was 
often with the most eminent men of science (Horatio Gor-
don Hutchinson, Life of Sir John Lubbock~ Lord Avebury 
[Londona Macmillan and Co., 1914], I, 11 • 
2Money Market Review, XXXII (March 4, 1876), 282. 
3rbid., LII (March 6, 1886), 401. 
4spectator, XLVIII (May 9, 1875), 587. 
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university of London, where he was also Chancellor. 
politically he has been described as a "right-wing 
Liberal intellectual,"1 while Lord Acton gave the 
following impressions 
He has astonishing attainments and a power of 
various work that I always envy. And he is 
gentle to the verge of weakness,2 
Such, then, were the men who, along with the 
Chairman and the others on the Executive Committee, 
made the major decisions for the Corporation. 
A faction of the membership which almost always 
was in unison with the 'Council's' policy was the philan-
thropists, Such individuals were often accused, in this 
period, of deriving their greatest satisfaction from seeing 
their names on lists of numerous worthy associations, rather 
than from actual participation,J But there is no need to 
impugn their motives, for indeed charitable activities were 
pursued by most of the Executive Committee members. Mr. 
Clarke, for example, was thetreasurer of a fund for needy 
journalists, John Lubbock was famous for his efforts to 
1Donald Southgate, The Passin! of the Whigsa 1832-
1886 (Londonr Niacmillan and Co,, 1962 , p. J81. 
2Lord Acton to Mary Gladstone, Feb. 10, 1881, 
Herbert Paul, ed., Letters of Lord Acton to Mary Glad-
stone (New Yorks Macmillan co., 1964), p. 169. 
JJerrold, P• 1086. 
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improve the lot of the clerks and, by securing a Bank 
Holidays Act (providing one holiday per quarter), heard 
the resultant days proclaimed st. Lubbock's Day in the 
City for many years. Any testimonials of cash value 
which Lubbock received he donated to educational in-
stitutions. E. Philip Cazenove (1799-1880), who founded 
his own brokerage firm and was a friend of the Rothschilds, 
was another •council' member who devoted his later life 
to philanthropy.1 Sir Samuel Montagu•s labors were global 
in dimension. 2 To round out the list was Arthur Kinnaird, 
tenth baron Kinnaird (1814-87), who was described by the 
Corporation as "one of the oldest and most valued members 
of the Council."J He sat in Parliament until 1878, on 
the Liberal benches for Perth, and then entered the Lords 
where in philanthropy he was considered by many to be the 
successor to Lord Shaftesbury,4 
1The Times, Jan. 22, 1880, P• 8, 
2
.m:m_, Supp, 2 , Vol. II , 640, Sir Samuel Montagu, 
first baron Swaythling (18J2-l9llh made his fortune by 
establishing a foreign exchange bank in London in 1862. 
He vied with the Rothschilds in eleemosynary feats in the 
Jewish community L'l'l London, and Jews in many lands benefited 
from his generosity also. 
Jco;rp. For. Bondh, ReE•• 1887, P• 12. 
4The Times, April 27, 1887, P• 9. 
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Many of the Corporation members also viewed this 
organization as a non-profit institution for the public 
good. A resolution was approved at the 1880 General 
court allowing those who wished to forego their accumulated 
interest to come forward and receive their original £1001 
twenty-nine chose this course. 1 
At the first Corporation meeting on November 27, 
1873, Mr. Gerstenberg complime~ted the society upon its 
leadership and said that "if they searched through the 
whole City of London they could no+. easily find men of 
greater weight and influence."2 It is impossible to 
gauge the social influence a particular group commands, 
but if titular distinctions were mean.ingful, then cer-
tainly the •council' was well endowed. Political in-
fluence can be almost as eth3real as social connection, 
and the two are ofter. intertwined. Setting aside their 
importance as capital~sts in the City, one might assert 
that whatever politic~ influence the •council' possessed, 
and it never appeared to be considerable, was likely to 
be felt more by the Conservatives than by the Liberalsa 
this, even assuming that Gladstone had no antipathy toward 
1Money Market Review, XLII {March 5, 1881), 316. 
Sixteen others only took 5 per cent of their interest, 
while eleven were satisfied with 10 per cent. 
21B.!9.•t XXVII (Nov. 29, 1873), 616. 
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Lombard Street. Mr. Bouverie, a future chairman of the 
Corporation, though a Whig, was closer to the Conserva-
tives in sentiment, as the summer of 1882 was to prove, 
while Sir John Lubbock, another who might be counted a 
Liberal, was to become a Unionist in 1886. 
Turning from the converts, one can draw from the 
ranks of the "legitimate" Conservatives such men as Sir 
Robert N. Fowler (1828-91), who not only served as Alderman 
and Lord Mayor of London, and sat in Commons, but also 
reorganized the Conservative Party in the Metropolis.1 
Joining the Corporation in 1880 was another important 
Conservative, Robert Bourke, who had served as Under 
secretary of Foreign Affairs for Derby and Salisbury.2 
His talents were used by the Council in 1881 when he 
was sent to Constantinople for the Turkish holders in 
the belief that a success akin to that which had occurred 
in Egypt might be the result. A more direct connection 
with Government was exhibited by the M.P. for Whitehaven, 
l DNB, Supp. 1 , VolJCXII, 660-61. 
-
2 Ibid., Supp. 1, Vol.XXJI, 199. Robert Bourke (1827-l902}W'a.s born in Ireland and held his peerage in 
that country. He occupied a seat in Commons for Kingslynn, 
which he represented for eighteen years. Bourke was a 
staunch opponent of Gladstone•s policy from 1880 to 1885, 
and on the victory of the Conservatives in 1886 he was 
made Governor of Madras. 
George Cavendish Bentinck. 1 In 1874 he became Parlia-
mentary Secretary for the Board of Trade, and in the 
following year was made Judge Advocates he was one of 
those under the protective wing of the Prime Minister 
and could count on preferment. 2 
Two other men very close to Lord Beaconsfield also 
had contact with the Council, one indirectly through finan-
cial dealings, the second more obviously. The former was 
Montagu Corry,J private secretary to Benjamin Disraeli, 
who, because of the great man's distaste for detail, had 
very great power indeed. 4 Mr. Corry, the main "social 
link" connecting the Prime Minister with the world, brought 
1George A. F. c. Bentinck (1821-91) was a lawyer 
and art buff, and held a seat in the House for the Con-
servative interest from 1865 to 1891. He rarely spoke 
in Parliament, and ought not be confused with George "Big 
Ben" Bentinck, a colorful personage of the period (The Times, 





him 0 all the gossi1J from :;11e clubs and all the chatter 
from the d::t-awing-rooms • 111 In 1874 fYlr, Corry became a 
trustee of the Foreign and Colonial Government Trust and 
joined a number of Corporation members in their task of 
safeguarding several million po1mds of investments. At 
the least, the head of state from 1874 to 1880 could have 
heard first-hand of the impact of political decisions upon 
the investor, as well as the views of a society which claimed 
to represent him. 
The second individual was Sir Philip Rose (1816-SJ), 
a neighbor of the Disraeli family in early days, and a per-
sonal friend, solicitor and executor to the British Prime 
Minister. 2 Beginning in 1852, he became an electoral agent 
for the Conservatives, organizing support outside Parliament. 
He retired from this activity in 1859, under a cloud of scan-
dal centering on corruption of election petitions.J Gener-
ally a prudent and good advisor, Mr, Rose was rewarded in 
1874 with a baronetcy as part of the spoils of victory. 
In recommending this distinction to the Queen, the Prime 
Minister saida 
1T(homas] H(ay] S(weet] Escott, "Lord Carnarvon•s 
Resignation," Gentleman's Magazine, CCXII (March, 1878), 
357-58. 
2The Times, April 18, 188J, P• 12. 
JHarold J Hanham Elections and Party 
Politics in the T!me of nlsrae!! and Gladstone 
Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1959}, P• 277. 
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Mr. Philip Rose is the son of a h1rgher family of 
Bucks, which has e:dsted in reputo for more than 
two centuries. Mr. Rose is now the possessor of a 
fine estate in that county, of which he is a magis-
trate. He is a man of education, but entirely the 
creator of his own fortune. His life has been of 
singular prosperity, mainly owing to his combined 
energy and integri"tY, and to a brilliant quick-
ness of perception.l 
Mr. Rose was an early supporter of Mr. Gerstenberg1 in 
1873 he was one of the three men ~··1ho set their hands to 
the Board of Trade document which brought the Corporation 
into being. He was a director of the Foreign and Colonial 
Government Trust, and took an active part in bondholder 
affairs. When it was necessary, his influence and talents 
were available. 2 
Taking all into account, however, the sum of 
the combined influence of all the individuals mentioned, 
were they to act in unison, would have dwarfed the power 
which the Council itself could exert for any cause. In-
fluence in the nineteenth century was most often a matter 
1Disraeli to Queen Victoria, April 17, 1874, 
Buckle and Monypenny, V, 297. 
2Money Market Review, XXX (Dec. 11, 1875), 639. 
At the meeting of the Turkish creditors on December 6, 
1875, the chairman remarked that "Sir Philip Rose was 
instructed to prepare a draft letter to Lord Derby • • • 
and the consequence was that instructions were sent by 
Lord Derby to Constantinople to give every co-operation." 
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between individuals, too valuable and sensitive a link 
to abuse by constant stress, resort to it was reserved 
for cases of default in which there were either over-
riding personal or public ends to be served. Aside from 
this, even if the Corporation had represented a unanimity 
of purpose, which they did not, other factors such as 
public attitudes, national and international politics, 
and the like, would have given members pause before using 
private connections to gain Government support. In its 
first report, the Corporation stated thats 
The Council have continued to receive from the 
Foreign Off ice favourable attention on the few 
occasions when they have requested assistance or 
information. These applications are made as sel• 
dom as circumstances compel, because it ls not 
desirable to either cause trouble for Her Majesty's 
Government, or to seek its intervention for trivial 
purposes,l 
These guidelines were adhered to, and whatever benefits 
the Council gained from Government were sought via the 
front door, 
This then was the 'Council' in broad reliefs its 
organization, officers, and membership. To them were en-
trusted the cudgels for defense of the English creditors, 
The reports for the first three years after in-
corporation indicated that there was much to occupy the 
1corp. For, Bondh, Rep •• 1873, p. 49. 
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new organization, since defaults rose from thirty-four 
in 1873 to thirty-eight in 1875.1 The first year boded 
especially well for the Council. There were promising 
signs that a sister organization might be erected in 
New York, 2 while on the Continent close cooperation 
with Belgian and Dutch holders had barred Greek loans, 
both public and private, from being raised. Successes 
were also won in Americaa an Arkansas railway loan was 
blocked when the Council showed there were no provisions 
for repayments Minnesota was sued in the u.s. Supreme 
Court and the English creditors were victorious, and 
ardor for investment in the Mississippi Valley states 
was cooled by a letter from Clarke to the Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce, in 1874, describing the credit pos-
ture of this area. The Council was requested by a large 
number of banks, including the Bank of England and Roth-
schilds, J to aid in pressuring Italy to live up to her 
1Powell, p. 501. In 1873 Professor Leon Levy 
estimated that £JJ2,J99,800 worth of loans were in full 
or partial default, 
2Mo~ IY.larket Review. XXVIII (Feb. 28, 1874), 273. 
At the Gene Court on February 25, 1874, the chairman 
announced that progress in this direction was being made 
and that Duncan, Sherman and Company was taking the lead. 
3The London Rothschilds had remained sympathetic 
to the objectives of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders. 
Their decision not to join the Council in 1868 (suggests 
Jenks, P• 289) was due to the firm's deep involvement in 
both the Austrian and Italian defaults. 
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engagements. The Corporation library also fared very 
well, with its complete listing of drawn bonds proving 
most beneficial. 
But the same period saw a rising wave of public 
hostility toward foreign government loans, the Stock 
Exchange, and loan contractors. At bottom this disen-
chantment was due to the promoters, with their bulging 
sack of tricks, who played hob with the gullible English 
speculators. Since there was a financial advantage in 
having a loan brought out in London, 1 large sums were 
expended to have the name of some important Britishhouse 
as agent on the prospectus, a practice which in fact vic-
timized the investor. The bondholders quickly learned that 
in case of trouble, the agent was only the middleman and 
knew nothing of the country involved nor anything else 
about the loan. In this way. promoters (quite often 
syndicates) brought forth loans, ! la Augustus Melmotte, 2 
which they knew were worthless. City editors might be won 
1c1arke, p. ?. The author cites a German syndicate 
which profited by releasing its Hungarian loan at an issuing 
price 2 per cent higher on the prestigious London market than 
it would have fetched on the Continent. 
2This character was created by Anthony Trollope in 
his novel The W~ We Live Now, of 1875. Melmotte is a 
caricature of tE'i Continental promoter who rose from ob-
scurity to wealth and social standing by defrauding the 
public. 
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to the cause, 1 banking friends and associates might buy 
and sell some of the old securities of the nation in ques-
tion to create the impression of vitality, forged telegrams 
might even be posted at the Exchange to encourage sales, 2 
and most importantly, as much of the stock as possible had 
to be placed, both to avoid future lawsuits and to obtain 
a quotation on the official list. If needed, brokerage 
houses could be found, at a handsome price, to suggest the 
stock to their clients, or to hold the securities for a 
specific term in order to demonstrate to the Exchange that 
a market for the security existed. It was usually expedient 
to pay one or two coupons to the holders while the stock was 
being unloaded, but this was like feeding a famished dog a 
joint of its own tail. In this fashion £9.2 million (face 
value) of South American stock was lost to Englishmen by 
18753 after the panic of the first quarter of the previous 
year.4 
1westminster Review, XLIX (Jan. 1876), 8. Occa-
sionally editors lost their jobs for "puffing" certain 
stocks too vigorously. An instance of this was alleged to 
have forced the resignation of a City editor of The Times. 
Jenks (p. 399) points out that in the 1870's The Times was 
often called the .. Jew's harp" because of its favoritism to-
ward Rothschild stocks. 
2Money Market Review, XXVIII (Jan. J, 1874), 4. 
By 1874 the number of these fraudulent messages was in-
creasing as the foreign securities market drifted lower. 
3cairncross, Home and Foreign Investment, p. 228. 
4
"A Sketch of the History of Foreign Loans," Bankers 
Magazine, XXXVI (July, 1876), 521. 
The Times observed that the promoters had, in 
the English investor, an Aladdin's lamp, 1 while the 
Economist blamed the publica 
This set of peculiarly crafty sellers finds ready 
to its hand a race of peculiarly foolish buyers such 
as is not to be found in other markets.2 
Punch, in a cartoon entitled "Pickpocketing in the 'City,'" 
depicts the business of Foreign Loans and Accomodation Paper 
as they rob Mr. Englishman.3 There was even a sinister tone 
from Macmillan's Magazinea 
You may abuse Her Majesty's Government, but the 
"City" is sacreds the "City" can pay for silence, 
if need be, as well as coerce refractory critics 
by methods of its own. and by legal terr~rs that 
are all the greater for being undefined. 
To some the Council might have seemed part of a conspiracy; 
to others the Corporation seemed useless since it had neither 
stopped nor immediately retrieved the situation. People 
were calling for an investigations with the number of 
brokers as members, the Corporation's position was a 
delicate one. 
1The Times. Aug. 2, 1875, P• 9. 
2Economist, XXXIII (March 27, 1875), 362, 
3Punch, LXIX (July, 1875), 60. 
4
°Foreign Loans Committee," Macmillan's Magazine, 
XXXII (May, 1875), 94, 
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Less than a week after incorporation in 187J, 
Mr. Sheridan told a meeting of bondholders that there 
was not sufficient protection for the English investors 
in foreign securities, and that he proposed to bring the 
matter up in Parliament next session. 1 Such a proposal 
raised many eyebrows, for it meant a possible interposi-
tion by Government in the sacrosanct precincts of free 
trade. But even the Economist, the old crusader for 
liberal economics, believed that where deliberate fraud 
was being used to mulct the public of their money, Govern-
ment was obliged to act. 2 The long-awaited investigation 
finally came in early 1875, when on February 23 Mr. Henry 
James moved 
to enquire into the circumstances attending the 
making of Contracts for Loans with certain Foreign 
States and also the causes which have led to the 
non-payment of these Loans.J 
The resultant Parliamentary Committee, chaired by Robert 
Lowe, generally muddied the waters by summoning witnesses 
to public hearings which led to dirty linen becoming more 
1Money Market Review, XXVII (Aug. 9, 1873), 193. 
2Economist, xxxrrr (Feb. 27, 1875), 237. 
3charles UUguid, The Story of the Stock Exchan,e, 
Its History and Position (Londons Grant Richards, !961 , P• 
237. For the investigation, see Bankers Ma~azine, XXXIII (Oct., 1875), PP• 796 and 834, and (Nov., 1 7S), pp. 878 
and 905. 
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soiled. The death knell for the loan mania was sounded. 
Brokerage firms, notably those of Mullins and Marshall, 
and of E. Cazenove, who had connections with the Corpora-
tion, were involved in the questioning. Mr. Clarke was 
also called to give testimony, with a sheaf of prospec-
tuses, he illustrated the mischief that could be done by 
false advertising. Regarding the Committee of the Stock 
Exchange, he was of two minds, for as he later wrotea 
While the Stock Exchange has justly earned the con• 
fidence of Continental investors by its severity on 
foreign governments guilty of breach of engagements, 
it has afforded facility and eren countenance to 
the operations of adventurers, 
Such opinions were not taken kindly by the denizens of 
Capel Court who found their livelihood the center of so 
much unwanted attention. On stepping down as Secretary 
in 1884, Mr. Clarke spoke of the great unpopularity which 
was his over the years as a result of his defense of the 
bondholders. He also strongly denied that he or any 
'Council' member had ever speculated upon the knowledge 
they had gained from their positions of trust. 2 
In the end, the investigation accomplished little 
and, as a magazine of the day observed, "throughout the 
report there runs, like a thread, the feeling that the 
1Quoted in Clarke, P• 8. 
2Money N.iarket Review, XLVIII (Feb. 23, 1884), 290. 
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powers of Parliament are unable to grapple with these 
protean forms of fraud. 111 
Thus by the autumn of 1875, the Council, though 
well established, was undergoing both internal and exter-
nal stresses, moving toward a period which would tax its 
resources. For the next half-dozen years or more, no area 
was to provide more fuel for discussion or printed matter 
than that encompassed by the Ottoman Empire. A part of 
this supposedly moribund state, Egypt, was a frequent bor-
rower on the London money market, and a land whose fiscal 
irresponsibility was to bring it ver-y shortly into contact 
with the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders. 
1westminster Review, XLIX (Jan., 1876), 9. 
CHAPTER II 
EGYPT, 1863 TO 18761 BACKGROUND TO BANKRUPTCY 
Between Golden Hook and Golden Horn 
To epitomize the problems of the Egyptian 
Viceroy, Ismail Pasha, only two phrases are necessarya 
the "golden hook" of foreign finance with its attractive 
bait of ready money, and the "Golden Horn," a synonym for 
Constantinople, the seat of his suzerain. The former was 
an allurement which led to a series of ruinous loans, while 
the political grip of the latter led to a desire for inde-
pendence, which could most easily be attained through 
baksheesh {gratuity). Thus, with two such lesions on the 
economic body of the state, little wonder that bankruptcy 
was the result. Before embarking upon this topic, it would 
be well to note the condition of Egypt, and the extent of 
English involvement there, at the time of the accession 
of its prodigal prince in 1863. 
As the tide of battle slowly ebbed from the shores 
of Egypt at the opening of the nineteenth century, a new 
figure appeared, Mehemet Ali, who ruled from 1807 to 1849. 
He strove to bring prosperity to his land and set the 
Pashalik on an independent course. Although failure at-
98 
99 
tended his attempt to raise Egypt directly from a 
subsistence to a complex economy, nevertheless through 
the introduction of agricultural improvements, the inter-
mediary export-oriented stage of development was reached. 1 
In Egypt's case the exported commodity was cotton. 
Diplomatically, Mehemet Ali was supported by 
France, who viewed Egypt as an area for her penetration. 
Since the Napoleonic Wars French had replaced Italian as 
the language of the educated and the foreigners it was to 
Paris that the Egyptian ruler looked in 1840 when Europe 
stripped him of Syria, his prize of battle. 2 Following 
her traditional policy, England supported Turkey, leaving 
France isolated. The resulting arrangement of 1841 left 
Egypt to the dynasty of Mehemet Ali in exchange for a 
yearly tribute of £400,000. 
Egypt was important to England as a place to get 
around and through rather than as an area for future ex-
pansion. It has been observed that India was the barracks 
1charles Issawi, "Egypt Since 18001 A Study in 
Lop-sided Developments," Journal of Economic History, XXI (March, 1961), 4. The drain of capital abroad as well as 
the rising population meant that Egypt did not attain a 
"complex" economy until the 19JO's. 
2For further reading on the period, consult 
Charles w. Hallberg, The Suez Canal, Its Historic and 
Diplomatic Importance (New York• Columbia University 





. I ,, 
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for the Empire1 in addition it was a dependency into 
which much English capital had been poured by 1880--
£270 million. 1 At an early date, Englishmen in the 
subcontinent urged upon the Home Government the ex-
pediency of occupying Egypt, since it lay athwart< the 
lifeline of the Empire. 2 Such suggestions were dis-
missed, as the Sultan was an old ally. 
It was in the late 18JO's, with the advent of 
a regular mail service to India, that the small English 
colony in Egypt made its appearance. In the following 
decade the British Government began pushing for the con-
struction of a railway to connect the Mediterranean with 
the Red Sea, which met with solid French opposition.J 
British influence reached its apogee in 18511 despite 
French objections. Robert Stephenson and Abbas, grandson 
of Mehemet Ali, signed the contract for the line which was 
to extend from Alexandria to Suez via Cairo. By 186J, 
Egypt possessed 376 miles of track. Following this vic-
tory, the English obtained the concession for a telegraph 
1Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and 
the Victorians (Garden City, N.Y.1 Doubleday and Co., Inc., 
1961), P• 6. 
2Hallberg, p. 75, 






network in 1856, and in six years the Nile Valley was 
linked to Europe.1 Britain took a deep interest in 
telegraphy 1 and in 1859 invested directly in a Red Sea 
cable and another from Alexandria to Malta, and in 1863-
64, in a line in the Persian Gulf. 2 But another project 
which envisioned rapid trans-isthmian communication was to 
cause a setback in English preponderance, and a sharpening 
of rivalry between the two Western Powers. 
Tradition had it that on a still night in a certain 
part of the desert, one could hear the lapping of both the 
Mediterranean and the Red Sea. The mingling of these 
waters was the dream of a young French engineer, Ferdinand 
de Lesseps, and his success in the teeth of John Bull's op-
position has been story enough for many books. The scheme 
was set afoot in 1854, but the bulk of the bills and the 
glory were left as a legacy for Said's heir. 
On January 18, 1863, Ismail Pasha became Viceroy 
of Egypt at the age of thirty-three. He had been educated 
in Paris and spoke French fluently. Cunning, intelligence, 
1zvi Yehuda Hershlag, Introduction to the Modern 
Economic History of the Middle East {Leidenr E. J. Brice, 
1964), p. 98. 
2
"Imperial Telegraphs," Quarterly Review, CXCVII 
(April, 1903), 378. 
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and an ability to master detail were his, especially 
where personal gain was involved. He also possessed 
congeniality, a high level of personal courage, and a 
hospitable nature, Before his assumption to power, 
which was made possible by a series of unexpected deaths, 
he had lived as a wealthy landowner engaged in bringing 
new machinery and methods to his estates.1 Such ac-
tivities were to give Ismail the reputation of being 
a progressive man. Outwardly he appeared successful, 
for he was counted as one of the world's richest in-
habitants, which was useful when public trust was 
needed in raising loans, 2 
The Province of Egypt was passed down according 
to Muslem law--to the eldest of the family--but by the 
time of the reign of Ismail this provision had been waived. 
The Viceroy was little better than a !!!:.!:.!. (governor), for 
Egypt was solidly implanted in the Ottoman Empire, The 
Firman of 1841 stated that the taxes were to be collected 
in the~ name of the Sultan, that the Egyptian navy was to 
A Secret History of the English 
a Personal Narrative of Events 
New Yorkt Alfre A. Knopf, 
lOJ 
fly the Turkish colors, that treaties and laws of the 
Porte were binding, and that the Divan acted as diplomatic 
representative for all political subdivisions. All major 
decisions were liable to veto and the annual tribute was 
requisite. If Egyptian independence could be achieved 
by bribery, diplomatic pressure from friendly European 
states, or even warfare, Ismail was not the sort to draw 
back. It was to France that the Viceroy turned, and with 
gold won the adherence of Morny and others in the entourage 
of Napoleon III.1 The Fourth Estate was not ignored, and 
one Parisian journal was paid £6,ooo a year for favorable 
treatment. 2 From Russia, too, help was expected, in fact, 
a draft treaty of alliance was initialed by the Viceroy 
and Count Paul Ignatiev, the Panslav Russian Ambassador 
to Constantinople (1864-76), in 1869, though time proved 
the effort abortive.J Yet if one commanded wealth, all 
else was unnecessary, for baksheesh could oil the hinges 
of any door, even the Porte. 
1sir Henry G. Elliot, Some Revolutions and Other 
Diplomatic Experiences (London t John Murray, 1922), P• 189. 
For a further opinion on this matter, see Landes, Bankers 
and Pashas, pp. 196-97. 
2 Hamza, p, 106, 
JFrederick J. Cox, "Khedive Ismail and Panslavism," 
Slavonic and East Euroiean Review, XXXII (1953-54), 156. The 
fUI! details of thesenteresting negotiations are related 
in this article. 
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The first alteration in the Viceroy's position 
came in 1866, when a Firman granted that the eldest son 
of Ismail might succeed to his father's dignity, this event 
was celebrated by a rise to £681,818 in Egypt•s tribute. 
In the following year the Viceroy received the title of 
Khedive1 for himself and his successors, an honor whose 
cost may never be known. Wider administrative powers were 
likewise granted commensurate with the new rank. Never-
theless, as the decade closed, it became evident that there 
was friction between Constantinople and Cairo due to Is-
mail' s military and naval build-up, planned legal reforms, 
the adoption of monarchic pretensions, and financial 
dealings. In September of 1869, the Sultan advised the 
Khedive to reverse these policies at onces tensions rose, 
and the Powers. particularly Britain, stepped in to smooth 
matters over. The Firmans of November 1872 and June 187J 
restored those powers to Ismail Pasha which had been sus-
pended since 1869, and he was given even broader control 
over law, the army, and the right to negotiate trade 
agreements with any nation. 2 With these documents many 
1The word "Khedive" comes from the Persian "Khidiv" 
or sovereign. 
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of rsmail's desires were satisfied. However, diplomatic 
representation was still vested in the Sultans in addi-
tion, the tribute was still collected in his name and 
forwarded to Constantinople, and the Turkish flag re-
mained the Egyptian naval ensign. 
These political triumphs, unfortunately, were 
adumbrated by the financial course the Khedive pursued. 
The causes of Egypt's economic collapse were not far to 
seek, and they form an instructive backdrop for the ac-
tivities of a later date. 
The annual tribute to the Porte, as well as the 
baksheesh expended for political gain and for the main-
tenance of a coterie of friends and spies at Constantinople, 
were heavy drains on the Egyptian Malieh (Treasury). The 
Sultan also set a very poor example financ~Ily, for he 
had discovered the next best thing to the Midas Touch--
the eager Europeans who offered gold now for payment in 
the future. What was worse for F.gypt, the Porte had 
secured debts upon the Egyptian tribute which drew the 
Nile Valley into the sphere of international finance. In 
all, three loans were pledged to the Egyptian tributes the 
first, in 1854, utilized £282,000, while in the following 
year France and England guaranteed a loan to Turkey which 
consumed the remainder of the tribute as pledge for 
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repayraent. 1 The guarantee. an unusual step for the British 
Government, only passed Parliament by 1J5 to 132, with both 
Gladstone and Disraeli dissenting.2 On.e other loan, that o:f 
1871, was also secured by the Tribute, which had since been 
increased.J When Egypt began to stagger under her debt, 
these bondholders were as anxious as any of the Khedive•s 
other creditors that default might not occur, and were 
quick to take protective steps. 
A more crippling blow to Egyptian finance was dealt 
by the influx of Europeans which attended the opening up G:f 
the cou..itry in the 1850's. The population of Egypt stood 
at approximately 4.5 million in 1846, and rose to 5.2 mil-
lion in 1873, and to 6.8 million in 1882.4 The small 
1Egyptian Tribute Bondholders' League, The ~~tian 
Tribute: A Short Historx of the Tribute Loans, 1854~ 55, 
i8z1, as Affecting the English and French Governments, the 
Khedive and the Bondholders. Compiled from Official Docu-
ments, Proceedings of Parliament, Etc. (London, Feb., 1876), 
p, 4. The Crimean War Loans were those of 185~ and 18551 
the latter was signed on June 7, 1855, for £5 million. 
The Rothschilds handled the details, and most of the issue 
was taken up in England. 
2William H, Wynne, Selected case Histories of 
Governmental Foreign Bond DefaUlts and Debt Readjustments, 
Vol. II of State Insolvenc an~ Fore! 1 Bondholders, by 
Edwin M. Borcha and W l am H. in;y-nne New Havens Yale 
University Press, 1951), p, 396, n. 12. 
3Egyptian Tribute Bondholders' League, pp. 11·12. 
The 1871 loan was for £5.7 million and was to pay 6 per 
cent interest. 
4Arthur E. Crouchley, The Economic Development of 
~odern Egypt (Londona Longma.ns, Green and Co., 1938), 
p, 125. Hershlag (p. 107) cites lower figures--4,8JJ,OOO 
for 1862, and 5,518,000 for 1879. 
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European colony in 1845 was estimated at 6,ooo, 1 but this 
figure increased to 79,696 in 1871, and to 90,886 by the 
time of the British oceupation. 2 Since the natives looked 
to the civil service for advancement, and only occasionally 
invested in business, the foreigners had a monopoly in 
trade and finance. Consequently, Europeans were concen-
traded in the large towns,3 the great majority of them in 
Alexandria (through which 94 per cent of the area's exports 
passed by 1874),4 and here, as in Cairo, they formed a vocal 
and substantial minority which could make its wishes known 
to the local government. The largest single group were 
the Greeks, with the Italians as a distant second. The 
French bloc was considerable and their chief rival, 
the English, though economically strong, were numerically 
weak.5 The picture is confused, since both the 
1The Hour, Nov. 9, 1873, Archives of the Corporation 
of Foreign Bondholders (hereafter ACFB), .Egypt, I, 322. 
2crouchley, p. 125. Most other estimates of the 
European population range somewhat higher. 
JJames c. McCoan, .Egypt as It Is (New Yorka Henry 
Holt and Co., 1877), P• 35. His estimates give Alexandria 
a foreign population of 50,000, Cairo, 25,000, and the 
rest of the country, 15,000. 
4Bankers Magazine, XXXIV (July, 1874), 550. 
5Tbe Times, Feb. 10, 1876, P• 7. Their Alexandria 
correspondent est!ma.ted that, of the 47.000 Europeans in 
the city. 4.500 were British subjects. McCoan {pp. 35-36) 
gives the following estimates for 1877• 40,000 Greekss 
16,ooo Italians1 15,000 French1 7,000 British, 7,000 Austro-
Htmga.rianss 1,500 Germans, and 4,ooo others. 
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Greeks and Maltese placed themselves under British 
protection. To the Englishmen who felt that influence 
in Egypt was to be fostered, it appeared by 1870 that the 
foreign community of Alexandria was being Gallicized and 
that all eyes were caught by the dynamic, turbulent policy 
of the Quai d'Orsay. 1 
On both Ismail Pasha and his land the foreigners 
were to leave an imprint impossible to efface. Those who 
swarmed to Egypt were often loaf ere and r1ff-raff2 hoping 
to make their fortunes from the Canal, thG Khedive•s Govern-
ment. or anything else. Moneylenders, second-rate finan-
cial men, and swindlers vied for what was available. James 
c. McCoan, who for years was the editor of the Levant Herald, 
and lived in the Middle East, said it was "no libel to say 
that a minority (of the foreigners] at least are the very 
dregs of the Levant."J From this social strata came many 
of those who would conduct the Viceroy into impecuniosity 
and monopolize the gains despite the outcries of the smaller 
entrepreneurs.4 Of immediate consequence was the extra-
1 ~ •• Jan. 17, 1870, p. 6, 
2 Sir Edmund Grimani Hornby, Sir Edmund HornbI, an 
Autobiograph.y (Londona Constable and Co., 1929), p.77. 
JMcCoan, P• 35. 
4An excellent treatment of the financial types that 
poured into Egypt in the 186o•s is to be found in Landes, 
Bankers and Pashas, Chapter J, "Klondike on the Nile." 
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territoriality which Europeans enjoyed. The Government 
lost much revenue through smuggling, for as soon as 
contraband reached premises owned by a European, the 
authorities were powerless. This illicit traffic was 
the most profitable trade in the land.1 The Western 
community was even free from taxation upon legitimate 
trade. Finally, the use of fraud by the foreigners was 
estimated to have cost Ismail Pasha £1.4 million through 
suits in the consular courts. 2 On one occasion the Vice-
roy was reported to have told a servant, "Please shut that 
window, for if this gentleman catches cold it will cost 
me £10,000."J 
But most of the debt of F.gypt was acquired with 
the participation of the Khedive. vast sums were expended 
for public works, and improvements were considerable, 112 
new canals were dug, 430 bridges were built, 150 light-
houses were erected, a.1d 5,200 miles of telegraph lines 
were strung. Also, £1),)61,000 was expended on 910 miles 
1Edward Dtcey,_ The Stor; of the Khedivate (New 
Yorka c. Scribner s Soas, l902 • P• 121, . 
2 Hamza, P• 104. 
;Pierre Crabitls, Ismail the Ma.li~ed Khedive (Londona George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 9jj), P• ~16, 
ii 
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of railway. 1 The cost for these projects probably ex-
ceeded £E51 million, though somewhat lower figures can 
be cited. 2 In spite of having his own engineer and the 
use of corvee labor, the Khedive still found himself 
overcharged by the European contractors.J The greatest 
public work of all was the Suez CanalJ here, also, exact 
figures on cost have been debated, and have varied from 
£6.7 million to over £16 million. 4 The cost to Ismail 
1crouchley, P• 117. Contractors fared so well that 
men such as Frederick Krupp visited Egypt to see what pro-
fits might be made (William R. Manchester, The Arms of 
Krupp• 1587-1268 [New Yorks Bantam Books, 1970], p. 95). 
2crouchley, P• 117. A writer of the time stated 
that the public works cost £4.6,264,ooo (M. G. Mulhall, 
"Egyptian Finance," Contemporary Review, XLII (Oct., 1882], 
532). This opinion Is also baekea up by William L. Langer 
{Euro ean Alliances and Ali ents 1871-18 O [2d ed.a 
New Yorks red A. Knop , 9 0 , p, 5 • The :Egyptian 
pound (£E) was equal to £1 Os. d, sterling during this 
period. 
Jsir John Fowler (1817-98) was rsmail's resident 
engineer from 1871 to 1879. In 1873 he began the construc-
tion of the Sudan railway, which was halted three years later 
due to a lack of funds {Richard Hill, A Biographical Diction-
ary of the Anglo-~!tian Sudan [Oxfordt At the Clarendon 
Press, 1951], p. ~ • He arranged purchases of equipment 
in the United Kingdom, and when necessary wrote letters to 
the press emphasizing his employer's sagacity and good 
faith as a borrower. 
An example of the padding of contracts can be seen 
in the agreement with Greenfield and Company. On March lJ, 
1870, the Viceroy ordered the commencement of construction 
on the harbor of Alexandria. The firm, represented by Sir 
George Elliot, M.P., estimated the job at £2,540,000, or, 
as has been suggested. at a sum which was excessive by 
eighty per cent (Mulhall, p. 5JO). 






Pasha and his state was considerable, £6,770,000, in 
lost revenue from the land left idle through corvee, 1 
as well as the diversion of most of the carrying trade, 
which now passed through Egypt without pause. Although 
admirable in themselves, the public works of the Khedive 
were, in execution, less of an advantage to the fellah 
than to the foreigner. 
Another area of expense which can never be cal-
culated was the debt incurred in the military arena. As 
a vassal the Viceroy was obliged at his own expense to 
answer the Sultan's call to combat. For a time the Khe-
dive contemplated a violent rupture with Turkey, and con-
sequently lavished much upon his navy and army. He hired 
four Confederate generals for his army, and in February 
of 1874 purchased a consignment of 500 Krupp guns. 2 Since 
the cost of keeping a standing army of J0,000 was heavy, 
and since the Khedive had visions of a greatly enlarged 
realm, expansion into the Sudan began, and by 1873 a 
secret war with Abyssinia had erupted which was to cul-
minate in three disastrous defeats for Egypt between 1875 
and 1876. 
1 Mulhall, P• 528. 
2The Times, June 16, 1874, p. 14. Manchester (p. 95) points out that Abbas was the first purchaser 
of the new Krupp cannons, buying twenty-six at the Exposi-
tion of 1855· 
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Wasteful, inefficient, and corrupt were the 
proverbial adjectives describing the Egyptian Govern-
ment, with peculation and self-aggrandizement at every 
level. In all of this the Khedive set the tempo. When 
Ismail came to the headship of Egypt he owned a few 
thousand acres of land--by 1878 this sum had swollen to 
916,000 acres. 1 Some of this was reclaimed desert land 
or purchased real estate, but a portion had been ob-
tained from f ellaheen who had had the misfortune of 
falling into debt. It was the Vioeroy•s Daira (literally, 
administration) or personal estate towards which the rail-
ways ran, and which were most plentifully irrigated, In 
addition, many millions were unsuccessfully expended in 
the contruction of sixty-four sugar mills on the Khedive•s 
property, 2 
Here is a man whose extravagance was legendary 
in his own time, Cairo was to be a Paris on the Nile, 
and if it could not be built in a day, the next fastest 
time would do, Elegant palaces, public edifices, and 
1Gabriel Baer, -..A~Hi--..st ... o ....... __ o_f~Lpai.,,.n .... d.,..o~wn.,.....e ... r,_s.h ........ .....,i .... n 
Modern Egypt, 1800-1950 Lon ons Oxford Un vers y 
Press, 1902), p. 41. 
2crouchley, P• 117. 
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thoroughfares which even Haussmann would envy were to 
be constructed. Jewels, carriages, horses, and opera 
bouffe there were in abundance, and on his stage was 
held the world premiere of "Aida" which the Khedive 
had commissioned. 1 Visitors to the country, even those 
of minor importance, were graciously welcomed, housed in 
palaces, banqueted and given private rail and steamship 
accommodations. 2 Of all his fates, however, the one 
remembered most vividly was that celebrating the opening 
of the Suez Canal in 1869, when crowned heads and world 
dignitaries met, with the Viceroy as host. To place a 
price tag on all these luxuries and fillips of fancy is 
impossible, but Mr. Dicey, not an admirer of the Khedive, 
estimated that £El00 million were unaccounted for by 1879.J 
The introduction of European financial techniques 
and especially the use of treasury bills was most perni-
cious to the economic well-being of Egypt. The 1850's 
1The Opera House at Cairo was one of the great 
works of Ismail's reigns unhappily, it was destroyed by 
fire in 1971. However, the national anthem which Verdi 
wrote for Egypt is still in use (Landes, Bankers and 
Pashas, pp. 154 and 209). 
2The Times, Aug. 19, 1874, p. 6. Letters describing 
Ismail's open-handedness made frequent reading in the jour-
nals of the day, and brought rage from the unpaid creditors 
at a later date. 






witnessed almost a speculative boom in Anglo-Egyptian 
ventures, 1 which was fed by a legal rate of interest of 
6 per cent per month which remained as law throughout 
our period. 2 Under Ismail, "banking" Egyptian-style 
flourished so that most European houses in Egypt were 
connected in some way with khedivial finance,3 and by 
1877 eight banks in the Nilotic had direct telegraphic 
communication with London and Paris.4 Banking in these 
years in Egypt had nothing to do with investments in 
industry, for there was virtually nonei what it did mean 
was the business of serving as a middleman by acquiring 
funds for the Khedive in exchange for treasury bills 
bearing high interest. Until about 1870, this lucrative 
trade was in the hands of the haute bangue of Europe, at 
which time the commercial and deposite banks entered the 
lists in numbers. Such a system could only be short-
lived, and by 1874 speculation had slowed to a point where 
large reservoirs of capital were idle, 
The Viceroy found that by means of treasury bills 
he could have ready money for establishing enterprises, 
purchasing land and administering government. Having the 
1sidney George Checkland, The Rise of Industrial 
Society in England1 1815 to 1885 (Londona Longmans, 1964), 
P• 207. 
2The Times, Jan. 19, 1876, p. 7. 




Khedive as a partner in a venture (which was often 
the case) usually spelled doom for the project. The 
societe General d':agypte of Alexandria floundered in 
187ls the Societe Financiere d'~te strove until 1877 
to obtain a judgment against the Cairo Government and 
failed, 1 the F.gyptian Commercial and Trading Company 
(which had promised 10 per cent interest) was in liquida-
tion by the end of the decade, 2 the Societe Agricole et 
Industrielle d't.gypte was bankrupt after two years of 
operation3--these were but a few of the institutions which 
enjoyed khedivial connections. Where possible, Ismail 
used his investment to bleed the firm white and always 
1Morninf Post, Oct. 24, 1877, ACFB, Egy-pt, VIII, 
128. SeventY-f ve per cent of this company's capital was 
in English hands, the Tribunal refused to uphold their 
claims. 
2Landes, Bankers and Pashas, pp. lC51-54. This 
firm, with £2 million capital, 25 per cent of it from 
public subscription, was to lend meney to the cultivators 
and had as its directors Henry Oppenheim, John Cater of 
the Bank of F.gypt, and John Wingfield Larking, the special 
representative of the Khedive. The London agents were 
Frilhling and Goschen. 
Jibid., p. 261. This was a joint stock enterprise 
which attracted little interest in England. The Viceroy 
owed the company five million francs, which he finally 
paid after the Western Powers were forced to a,ply pressure. 
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tried to have agents on hand to protect his interest, 
while at the same time the organization attempted to 
prosper from its Viceregal affiliation. 
Casualties such as these did not deter the zeal 
of those desiring to profit by the Khedive•s unwise 
fiscal measures. In 1869 the Franco-Austrian Jank 
and a branch of the Anglo-Austrian Bank, each with £1 
million nominal capital, opened their doors in Alexandria, 1 
followed the next year by the Franco-Egyptian Bank with 
Charles Ferry, the brother of the statesman, as Director, 
and in 1873 came the Bank of Constantinople which paid 
24-1/J per cent interest per annum. 2 The Austrian Consul 
General reported (1875) that in the period from June, 1874, 
to June, 1875, thirteen new banks with a combined paid-up 
capital of £5,870,000 and a reserve of £1.2 million had 
been opened in Egypt, paying from 10 per cent to 59 per 
cent interest,J Table J lists the most important financial 
institutions in Egypt on the eve of defaultr numerous 
1 The Times, June 22, 1869, p. 6. 
2Bankers Magazine, XXXIII (May, 1873), 429. This 
organization, like the Franco-Egyptian, was established 
by Bischoffsheim, and was merged with the reorganized 
Imperial Ottoman Bank in 1874. 
JACFB, ~. I, J44. The Austrian Brown Book 
added that many---pr!Vate banks were also set up, upon which 
no statistics were available. 
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private banks also existed, such as Oppenheim and 
Nephew, Dervieu et Compagnie, and Bravay. A dearth 
of capital was obviously not one of the problems of 
the moment. 
Since English concerns helped stimulate the un-
healthy banking practices of Egypt, were involved in the 
flurry of negotiations in 1876, and were also represented 
by Goschen, their activities are of interest. 
Of those members of la haute finance most con-
earned with the reign of Ismail, none were more involved 
than the Oppenheims. The family was English by adoptior,; 
having left Windecken and Oberhessen where they had been 
moneylenders, the brothers Hermann and Simon, with the 
latter's son Henry, were forced to keep up their peregrin-
ations until 1850, when they opened a bank in London. At 
this point their history becomes hazy, for in the next 
vignette Henrywas reportedly seen in the Levant, watching 
over the paternal ships as they brought stores for the 
British troops in the Crimea. 1 However, according to 
the Archives of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, 
the German family arrived ln London somewhat earlier than 
generally thought, met the same problems as elsewhere, and 
1Landes, Bankers and Pashas, p. 111. 
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left very suddenly in 1849 with a compatriot, when some 
dispute over banking and bill operations occurred. After 
a South African business of theirs went to bankruptcy 
court, their next port of call was the Levant, where as 
street money-changers and watch repairmen their situation 
remained static until the Crimean war gave them the op-
portunity for profits from usuriously changing currency 
for the British troops at Balaklava and elsewhere. 1 
The Oppenheims' first try in opening a firm in 
Alexandria failed, but, persevering, Oppenheim and Nephew, 
with Henry in charge, hung out its sign in 1862. This 
bank, in association with Hermann's other new enterprises 
(Alberti, Pinto, Oppenheim et Compagnie of Paris, and 
Oppenheim-Alberti of Constantinople) gave the new busi-
ness broad ties with Europe. Henry set about making his 
house useful to the Viceroys, and particularly Ismail. 
Their success began with the negotiation of a public 
loan in 1862, 2 but they also accrued great profits on 
10Loans to Foreign States," 1875, ACFB, Ep;ypt, 
I, 207 (insert). 
2rn 1862 they arranged a ~2.4 milL1on loan for 
thirty years, of which Egypt got 65 per 6ent1 the contract 
price was 62,5 and the issue price was twenty points higher. 
Fruhling and Goschen were the London agents, and the loan 
reportedly was over-subscribed (Landes, Bankers and Pashas, 
p. 117). 
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private arrangements, especially under Ismail Pasha. 
After once dealing with the Oppenheims, the Khedive 
found that it was financially imprudent, and often 
impossible, to change contractors, so that this combina-
tion of ruler and banker remained even though "the breath 
of scandal was to stick to the Oppenheims throughout their 
career in Egypt."1 Henry took up residence in London in 
1868, and before his death in 1912 had been accepted into 
the highest circles. Hermann died on July 14, 1876, and 
his house went into liquidation. 
Of the joint stock banks which gained from dealings 
with the Khedivial Administration, three were English in-
stitutions. Through these banlts the small investor could 
share in the yield of high interest which liquid capital 
commanded in the area. Table 4 indicates the amount of 
interest which these English banks paid their shareholders 
from 1869 to 1876. 
The Anglo-Egyptian Bank was formed in 1864, and 
was reorganized, in 1867, as the Anglo-Egyptian Banking 
Company. Despite the name, the direction of the firm was 
in French hands, but included an Alexandrian banker and 
representatives from the Agra and Masterman•s Bank. 2 The 
1ill£!,., p. 116. 
2Barclays Bank, s Bank 
Dominion Colonial and overseas By 
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driving forces among the directors1 and staff were1 
Octave Foa, the Secretary1 Jean Baptiste Pastre, founder 
of the Credit Society of Marseilles, and resident and 
merchant in Egypt since the 1820's1 and his brother 
Jules, a member of the Conseil Superieur du Commerce 
of France, and the President of the Marseilles Chamber of 
Commerce. This French grip on the institution, albeit 
1The directors of the .Anglo-Egyptian Banking 
Company were as follows, according to the Share List for 
1869 (BT Jl/1JJ4/469)a 
Directors Shares Held (1869) 
George G. McPherson (Chairman, Agra 
and Masterman's Bank1 Director, 
Mercantile Credit Association) 100 
Edward Masterman (Director, Agra 
and Masterman's Bank) 250 
Robert E. Morrice 475 
Charles L. Devaux (Director, General 
Credit and Discount Company) 1,063 
Jean Baptiste Pastre 2,272 
Jules Pastre (of Messrs. Pastre 
Freres, of Alexandria) 2,171 
G. Sinadino (of the banking firm, 
G. Sinadino of Alexandria) l,JOO 
Octave Foa 38 
I , I 
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weakened in time. 1 was not appreciated by the English 
holders, and by 1871 there were calls to add more Britishers 
to the directorship. 2 The number of stockholders steadily 
grew, reaching l,OJ8 in 1872, and 2,128 by 1875,J and this I· 
and the high rate of interest were reflec·ted in the price I. 
of shares, which rose from 22-7/8 in March of 1871, to 
J8-l/4 in August of 1872. Both 1873 and 1874 saw the 
shares depressed, but by the summer of 1875 they had 
reached £39 per share. 4 By 1874 the Anglo-Egyptian was 
the major supplier of the Khedive•s liquid capital and 
held £l,JJ7,446 in Egyptian securities in August of that 
year, and £1,590,271 a year later.5 
One firm backed by English capital was the Bank 
of Egypt, established in 1855. The Board was solid and 
conservative, with such men as Mr. w. Tite, M.P., John 
1~10-~yptian Banking Company, Share Lists (BT Jl/1334/3496) showed that by 1877 Jean Baptiste Pastre 
held only JOO shares, while his brother Jules had but 200. 
2Bankers Magazine, XXXI (June. 1871), 544. 
J . 6 The Times, Nov. 2J, 1875. p. • 
4Monthly price lists in the Bankers Magazine have 
been consulted for the quotation of bank shires. 
5Bankers Magazine, XX.XV (Jan., 1875), 46, and 
XX.XVI (Jan, 1876), 37. 
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Cater, and John Bramley-Moore in control, 1 but has been 
described as 
small in vision and scope. Its British directors 
were not cut out for royal finance. They were 
sober, conservative men who liked regularity in 
their dividends and orthodoxy in their trans-
actions. 2 
Nonetheless, from 1866 to 1871, the five years following 
the panic, the bank earned profits totaling 90 per cent 
of its capital,J and its stock was consequently sought. 
With par at £25, the shares were quoted at £45 in October 
of 1871, reached £52 a year later, and were over £53 in 
January, 187J, before a decline ensued. Though weak in 
the early 186o•s, the bank managed to keep afloat4 and 
seemed to have had a substantial amount of Egyptian 
treasury bills in its keeping.5 The total number of 
1The Chainnan of the bank, John Bramley-Moore, 
was also the director of the Rio de Janeiro Improvements 
Company, deputy chairman of the East Argentine Railroad 
Company, and chairman of the General Credit and Discount 
Company. 
2Landes, Banke:z:s and Pashas, p. 1.38 • 
.)Bankers Magazine, XXXI (March, 1871), 2J4. 
4Gordon Waterfield, La.yard of Nineveh (Londona 
John Murray, 196J), p. 297. In the early 186o•s, A. H. 
Layard, as Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, was 
charged with using his position to assist the Bank of Egypt. 
5The balance sheets for the Bank of Egypt listed 
its holdings of F.gyptian securities as1 £)56,584 in 18701 
£J57,216 in 187ls £371.691 in 18721 £48),625 in l87Ja and 
£297,J47 in 1874. 
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holders was small, 415 in 1871 and only 4JJ the following 
year when the price of the stock demonstrated some of its 
greatest gains.1 
The last of these English organizations to be 
created was the Bank of Alexandria. in 1872. As Table 4 
indicates, its shares were within the reach of the small 
investor, though not receiving a great deal of publicity. 
Since over fifty per cent of F.gyptian cotton was delivered 
to Manchester, 2 many Lancashire operatives who had an 
interest were drawn into investing in Egypt and especially 
in a firm which would promote the business they knew best. 
The reorganized Board of Directors in 1876 showed this 
predominance, as it included, among other manufacturers 
of importance, Jacob Bright, M.P., brother of the statesman, 
who joined the business in 1875 with 700 shares.J Hermann 
1Bankers Magazine, XXXII (Aug., 1872), 694. 
2Arthur Redford, .Manchester Merchants and Foreiiy;: 
Trade (Manchestert Manchester university Press, 19J4-56~ 
II, l83-84. 
3commercial Bank of Alexandria, List of Directors 
(BT Jl/2257/l078J), The directors of the Commercial Bank 
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Oppenheim and the Bank of Constantinople were among the 
largest shareholders, with 2,000 shares each, and it was 
also well-subscribed in Cairo. 1 But, as will be noted, 
the bank could not resist the high interest on Govern-
ment bills which, like a Siren's call, led the organization 
to join the Anglo-Egyptian in 1874 to lend Ismail a re-
ported £4 million. 2 
Banking, then, had a direct bearing on the accumu-
lation of Egypt's floating debt. Other contributors to 
the elephantine debt of 1876 have been touched upon, but 
one further culprit remains, the series of public loans 
which were raised by Ismail Pasha. 
The Viceroy, had he ever opened Thackeray•s 
Vanity Fair, would have appreciated Chapter J6, "How to 
Live Well on Nothing a Year," for although his income was 
1Bank of Alexandria, Share List for 1872, BT 
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shrinking, he was usually able to obtain credit at 
some price, and as he borrowed more, the number of those 
pressing money upon him increased. On assuming the Gover-
norship of Egypt, Ismail found a debt which by most authori-
ties stood at £J.J million.1 In the previous year, 1862, 
Egypt had floated its first public loan, with Oppenheim 
as contractor and Frilhling and Goschen as London agentsr 
this expediency for acquiring funds was shortly to be 
repeated. 
In 1861 the revenue of Egypt was approximately 
£E2,154,ooo, but by 1864 this had climbed to £E6,972,ooo. 2 
The source of this prosperity was the cotton boom brought 
about by the American Civil War, which drove British manu-
facturers to search elsewhere for their raw material. These 
palmy days stimulated the Viceroy•s appetites. Exports 
soared from £4,454,425 in 1861-62 to £14,416,661 in 186J-64,J 
1 Landes, Bankers and Pashas, p. 128., n. 1. Bl'Wlt 
(Secret History, p. 12) agrees with Landes. Hamza (pp. 61-
64) giving LE6.5 million1 Crabites (Ismail the Maligned 
Khedive, PP• 20-25), £15 million1 and Baer (p, 34), £!15 mil-
lion, are some exceptions. Hershlag (p. 96, n. 2) states 
that "the differences in estimates as to the size of the 
debt stem mainly from the non-inclusion of the current debt 
in the lower estimates," 
2Landes, Bankers and Pashas, p. JJ?, Appendix D, 
Table 1. 
J Ibid., P• 329, Appendix A. 
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so that the new prince felt most expansive and ready to 
undertake a host of schemes. To obtain the amounts of 
liquid capital necessary for implementation, Ismail 
emulated his sovereign and was drawn into a dreary round 
of larger loans to pay the mounting interest on previous 
borrowings. Table 5 indicates the essential features of 
the various loans. These figures are approximations, but 
they represent the most accurate estimates available. 
From 1866 on, the pressures of finance began to 
mount upon the Cairo Government. While England was sub-
jected to the effects of a European war, panic, and high 
bank rates, the Viceroy had two loans on the exchanges, 
both of which were in difficulty. FrUhling himself came 
to Egypt to advise the removal of securities from the 
market--but refused the request for a personal loan.1 
Prospects grew even darker in 1867, as cotton prices hit 
bottom, 2 and a new loan bearing 9 per cent interest was 
floated. Ismail was to find that there were gradations 
of bleakness. Despite the soothing rhetoric of his London 
agent, J, w. Larking, 1868 for the Khedive was a most 
lugubrious year. Revenues equalled £E5,0ll,OOO while 
1 Hamza, pp. 98-99. 
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expenditures reached £El6,637,ooo, 1 and again there was a 
wild casting about for capital. Internal taxes were in-
creased, and the Chamber was told by Ismail Sadyk, the 
Khedive•s Minister, that income vastly exceeded outgo. 2 
While indulging in this charade, the Viceroy signed an-
other contract with the Oppenheims for a new offering. 
This issue for £12 million was probably the first ayn-
dica ted loan of any kind.J In this way, £95J,J28 was 
added yearly to F.gypt's debt, but a clause in the docu-
ment stipulated that the Viceroy was not to resort to 
another public loan for five years. The clause was 
inserted on the behest of Great Britain, who pressured 
the Divan to intervene, 4 which indicated the concern 
Downing Street entertained for her investors. To the 
outsider it appeared that the F.gyptian situation had 
stabilized, 
1Landes, Bankers and Pashas, p. JJ7, Appendix D, 
·rable l. 
2Jaeob M. Landau. Parliaments and Parties in .Egypt (New Yorks Frederick Prager and Co., 1954), pp. 16-17. 
Jcairncross, Home and Foreign Investment, p. 93. 
4Jenks, p, Jl6. The Porte did not need much coaxing, 
for the Khedive•s borrowing was helping to dry up London 
capital. He formalized his prohibition on loans in a fir-
man of November 29, 1869. 
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The Egyptian Government was already living from 
hand to mouth on foreign capital. so that although 
baksheesh could eventually eradicate the Sultan•s edict, 
evasions had to be contrived for the moment, 
When the Chamber was assembled for their annual 
rubber-stamping session, the Khedive congratulated them 
upon the prosperity of the country and announced that the 
debt was now lower than when his predecessor had reigned. 1 
Meanwhile, Ismail had arranged for a second Da.ira loan, 
supposedly a private affair which would not violate the 
contract of 1868--so argued the Viceroy. But ill fortune 
was again in evidence, for the panic generated by the 
Franco-Prussian War led to only 70 per cent of the stock 
being taken up. The London journals were likewise un-
happy, the Economist remarked that the Khedive was using 
a ploy in claiming the Da.ira a non-government loan and 
warned that "a half civilised Government once finding its 
hand, to use a vulgar saying, 'in the pocket of Lombard 
Street,• would keep it there,"2 
1The Times, Jan. 28, 1870, P• 10, 
20 The Serious Danger of Rash Foreign Loans," 
Economist, XXVIII (April JO, 1870), 529. 
129 
Also rouEed to action in this affair was the 
Council of Foreign Bondholders. No sooner had the 
tenns been announced than the Council took up the case of 
the 1868 holders. Since the bond had stated explicitly 
that no loans could be raised for five years, as they 
would undoubtedly depress existing securities, the organiza-
tion called for either a halt to the proceedings, or com-
pensation. In the latter case, the 1868 bondholders might 
accept either a greater sinking fund, or Cairo could re-
purchase a portion of that stock. In April, 1870, Hyde 
Clarke took the matter up with the agents of the 1868 
loan (the Franco-Egyptian Bank, which was controlled by 
Bischoffsheim and Goldschmidt, who were also the n!l! loan 
contractors), in a letter which read in parts 
It would be of interest to the bondholders to 
learn the amount of the loan, and some further 
particulars as regards the application of the 
proceeds, showing that they are intended solely 
for private purposes. Leaving aside for the 
present the question whether, according to the 
letter of the bond of 1868, his Highness is in 
equity enabled to issue a private loan, there 
can be no doubt that such an issue would be felt 
as a grievance by the subscribers to the loan of 
1868.I 
1The Times, April 28, 1870, p. 6. The corres-
pondence by Secretary Clarke on the issue of the Daira 
loan of 1870 appeared here. 
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The Franco-Egyptian Bank insisted in its correspondence 
with the Council that this was a private matter and they 
ought to take it up with the Oppenheims and other con-
tractors of the 1868 issue. The final response of April 
23, 1870, suggested that correspondence cease: 
We doubt not that in due season, and upon every 
fitting occasion, his Highness the Khedive of Egypt 
will, as hitherto, prove to the bondholders of the 
existing loans, oath for his Government and his pri-
vate service, that neither his dignity nor his repu-
tation for good faith requires any protection or 
preservation other than his own and that every 
guarantee accepted by his Highness or his Govern-
ment will be duly and faithfully performed.! 
At this juncture it became known that the Porte 
had protested the Daira. loan. 2 These months saw the 
peak of Turko-Egyptian ill will, but Bisohoffsheim 
remained undaunted, and on May 5 announced that the firm 
had transferred the Sultan's protest to the Khedive, The 
sales went forward. By September, however, the Sultan 
had reversed himself• bribery having been utilized,J 
and the Council's ally fell away. In surveying the year 
in November, the Secretary of the Council warned that 
l~. 2wynne, p. 5a1. n. 11. 
)Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentaty Papers 
(House of Commons and Command) (hereafter Piirllamenta.R 
Papers), LXXVIII, Egypt No. 4 (1879}, c. 2J9'5, Append ces 
6 and 8. 
131 
under all circumstances it will become necessary 
to exact more forms from all borrowing states, 
even if we cannot obtain more securities.l 
The use of treasury bills continued, swelling 
the F.gyptian unsecured debt, for although the loan of 
1868 was to consolidate finances, it was soon obvious 
that the floating debt was as inextinguishable as the 
burning bush of Moses. As Khedivial credit slipped, 
renewal rates and interest on further advances rose 
sharply, but all were aware that in 1873 another public 
loan would be required which would be profitable for 
everyone. It was estimated that from 1868 to 1873 the 
floating debt rose £4 million a year, and had reached 
£JO million by the latter date. 2 
Internal taxes continued to mount, so that in 
1876 the fellah paid J5s. to his government, while the 
citizen of France and England paid 18s. and 8s. 6d, res-
pectively,J Such being the case, Ismail offered a new 
inducement in order to draw gold from the natives, es-
pecially from the wealthy landownersa on August 3, 1871, 
1 The Times, Jan. 26, 1870, p. 6. 
2Economist, XXXI (Nov. 8, 187J), 1J54. In 1873 
the Khedive's personal floating debt was placed at £6 million 
while that of the nation was estimated at £24 million. 
)Hamza, p. 276. By 1878, the tax load on the 
f ellaheen had risen to £2 per head (Spectator, LII 
[March 29, 1879], 394-95). 
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the Law of Moukabala (compensation) came into existence, 
Though ruinous in the long run, it was designed to provide 
£28 million in but a few years. In exchange for an addi-
tional six years• taxation, which could be paid either in 
one payment or spread over twelve years, the landowner 
was to gain a fifty per cent reduction in land taxes 
in perpetuity, and-an indefeasible title to the property. 
The law remained in effect until January 6, 1880, after 
Ismail's deposition, but it is doubtful whether the Vice-
roy would have permitted the benefits of the law to be 
enacted. The Moukabala was a success in its first three 
years. 1 
Of all the public loans of Ismail's reign, the 
floatation of 1873 was the largest, £32 million, and the 
most damaging, as the Khedive was "unmercifully fleeced 
by the loan-contractors. 02 Already by 1872 :Egyptian 
currency had been weakening,3 and in oarly October a 
1Hamza, PP• 20A and 212, The income for these years 
was £5.1 million, £3.2 million, and £1,6 million. By 1880 
the tax had yielded £E9.5 million, according to Crouchley 
(p, 121), and between £12 and £15 million, according to 
Hershlag {p• 100). 
2The Times, April 4, 1876, p. 5. 
JBankers Magazine, XXXIII (July, 1873), 588, The 
official rate of exchirigeof 97.5 piastres to the pound 
sterling had risen to 195 among tradesmen, and to 410 copper 
piastres per pound sterling in the market places. 
1.3.3 
major crisis had occurred on the Alexandria bourse, with 
ensuing failures. The Viceroy pilU1ed his hopes upon the 
new loan to reduce the mountain of unsecured debt. while 
those in the syndicate, nominally led by Bischoffsheim, 
one o:f ·\~he "less reputable firms, .. l were also eager. The 
attitude of the financiers could be summed up by these 
words of a shareholder of the Anglo-Egyptian Bank, in-
quiring of his chairman at a meeting, "I believe there is 
a new Egyptian Loan in contemplation. are we likely to 
have any good pickings out of that? {A laugh [from the 
audience])." 2 But before the harvest there was labor to 
be done. The prospectus was released in London in July and 
was greeted coolly by the financial press. Since another 
£1,282,835 was to be added to the annual charge on the 
Egyptian revenue (not including the sinking fund), Ismail 
made the offering more attractive by inserting a clause in 
the bond which prohibited the raising of another loan by 
Egypt until 1878. Sir John Fowler, the engineer, was sent 
to England where he bustled about, negotiating contracts 
for railway and telegraph equipment and generally trying 
to show how wisely the Khedive spent his money • .3 
1cairncross, Heme and Foreigp. Investment, p. 20. 
2Bankers Magazine, XX.XIII {June, 1873), 558. 
3The Times, Sept. 16, 187.3, p. 5, One of the con-
tracts which Fowler negotiated was with Shaw and Thomson 
for fifty miles of railway. 
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The Levant Herald, along with other journals, 
published complimentary articles on progress in Egypt, 
but in England, at least, it was an uphill struggle. 
In May the Economist carried an article by Edward Mirzan, 
a man conversant with Egyptian finance, who set her debt 
at that point at £6J,102,4oo. 1 The faux pas of the Khedi-
vial campaign was made by the usually astute Henry Oppen-
heim, who had given up Egypt's climate for that of London 
in 1868. In September of 187J, he released a budget for 
the upcoming year in Egypt which showed a surplus of 
£1.2 million. The British press was not the Cairo Chamber, 
and this document was quickly withdrawn in lieu of another, 
which was also in error as to fact, and which in turn was 
superseded by a third estimate. Such activities only wor-
sened matters, 2 
An attempt to retrieve the situation with a pamphlet 
defending the budget was undertaken, but half of the loan had 
already been placed and the remuneration was so gratifying 
that there was no doubt that the remainder of the loan 
1Edward Mirzan, "The Egyptian Debt," Economist, 
XXXI (July 5, 1873), 809. 
2Articles on the budgets appear in The Times 
{Oct. 17j 1873, P• 6) 1 a11d the Economist (XX.XI (Sept. 20, 1873 , 11441 .. Egyptian Budgets," XXXI [Oct. 18, 
1873]~ 12.59-611 and "The Turkish Financial Reforms," 
XXXI L0ct. 2.5, 1873], 1294-95), 
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would be subscribed.1 When the syndicate for this loan 
parted company in early 1874, it had a reported £1.6 mil-
2 lion to divide, but upon its retirement the stocks began 
to tumble.3 In May of 1874 a new syndicate was formed 
(including the Oppenheims) to dispose of the second moiety 
of the loan, which stimulated a rally in Egyptian securities. 
Nonetheless, by this time only £932,000, or less than l/J2 
of the stock, had been purchased by Englishmen. 4 
10ppenheim had divided the loan into two blocks 
of £16 million each, with the option to take up the second 
lot if all went well. Much of the syndicate's profits came 
from remitting the Khedive•s share to him in his own treasury 
bills at inflated prices. In all, the Khedive received less 
than £20 million of the £.32 million issue (Jenks, pp. Jl8-19). 
21!2,g., P• .319 • 
.3"The Dissolution of the Egyptian Synclicate," 
Econom:tst, XXXII (Jan. 17, 1874), 63. The decline in 
prices !s illustrated belows 
Loan Price in January Percentage Total Depre-
187.3 1874 of Decline elation (£) 
1862 96 84 12.5 274,400 
1864 100 93.5 6.5 .370,800 
1867 105.5 98.5 6.6 l.37,.300 
1868 §g 77 19.0 2,259,100 1870 70 18.6 l,J.38,500 
1873 84 64 - 23.,8 J,708,000 
4tinancier• IVIay 25, 1874, ACFB, Egypt, I, 126. 
ii 
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As the quicksand of insolvency closed over the 
struggling Viceroy, one further internal loan, the 
Rouznameh, for £5 million at 9 per cent, was attempted 
in 1874, but even the Mufettish (Chief Steward), Sadyk 
Pasha, with all his Eastern ingenuity, could only squeeze 
£El.8 million out of the inhabitants.1 Thus Ismail found 
himself on the verge of bankruptcy, driven thence by poli-
tical and military ambition, the desire for luxurious en-
virons, an array of public works, and entanglements with 
Europeans and international finance. 
No Solution for the F.gyptian Riddle 
October 1875 to May 1876 
The Creditors of Egypt 
Before resuming the wayward path of Egyptian 
finance, it might be well to point out some of the general 
impressions made by Egypt upon the British public. Cer-
tainly by the early 1870's the proliferation of books and 
articles on Egypt was evident. The Suez Canal had contri-
buted to this, as had generally improved communications, 
letters from London to Cairo were lOd. each by 1871, and 
shipping lines of several nations served Egyptian ports 
1cromer, the Earl of [Evelyn Baring, First Earl of 
Cromer], Modern EgYpt (New Yorks Macmillan Co., 1908), I, 53. 
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regularly. 1 For all that, and despite the fact that the 
area of the country in 1876 was 659,081 square miles, 2 
its cultivable size was but slightly larger than Wales, 
a rather small parcel of real estate to generate so great 
an interest on the part of investors, especially when agri-
culture was the only industry. 
An anecdote, related by Lord Granville in the 
Upper House. told of a Frenchman who declared that he 
would invest in Suez shares because he felt that a rail-
way on the Island of Sweden would be a good thing. It 
is doubtful that the English investor was quite so un-
enlightened, but his knowledge of things .Egyptian was 
shallow. It was thought that ninety per cent of the 
bondholders were ignorant in Egyptian matters,J and even 
in the City there were many hazy ideas afloat. 4 This did 
not mean that certain basic conceptions, easy to grasp 
and vague in dimension, were not present. One such axiom 
was that Egypt was rich, very rich, and could pay the in-
terest on her debts. Such a belief rested not only upon 
the knowledge that the land was some of the most fertile 
1crouchley. p. 142. 
2Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, XXII (Feb, 20, 1874), 26j. 
)The Times, Oct. 27 1 1875. P• 6, 
4A. J, Wilson. ttFinancial Position of Egypt," 
Fraser•s Magazine, XCII (June, 1876), 786. 
1J8 
of the Earth--that, as the saying went, "one need only 
tickle the soil with a hoe to obtain fine harvests"--
but also upon a belief in her store of precious metals. 
Upon this head also there was a maxim: "Australian 
gold was burj_ed in Egyptian sand • .,l It was generally 
known that Egypt supplied cotton for English mills, pur-
chased much of her industrial goods from the United King-
dom, and possessed a favorable balance of trade, 2 Finally, 
there was a general opinion that the East did not know how 
to govern itself .3 Englishmen were assured that the progress 
they had achieved was induced by their superior constitution 
and methods of approaching things. They were willing to 
invest time and money in backward areas and to provide 
the lead for advancement, but had little sympathy with 
the morality, religion, or culture of the natives, Nothing 
good could be said of Middle Eastern off ieialdom, and as 
1ttamza. p. 242. The flow of gold bullion gave cre-
dence to this point of view. :r·or example. in 1875 bullion 
import into Egypt was £5,868,403, outflow was £2,014,049. 
2Landes, Bankers and Pashas, pp, 329-JB, Landes' 
Appendices A and B give cotton prices as well as a general 
import/export table. Appendix A, "Egyptian Exports and Im-
ports, t• indicates a surplus ranging from £7 • OJ.5, 37.5 to 
£9,478,748 in the years 1871-72 and 1874-75. 
3Richard Faber, The Vision and the Needs Late 
Victorian Imperialist Aims {Londons Faber and Faber, 
196li), p. 60. 
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long as the interest was paid, the myopic investor was 
content. All positive factors were belabored by those 
whose job it was to "puff" Egyptian securities, and in-
sofar as the administration was corrupt, this was com-
batted by representing the Khedive as the exception, not 
the norm--a man of progress and modernity. Thus the 
investor found it difficult to obtain an unbiased opinion 
of Egypt or its stock. Most journals were complimentary 
to the Viceroy, often because of misinformation, and 
their advice certainly stimulated the sale of securities. 
As the Council struggled against the Daira loan 
of 1870, Bankers Magazine wrotea 
English and French capitalists see distinctly that 
the proceeds of former loans have been honestly 
applied to the development of the great national 
wealth of the country, and they justly conclude 
that his highness will continue in the same course 
of strict observance of his engagements. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • What, then, is the real state of Egyptian 
finance? We answer that it would be well if many 
of the older pow~rs of Europe could show as good 
a balance-sheet,l 
Their enthusiasm did not wane, for in 1873 they informed 
their readers, 0 Egypt may be regarded as one of the most 
progressive countries in the world, 02 Encomiums to Ismail 
111Progress of Egypt," Bankers Magazine, XXX {June, 1870), 504 and 506. 




and advice to purchase "F.gyptians" were not confined to a 
single journal, but could be found in the Money Market 
Review, the Levant Hera1d, 1 and Herapath•s Railway Journal, 
to name a few. As 1875 drew to a close, the campaign to 
masquerade Khedivial finance became frantic, with critics 
calling for the publication of an authentic budget. 
Those journals which had resisted being mesmerized 
by the Egyptian financiers, most notably the Economist and 
The Times, were attacked as bears looking for the fallr 
and rsmail's defenders insisted that Egypt and Turkey 
should not be coupled in the investor's mind. 2 
Egyptian securities were also purchased because 
the buyer felt he knew something about them, had lived in 
Egypt or knew a relative who had, or perhaps had heard of 
those whose bonds had been drawn quickly and hence had done 
well. There was also the belief that England would support 
him in a crisis, for there was the precedent of the Societe 
Agricole d'!gypte.3 
1Levant Herald, reprinted in The Times, Jan. 1, 1875, 
p, 7, The long-time editor of the Levant Herald and con• 
tributor to the press on Middle Eastern affairs, Mr. J. c. :.:c-
Coan, was himself a holder of Egyptian securities. 
2see the letter of Sir Samuel Baker to The Times, 
Oct. 27, 1875, P• 6. 
3navid s. Landes, "Some Thoughts on the Nature of 
Economic Imt>erialism," Journal of Economic History, XXI (Oct., 1961), 511. Landes discusses the importance of the 
British defense of the Agricole in this article. 
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As will be recalled, one of the objectives of 
the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders was to supply the 
investor with information on loans which were floated on 
the London Exchange, and generally speaking, the Executive 
Committee of the •council' did evince an interest in this 
province of the Ottoman Empire. E. P. Cazenove and Sons, 
in 1867, and I. Thomson and N. Bonar, in 1868, acted as 
agents for Egyptian loans and were connected with the 
Council, while Sir John Lubbock was acquainted with Egyptian 
finance through his son Neville. The younger Lubbock was 
a partner in Cavan, Lubbock and Company of Alexandria, which 
had supported the ill-fated Agricole to the extent of some 
JOOO shares,1 
It cannot easily be determined whether any of the 
'Council' members chose to purchase :Egyptian bonds1 how-
ever, it is certain that a few at least bought shares in 
banks doing business in the Nile Valley. Among the share-
holders of the Anglo-Egyptian Bank, for example, one finds 
the names of I. J. Gerstenberg (fifteen shares), General 
Sir George Balfour (twenty-five shares), and Sir Francis 
1The firm played a role in its own defense, for in 
1866 Neville Lubbock arrived in Cairo with a note from 
Lortl Clarendon to the British Consul General, urging the 






Lycett (JOO shares). 1 
The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders contributed 
to the new attention being paid by Englishmen to this area 
of the globe. Many of those at the Councilhouse were en-
rolled in the Royal Society of Arts, which by 1874 had 
over 4,000 members. The organization was subdivided into 
a number of sections devoted to various aspects of trade 
and industry. The Indian Section of the Society included 
Balfour, Clarke, and others from Moorgate Streets this 
interest in the subcontinent gave an imperial hue to their 
views as to the importance of the Levant. But they also 
appreciated the significance of the IUlotic and Africa in 
general. In 1873 Hyde Clarke. in conjunction with a number 
of important merchants from the Royal Geographical Society, 
proposed and was given authorization to establish an African 
Section within the Royal Society of Arts. 2 Its first meeting 
was held February 6, 1874, at which time the objectives of 
the Society's African and Indian Sections and their committees 
were stated1 
(To serve] as centres for taking action, and as a 
rallying point for merchants, traders, and others, 
3496. 
1Anglo-F.gyptian Bank, Share List for 1872, BT Jl/1334/ 
2Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, XXII {Feb. 




















where they might concert measures for the benefit 
of trade, and bring their views before the Gorern• 
ment when imperial action appeared necessary. 
Egypt was periodically the subject of papers and dis-
cussions, and from these the sentiments of Corporation 
members could be gauged, Mr. Clarke also lobbied for an 
Oriental Institute to meet annually, 2 but here he met with 
some difficulties, 
At the time of the formation of the Council in 
1868, the indebtedness of F.gypt had reached £E26.714,ooo, 
with an additional floating liability of £El0,08o,ooo,J 
but aside from the unsuccessful attempt to block the 1870 
Daira loan~ the Council took no other action, for its 
general tenet was not to interfere unless a default had 
occurred and the bondholders had summoned their aid. Secre-
tary Clarke, however, did look with disfavor upon the ac-
tivities of the nouveaux riches financiers who penetrated 
areas such as Egypt under false pretenses, for, as he wrotea 
The new competitors for this business also assumed 
an English garbs abroad they passed as English 
bankers and merchants, in reckless scheming, they 
were abetted by unprincipled adventurers.4 
ll!?.!!!· 
2clarke to the Council of the Royal Society of Arts, 
.!.21£.• (Sept, 18, 1874), 902. 
)Hamza., P• 127. 
4
cla.rke, P• 9. 
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Investors who cared to peruse the Council's materials 
might have profited therefrom, A memorandum of early 
1875, marked "private and confidential," dealing with 
Egyptian finance, observeds 
Those states which manage. by hook or by crook ••• 
to remit the sufficient amount, in ample time, to 
meet their approaching coupons, are not considered 
as "defaulting States," but may not they, perhaps, 
soon be included in that category? , • • So long as 
the Khedive and his worthy advisors and agents feel 
sure of encountering the credulity of the British 
public, and they continue to evince their readiness 
to give up their gold against his representations 
and elaborately engraved scrip, so long will the 
Khedive doubtless, graciously favor them by ac- 1 cepting their all, or any voluntary contributions: 
The Council Under Pressure 
Wednesdays in the Levant were considered unlucky, 
and the news which was flashed from Constantinople on 
October 6, 1875, seemed to bear this out, Turkey, which 
had accumulated a bonded debt of over £200 million, a 
moiety of it in the previous four years, had abruptly 
defaulted by announcing a 50 per cent reduction of interest 
(the balance repayable in 5 per cent scrip) on all loans 
except the Guaranteed Loan of 1855.2 For Englishmen this 
1F. c. (pseud. ), "Egyptian Finance," ACFB, Egypt, 
I, 207 (insert). 
2The Turkish debt stood at £217 million, out of 
which the Sultan had received £107 million (Wynne, P• 415). 
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meant that some £85 million of investments were in 
jeopardy,1 Unwise financial procedures, 2 floods, famine, 
and internal uprisings and revolutions had driven the 
"Sick Man" to the wall, and default was urged by Ignatiev.3 
But the British investors did not much care about the reasons 
for bankruptcy. They had the best securities of any of 
the Turkish creditors, and they meant to see them honored.4 
But, by assuming an adamant posture, they were forced to 
wait six years for a settlement, while the Egyptian bond-
holders received attention. The success of the latter was 
1Financier (Feb. 18, 1876, P• 4) estimated the dis-
bursement of Turkish securities as followsa England, 
£85 millions France, £50 millions Italy, £20 to £25 milliona 
Turkey, £25 millions Dual Monarchy and Germany, £20 millions 
Belgium, £7 million. The Times (Dec. 14, 1875, p. 6) be-
lieved that £60 million was owned by Englishmen and that 
Franco-Italian holdings were £130 million. Figures on 
English holdings at the settlement of the debt are available 
in the Co;rporation of Foreign Bondholders Report for 188) 
(p. 94). 
2Donald c. Blaisdell, Eurotean Financial Control 
in the Ottoman Eqmire1 a Stu~ ofhe Establlshiiient, Ac-
tivl ties and Si~!?!cance o the Adlrilnlstratlon of the 
Ottoman f>ubi!c DiJt (New Yorke Coiumb!a University Press, 
1929), P• 6. Turkish loans were raised at 5 or 6 per cent 
interest and issued at an aYerage of 50 or 60. 
J~ •• PP• 78-79• 
411ttle evidence of the "philosophical attitude 
tovre.rds the Turkish repudiation," suggested by Dwight 
E. Lee (Great Britain and the C rus Convention Polic of 
187~ [Cam ri ge, Mass.1 rvar vers y ss, 9 , 
P• O), presents itself in the financial press of the day. 
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partially due to the activities of the Corporation of 
Foreign Bondholders, which eventually was able, despite 
the heavy pressure, to assist in a solution after London 
had washed its hands of the F.gyptian affair, 
The Turkish collapse came at an inopportune 
moment for the Council, with its leadership in disarray 
because of the illness of the chairman, Mr. Gerstenberg, 
the decline of the foreign government securities market, 
and internal division. The organization had heretofore 
enjoyed favorable publicity, with support from the Bankers 
Magazine and Money Market Review, The sour notes which 
were to presage the full onslaught against the Corporation 
were first sounded in the "Thunderer .. l in early 1875, when 
it leveled a broadside at the Council•s annual statementi 
"We confess, however, that we hardly think that this report 
justifies the existence of the Corporation." The erup-
tion continued: 
Little is done by it [the Council], and not much good 
has come of that littie for the creditors of the 
States and comm\ll'lities which have fallen into 
bankruptcy or who defy their creditors, • •• and 
in n~arly all other instances, what the Council has 
done has been to carry on voluminous correspondence, 
entar intc relations with diplomatic agents of its 
own abroad and generally to make a good deal of fuss 
with very little solid results ••• , It does not 
appear to us, therefore. that this body has as yet justified its existence in any instance. and it 
1Reginald Baliol Brett, Second Viscount Esher 
(Cloud-galp'd Towers [Londona John Murray, 1927], P• 61) 
affixedth s name to The Times. 
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cannot but entail considerable expense1to those bondholders who give it their support. 
The Money Market Review rejoined in short orders 
We consider such remarks, to say the least, 
frivolous •••• As for twitting the Corporation 
with not being more successful in at once dragging 
money out of the empty coffers of the bankrupt 
States, or suddenly instilling financial probity into 
the minds of disreputable Governments, it is to be 
regretted that The Times, with all its powers of 
advocacy has not been able to do better itselfs 
and we should say that this alone should "justify 
the existence" of such a body as the Corporation, 
who at any rate h!!!, accomplished something.2 
This same journal published Mr. Weguelin's remarks when 
he addressed t'-:e General Court of the Corporation in 
February of 1875 on the suddenly altered affections of 
the press, However, the Economist likewise pronounced 
the society a failures 
We fear it can hardly be said that this body has 
achieved the position, as an agency for protecting 
the holders of foreign bonds, which it was hoped 
it would achieve. 
The reasoning of the journal went as follows1 
It was originally, and is nothing if it does not 
remain, an association of capitalists largely in• 
terested in loans to foreign stetesa but we doubt 
if the best capitalist class in the City has not 
long ago ceased to be very much interested in ·the 
kind of loans where the bondholders most need pro-
tection. Hence the association is apt to become 
unreal, many who may be largely interested not 
1The Times, Feb. 16, 1875, P• 10. 
2Money Market R§View, XXX (Feb. 20, 1875), 217-18. 
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being influential in the City ••• , while 
other gentlemen who have the City influence and pos-
session may have no sufficient interest to indu!e 
them to take an active part in the proceedings. 
It was therefore incumbent upon the Council to demonstrate 
graphically its vitality in meeting the challenge of the 
moment. 
A wave of anger swept the City on news of the Sultan's 
decree, with opprobrium being heaped on Turkey, the con-
tractors, and any others who could be implicated, while 
rumors filled the air, obscuring a proper view of the 
situation. 2 For some time the Council had publicly aired 
its misgivings on Turkish finances,3 this despite Gersten-
berg•s position as a shareholder of the Imperial Ottoman 
Bank. 4 The Corporation's efforts began with a meeting 
chaired by John Lubbock, where it was decided to call a 
general assemblage of Turkish holders for October 19, 1875. 
at the City Terminus Hotel, to formulate a policy. The 
1Economist. XXXIV (Feb. 26, 1876), 245. 
2one such story reported that Mr. Gladstone had 
accepted an invitation from the Sultan to go to Turkey 
where he would be given a free hand to untangle that 
country's finances (Money Market Review, XXX [Oct. 16, 
1875]. 421). 
3~,, XXVIII (Feb. 28, 1874), 273. 
4Bankers Magazine, XXXII (July, 1872), 593. 
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attendance was excellent, the chair was occupied by 
Hugh Childers, M.P., who urged both unity and moderation 
toward an ancient ally, Tempers were high. so that after 
Mr, Galloway (a holder of £450,000 in "Turks") had re-
solved that the Council should handle matters, the volley 
of verbiage began in earnest. A •council' member, Mr. 
Cornelius Surgey, drew cheers from the throng when he 
saids 
He thought they should take this opportunity of 
calling on the Great Powers of Europe to do what 
he considered it was their duty to do, and that was 
merely to support the bondholders to the utmost with 
the Turkish Government, and as old allies offer her 
wise advice.l 
~ir. F. c. Hamond summoned the Government to stand up for 
the bondholders and made dark threats against the Porte 
should it misappropriate the Egyptian tribute• 
Woe be to his suzerain if he tried to stop the 
Khedive from performing an honourable duty, for 
the first thing he would do wo~d be to declare 
his independence of the Porte. 
It was decided that each loan should keep its individual 
securities and that a protest would be lodged with the 
Foreign Office, which was delivered in person by a com-
mittee on November 5.3 Protests were also sent to the 
1Money Market Review, XXXI (Oct. 23, 1875), 438. 
A full account of the meeting of October 19 may be found here. 
2 Ibid., 439. 
3wynne, p. 420. 
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Grand Vizier and to the contractors of the 1858 and 1862 
loans which the Council represented. From October 26 
to November 1 the Councilhouse hummed with activity as 
holders of the several Turkish issues met to select, under 
the 'Council's' aegis, committees which would then send 
representatives to a general body which would act for all. 1 
Four loans were not includeds the 1855 Guaranteed, which 
had not been disturbed by the Sultans the l858s and two 
others, the 1854 and 1871, both of which were pledged to 
the Egyptian tribute. The contractors for the latter 
three issues, Dent, Palmer and Company, had already en-
tered the lists on behalf of these creditors and soon 
wished to assume a wider role. On October 21 that house 
held a meeting at which a committee was set up, including 
Philip Rose from the Corporation. and a mission was directed 
to Constantinople to appraise the situation. 2 In the mean-
time the Palmer group invited Messrs. Bennoch and EykynJ 
to join their committee in its planned protests. The ad-
hesion of these two men was accomplished but was short-
1For reports of these meetings, consult the City 
pages of The Times for October 27 through November 2, 1875. 
2wynne, p. 421, n. 6. 
)Roger Eykyn (1828-96) had married the daughter of 
another 'Council' member, George Schlotel. Eykyn was a 
Justice of the Peace for Berkshire and from 1860 to 1874 





lived, as they wished to keep their freedom of action, 
The fragile arrangement flew apart at the December 6 
meeting of the contractor's group, where E, H. Palmer 
advised giving up individual securities and asserted 
that his committee now spoke for all of the holders, 
He also proposed a contribution of 2s. 6d.per hundred 
pounds' worth of stock, and when IJ.Ir, Bennoch rose to 
respond, the chairman (Mr, Palmer) declared his own 
motion affirmed and fled, leaving all in confusion,1 
Of the sixteen plans being circulated, the 
•council' decided to back Mr, Hamond's, even to the exclu-
sion of those propounded by Philip Rose and Cornelius 
Surgey, and this course was adopted by a gathering of 
holders on December 10,2 
The organization's initial efforts in October 
had been appreciated by many, and the Spectator, for 
example, urged1 
1riioney Market Review, XXXI (Dec. 11, 187.5), 638-40. 
2rn accordance with the wishes of this meeting• 
another deputation was sent to Downing Street on December 
13, led by F, c. Hamond and including representatives from 
Moorgate Street. The Foreign Secretary, decidedly piqued 
that the bondholders now supported another plan, said he 
would read their suggestions {ill,g_,, [Dec. 18, 1875]. 670). 
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The best course for the Turkish bondholders is to 
empower the Council of Foreign Bondholders, which is 
composed of men of experience, to make the best 
bargain they can at Constantinople, by persuasion, 
or menace, or offer of some acceptable plan.l 
The Times did not share this opinion1 
Without in any way questioning the good intentions of 
the Council of Foreign Bondholders, we must still 
point out that its position towards Turkey is that 
of an entire outsider. It is little likely, there-
fore, to obtain any consideration from the Turkish 
Government, which will inevitably look upon its 
protests and representations as the acts of 2a 
troublesome and insignificant intermeddler. 
By December the Corporation was being treated as a 
villain• The Times refused to publish the particulars 
of the Council's plan and warned that if no settlement 
were reached it would be the fault of Moorgate Street. 
Further, this journal endorsedthe Palmer Committee, 
judging that representation by them would be superior 
to that of "the chairmen of the various noisy and 
separatist committees got together by the Council of 
Foreign Bondholders."3 Mr. Hamond left for the Ea.st 
but the press attacks continued. so that a meeting of the 
Turkish holders was convened on December JO merely to 
pass a resolution reaffirming faith in the Corporation 
1sRectator, XLVIII (Oct. 2J, 1875), 1319. 
2The Tiples, Oct. 18, 1875, P• 7. 
3112.!!i.•• Dec. 8, 1875, P• 7. 
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and registering surprise at the animadversions cast upon 
their group. 1 
At a meeting on January 10, 1876. convoked by 
E. H. Palmer, it was announced that his efforts had been 
paralyzed and that the Council was to blame. Still. the 
fragmentation of the bondholders had not run its course, 
for although Palmer boasted that the combination repre-
sented between £600,000 and ~700,000 of tribute loan 
securities, a new group had sprung up which would even-
tually join ranks with the Council--the Egyptian Tribute 
Bondholders League. .The new oommi ttee felt, as did the 
Corporation, that each loan should keep its individual 
security, and well might they argue this, for the Khedive 
had lived up to the letter of the bond by forwarding the 
tribute to the Bank of England, where it lay awaiting 
the ~ignature of the Turkish ambassador for its release. 
But the ambassador approved the remittance of only hal:f' 
of the funds, in accordance with the Sultan's decree of 
October, l:J7.5. 2 
Members of the Tribute League were present at the 
Palmer conclave of Janua.r; 10 only to distribute copies of 
1Money Market Review, XXXII (Jan. 8, 1876), 31. 
2Wyn..11e, p. 419. 
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their protest and of a statement of their raison d'etre.1 
They claimed to have the backing of £682,000 worth of 
tribute stock holdings and felt confident that British 
interest in the Levant was rising. On January 16 the 
League put forth a pamphlet designed to garner adherents. 
and on March 6 they held a private meeting. Their ob-
jective was to obtain the release of the funds via the 
courts, and if necessary, to call upon the Western Powers 
should the Sultan attempt to appropriate the Khedive•s 
payments. Throughout the first half of 1876 the Tribute 
League ran an independent course from the Corporation, 
but on its governing committee sat Mr. George Taylor. 
a •council' members thus a channel of communication existed 
between the two bodies. Reference will be made again to 
the League and to the tribute loans since they are related 
to both the debt of Egypt and to the development of the 
Council. 
Abusive exchanges with Dent, Palmer and Company 
persisted but the Council met with as little result as 
the contractor. In late February Mr. Hamond reported on 
1standard, Jan. 11, 1876, ACFB, Turkey, VIII, 26. 
The points of the Tribute League•s objections may be 
found here. An account of the meeting is given in the 
Money Market Review (XXXII (Jan. 15, 1876], 65). 
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the negative outcome of his journey to the Golden Horn.1 
The Council decided that efforts toward a settlement 
should be continued, but for those securities not having 
the :Egyptian tribute as hypothecated revenue, effective 
action had ground to a halt. With the revocation of the 
decree of October, 1875. although no agreement was reached 
it appeared to the Corporation that its own usefulness had 
ended. 2 Turkey•s desperate position and intransigence 
militated against a settlement, but bondholder disunity 
was just as damaging. Notables. philanthropists, and 
financial practitioners, representing various groups or 
no one in particular, poiulated Constantinople and badgered 
the local English officials and buttonholed members of the 
Sultan's entourage for support. 
The Corporation, as well as the English holders 
in general, soon realized that their French compatriots, 
possessing poorer security for their money, were in no mood 
to cooperate in maintaining the old arrangements. Mr. Hamond 
remarked with heat that M. Bour,e, leader of the French 
bondholders, had telegraphed ahead to the Porte announcing 
that they did not support his mission,3 while Palmer wrote1 
1For an account of the meeting, see the Money Mar-
ket Review (XXXII [Feb. 26, 1876], 248-50). 
2~., XXXIV (April 14, 1877), J8J, 
3Financier. Feb. 25, 1876, P• 5. 
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The Minister most opposed to any exceptional 
consideration for the Tribute loan was Youssouf 
Pasha, the then Minister of Finance, possibly at 
the instigation of the French section of the 
General Bondholders.l 
This lack of unity, and a stricture from the press, 
placed the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders on the 
defensive and colored its approach to the Egyptian 
problem which was unraveling itself at the same time. 
The Council's report for 1873 had stated: 
It is now sufficiently recognisable that defaulting 
states so far co-operate together that they take 
example from each other's misdeeds, and it needs a 
thorough union of Bondholders to resist their ag-
gressions, and to bring to their minds the convic-
tion that neglect of obligation to any one class of 
holders will bel')met by certain exclusion from the 
united markets,' 
The hope for unity was to fade, but there seemed to be 
substance in the idea that nations would emulate the mal-
practices of the defaulter, and this possibility, fearful 
as it was, rose before the eyes of many, in respect to 
Egypt, upon the news of the October decree of the Sultan, 
Egyptian sacurities began to decline rapidly, as did the 
price of bank shares. 
1Pamphlet enclosed in ACFB, T;urkey, x. 
2co;r:e, For, Bondh, Rep., 1873, p, 4o, 
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By late October, 1876, the Globe reported that 
railway construction in the Sudan had been curtailed to 
save money, 1 and telegrams became more gloomy by the day. 
The Alexandria correspondent for The Times bore witness 
to the economic deline1 
Certain, however, it is that heaps of people will 
be cleaned out: The losses are enormous, and the 
place has been in a state of the most complete 
panic all the week.2 
The floating debt was snowballing, and was es-
timated by the French agent to be between four and six 
hundred million francs by December.J With the situation 
decaying rapidly, Ismail decided to take his plight to the 
Western Powers, and by carefully treading the line dividing 
France and .England, and the secured and unsecured creditors, 
this Oriental funambulist aspired to emerge financially 
rejuvenated, with his power intact. 
The Egyptian Policy of the British 
Governments November 1875 
to May 1876 
The English Prime Minister of the day, Benjamin 
Disraeli, had taken office in February of 1874 with a 
1Globe, Oct. 27, 1875, ACFB, Egypt, I, 296. 
2The Times, Nov. 4, 1875, p. 6. JBouvier, p. 75. 
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majority of J68 to 250 over the Liberals, excluding the 
fifty-four Irish members. The anti-colonial feeling of 
an earlier day had peaked by the mid-186o•s, and Disraeli's 
victory was due, in great measure, to his emphasis on Em-
pire and security. His appeal found a response which had 
been prepared by a decline in British prestige on the Con-
tinent and a vague pessimism caused by economic depression. 
For some time the more influential journals, the Money 
Market Review, for example, had called. for Government 
assistance on behalf of .the English bondholders 1 
It need scarcely be said that the attitude of our 
Foreign Office has been weak, and that the principle 
of non-intervention, used up in Europe, and worn out 
to a rag, has been a means of weakening English dip-
lomacy, by an avowal of incompetency and of an in-
disposition to resist fraud and oppression. This 
has to be stayed, and the steady action of the Council 
of Foreign Bondholders, and of the Committees in co-
operation with it, will be well directed in helping 
to restore the functions of the Foreign Office to a 
healthful exercise.l -
Many members of the 'Council' looked with satisfaction 
upon the Conservative triumph, and at the General Court 
of 1874, General Sir George Balfour, M.P. for Kincardine-
shire, opined that "the new Government would give greater 
attention to foreign matters," which, translated into the 
needs of the bondholders, meant "influence which might 
be exercised by the British Ministers in various ways."2 
1Money Market Review, XXI (Sept. 10, 1870). 251. 
2Ibid., XXVIII (Feb. 28, 1874), 27J-74. 
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Disraeli's imperial policy has been characterized 
as the product of an "impossible romancer • • • an irres-
ponsible novelist, 111 with policy in the East held up as 
an example. Egypt, which had hitherto occupied but a 
modest corner of the world's stage, had been slowly 
edging into the spotlight. Nowhere more keenly than in 
London was this alteration felt. Although the amount of 
trade between the United Kingdom and Africa was not sig-
nificant in these years, that with Egypt was not to be 
despised, seventy-fi"re per cent of the Nile Valley's im-
ports came from the United Kingdom, a level which remained 
fairly stable for the entire decade. 2 Cotton was the 
1John Lyle Morison, "The Imperial Ideas of Benjamin 
Disraeli," Canadian Historical Heview, I n.s. (Sept., 1920), 
278. 
2Ashworth, PP• 143 and 146. The trade of the United 
Kingdom with Africa is cited in the above work as follows1 
Period Percentage of Ex- Percentage of Im-
ports to Africa ports from Africa 
1860-69 5.9 8.4 
1870-79 5.5 6.o 
1880-89 5.5 4.8 
A table of British trade with Egypt (1860-74) may be found 
in an article, entitled "Recent Foreign Loans, Their In-
fluence on Trade and the Rate of Discount," in Bankers 
Magazine (XXXVI (June, 18761, 40J). Another source, 
the Statist (I (March 2J, ie7a], 6) discussed the diffi-
culties and cited statistics on trade with Egypt. There 
was much faith in the yearly statistical summary of Egyptian 
commerce released by R. J. Mosse of Alexandria. 
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Nilotic region's chief export and with the end of the 
boom in 1865, the country sank back to the position of 
a third-rate contributor to the English looms. 1 Further-
more, Egyptian cotton became so notorious for its poor 
quality that in 1874 a deputation of M.P.'s from the 
textile towns presented the Foreign Secretary a memorial 
on the subject. 2 Such publicity, coupled with the slug-
gish British economy, helped to pull down Egyptian cotton 
prices 19 per cent from March 1875 to the spring of 1879.3 
In addition, in 1873 there was a collapse of the market 
for English plain and printed goods. 4 
It was not her commerce, nor yet the rising level 
of .English capital being drawn into Egypt, but rather the 
Suez Canal which most interested London. While the empire 
of Louis Napoleon toyed with the idea of creating de Lesseps 
the Duke of Suez, a team of British naval officers from 
the India Office were inspecting the new waterway with 
1
"The Distress of the Cotton Trade and the Future 
Cotton Supply," Economist, XXVII (Nov. 6, 1869), 1)08. 
By this date Egypt, Brazil and others together supplied 
one-sixth of British cotton needs. 
2The Times, June 12, 1874, p. 5. 
Jstatist, III (April 5, 1879), 111. 
4samuel B. Saul, Studies in British overseas Trade, 
1870-1914 {Liverpool1 Liverpool University Press, 1960), 
p. 101. 
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regard for its military usefulness. The importance of 
the "Great Ditch" to the trade of the United Kingdom was 
soon evident. In 187.5, 1,494 vessels passed through the 
Canal, paying £1,1.51,000r of these, 1,061 ships were 
British and supplied £844,680 in tolls.1 The trans-
isthmian route also reduced the journey from London to 
Calcutta by J,200 miles--thirteen days by steamer--which 
affected a savings to the shippers as well. 2 The completion 
of the Canal and the linking of London with Bombay by cable 
in 1870 drew the Empire that much closer together. But 
Egypt was a part of the ottoman Empire despite its quasi-
independent status, and the Compagnie Universelle du Canal 
Maritime de Suez was a French operation headed by a man 
with a score to evens 
The Canal had been attacked so bitterly and so con-
stantly by English interests that de Lesseps took an 
almost fiendish delight in putting the thumb-screws 
on British shipowners.J 
Both Liberal and Conservative Ministries had staunchly 
championed the cause of the shippers, 4 and several abor-
tive schemes to buy the waterway or even to dig another 
1
"The Suez Canal an International Highway," Quarterly Review, CXLII (Oct., 1876), 454. 
2Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, XXIV (March J, 1876), 279.80. 
3crabitas, The Spoliation of Suez, p. 141. 
4Lt.-Col. Sir Arnold T. Wilson, The Suez Cana.la 
Its Past, Present and Future (Oxfordt OXford University 
Press, 19JJ), pp. 46-50. 
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came to nothing, including the negotiations carried on 
in 1874-75 by Disraeli in Paris through his friends the 
Rothschilds. 1 
Important as Egypt was to Great Britain, she con-
tented herself with relying upon influence in Cairo to 
achieve her wishes, and, when necessary, applying to the 
Sultan for his added authority. France believed that 
England was following a policy which would bind the Nile 
Valley closely to England, 2 yet at Downing Street, Egyp-
tian dispatches were still subsumed with the Turkish 
documents, and the antediluvian consular machinery for 
the Levant was to creak on until 1877, when it was re-
formed. The English press was also quiescent on the topic 
of a British penetration of Egypt, although there was the 
occasional article which speculated on the division of 
the "Sick Man's" effects once he should succumb.3 The 
1Hallberg, P• 222. Offers were extended from 
several quarters, including one from a private group led 
by Sir John Pender and the Duke of Sutherland, two indi7i-
duals much involved in Egyptian enterprise. 
2nuc Decazes to Pellissier. Dec. 3, 1875, quoted 
in Bouvier, p. SJ. The French Foreign Minister gave as 
an example England's monopolizing the key positions in 
agriculture, commerce, and public works. 
JFor example, see Lepel Griffin, "·!'he Present 
State of the Eastern Question," Fortnightly Review, 
X:V n.s. (Jan., 1874), 21-42. 
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situation was drastically altered between October, 1875, 
and late spring, 1876, when it seemed an "Egyptian policy" 
was unfolding. Anti-Turk sentiment, exacerbated by the 
recent default, merged with anti-Russian feeling which 
counseled laying claim to Egypt before it was permanently 
lost. Even the Conservative papers began to think that 
the dismemberment of Turkey might be advisable.1 Sig-
nificance was seen in the Khediva•s son receiving the 
Star of Indias at the same time, in early November a rash 
of articles appeared, such as the Pall Mall Gazette's 
"Egypt for the English," which heightened expectations. 2 
We have already alluded to the unsuccessful struggle 
of the Corporation on behalf of the Turkish bondholders, 
and to the adverse publicity which damaged its reputation 
in certain circles. The Council, like the Egyptian bond-
holders in general, watched the bewildering turbulence of 
Egyptian affairs, unable to penetrate the froth and foam 
of the surface to determine the direction of the current 
of events. As long as Ismail paid his coupons, nothing 
could be done. Thus the holders remained apart, relying 
on the letter of their bonds, eaeh searching for signs, 
1 Lee, P• 9, 
2George c. Thompson, Public o inion and Lord 
Beaconsfieldt 1875-80 (Londona Macmillan Co., 1886), I, 
238. Many o her articles are cited in this work to show 
the lively interest generated by Egypt in the period. 
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while behind closed doors the Khedive strained to fend 
off bankruptcy, and foreign capitalists and their govern-
ments were to concoct scheme after scheme to solve the 
problem and bring Ismail under control. Therefore, 
the actions of the Government were eagerly monitored by 
the English creditors, for it was axiomatic that the more 
deeply Britain became embroiled in Egyptian finance, the 
better it was for the holders, As long as it appeared 
that the Government was interested in staving off Khedivial 
bankruptcy, which they were, there was no need for bond-
holder activity. 
Cabinet solidarity upon the Egyptian question un-
fortunately did not exist, or as Punch interpreted it. 
"the Cabinet coach had the Derby drag on, and showy 
driving from Ben on the box. "l Foreign Secretary Derby, 
who was assessed by a journalist of the day as thoughtful, 
cautious, lacking in oratorical skill but possessing a wide 
aptitude for business, 2 held the least popular view that 
1Punch, LXXI (Aug. 12, 1876), 70. By early March, 
1876, both Carnarvon and Northcote had become concerned 
over the effects upon France of divergent telegrams being 
sent by Derby and Disraeli (Hardinge, II, 93). 
Street 
• pp. 81-R. Ro 
83. 
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there was no interest which would force England into 
Egypt, while the Prime Minister•s "imagination cannot 
have been so limited, .. although "he used none but vague 
phrases .. on the subject.1 At the Lord Mayor's banquet on 
November 10, 1875. Disraeli spoke of England•s stake in 
the Middle East, and even the Khedive and his court began 
purchasing stock for the rise, through Parisian houses. 2 
Disraeli's coup de th4!tre which would widen the dichotomy 
of views within the Government was indeed close at hand. 
One of the last salable assets possessed by Isma.11 
Pasha was the block of 176,602 shares of the Suez Canal 
Company. Upon learning of their availability for purchase, 
Disraeli obtained the Cabinet's reluctant approval on 
November 17 to tender an offer, despite Lord Derby's 
opinion that such an action would lead to "disagreeable 
correspondence both with France and the Porte."J 
On November 12 the Khedive had signed a contract 
with a French banker in which a one-week option was given 
to arrange a loan with the Suez shares as collateral. While 
1Buckle and Monypenny, V, 45J. 
2~, Nov. 19, 1875, ACFB, Egypt, I, 224. 
3Derby to Lyons, Nov. 19, 1875, Lord Newton, 
Lord Lyons, a Reeord of British Diplomacy (Londons 
Edward Arnold, 1913), Il, 87. 
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these sub rosa negotiations were being carried on be-
tween several French houses, the news was leaked to the 
British Government, and Derby inquired of his agent in 
Paris, Lord Lyons, if he had heard such rumors, since 
England viewed them as serious and would herself be pre-
pared to make the purchase.1 .Although the correspondence 
between the houses of Rothschilds was generally "extra-
ordinarily uninteresting."2 it may be that one o:f' that 
family•s agents did catch wind o:f' the negotiations in 
Paris or Cairo. Perhaps more plausible was the sugges-
tion that it was Henry Oppenheim, acting on his own or 
on the Viceroy's authority, who wished London involved in 
the salvaging of Egyptian fortunes. If so, his choice of 
Frederick Greenwood, the editor of the solidly conserva• 
tive Pall Mall Gazette, was the right one, for on being 
told of the contemplated sale on the evening of November 
14, he went directly to Downing Street.J Disraeli en-
thusiastically wrote his Sovereign, "Tis an affair of 
millions, about four at leasts but would give the possessor 
an immense, not to say preponderating, influence in the 
1Derby to Lyons, Nov. 17, 1875, ibid., p. 86, 
2stephen L. Gwynn and Gertrude M. Tuckwell, 
The Life of the Rt Hon Sir Charles W Di ke Bart M.P. 
Lon on1 John Murray, 9 7 , I, • 
3-::uckle and M.onypenny, V, 439-40, 
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management of the Canal,"1 but the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Sir Stafford Northcote, never a convert to 
bold action in Egypt, feared that "suspicion will be 
excited that we mean quietly to buy ourselves a pre-
ponderating position, then turn the whole thing into 
an English property."2 Decisiveness seemed imperative, 
for Sir John Rose, a member of the •counci1.•3 had 
informed the Government that there were now several 
French parties bidding for the shares.4 Under these 
circumstances the attitude of the Quai d'Orsay had to 
be determined. 
London had made it clear to the French charge 
that Britain could not allow the Khedive's shares to fall 
101sraeli to Queen Victoria, Nov. 18, 1875, 
~., P• 443. 
2Northcote to Disraeli, Nov. 26, 1875, Great 
Britain, Iddesleigh Papers, British Museum Additional 
Yianuscripts (hereafter BM Add MSS) 50017, p. 129 (copy). 
3s1r John Rose (1820-88) was born in Scotland but 
Amigrated to Canada, where he engaged successfully in 
commerce and entered government in 1857. He held several 
posts and proved useful to Downing Street. In 1868 he 
came to London to float a railway loan1 there, in 1870, 
he joined an investment bank and, shortly thereafter, the 
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, where he could look 
after Canadian interests (~, XVII, 242). 
4w. H. Smith to Northcote, Nov. 2.3, 187.5. 
Iddesleigh Papers BM Add WJSS 50017, P• 118. 
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into French hands 1 1 and notified General Stan.ton. the 
English agent in Cairo. to advise the Viceroy not to 
finalize an arrangement without listening to London first, 
Confronted in this manner, the French Foreign Minister, 
the Due Decazes, presented no serious objections to the 
purchase2 despite his angry histrionics before The Times 
correspondent Blowitz.3 There was no doubt that the 
Third Republic placed great value upon the friendship 
of Great Britain, which would explain their policy, but 
in addition there were personal motives, The Credit 
Foncier of Paris, which formed the focal point of all 
combinations willing to purchase the shares, suddenly 
opposed the entire scheme and in doing so, left the 
United Kingdom alone in the field, 4 The French houses 
1 Hallberg, p, 238, 
2Robert Blake, Disraeli (Garden City, N,Y.a Anchor 
Book, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1968), p. 557. Any dis-
pleasure of the Quai d'Orsay was not evident in the press {Lucien E, Roberts, "Egypt as a Factor in European. Power 
Politics, 1875-1878," in Power, Public ff1nionb and Dip-
lomacy, ed. by Lillian P. Wallace and W !lam • Askew 
[Durham, N,C,1 Duke University Press, 1959], pp. 49-50), 
3crabit&s, The Spoliation of Suez, pp. 173-74. 
4charles Lesage, L'Invasion an laise in tes 
L'Achat des Actions de Suez novem re Parsi P on-
Nourrit, Cie., 190 • P• 55. 
hoped to unburden themselves od Khedivial paper by 
utilizing the prestige which would accrue from the 
involvement of the British Government. The Due Decazes, 
a man knowledgeable in Middle Ea.stern affairs through his 
membership in the Imperial Ottoman Bank,1 and greatly 
immersed in the activities of the Credit Foneier, 2 also 
had a stake in these negotiations. 
The transaction was closed on November 23, and 
in three days the stock was delivereds the Rothschilds 
advanced the almost £4 million purchase price (at 2.5 
per cent commission), un'til Parliament could approve the 
proceedings, which it did on February 20, 1876. In the 
long run this speculation with public money in a private 
venture was most profitable,J but it made England also 
another creditor of the Khedive, for he and his minister 
Nubar Pasha had carefully hidden the fact that the stock 
was not free from encumbrance. The Viceroy had lost the 
revenue upon his shares until 1895, and at a meeting on 
1Bouvier, P• 101. 
2charles R. Wilson to Disraeli. April l, 1876, 
quoted in Rich~r~ A. t}ffiRsa P~rbti~f Polict1Towangf ~~fty1~r6c~ifo~l~ atsB:rkel;y: i96~)~ :. 5~: n -
JHallberg, p. 2J8. The shares were purchased at 
£2J each, slightly above prevailing market ~rices, but 
by 1881 ~hey were quoted at £78, and by 1905 the English 
block was worth £JJ million. 
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August 24, 1871, the Canal Company had also stripped the 
shares of all voting power for the same periods thus the 
Khedive was liable to England for an annual payment of 
£200,000, and any role in Canal management which Britain 
might play had to be negotiated with de Lesseps.1 
Great was the surprise and general approval of 
the populace on learning of their Prime Minister's ~ 
de forces led by The Times (which usually opposed Dis-
raeli, though perhaps less so on imperial policy)2 
England's journals paid their court. Mr. Gladstone, who 
assumed a negative stance,3 admitted that 0 a storm of 
approbation seems to swell, almost to rage, on every side."4 
1 rn an arrangement signed on February 3, 1876, 
between Stokes , representing England, and the Canal Com-
pany, the United Kingdom received three of the twenty-four 
seats on the Board of Directors, along with a promised in-
crease in their representation in 1895. Charles Rivers 
Wilson was one of the men deputed by the Government to 
represent London (Hallberg, pp~ 247~9). see Crabites (The Spoliation of Suez, p. 184) for the text of the agree-
ment. 
2Lord Esher (p. 61) viewed The Times as usually 
hostile to Disraeli, while Paul Knaplund (Gladstone's 
Forei~ Policy (New Yorks Harper and Bros., l9J5], p. 66) 
noted his sympathy toward the Prime Minister on imperial 
matters. 
JThis opposition was forgotten, for on September 
27, 1882, Mr. Gladstone suggested to Lord Granville that 
the Government make an additional purchase (Knaplund, 
P• 165). 
4
a1adstone to Granville, Nov. 28, 1875, Agatha 
Ramm, ed., The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone 
and Lord Granville~ l868-z6, Camden Third Series, LXXXII (Londona Buttler, anner and Co., 1952), II, 473. 
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No evidence exists that Disraeli actually designed to 
throw over Turkey for a new Egyptian policy,1 but he 
certainly realized the importance of this route to 
India and defended his actions in Commons as follows1 
I have never recommended this purchase as a f inan-
cial investment •••• I do not recommend it either 
as a commercial speculation. • • • I have always and 
do now recommend it to the country as a political 
transaction.2 
The Prime Minister had obtained a counter in the dip-
loma tic game, while the press had labeled Egypt terra 
Britannica, should Turkey collapse. To investors in 
Egyptian securities such prospects were most welcome. 
Sir George Elliot, M.P. for North Durham (and deeply 
involved in. Egypt) voiced his support of the purchase,.3 
Goschen took the same view--considering it a wise poli-
tical stratagem4--while the Chairman of the Bank of Egypt 
remarkedi 
It [the step taken by England] appears to have 
commanded the general approbation of the country. 
and I have no doubt whatever that our Government 
1B1ake, P• 561. 
2Quoted in Roberts, "Egypt as a Factor," p, 55 • 
.3areat Britain, Parliament, Hansard•s Parliamentary 
Debates (hereafter Hansard), Jd ser., Vol. 231 (Aug. 5, 
i876), col. 6Jl. 
4Goschen to Granville, Dec. 
Fitzmaurice, Life of George Leveson 
Granville' K.G., lBl5-lB9l (London: 
Co., 1905 , II, 158. 
7, 1875, Lord Edmond 
Gower, Second Earl 
Longmans, Green and 
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has been well informed of what they are about, 
and that they have taken a cautious and prudent 
step, and one that h~reafter we shall find of 
great benefit to us.l 
The Corporation also looked with favor on the 
Government•s policy and saw in it a potential advantage 
to the bondholders1 
The recent policy of the British Government in 
acquiring the Viceroy's interest in the shares of 
the Suez Canal may be made, it is to be hoped, the 
basis for founding a system of administration better 
adapted to the real development of the resources ~f 
the country, and the establishment of its credit. 
Some •council' members, the Deputy Chairman John Lubbock 
among them, favored the purchase but disliked the arcane 
way in which it had been brought about, since it had 
caused much speculation on the Exchange.3 But another 
member, Mr. Philip Rose, was pleased that negotiations 
had succeeded at all, for as he reminded Corryt 
rs it not curious that the arrangement which I 
was urging upon Mr. D. 18 months ago, to secure 
the Suez Canal for the English Govt., should have 
been brought about, tho• in a much better way, 
as my plan contemplated an arrangement with 
Lesseps and his Company, whereas they have now 
got a title from the Sovereign, f.Tld have helped 
that sovereign at the same time?'¥ 
1Bankers Magazine, XX.XVI (March, 1876), 219. 
2corp, For, Bondh. Rep., 1875. P• 16. 
3Hansard, Jd ser., Vol. 231 (Aug. 8, 1876), col. 855, 
4Philip Rose to Corry, Dec. l, 1875, Buckle and 
Monypenny, v, ~51. 
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If the shares purchase was to be a signal for Jritish 
expansion, there were certainly many on the •council' 
who could look with approbation upon the fact, 1 
As encomiums poured in from all sides; the Con-
servative Government contemplated its next move. Bismarck 
was quick to congratulate Britain warmly on its demarch, 
and on November 29, 1875, broached the subject of an 
eventual division of the Ottoman Ernpire. 2 To mollify 
France, however, on November 27 the British Foreign 
Secretary informed the French Ambassador that England 
was not averse to the establishment of an International 
Commission to manage the Canal• This ignited the vigorous 
opposition of Lord Carna.rvon, the Colonial Secretary, 
the only Minister of Government who actively promoted an 
aggressive posture in Egypt.3 On November 29, 1875, he 
1Aside from the societies already mentioned, several 
'Council' members were enrolled in the Royal Colonial In-
stitute, established in 1868• and they included two of its 
trustees, Sir John Rose and Lord Kinnaird, as well as 
Augustus B. Abraham, Hyde Clarke, and Sir John Lubbock. 
Other members of the Royal Colonial Institute interested 
in F.gypt included Stephen Cave,, George Goschen, Sir Henry 
Drmnmond Wolff, and, interestingly, Hermann Oppenheim. The 
Royal Asiatic Society, a more scholarly group, included 
among its membership General Sir George Balfour and William 
Trotter, also from Moorgate Street. 
2Lee, P• 20. 
JThe Secretary for India also expressed a willing-
ness to see Britain intervene in~~he. Turkish Empire <Salis-bw::':'l. to Mal~t Jan 14 18?6 La~ Gwendolen Ce~li, L1:re 
01· "Rooer-c;- i•1ia~u1s• oI' !>aJ.isbLry [London a Hodder and Staugh-
ton, Ltd,, 19 -J2], II, 86). 
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laid his views before the Prime Minister, arguing that 
they should pause over their success and study the temper 
of Europe and of the British people, since "the control of 
the Canal is valuable as a step to the control of Egypt."1 
For the English public, the policy which emerged was a con-
fusing affair: while Lord Derby gave speeches designed to 
dampen public ardor, a mission was sent forth to Cairo to 
look into the financial affairs of the Khedive. The gentle-
man selected to make the inquiry for the Government was 
Stephen Cave, M.P., a Bristol banker who held the post 
of Paymaster General. 2 
On October JO, and again on November 16, 1875, 
the Viceroy had requested England to send out financial 
experts to assist in the modernization of the Egyptian ad-
ministration; but red tape held matters up, for by Novem-
ber 26, the day of the shares purchase, the Treasury re-
ported that not enough information ha.d been given.:3 On 
1carnarvon to Disraeli, Nov. 29, 1875, Carnarvon 
Papers PRO FO J0/6/11. · 
2sir Stephen Cave (1820-80) passed the bar in 
1846, and from 1859 until his death sat for Shoreham in 
the Conservative interest. He was both a traveler and a 
linguist, and possessed much financial experience, since 
he was a member of the Bank of England and was placed on 
the Parliamentary Committee to investigate foreign loans 
in 1875 (m:ill,., III, 1250). 
3Parliamentary Papers. LXXXII, Egypt No. 4 (1876), 
c. lJ96, Nos. 1-5. 
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the same day Mr. Stephen Cave was selected,1 and three 
days later General Stanton was apprised of the mission's 
early departure for Egypt. 2 Although no written in-
structions to Cave survive, the objective of the jour-
ney was to determine if Egypt could continue to meet her 
obligations, 3 if necessary with the aid of a financial 
advisor, and, if the Khedive could be convinced that such 
a need existed, to arrange for the arrival of a second 
emissary. The wishes of France were not consulted, for 
it was feared that Paris would use the Viceroy's pecuniary 
embarrassments to obtain control over the Cairo Government. 
The public looked on with interest as a high officer of 
the Crown prepared to vacate his duties for several months, 
and. accompanied by a staff drawn from the Foreign Off ice 
and War Department, departed for Egypt, all in response 
to Ismail's desire for two clerks, 
1 On November 26 the Prime Minister suggested 
Cave for the Egyptian mission (Buckle and Monypenny, 




On arriving in F.gypt on December 16, Cave folmd 
himself surrounded by intrigants, 1 mountebanks, money-
lenders, and groups of major capitalists, and in the 
midst of it all, an agitated prince who disliked the 
precedent for foreign interference which was being set. 2 
De Lesseps soon appeared on the scene and busily engaged 
in persuading the Khedive to part with his founder's 
rights to 15 per cent of the profits of the Canal Company 
(which was now beginning to produce revenue) for a loan of 
£2 million at 9 per cent.J Henry Oppenheim informed the 
British Foreign Office that de Lesseps had come to Cairo 
with a plan to form a company "to lease the Egyptian rail-
ways, the harbour of Alexandria and tobacco dues and thus 
to furnish the money for paying off the floating debt."4 
10ne of the arch-intrigants in a land of artifice 
was Nubar Pasha, who fancied himself the Bismarck of Egypt. 
He worked against Mr. Cave's investigation, but when Ismail 
discovered he was leaking information to the Greek Consul 
General, and was in touch with the Russian agent as well, 
Nubar was exiled (Stanton to Derby, Dec. 2J, 1872. Great 
Britain, PRO Foreign Office Confidential Prints Lhereafter 
PRO FOCP1 407/7, No. JO, P• lls Atkins, P• 116). For a 
sketch of Nubar, see Cromer, II, 335-40. 
2cave to Derby, Dec. 2J, 1875, PRO FOCP 407/7, 
No. 18, P• 8. 
Jcave to Derby, Dec. 20, 1875, ~ •• No. 17, p. B. 
40ppenheim to Corry, Dec. Jl, 1875, quoted in 



















If such were the case, English capitalists (principally 
those connected with Sir George Elliot who, as contrac-
tor for the new dock facilities, was still owed £1.4 mil-
lion, 1 and many bondholders, especially those of 1873) 
would have much to complain of, since these securities 
had already been hypothecated, 
Oppenheim was not a neutral observer, for he 
himself was trying to gain support for a project of his 
own contrivance to prop up Egyptian finance. 2 The Duke 
of Sutherland, at~other personage with economic ties in 
Egypt, also had a solution to the Viceregal embarrass-
ments, but he contented himself with personally carrying 
his cause to the Prime Minister,J such was not the case 
with the combination represented by Sir George Elliot. As 
the director of the Telegraph Construction and Maintenance 
p. 66. 
l Edward Valet to Salisbury, Feb. 18, 1880, ~ •• 
2Northcote to Cave, Jan. J, 1876, Iddesleigh 
Papers BM Add MSS )0063/185 {copy). 
JGeorge Granville William Sutherland Leveson-
Gower, Third Duke of Sutherland (1828-92), represented 
sutherlandshire in Parliament from 1851 to 1801. He 
was not politically minded, and preferred travel, rail-
way buil4ing. land reclamation, and the development of 
his urban holdings. such as those in Cairo (DNB, rr. 
1026-27; Atkins. P• 661 Baron Samuel Selig de Kusel, 
An English.Iran's Recollections of Egypt, 1863 to 188 
London1 John Lane, 1951 , p. 9 
.i,I 
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Company, this gentleman had for years been deeply 
interested in Egypt's communication system, and 
appreciated its importance to Britain. While Elliot 
betook himself to the Levant to promote his scheme and 
to obtain the adherence of Mr. Cave, J. c. Parkinson, 
his son-in-law, remained in London to cultivate Govern-
ment support. Backing Elliot was the Imperial ottoman 
Bank, Glyn Mills, and most likely Friihling and Goschen.1 
The Government gave no official cognizance to any of 
these would-be nostrums. 
For the M.P. for Shoreham far from home and under 
great pressure, matters became less clear, and he was soon 
admitting to the Foreign Office that he liked the Elliot 
proposals, and reported on January 22 that Ismail preferred 
them too. 2 More disquieting to Downing Street was the news 
that Cave had used his influence with Stanton to gain 
additional time for the British capitalists,3 whereupon 
Derby demanded an immediate denial1 a few days later the 
Elliot plan collapsed. The plan was actually doomed when 
the Rothschilds chose to remain aloor. 4 a fact which. 
1 Bouvier, P• 8.5. 
2cave to Derby, Jan. 22, 1876, PRO FOCP 407/7, 
No. 77, P• 38. 
JElliot to Parkinson, Feb. 1, 1876, ~ •• 
No. 81, P• 44. 
4Northcote to Disraeli, Feb. 2, 1876, Iddesleigh 
Papers BM Add MSS 50017, P• 158 {copy). 
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when communicated to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
did not surprise him since he had felt for weeks that 
Egyp,tian bankruptcy was a foregone matter.1 
More anxious for a settlement than the English 
groups and more heedless. too. of the rights of the 
bondholders, were the French bankers who banded to-
gether in early 1876 as the Grand Syndicate, 2 which 
included Oppenheim-Alberti, the Anglo-Egyptian Bank, 
and the bulwark of the combination, the Credit Foncier, 
under the nominal leadership of Edouard Hentsch of the 
Comptoir d'Escompte. The immediate objectives of the 
Syndicate were to maintain market prices of Egyptian 
securities by purchase on the open market, and to grant 
extensions on Khedivial paper so that they would have time 
to devise a project to allow them to transfer their share 
of the debt to the public. They anticipated imposing 
their will upon the Viceroy in order to obtain solid 
hypothecations, and placing the necessary loan for the debt 
consolidation in a preferential position. In short, the 
bonds of all other issues were to be abridged insofar as 
they impinged upon the new arrangement. Such an attitude 
1Hardinge, II, 93. 
2Eighteen banks constituting the Grand Syndicate 
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seemed to them justified by the situation. By February 
the Anglo-Egyptian had lost £444,ooo on its holdings,1 
but in Paris, where holdings of F.gyptian paper were con-
servatively estimated at e7.6 million2 (and which probably 
well exceeded £20 million), nerves were frayed. The Credit 
Foncier, whose bylaws forbade investment in such securities. 
and who.se billcase could be examined only by its Governor 
and De?uty Governor--both of whom were chosen by the French 
Government--and the Finance Minister, had acquired £5.75 mil-
lion (141 million francs) in Egyptian paper.3 
Since it appeared that Cave was in Cairo to support 
English capitalists, the ex-Finance Minister of Italy, 
s, Soialoja, was also dispatched, while the Due Decazes 
sent the tactless and abrasive Maxim Outrey, who had been 
removed as agent in Egypt in 1867 at the behest of th4 
Viceroy. outrey•s sojourn probably did more harm than 
goods one of his favorite themes was that "l!hgland was 
trying to obtain possession of Egypt,"4 Jules Pasttf, 
the Syndicate's man on the scene, pressed vigorously for 
the creation of a National Bank of Egyp~ with his institu• 
tion as lts nucleus, which could consolidate the debt into 
No, 47, 
1Barclays Bank, P• 80. 
2The Times, April 12, 1876, P• 8. 
'Ibid., May a, 1876. P• a. 
4stanton to Derby, Jan. 15, 1876, 
P• 20. 
PRO FOCP 407/7 1 
181 
salable obligations. By the time of Cave's departure, 
a contract had been signed, but the British Foreign Of-
fice refused to be a party to it or to send a commissioner 
to partieipate,1 thereby ruining its chances for success. 
While plans to send Wilson went ahead, Derby re-
jected France's suggestion of restricting Viceregal. res-
ponsibility by arguing that Her Majesty's Government "have 
no reason to suppose that the Khedive desires the estab-
lishment of any system of control over his finances by 
foreign governments. 112 Cave was alive to the power which 
an English financial adviser might wield in Cairo.3 His 
report, released in April, 1876, emphasized En.gland's 
desire to use financial influence to guide Eo"71Jt, for it 
advised that the Khedive "should place a person who would 
command general confidence, such, for instance, as the 
financial agent sent out by Her Majesty•s Govemment 
to take employment under his Highness. 114 Again there was 
1Derby to Stanton, March 6, 1876, ibid., No. 141, 
P• 77. The Foreign Secretary stated that !f"the bank com-
missioners had the power to eontrol revenue, England might 
reconsider its decision. This was reiterated in Parlia-
ment by the Prime Minister as well. 
2Derby to Lyons, Feb. 19, 1876, Pa~iamentary 
Papers, LXXXIII, F.gypt No. 8 (1876), c. 14 , No. 2• P• l, 
Jcave to Derby, Jan. 5, 1876, PRO FOCP 407/7, 
No. 49, P• 21. 
4Parliamenta§ Papers, LXXXIII, F.gypt No. 7 (1876), No, 7, C. 14 , P• §. 
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no allusion to Paris. When the document was eventually 
published, a periodical of the day remarkedt 
His whole Report is framed on the supposition 
that Egypt would somehow be treated for the 
future like a native Indian State. He does not 
say this in so many words1 but he continually points 
out that what is really wanted in Egypt is the pres-
ence of a body of officials like those who administer 
in India.1 
Ismail•s strategy was still to play the foreigners off 
against one another and to rest in the belief that his 
collapse would not be permitted, The French people, 
stirred by chauvinism engendered by the shares purchase, 
supported a strong stance in F.gypt. 2 In turn, their 
government worked closely with the Parisian bankers to 
present a solid front to the Viceroy.3 Ismail had been 
forced to mortgage his founder's rights in the Suez Canal 
in early February for a £) million loan, which was ab-
sorbed in Paris to meet interest due. 
English public opinion towards Egypt had begun 
to cool by early spring, with fewer journals speaking 
out as Government's policy became more ambiguous. But 
the Cabinet had not lost sight of Egypt's importance, 
1Saturd.a.y Review, XLI (April 8, 1876), 446. 
2Lyons to Derby, March 21, 1876, PRO FOCP 407/9, 
No. l, P• l. 
JBouvier, PP• 89-90. 
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and as Cave busied himself in completing his report, 
Downing Street prepared to carry into effect the second 
phase of its program. The Observer, edited by Edward 
Dicey, announced on February 12, 1876, that Charles 
Rivers Wilson, Comptroller General of the National Debt 
Office, had been selected as the financial expert to 
travel to Cairo,1 Two days before, Northcote had laid 
the off er before Wilson, promising him a six-month leave 
of absence, which the latter accepted. 2 Wilson's personal 
secretary on this mission described his chief as intelli-
gent and able to extricate himself from a tight corner. 
but "in all circumstances, his first consideration was 
for himself."J 
Wilson arrived in the Egyptian capital late in 
February after pausing en route to discuss matters with 
1charles Rivers Wilson (1831-1916) came of a finan-
cial background and in 1856 entered the Treasury as private 
secretary to the Financial Secretary. In 1874 he took up 
the duties of the National Debt Office, and in early Febru-
ary of 1876 was chosen to represent England at the Canal 
Board• which he did until 1896, when he retired from Govern-
ment, He maintained his connection with private enterprise 
and directed the Alliance Assurance Company {DNB, 1912-21, p. 
581-82). ---
2Northcote to Wilson, Feb. 10, 1876, Charles Rivers 
Wilson, Cha~ters from .My Official Life (London1 Edward 
Arnold, i9l ), p. 84. 
JFleetwood Guy Wilson, Letters to Somebody 
(Londons Cassell and Co., 1922), P• 51. 
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Cave in Paris. His task was to secure a settlement of 
the Egyptian floating debt which would be just both to 
the creditors and to the Viceroy,1 while at the same time 
representing English capitalists. Among the latter were 
Baring Brothers, and his friends, the Rothschilds, with 
whom he communicated by cyphered messages. The arrival 
of Wilson elicited the same response from Italy and France 
as had the Cave Missions from the former came s. Baravelli 
to render the Khedive wiser with his sage counsel, and 
from Paris came M. Villet, 2 Again the Frenchman had the 
Quai d'Orsay behind him while, as Wilson complained, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer gave Jl!!B. only "platonic" 
support.J The Viceroy persisted in requesting Britain 
to approve the national bank scheme, while opening con-
versations with the London Rothschilds through Wilson. 4 
The interest of the "great house" merely redoubled French 
1Derby to Lyons, rJia.rch 25, 1876, Parliamentar::y 
Pa;eers, LXXXIII, Egypt No. 8 (1876), C. 14821-, No, jl, p, 2J. 
2Theodore Rothstein, ~t•s Ruin1 a Finrc5c1al and Administrative Rteord (Londonl: ~. ~l?Ield, 190). p. 26. 
M. V!!!e~ brough a scheme, from the French Syndicate, 
which included the outlines for a Commission of the Public 
Debt. 
407/7, 
3c. R. Wilson, p. 86, 
4stanton to Derby, March 18, 1876, PRO FOCP 





determination to impose a settlement on Ismail with its 
concomitant restraints on spending, even without British 
adhesion. 1 Ismail found himself in a most uncomfortable 
positions the European community in Egypt favored the 
h . t 2 p t , th t d ti f f d J Frenc proJec ' as re rea ene a cessa on o un s, 
the Cave Report, though not yet published, hung like an 
albatross about his neck, prohibiting freedom of actions 
and Treasury bills which could not be met were again ra-
pidly falling due. But temporary relief was at hand. 
A meoting of members of the major French houses was con-
voked, at which the necessary funds to meet the Khedive's 
Treasury bills were promised, after which Decazes personally 
thanked those on hand for their patriotic action that day. 4 
But the Viceroy was not out of the woods by any means, for 
on April J the Cave Report was released. 
As soon as Cave touched English soil, the financial 
press began to call for publication of his figures, and in 
1such threats to act without England were voiced 
in a letter by Decazes to Outrey on March Jl, 1876 (Bouvier, 
p. 90), and were passed along to Derby by Lyons on March 21 
(PRO FOCP 407/9, No. 1, P• l}. 
2The Times, March 20, 1876, P• 8. 
Jstanton to Derby, March 21, 1876, PRO FOCP 407/7 1 
No. 189, P• 90. 
4Lyons to Derby, April 1, 1876, ibid. 407/9, No. 28, 
p. 17. 
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Parliament, City men were continually asking questions of 
the Government. The investigation had cost the people of 
England £22,200, 1 and there had been much speculation in 
Egyptian bonds. On March 23 the Report was submitted to 
the Government but was withheld from publication, Disraeli 
explained, because such was the Khedive•s desire, 2 there-
fore the feeling arose that something was being concealed, 
and stocks plunged. The Viceroy complained bitterly about 
the handling of the affair, and some have argued (unlikely 
as it seems) that Derby had used the threat of publication 
of the Report as blackmail to offset mounting French pressure.J 
Ismail could not resist for long, and in ten days• time he 
asked that the document be released. 
The Cave Report gave the revenue of Egypt, with the 
Moukabala, at £10,7 million, from which £7 million was needed 
for interest on the total debt which was estimated at £75 mil-
lion (the floating obligation being placed at £24 million, 
including the Daira bills). This situation could not con-
tinue, even though the author waxed confident that with ad• 
justments the creditors might be repaid. The solution ad-
vocated was• (1) to combine the I.aira and national debts 
sinca the latter could not pay its ways (2) to consolidate 
1The Times. Anril 1, 1876, p. 7. 
2Hansard, 3d ser., Vol. 288, col. 480. 
)Rothstein, P• 21. 
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all into a seven per cent debt to be paid in fifty years, 
(J) to raise a loan on favorable termsi (4) to reduce cor-
ruption and waste by employing European officials,1 All 
of these conclusions had been arrived at after careful 
inspection of the chaotic accounts of the Malieh, The 
Report served as yet another depressant on the slumping 
Egyptian market. On April 6 Ismail promulgated a decree 
suspending all payments on Treasury bills for three months, 
effectively admitting bankruptcy. 
The Viceroy still hoped to use the Rothschilds, who 
had decided to pursue the problem of Egyptian finance. 2 
At the same time, although it had abandoned the bank scheme 
the Syndicate had another settlement to propose. Decazes 
remained solidly behind the French capitalists and by the 
end of March had persuaded the Parisian branch of Rothschilds 
not to support the London house,J This being the case, the 
British concern decided not to move except with Government 
support. Wilson was sanguine about what might be accomplished, 
1Parliamentary PaEers, LXXXIII, Egypt No. 7 (1876), 
c. 1425. 
2 J·, Pauncefote to Tenterden, March 13, 1876, quoted 
in Atkins, p. 72. 
3w11son to Disraeli, April 1, 1876, ~ •• p, 75. 
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even after the Khedive's decree1 
It certainly does strike me, as it struck very 
forcibly Lord Lytton and Lord B. Frere when they were 
here, that a very remarkable opportunity has been af· 
forded and is I think still available for England, if 
it is her interest to do so, to acquire by honourable 
means a preponderating influence in F.gypt.l 
The Government still opposed a total default by Egypt. 2 
but they could not give the Rothschilds the sort of backing 
which they requested. The "opinion out of doors" tht:tt 
there was no consistent foreign policy being followed3 
seemed to be borne out as the Cabinet looked on while 
French bankers won the field and dictated terms. The 
Syndicate and the French Government wished for English 
participation, and Alfred Rothschild informed Northcote 
at the eleventh hour that France was willing to listen to 
any arrangement London might propose.4 With the atmos-
phere becoming more threatening in the Middle Ea.st, 
Downing Street wished to keep its freedom of action and 
refused to interfere in the internal affairs of Egypt. 
1c. R. Wilson to w. H. Smith, April 9, 1876, 
Iddesleigh Papers BM Add MSS 50017, P• 196, 
2Northcote to Tenterden, April 18, 1876, Tenterden 
Papers PRO FO J6J/2, 
>w. H. Smith to Northcote, April 17, 1876, 
Iddesleigh Papers BM Add MSS 50017, P• 194. 
4Northcote to Disraeli, May 1, 1876, !.!?J:.s!., P• 204. 
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The arrangement between Ismail and his floating 
debt creditors (the unsecured debt having reached 
£27 million) was concluded in a series of three de-
crees, 1 On May 2 the Viceroy proclaimed the creation 
of a Commission of the Public Debt (Caisse de la Dette 
PUbligue) which would have representatives from France, 
Italy, and England (should she choose to participate), 
and which would control the collection and disbursement 
of public money. The second decree, issued on May 7, 
dealt with the conversion of the debt. Under its pro-
visions the debt was set at £91 million, inclusive of 
the glut of paper in French portfolios which was to be 
paid off in sixty-five years at 7 per cent. All old bonds 
were to be turned in for the new Unifieds. with the 1862, 
1868, 1870, and 1873 holders exchanging at par, while the 
so-called short loans of 1864, 1866, and 1867 (whose matu-
rity dates were relatively near) received a bonus. 2 But 
the largest bonus was reserved for the Syndicate, and 
was equivalent to 25 per cent, that is, £80 o:f' the 
Khedive•s Treasury bills would entitle the holder to 
£100 of the new scrip. Ismail was granted a £5 million 
1wynne, pp. 588-91. 
2The loans of 1864 and 1866 received a 5,25 per 
cent bonus, while the 9 per cent issue of 1867 was granted 
an 11.75 per cent advantage, 
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loa.n, 1 and altogether approximately £6.5 million would 
be necessary to service the consolidated debt. On May ll 
a third decree was promulgated establishing a Supreme 
Council of the Treasury to oversee all state revenue 
collection and expenditure. 2 
Wilson strongly protested these proceedings. 
and on May 8 asked London's permission to return home, 
which was granted.J The Foreign Office informed the 
Khedive in clear terms that the new settlement was un-
satisfactory and that they would not participate in itr4 
the astounding rise in the floating debt (£6,5 million 
per month), the terms of the conversion, and a desire to 
avoid responsibilities of every sort were all reasons for 
this course. 
so the English exodus began, General Stanton, 
who had acted as agent since 1865, was removed to Munich, 
1The loan was issued at 72, which added £6 1 670,000 
to the debt and cost the nation £950,000 a year, a rate 
of 19 per cent for the entire transaction. 
2Th1s body--unlike the Caisse which handled only 
funds springing from sources guaranteed to the creditors 
and used to pay coupons--was to have power encompassing 
all state finances. It was replaced later in the year by 
the controllers under the Gosehen scheme. 
)Derby to Stanton, May 18, 1876, PRO FOCP 407/9, 
No. 109, p, 70, 
4
nerby to Stanton, lV'ay 2J, 1876, ibid., No. 115, 
p, 75. 
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and Wilson departed after creating antipathy in the 
European community. 1 The French bankers had won, but it 
was a Pyrrhic triumph, for pressure was still severe since 
the bondholder, like the quadruped in the saying, had been 
brought to the water but could not be made to drink. The 
investors, confronted by the new arrangements, refused 
to purchase or exchange their old scrip for the new, a 
situation which had not been fully considered. Thus by 
the end of May the bondholders were in an uproar, the 
English Government was disengaged, and a new initiative 
by the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders was about to 
begin. 
1Baring wrote that Wilson, during his stay, had 
run up petty debts, which the Viceroy was later forced 
to pay, and had thought only of his own position (Baring 
to Gosohen, March 22, 18?8, Cromer Papers PRO FO 633/2). 
CHAPTER III 
THE COUNCIL ACTS IN EGYPT 
MAY 1876 TO MAY 1877 
Egyptian securities began to slump in July, 1875, 
depreciating 15 per cent in value in four months, prompting 
The Times to begin its policy of steering investors away 
from Khedivial bonds.1 This dolorous view of the situa-
tion proved correct, for F.gyptian securities suffered 
heavily throughout the period of the negotiations in 
Cairo. The Economist presented the facts arrayed in 
Table 7. The general decline was punctuated by occasional 
rallies, as when Britain made the shares purchase. which 
caused the 187J issue to jump from 52 to 69 in but a few 
days, 2 The Suez stock rose in Paris from 690£ to 706f, 
as people placed their money in securities which were 
felt now to be more reliable.3 Optimism was sustained by 
1The Times, Oct. 27. 1875, p. 6. 
2 Ibid,, Dec. 6, 1875, P• 6, 
Jstand.ard, Nov, 27, 1875, ACFB, ~. II• JO. 
A letter, signed "W.H.P.", stated that th&Writer had 
bought ''Egyptians" at the time of the Canal shares pur-
chase in the belief that England would soon occupy that 
area {Statist, I (April 13, 1878], 129). 
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the departure of Mr, Cave for the Easts to many, Ismail 
was beginning to resemble an English client, Bondholders--
including those possessing the tribute loans~-expected 
that British financiers in Cairo would improve matters. 
Throughout the winter sundry rumors and imprudent utter-
ances by those in the Government sent the market leaping 
and plunging.1 The most chronic Egyptophiles were finding 
their mettle being tested, and even the great coup of 
November was suspect1 
'What are we to do with these four boxes of scrip 
brought home from Egypt in the Matybap?' an eminent 
civil servant asked an eminent cl man. •no with 
them?' answered the cynical banker, 'Paper one of 
your offices--say, by preference, the Bankruptcy 
Court. •2 
By mid-March, 1876, twenty-one brokers had failed at 
Capel Court, and it was openly surmised that without 
the continual French purchases, Khedivial bonds would 
probably drop 20 per cent in value.3 With the release 
of the Cave Report, there were wild fluctuations on the 
Paris Bourse, and the ill effects in England were such 
1The Economist chided the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer for say!~ tha:t Ismail could pay his debts 
without producing a shred of evidence to substantiate 
this claim ("New Information on Mr. Cave•s Mission," 
Economist, XXXIV [Feb, 19, 1876], 214), 
man's 
2
·w. Hepworth Dixon, 0 The Way to Egypt," 
M§l;gaZine, X:VI n,s. (Feb,, 1870), 166, 
JThe Times, March 25, 1876, P• 7• 
Gentle-
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that those speculators who profited from the decline were 
called "Cave Bears" by Punch. 1 The Bµllionist placed the 
blame for this state of affairs on the Government's 
shoulders a 
The enormous fluctuations that have gone on from 
day to day in Egyptian bonds are largely due to the 
bungling action of the Government, who by the course 
they have taken in the whole matter have inflicted 
a maximum of injury upon the holders of Egyptian bond~, 
without banefitting in any degree the ruler of Egypt, 
The Corporation's quiescence on Egyptian affairs 
has been partially explained by the loss of its chairman, 
the dearth of success in defending the Turkish bondholders. 
the attacks by the press, and the form of its bylaws which 
prevented its taking action before a de facto default. In 
addition, the initiatives of the Government forestalled 
the Council's action, since the latter assumed that Downing 
Street was working if not for its own nationals, then at 
least not against them. However, by Vi.arch the Corporation 
(now faced with the defaults o:f' Peru and Mexico), as well 
as the investing community in general, was becoming exas-
perated with the Foreign Secretary. The Economist remarked• 
It is fairness, moderation. and above all, steadiness, 
which impress these hand-to-mouth Governments. Lord 
Derby is always fair, always moderate, but he is 
not always firm.J 
1 Puncht LXX (April 22, 1876) • 161. 
2Bullionist, April 8, 1876, ACFB, Egypt, III, 292. 
J .. The Difficulty of Dealing with Bad Governments," 
Economist, XXXIV (~'larch 25, 1876). J66. 
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But hampering the Corporation's actions was the 
lingering question of the finances of the organiza-
ti on. 
According to w, H. Bishop• a leader of the dis-
sidents within the Corporation after 1880• and himself 
elected to the •council' in 1889; the conflict arose 
when 
those original subscribers were not consulted as to 
the change effected, but were; in 187J; informed 
that the 'Corporation• had been registered under 
the Limited Liabilij;y Acts, without the addition of 
the word 'Limited, 11 
Mr, Gerstenbere was of another opinion, and argued that 
subscriptions • • • by persons who had joined the 
association for objects other than the protection 
of the interests of foreign. bondholders had • • , 
been returned_.2 
As long as there was nothing to divide; the question was 
moot. In 1874 the Corporation generated enough revenue 
to meet expenses,J but in the following year experienced 
a loss exceeding £6,ooo, 4 this, after the Council reported 
that a circular would be sent to all bankers with an eye 
1Bishop, P• 1, 
2The Times, Feb. 26, 1874, p. 7,. 
3corn. For. Bondh1 Rep., 1874• p. 7• 
4Money Mar}tet Review, XXXII (March 4, 1876), 282. 
to increasing life memberships. 1 The repayment of the 
certificates was a burden on the Chairman, 2 and in fact 
the circumstances that the Council were too desirous, 
at the present time, to repay the advances as quickly 
as possible, rather hampered their action occasionally.J 
At the General Court of 1876 it was disclosed that £18,726 
had been earned in commissions by the society for the 
settlement of Colombian and Spanish defaults. 4 Again the 
cry for dividing profits arose, and one member, Mr. Dickson, 
opined that the institution had accomplished nothing that 
would not have occurred anyway, and that the group should 
liquidate, It was even necessary for Lubbock to assure 
his listeners that no •council' member was in receipt of 
any remun~ration and that the mission of Roger Eykyn to 
Spain upon their behalf was not primarily a business trip 
for his own benefit at their expense.5 Such being the 
atmosphere at Councilhouse, concerted action was difficult. 
Nevertheless, the •council' was rebuked by an irate member 
on just those grounds: 
1 Corp, For. Bondh. Rep., 1875, p. 6, 
2rbid., 1885, p. 5. By this date the entire amount 
of the original permanent certificates was repaid. 
)Money Market Review, XXX (Feb. 20, 1875). 220. 
4rbid., XXXII (March 4, 1876), 282. 
5Ibid., 28). 
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The Council might have long ago intervened with 
the Egyptian Government, initiated some plan in 
connexion with the Egyptian debt, and seen whether 
something could not be done to prevent the catas-
trophe which had occurred.l 
The Corporation was sensitive to the plight of 
the Egyptian bondholders and undervalued neither their 
importance nor that of the Nile Valley. As will be 
remembered, several who sat upon the 'Council' also 
participated in the investment trust movement, Acting 
Chairman Francis Bennoch. General Vaughan, and Albert 
w. Ray, a Corporation member, were all involved in the 
direction of the Omnium Stock Trust, which possessed blocks 
of Egyptian 1873, Daira 1866, Egyptian Tribute of 1871, and 
other investments in the Nilotic. 2 Bennoch was also the 
chairman, and Mr. Ray the manager, of the Government Stock 
Investment Company, this organization possessed a large 
number of shares of the 1871 tribute loan among its "ragged 
lot of wretches ... .3 Finally, the Foreign and Colonial Govern-
ment Trust was well represented at Moorgate Street, and 
among its extremely large holdings were most descriptions 
of Egyptian bonds. 
The interest of the •council' members in imperial 
matters was also great 1 as attested by their activities in 
1 rbid., 282. 2 rbid., XXVIII (June 27, 1874), 840. 
Jin 18?6, £137,000 out of the £150,000 of this 





the Royal Colonial Institute, the Royal Geographical 
Society, and related orga.~izations. 1 Sir John Rose. for 
example, believed in maintaining the ties between .England 
2 and Canada. Lubbock bolted the Liberal Party over home 
rule for Ireland, '3.J.!d was a dominant figure in the reor-
ganization of the Royal Colonial Institute, he felt that 
the i.mperial relationship with India was ideal.J Upon 
the •council' there were many others who were interested 
in, or who had spent a portion of their lives in the sub-
continent--Clarke, Wythes, 4 Vaughan.5 Balfour, Kinnaird, 
and Tyler, 6 to mention the most important. Egypt, the 
1Refer to Table 2 in the Appendix. 
2navid NI. L. Farr, The Colonial Office and Canada, 
1867-1887 (Torontos Universlty of Toronto Press, 1955), 
pp. 20-21. 
JJohn Lubbock, First Raron Avebury, Addresses, 
Political and Educational (Londona Macmillan, 1879), 
p. 170. 
4aeorge A. Wythes (1811-83) was a railroad contrac-
tor who aided in the construction of the Indian and Penin• 
sular Railway. He joined the Council in 1873 and served 
on the Spanish Bondholders' Committee (The Times. ~iarch 7, 
188J, p. 7). 
5.Major General John Luther Vaughan (1820-1911) 
served in India with great distinction. Upon retirement, 
he entered the world of investment, joined the men of 
Moorgate Street. and participated on various committees 
(~ •• May 4, 1911, P• 11). 
6capta.in Henry W. Tyler (1827-1908) was Government 
Inspector of Railways in 1853. climbing to Chief Inspector 
in 1867, which post he held for ten years. He was involved 
in Indian railways, and brought much experience in this 
form of transportation to the •council' when he joined in 
1875 (~ •• Jan. Jl, 1908, P• 14). 
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portal to the East, and the Suez Canal, its key, were to 
remain of significance to the Corporation, but the pro-
tection of the investments of English bondholders there 
was a primary concern. In the long haul, it would be 
easier to arouse public support on these imperial con-
siderations rather than on behalf of the bondholders. 
On February 25, and also on March J, 1876, the 
Royal Society of Arts (Indian Section) heard and discussed 
a paper on "The Suez Canal and English Trade," presented by 
Charles Magniao. 1 The proceedings received wide publicity, 
and some of those present complained that too much consider-
ation for British interests was evinced by the author. Hyde 
Clarke, in supporting Mr. Magniao, remarked on the history 
of the Canal, that the "design of M. de Lesseps was dis-
tinctly of a political character, and it was Lord 
Palmerston's duty to oppose it in the manner he did. 02 
In the ensuing discussion, the Secretary of the Corporation 
of Foreign Bondholders expressed a hope that rdr. Cave's 
1Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, XXIV (Feb, 25, 1876), paper presented (~SJ-61)1 (March J, 
1876), discussion of the paper (277-84). 
Charles Magniac was a partner in Matheson and 
Company, and was elected to Parliament for St. Ives from 
1868 to 18?4. In 188), after leaving the Corporation, he 
was elected to the presidency of the London Chamber of 
Commerce {The Times, Nov. 24, 1891, p. 6), 
2Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, XXIV (March J, 1876), 280-81. 
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mission would be successful. although he would rather 
have seen an Indian civil servant sent out to deal with 
the Khedive.1 Aside from these observations, the •council' 
remained silent on Egypt's debt until Way, when it ap-
peared that the Cabinet had become disinterested. 2 
Opposition to the Viceroy's May 7 decree was 
generated in Parisi M. Naquet,J a radical firebrand in 
the Chamber, called for a general investigation of the 
Fancier. The English journals were also perturbed, com-
plaining that the Cave Report had not really been incor-
porated in the new arrangements, 4 that the safeguards 
provided by the Caisse were illusory,5 and that Ismail 
still would not honor his engagements. or, as the 1:!2.!ll: put it, 
the best friends and greatest admirers of the Khedive 
do not venture to express any cgnridence that Egypt 
will be able to pay 7 per cent. 
But most nettling of all was the favored treatment given 
holders of the unfunded debt. The Times declared that if 
1 2 Ibid,, 281. Bouvier, P• 96, 
J"Tho Credit Foneier and the Paris Money Market," 
Economist, XXXIV (May 27, 1876), 621. 
40The First Composition of Egypt with Her Creditors," 
~·, (May 13, 1876), 561. 
5standard, Wiay 18, 1876, ACFB, E&Y;pt. IV, 106. 
6ttour, May 9, 1876, ibid,, 6. 
- -
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those holding Treasury bills were to lose 60 per cent of 
their face value, they would still turn a profit, 1 while 
the ~ warned 1 
Egypt is insolvent, and the circumstances under which 
she makes her first offer of a composition, and the 
torms by which she gives advantages to her unsecured 
over her secured creditors, preclude the hope of 
anything like a real improvement in the Khedive•s 
financial administra.tion.2 
The sharp rise in the floating debt from a reported 
£12 million in September, 1875, to the £28 million of 
May, 1876, lent weight to the words of the Economists 
The Khedive has never yet paid any material annual 
sum out of' his revenue towards the interest of his 
debts he has always been able to borrow, and has 3 borrowed about the whole amount of that interest. 
Although it was true for the moment, as Punch quipped, 
"Paynim pay nix," many British journals counseled actions 
again it was The Times which advised the holders not to 
exchange their old bonds for new, and the Monetacy Gazette 
concurred: "If our readers have any confidence in our 
advice, they will leave these ingenious gentlemen to 
their own deviees. 04 For some investors there was 
1The Times. April 28, 1876, P• 7. 
2~, May 16, 1876, ACFB, ;Eg;tpt, IV, 78. 
JEconomist, XXXIV (May lJ, 1876), 561. 
4The Times, June 21, 1876, P• 9J Monet@;!'.j! 
Gazette, Jlme ~1. 1876, ACFB, .EttYEt, rv. ~50. 
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comfort in knowing that those responsible for their 
plight were also suffering1 
The only matter for satisfaction is that the holders 
of the Treasury bills who did the bad finance, and 
who trusted to an endless series of loans to relieve 
them. have been many of them 'caught' in the end 
and cannot dispose of their rubbish,l 
As might be expected, the first steps ta.ken on 
behalf of the British creditors were formal protests to 
Downing Street. On the morning of May 11, Goschen paid 
a visit to the Foreign Secretary, and on the following 
day a memorial on behalf of the holders of the 1862 and 
1864 loans was presented by the contractors Fril.hling and 
Goschen to be transmitted to Egypt, In pa.rt, the docu-
ment read: 
We shall be greatly obliged to your Lordship if you 
will urge on General Stanton. to support our protest, 
a~d to point out to the Government of the Khedive 
how unfairly the holders of2the bonds of these loans have been dealt with. 
Lord Tenterden,3 responding to these requests for support, 
replied a 
1
"The Financial Effect of the Egyptian Debt Con-
solidation," Economist, XXXIV (May 20. 1876), 593. 
2Frii.hling and Goschen to Lord Derby, May 12, 1876 
Parliamentar.i Papers, LXXXIII, Egypt No. 8 {1870), c. 1484, 
No. 72, P• 57. 
3charles Stuart Aubrey Abbott, Third Lord Tenterden, 
(1834-82) entered the Foreign Office as a precis writer for 
Lord Stanley, and from 1871 to 1873 was Assistant Under 
Secretary and then Permanent Under secretary at Downing 
Street (~. I, JO). 
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I am to inform you that copies of your letter with 
its inclosures will be sent to H.M.G.'s agent and 
Consul General in Egypt, but his Lordship fears he 
cannot do more than instruct him to give unofficial 
assistance to the agents of the persons interested in 
bringing their representations to the knowledge of 
the Khedive for his Highness' consideration.l 
A few days later, the Imperial Ottoman also lodged a 
protest against Egypt with the Foreign Office, for its 
loan of 1867, and argued the priority of their claims and 
the special nature of the Khedive•s obligations to the 
creditors. 2 
The Co:rporation of Foreign Bondholders was still 
the soi-disant champion of the British investors and it 
was to this organization that many bondholders immediately 
applied for aid. Therefore, on May 22, Hyde Clarke also 
submitted a protest to Lord Derby which pointed out: 
One circumstance which is regarded as very serious, 
is that a government like that of Egypt, which is of 
ambiguous constitution and only guasi sovereign, the 
claims of which sovereignty are not recognized by our 
legal Tribunals, should attempt by arbitrary decrees 
to alter and cancel contracts, and to divert securities, 
without reference to the wishes, interests, and feelings 
of the other contracting parties. An example like this 
cannot fail to exercise a ver-J prejudicial influence 
in many cases.3 
1Lord Tenterden to Fruhling and Goschen, May 19, 
1876, Parliamentary Papers, LXXXIII, Egypt No. 8 (1876), 
C. 1484, No. 77t P• 68, 
2William Lander (Secretary, London Office for the 
Imperial ottoman Bank) to Derby, May 18, 1876, !PM,., No. 75, 
p. 72. 
p. 76. 
3Hyde Clarke to Derby, Ma.y 22, 1876, ~·• No. 82, 
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Lord Derby found the language of this missive too strong, 
and refused to send it on to General Stanton. Neverthe-
less, the Foreign Secretary indicated that "he would be 
willing to instruct General Stanton to give such unofficial 
assistance as he properly can to any representative of 
the bondholders in bringing their views before the Khedive,"1 
It must be admitted that this action by the Council 
was made with some reluctance, There seemed to reign among 
many holders a feeling of apathy, and at Councilhouse there 
was less than eagerness to enter the Egyptian fray. But 
a vocal minority of investors who were alive to the dangers 
of the present situation, and who saw their plans for a 
steady income jeopardized, were in a bellicose frame of 
mind. Of course, in the last analysis the individual 
holder was the master of his own fater he might send his 
bonds in for conversion and receive the interest due him, 
or stand out and hope that most others did the same. Time. 
therefore, was important. for although the press might 
advise a firm stand. there had to be a palpable movement 
under way for their defense. The Corporation certainly 
believed in the just cause of the Egyptian holders, for 
as it observed. "interests, at variance with those claims 
[of the bondholders], were assuming undue prominence, and 
1Tenterden to Clarke, May 29, 1876, 11?..!.s!·• No. 88, 
p. 85. 
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were likely to obtain undue preferenoe. 01 For some time 
Egypt had been in the thoughts of the 'Council.' since, 
as Lubbock later recalled, "we were pressed by many 
holders to do something, but there was no consensus of 
opinion what steps should be taken. 02 
Pressure mounted on the institution as letters 
began to appear in the press, questioning the Council's 
inactivity.J Perhaps even more disquieting was the possi-
bility that the holders would act independently and, per-
chance, successfully, which would be a blow to the organi-
zation. In Alexandria a committee of bondholders had been 
formed, 4 and Daira creditors from Egypt and England, buoyed 
up by persistent rumors of a British ooeupation,5 suggested 
the confiscation and sale of Isma11•s property, as would 
1CofR, For. Bondh. Rep., 1876, P• 8. 
2Money Market Review, LX (March 1, 1890), 509. 
JFor example, in a letter to The Times (May 17, 
1876, p. 12) a holder said that the Egyptian situation was 
even more pressing than the Turkish and called for the 
Council's good offices. 
4 ~. May 5, 1876, ACFB, ;Egypt, III, 408. 
5 Lee, P• 2J. 
April that the Sultan 
the Nile Valley, this 
as in the News of the 
IV, 216) • 
Rumors had persisted throughout 
had given Britain a free hand in 
topic continued to appear in print, 
World of June 4, 1870 (ACFB, .E;gypt, 
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be done with any other debtor, More disturbing still 
was the effort of two stock and share dealers, Williams 
and Jones, to organize an Egyptian Bondholders' Committee, 1 
With so much afoot, Clarke registered his protest 
and the Council announced that a meeting of Egyptian se-
cured creditors would be called in the near future, 2 
At the last moment, however, there came a postponement 
which in some quarters was greeted with satisfaction. 
The Daily Telegraph. a supporter of the Khedive and a 
foe of the speculators, wrote1 
As we opposed the design of this meeting from the 
first we quite approve of the postponement. and only 
hope that it will be for an indefinite period. This 
unquestionably will be the view of the immense majority 
of bona-fide bondholders,3 
The Monetary Gazette was less strident1 
The interests of bondholders are not best promoted 
in noisy meetings where discussion is apt to run 
into partisanship, but by prudent and concerted 
action, •• , the creditors of a defaulting State 
when soured by disappointment are not in the fittest 
mood for debate on the methods of actiop which are 
most advisable under the circumstances.4 
This obvious reference to the handling of the TUrkish 
default perhaps coincided with views held by the 'Council' 
itself, as they began casting about for a solution which 
1The Times, May 22, 1876. P• 5, 
21£!g_,, May 24, 1876, P• 8, 
JDaily Telegra2h, May Jl, 1876, ACFB• Egypt, IV, 202. 
4Monetary Gazette, June 7, 1876, ibid., 226. 
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would be popular, prudent, and efficacious. A month 
passed, however, before the Council took action at a 
time calculated for its salutary effect upon the enter-
prise.1 In the meantime. excuses had to be made. such 
as that in Cornelius Surgey•s open letter in the Money 
Market Review. Surgey argued that the Corporation, 
faced with default. could do little without some assis-
tance from the Government. "Why," he asked, "should she 
[England] not address a mild remonstrance to a defaulting 
State and suggest a just and honourable arrangement with 
its cred1tors?"2 Egypt was, as Lubbock said, a cause of 
much anxiety to the Council, but decisive action by the 
Corporation would be facilitated by the appointment of a 
permanent chairman. 
Since 1874 a great share of Council business had 
devolved onto the shoulders of Francis Bennoch who, as 
Acting Chairman, had tried to bring the organization 
through the turmoil of 187$-76. He had served well as 
a stop-gap, he was a self-made man, an example for the age 
1 Corp. For, Bondh. Rei•• 1876, P• 8. The Council 
felt that the favorable momen had arrived at the expira-
tion of the Khedive•s decree of April 6 (the decree sus-
pending Treasury bill payments for three months), which 
placed pressure on the Cairo Government to come to terms 
with her creditors. 
2Money Market Review, XXXII (June 17, 1876), 682, 
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who had entered a mercantile establishment at sixteen 
and was a partner in his own firm by twenty-five. This 
concern, Bennoch, Twentymen and Rigg--wholesalers and 
manufacturers--maintained a good reputation in London, 
and Bennoch personally played an important role on the 
Common Council and in City developments generally.l 
As temporary chairman he had provided the Corporation a 
broad knowledge of United States and European affairs 
and a zeal for the defense of principle, the latter 
quality bringing him into sharp verbal and epistolary 
combat with those who wished to bar the Corporation from 
the Turkish debt settlement. But his enthusiasm had 
won him enemies both among the bondholdors and on the 
Stock Excha.."'lge. 
A change was therefore thought necessary, so 
that at the General Court of 1876 the •council' announced 
its determination to seek outside the society for a salaried 
chairman. Such a step was deemed correct because of the 
power of the office. As Lubbock later said, although the 
'Council' was there to help, 0 the threads of all negotia-
tions pass through the chairman's hands ... 2 The post 
1charles Rogers, The Mgdern Scottish Minstrelsr or 
the Son.gs of Scotland of the Past Ifilf Century. with Memoirs 
of the Poets (Edinburgh1 Adam ana Charles Black, lBSS-57 
v. 1. 
2Money Market Review, LX (March 1, 1890), 510. 
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required full-time attention (a vice chairman was 
appointed only in 1896 to ease the burden); the stipend 
to be paid was £1200 a year.1 The authority for this 
decision to pay the chairman lay in Rule 20, which per-
mitted the disbursement of funds to individuals engaged 
in Council workr nonetheless, the move was attacked by 
the dissidents as illegal. 2 The decision had its draw-
backs, which were illuminated by the press. Besides 
weakening the esprit of the •council' and introducing a 
monetary nexus, the proposal would cause the philanthropic 
aspects of the association to suffer, and as the Economist 
observed. 
the appointment of a paid Chairman will be no remedy. 
• • • We should certainly like to see a different 
constitution from what is proposed for the Council 
of Foreign Bondholders. though we are quite aware 
how difficult a proper organisation will be.3 
Nevertheless, the man selected, Edward Pleydell 
Bouverie (1818-89), was well known to the members of the 
•council' through his City connections and his lifelong 
friendship with George Bentinck, The new chairman was 
1Bishop, p. 12 
2Rule 20 was also applied in the presentation of 
a £500 testimonial, in November of 1876, to Francis Bennoch 
for his service to the institution as temporary chairman 
(Bishop, p. 12). 
)Economist, XXXIV (Feb. 26, 1876), 245. 
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the second son of the third Earl of Radnor, and was a 
Whig in his politics, having entered Parliament in 1844 
for Kilmarnock, which seat he held for thirty years. 1 
In that period Bouverie occupied several posts2 but high 
office was never his, for he was "prone to independence 
ascribed to thwarted ambition,"3 which led him afoul of 
the Party leadership, as on the Irish Education Bill of 
1873, when he broke with the Liberals. While in Parlia-
ment, Bouverie had irritated Lord Granville, among others, 
with his personal attacks on Gladstone. 4 which Disraeli 
used to disport the House.5 Although other appointments 
and honors would follow, Bouverie was never again to sit 
in Commons after his departure in 1874. 
Perhaps the new chairman's independence struck a 
1
.m.m.. x:v t 1309. 
2Bankers Magazine, L (Jan., 1890), 75. Bouverie 
held the following postsc Under Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, Chairman of Committees, Vice-President 
of the Board of Trade, President of the Poor Law Board, 
Member of the Committee of Council on Education, Second 
Church Estates Commissioner, and Ecclesiastical Commis· 
sioner. 
1875. 
3 Southgate, p. Jll, n. 1. 
4Fitzmaurice, I, 500; Bright to Granville, Jan. 15, 
ibid,, rr. 14J. 
-
5Buckle and Monypenny, IV, 12. 
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responsive chord among the 'Council,' or his City in-
fluence 0r government experience might have been the 
deciding factors, at an;y· event, in July of 1876 the 
selection was made, 1 and the formal announcement came 
in early August. Bouverie, who was to be the "life and 
soul to this institution"2 for the auc~eeding thirteen 
years, stated his views at the General Court of 1877, 
including a strong posture against defaulters, a dis-
position toward expansion of Corporation activities, 
and the conviction that the institution was no philan-
thropic body and needed funds to exist. In addition, 
Mr. Bouverie believed in the weight of moral pressure 
and did not desire the Government to look after the 
bondholders' interest when there were alternatives, such 
as those present in the case of F.gypt,J 
Although the Council was still very sensitive 
over the Turkish debacle (which J. B. Martin mentioned 
in a letter to The Times on June 21), still the "Thun-
derer" was for the moment less antagonistic towards 
Councilhouse than heretofore. Two sources of aid for 
1cor:p, For. Bondh. Rep,, 1876, p. 9, 
2The Times, Dec. 17, 1889, P• 11, 
JMoney Niarket Review, XXXIV (March J, 1877), 227, 
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the bondholders the paper immediately eliminateda 
It is quite useless to look for help to loan 
agents, they are too deeply involved for the most 
part in the treasury bill deadlock, Neither ought 
a.D outer~ to be raised for Government help which 
cannot be given,l 
Martin exhibited surprise at the holders• passivity1 
The bondholders, as might be expected, were at 
first staggered by the preposterous nature of the 
terms offered to them; but it might reasonably have 
been presumed that they would not be long content 
to stand quietly by and allow the proposed measures 
to be carried through without a protest.2 
On the following day a holder of the 1868 loan reported 
that he had received a letter from Hyde Clarke in which 
the Secretar-~ said the Council was at present canvassing 
the views of English investors,3 and on the twenty-
seventh a small number of bondholders met at Council-
house and decided to apply to Mr. Goschen to represent 
them. 4 
The idea of securing the services of Goschen had 
first been rumored in the previous year and had met with 
general satisfaction.5 The credit for winning over the 
new emissarJ (for whom the project might result in un-
pleasant political overtones), and for preparing the way 
1 The Times, June 21, 1876, p. 9. 
Jibid., June 22 • 1876, P• 7. 
4 Cory. For. Bondh. Rep., 1876, p, 22. 
5;rioney Market Review, XXXI (Nov. lJ, 187.5). 527. 
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with both the Khedive and the French capitalists, belonged 
to two men, Hyde Clarke and Henry Oppenheim,1 
The Norns had been good to Mr. Goschen in the 
intervening years since he chaired the first meeting of 
the Council in 1868, With the Liberal victory, he had 
entered Government as President of the Poor Law Board 
and in 1871 was named First Lord of the Admiralty. Al-
though the Conservatives carried the day in 1874, Goschen 
retained his London seat, riding a wave of hero worship 
in the City, which for a time perhaps overrated him. 
Disenchantment would set in, but he was "nonetheless 
among the greatest financiers of the time and one of 
the ablest men of the age,"2 In 1866 the M.P. for London 
had been viewed as a radical by the Conservatives,3 and 
was soon an intimate friend of Gladstone.4 But a strain 
developed between Goschen and his chief, for the former 
was strong-principled, and in 1874 had opposed Gladstone 
11:!2!:!£, July lJi 1876, ACFB, ?ll;ypt, IV, J62t 
The Times, July 8, 18?0, P• 9. 
20The Right Hon. George Joachim Goschen, M.P.," 
Bankers .Magazine, XLVIII (Aug., 1888), 808, 
3Buckle and Monypenny, rv, 427. 
4awynn and Tuckwell, I, 179. 
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on the naval estimates.1 The appraisal of Mr. Goschen 
by Lord Acton is interestinga 
Goschen is above sordid motives. He dreads the 
radicals, • • • and, if left to himself and the 
nearest influences, he will drift away. His lips 
have never been touched with the sacred fire of 
Liberty. His international soul has never glowed 
with the zeal of the good old cause. He is moved 
by the fears to which city men are prone, and there 
are people more calculating than he is, who work 
those fears.2 
In fact, Goschen refused office in the Gladstone Govern-
ment of 1880 and eventually joined the Conservatives. 
Mr, Goschen had also kept up his City connections) 
and had watched Egyptian developments as well, joining 
with Hardington to support the shares purchase. The 
Egyptian loans which the family concern had sold in 
England were those enjoying some of the best security, 
and had also been those least onerous to the Viceroy1 4 
perhaps it was as much an antipathy to rsmail's dealings 
of late as a desire to protect his reputation that moved 
1Lord George Francis Hamilton, Parliamentary 
Reminiscences and Reflections (Londona John Murray, 
l9l7-22), I, J7. 
2Lord Acton to Mary Gladstone, Feb. 2, 1881, 
Paul. P• 165. 
JGoschen was a director of the Alliance Insurance 
Company (sharing the board with Rothschild), a Governor of 
the Hudson's Bay Company, and a member of the directorate 
of the Marine Assurance Company. 
4 Mulhall, P• 526. 
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Goschen to assume the cause of the bondholders. Henry 
Drummond Wolff• who accompanied Goschen, 0 the parent of 
Egyptian loans," thought that it was a question of con-
science and that the M.P. probably felt a moral respon-
sibility to those who had placed their trust in stocks 
which he had helped introduce to the market. 1 
On the morning of July J, a deputation of bankers, 
holders, and •council' members met with Mr. Goschen and 
obtained his assent, in general terms, to the group's 
request for his assistance in the present Egyptian dif-
ficulties. This solicitation was formalized immediately 
by a letter from Councilhousea 
The variety and complications of the different 
Egyptian Loans. render it absolutely necessary that 
English interests should be represented by some man 
of sufficient influence and known name to secure 
attention, and to protest those interests during 
this crisis in Egyptian finance. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • The object of this letter is to obtain your 
formal assent and to enable you to make such stipu-
lations as, under the circumstances, you may think 
desirable, which will, in due course, be submitted 
to the Bondholders.2 
1sir Henry Drummond Wolff, Rambling Recollections 
(London: Macmillan and Co,, 1908), II, i4I and 138. 
2Hyde Clarke to Goschen, July 3, 1876, Council of 
Foreign Bondholders, The Egyptian Debt! Mission of the 
Right Hon. G. J. Goschen, M.P. (hereafter Council, ~­
tian Debt. Mission)(London, Dec. 1876), Appendix, 
pp. I-ii. 
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Goschen's reply on the following day reaffirmed the 
agreement but set conditions, beginning with a vote 
of confidence from the English investors1 
The responsibility of giving any advice, or taking 
any steps in the present crisis of Eg;,rptian finance 
is so great, that nothing could induce me to incur 
it except an almost unanimous wish on the part of 
those interested, so far as their views can be made 
known.l 
He also desired the cordial backing of the contractors 
so that he might truly speak for all parties. There 
were other preconditionsa he would have full control 
over negotiationss he would in no way be involved in 
any financial transactions or combinations, his position 
would be honoraryr a trip to Egypt under any circumstances 
would be out of the question, and no policy would be pressed 
on Government if politically inexpedient, Upon this final 
point alone Goschen felt the bondholders had enough ground 
to refuse his services. The financier-turned-politician 
foresaw no easy solution to the Egyptian dilemmas 
It would be a great satisfaction to me if I 
could succeed in any degree in mitigating the sacri-
fices which are asked of the English Creditors of 
Egypt, and of removing in part the injustice to 
which they have been ~xposed, but the difficulties 
appear to me extreme. 
To implement Goschen's wishes it was decided that 
holders of Egyptian securities might register their views 
on the subject either at Councilhouse or at their banks, 
although the process would be slow, it would avoid the 
1Goschen to Clarke, July 4, 1876, ~·• p. ii. 
2rbid,, P• iv. 
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possible embarrassments of a general meeting. With the 
appearance of a champion for the English creditors, the 
Stock Exchange Committee also took action, and after a 
discussion with the Comptoir, exercised its Rule 59. 
Therefore, on July 7 it was announced that quotations on 
the new Egyptian stock would be denied until the bond-
holders had given their assent to a se·ttlement and had 
turned in their old scrip for new, which few had done to 
that date. As expected. this action had an immediate im-
pact, closing the London market to the Syndicate. 1 
But even at this point affairs might have gone 
awry, for suddenly there was an announcement that a meeting 
of Egyptian bondholders would be convened on July 14. Both 
the sponsors of the assemblage and its objectives were ob-
scure, but the Corporation's antagonists in the journalistic 
world proclaimed it a probable inspiration of Moorgate 
Street2 in an attempt to establish some control over Goschen. 
A highly pejorative tone was struck by J. c. McCoan, who 
staunchly supported Ismail and harbored an abiding dislike 
for the Council, 
whose unsolicited intervention in our affairs we 
utterly deprecate. • • • we desire that this commis-
sion [Goschen•s] should be of the most authoritative 
kind, emanating directly from the bondholders them-
1The Times, July 8, 1876, P• 9. 
2 ~·• July 13, 1876, P• 7. 
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selves in meeting assembled, without the endorsement 
or counter-signatur~ of Mr. Hyde Clarke and his col-
leagues in any way.l 
Such a meeting was also frowned upon by those numbered 
among the bondholders• friends, such as the Financier, 
which assumed a somewhat pedagogic air1 
We would suggest the advisability of a large and 
influential attendance at Friday's meeting combined 
with due circumspection and a business-like modera-
tion of tone on the part of those who propose to 
take part in the proceedings.2 
Two hundred holders appeared at the Westminster 
Palace Hotel on the appointed date, and, there being no 
one who would commence the proceedings, Sir John Lubbock 
was prevailed upon to take the chair.J The Deputy Chair-
man of the 'Council' expressed his ignorance of the cause 
of the meeting, which the Corporation had publicly dis-
avowed, but he supposed it was meant to strengthen Mr. 
Goschen•s hand. As the meeting progressed, however, it 
became clear that the holders had been summoned not simply 
to affirm freedom of action for Goschen, but to circum-
vallate his effort with a higher authority, a committee 
of creditors which would advise him. Mr. John Horatio Lloyd, 
l~. 
2Financier, July llt 1876, ACFB, Egypt, IV, 356. 
JMoney Market Review, XXXIII (July 15, 1876), 59. 
---
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chairman of the Government and Guaranteed Securities 
Permanent Trust, and the admitted sponsor of this meeting, 
moved that such a committee be established, but it was 
rejected amidst a great outburst of indignation.1 With 
this danger averted, it was but a matter of days before 
Clarke repo1 .. ted to the M. P. for London that, 
as to the number of Holders in Egyptian Securities 
who had signed the documents placed in your hands 
by the Deputation which waited on you this morning, 
I am directed to inform you that nearly three thou-
sand Holders of Stock in the various Egyptian Loans 
have requested you to represent their interests, in 
the manner and under the stipulations of your letter 
of the 4th instant.2 
Gosehen was satisfied, and on July 20 he formally under-
took the project which was to link him to the cause of 
the English creditors for many years. 
No word of approbation came from Gladstone at 
this time, but later he wrotes 
I did not, for reasons which I will exnlain to 
you (Goschen], send my good wishes on your assump-
tion of your heavy task in connection with Egyptian 
finance, but I admired your courage and public spirit.J 
Of more importance was the attitude of the Government. 
l~· 
2clarke to Goschen, July 19, 1876, Council, :Egyptian 
Debt. Mission, Appendix, P• iv. 
JGladstone to Goschen, Nov, 29, 1876, quoted in 
Arthur R. D. Elliot, Life of George Joachim Goschen, First 
Viscount Goschen, 18Jl•l207 (Londons Longman's, Green and 
Co,, 19ll), I, 174, 
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Disraeli had a benevolent view of Goschen's 
position, 1 but to the Foreign Secretary an Egyptian 
default appeared on the cards. although there was some 
satisfaction that Englishmen would not suffer alonea 
Neither Mr. Cookson's f consul at Alexandria] sugges-
tions nor any others will prevent a hopeless smashs 
and as the loss will fall chiefly on French creditors, 
who have been trying to swindle us throughout, we can 
bear it with resignation.2 
For the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders. at least, it 
had been a successful maneuver and had certainly created 
an auspicious atmosphere for the debut of their new 
chairman. For good or ill, the bondholders had taken 
their affairs in hand, and the Council had assisted in 
launching a mission which would have far-reaching impact 
on relations vis-a-vis Egypt, the Powers, and her creditors. 
Throughout the spring Egypt had been a beehive of 
activity, for the European creditors on the scene were 
vocal in the protestation of their rights. No thought 
of kismet impeded their efforts. for as soon as the Khedive's 
decree of April 6 was promulgated, the European community 
blazed up in anger. The holders of Treasury bills naturally 
were in the vanguard of the protesters, although the value 
of secured stock was also eroded with celerity. On April 11, 
1Buckle and Monypenny, VI, 58. 
2Northcote to Tenterden. July 15, 1876, Tenterden 
Papers PRO FO 36J/2 (enclosure). 
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a meeting of creditors was convened in Alexandria at 
the Imperial Ottoman Bank, at which time a committee 
was named to meet with the Viceroy. ~he following day 
the influential French colony met, and on April 13 an 
international conclave was held to ask the Powers for 
assistance. 1 Thirty-two of the most important English 
citizens, headed by Barker and Company, submitted a 
petition to General Stanton for British support, in 
keeping with the demands of the committee of creditors, 2 
but the Foreign Office replied that it could not inter-
fere in the matter.J 
Cairo's censorship of the press was severe,4 yet 
attacks on the Khedive were made frequently and placards 
appeared on April 13 calling for the abdication of Ismail 
and the accession of Halim.5 Amidst this clamor, the 
1The Times, April lJ, 1876, p. 5. 
2General Stanton to Derby, April 
Parliamentaf* Papers, LXXXIII, Egypt No. 
No. 59, p. (enclosure). 
JDerby to Stanton, May 12, 1876, 
p. 59. 
18, 1876, 
8 (1876), c. 1484, 
~., No. 69, 
4rt was not until 1880 that an English daily paper, 
the Egyptian Gazette, appeared in Alexandria, run in part 
by Charles Bell, an occasional correspondent for The Times 
of London (Enid H. c. M. Bell, The Life and Letters of 
c. F. Moberly Bell [Londont The Richards Press, 1927], p. 46). 
5The Times, April 25, 1876, p. 8. Ismail Pasha's 
uncle, Halim, had been forced to leave Egypt in 1868, with 
a pension of £601 000 a year1 when he was implicated in an assassination at~empt upon ~he life of his nephew. 
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holders met with Egypt's Finance Minister, Sadyk Pasha, 
as often happens, the two sides came away with differing 
impressions of what had been said, so that the committee 
of creditors was further embittered when a letter from 
sadyk was read before a second meeting, on April 20, 
"denying that at Saturday's interview he promised the 
admission of the bondholders' delegates to discuss the 
financial measures to be adopted. 111 A second foray on 
Cairo was launched with the object of obtaining the 
Khedive•s written assurance that no arrangement would 
be made without first soliciting their views1 the rejec-
tion of this proposition by the Finance Minister was 
complete a 
As to your request to be called in to join in the 
discussions of measures concerning bondholders • • • 
allow me to tell you that the promise you put in 
my mouth can only be a misunderstanding on your 
part, for, pardon me, gentlemen, the request is 
at present inopportune in every way. Your per-
sistence could only have been justified if we were 
treating a financial operation with you.2 
One avenue that still remained open to the 
creditors was an appeal to the newly-constituted Mixed 
Tribunals, and through this Khedivial Aohille's heel, 
Europe could be drawn into the imbroglio. 
1~., April 21, 1876, p. 5. 
2Ibid., May 8, 1876, P• 10. 
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Since Egypt was a province of the Ottoman 
dominion, foreigners enjoyed the privileges of extra-
territoriality. The Consular Courts had bent the law 
to favor fellow nationals, and Justice, with her blind-
fold a bit askew, could see her way well enough to find 
for Europeans in cases involving natives. An alteration 
in this situation was one of rsmail's fondest desires, 
beginning in the mid-l860's• Nubar Pasha,1 charged by 
the Khedive with the reformation of the judiciary, com-
menced a campaign which was crowned with success a decade 
later. The European colony of Alexandria was almost unani-
mously opposed to the creation of new courts, arguing 
that justice was already being meted out, 2 and this atti-
tude remained unchanged among the English residents through 
1869,J when the impact of the Canal was first felt. It 
could be argued that the Europeans, and especially the 
Powers, had nothing to fear, for they would dominate the 
institution, that the local colonies would be involved, 
1Nubar Pasha was an Armenian Christian (two reasons 
why native Egyptians would dislike him} who had arrived in 
Cairo in 1840 at the age of eighteen. From a position of 
secretary and translator in the ruling household he rose 
in importance, obtaining ministerial rank under Ismail. 
2The Times, oct. 21, 1868, P• 4. 
)Jasper Y. Brinton, The Mixed Courts of Egypt (New Havens Yale University Press, 19JO), P• ~5. 
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that the system would be given a five-year trial and 
could be ended at any time if a signatory so desired, 1 
and that the Consular Courts would remain to deal with 
violent crimes involving foreigners. 2 England gave her 
consent, perhaps believing it was an enlightened thing 
to do, but also in order to trim French influence which 
had flourished shamelessly under the old capitulations. 
Other continental capitals eventually followed suit, 
including Paris. which by holding aloof had delayed the 
inauguration of the Mixed Courts for several years. Nubar 
did not rely solely upon forensic eloquence, or upon the 
merits of the project to win the adhesion of the Powers, 
but on the time-honored bribe as well. It has been sug-
gested that the "judicial reform and autonomy" from Turkey 
cost Ismail at least £289,421,3 a sum suspicious because 
of its exactitude. In 1873 Ignatiev did receive £100,000 
1The first term of the Tribunals ran from 1876 
to 1881, after which three consecutive annual extensions 
were granted within our period. 
2
.Egypt, by these arrangements, would be adminis-
tered by four types of courts1 l) nonsular, for criminal 
cases involving Europeans or prot4ges of a governments 
2) religious courts handling wills, marriages, etc.a 
t> native courts, dispensing law for the fellaheen1 and 
L!-) the new European Tribunals, having jurisdiction over 
civil claims involving foreigners, (Tignor, Moderniza-
1!2.n., pp. 12)-24) 
Jcrabit,s, Ismail the Malig_n.ed Khedive, p. 215, 
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for his support of the courts, 1 and Tissot, when he was 
Political Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
obtained £50,000, while other Frenchmen also had their 
names inscribed on the Viceregal dole for the same 
2 purpose. 
The Tribunals, though opened in 1875. did not 
commence work until February of the following year. 
The new institution was divided into Courts of First 
Instance and of Appeals. with two-thirds of the judges 
European and the remainder nativer the Powers were in 
control of the Court of Appeals, while each of the parti-
cipating nations held a place upon the lower oourt,3 
Each of the Courts selected a president from among its 
jurists,4 and all judges held their posts from the Khedive 
and were paid out of court fees supplemented by the Malieh. 
In addition to these thirty-one judges, there were twenty-
four assessors, elected from the eream of the mercantile 
society, who joined the jurists on oases of a commercial 
1cox, p. 160. 
2w.alet to Granville, Jmie 6, 1882, Granville 
Papers PRO FO 30/29/160, 
3 Scott, p. 210. 
4Janson, a Belgian, was the first president of the 
Court of First Instance, and Lapenna, of Austria-Hungary, 
held the same honor for the Court of Appeals, 
r 
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nature in the ratio of three judges to two assessors. 1 
Instead of curbing French influence, these Mixed Courts 
provided another outlet for her expansion, for they 
introduced the Code Napoleon to the country and conducted 
most of their proceedings in French. The court was not 
only a gallicizer but also a Westernizer, for one of its 
functions was to register property owned by foreigners 
within the state, and as will be seen later, this pro-
cedure altered property relations for the fellaheen which 
stimulated the economic up-turn in the early 1880's. 
For Ismail, his highly-prized Tribunals were to 
be the bane of his tranquillity, for he discovered that both 
his personal property and the finances of the state were 
under the aegis of the International Courts. Article 11 
of the new arrangement stated1 
The Courts may not give decisions affecting the 
ownership of the public domains. They may not 
entertain jurisdiction over acts of Sovereignty 
nor over measures taken by the Government in the 
execution of and in conformity with the laws and 
regulations of the public administration. However, 
without being permitted to interpret an act of 
administration or to interfere with its execution, 
they shall have jurisdiction over all cases involving 
an infringement arising from such act of the vested 
rights of any foreigner, as recognized either by 
treaties. by law or by contract.2 
1 Brinton, p. 25. 
2 Wynne, p. 600. n. 89. 
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It is probable that Nubar did not fully inform his master 
on these points, for Ismail seemed genuinely surprised 
when informed of the fact by Mr. J. H. Lloyd when he 
visited Cairo. 1 The quality of the jurists, it seems, 
was not of the highest, for European governments viewed 
these positions as sinecures, a sort of "happy hunting 
grounds," to which superannuated judges might be sent. 2 
No sooner had ·the Khedive decreed a three-month 
moratorium on payment of Treasury bills than shoals of 
creditors besieged the Tribunals for full and immediate 
payment. The Viceroy argued that his decrees possessed 
the weight of law, and therefore could not be restricted 
in any way, since that would impair his sovereignty. The 
first of these cases to emerge was that of Cesare Carpi, 
who received a favorable decision on Wednesday, May J, 
1876.J In so doing, the Court of First Instance ruled 
that the Viceroy's decrees were acts of administration 
rather than laws because the Powers were not party to 
them. The state refused to grant execution, and the 
1Dicey, The Stoti of the Khadivate, p. 129. This 
John Horatio Lloyd, a h gh legil authority, of Lloyd's 
Bonds, was the same gentleman who called the meeting of 
Egyptian holders on July 14. 
2wable Gaillard, A Lifetime in .pta 1876 to 1935 (London1 Grant Richards, 1935), pp. 83- • 
JThe Times, May 6, 1876, p. 5. 
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matter was referred to the Court of Appeals in Alexandria. 
By J·une, one hundred cases had been won by the creditors 
and were awaiting the outcome of the Carpi case. 1 On 
suly 22, two days after Mr. Goschen•s formal agreement 
to represent the holders, the Court of Appeals upheld the 
lower court, placing the Viceroy in a most difficult posi-
tion. As a last resort, he applied to the Powers who had 
been signatories to the judicial arrangements, and declared 
that he would let them decide if the ruling was correct. 
To one jurist on the Mixed Courts this evasive tactic was 
reprehensible. A Dutch member of the Alexandria Court of 
First Instance, Herr Haakan, remanded all government cases 
and closed his court, arguing that, since the Cairo govern-
ment refused to execute legal decisions, there was no point 
in continuing to sit. His compeers, however, felt this was 
too rash an act, and he was suspended from the bench until 
October 28 and eventually removed. 
overnight Haakan became a local herot and inspired 
much parading and anti-government propaganda. 2 The re-
mainder of the hot months in Egypt saw no slackening in 
the running squabbles between creditors and the Khedive, 
A number of Italians were driven from the palace at Ramleh 
1rbid,, June 21, 1876, p. 12. 
2 Ibid., July 24, 1876, p. 4. For the Carpi case, 
see Wynne-rp:"' 600, n. 90). 
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by guards when they attempted to remove furniture in 
lieu of the sums due themr fifty-three Europeans owing 
rent to Ismail refused to pay and had their cases post-
poned by Haakan to October 20, but worst of all for the 
Viceroy, in late September the English Government joined 
with the rest of Europe in upholding the decision of the 
Mixed Courts, so that the Khedive was faced with a des-
perate situation when the International Tribunals re-
opened their doors on October 10. The summer did not 
bring a volt-face in rsmail's imprudence, for taxes were 
collected in advance, 1 waste and extravagance continued. 
and the war with Abyssinia was prosecuted although an 
unmitigated disaster. By August the Khedive had resorted 
to what has been called the "Ismalun" loan, a scheme where• 
by old bonds were ante-dated and mortgaged for what they 
would bring. 2 
The Syndicate and the French Government tried 
throughout to put the best countenance they could on 
Egyptian affairs. On June 10 the Caisse began functioning 
1The year 1876 witnessed a good Nile, hence an 
abundant harvest in Egyptian staples--cotton, sugar, wheat, 
and beans. Figures for these quantities are given in the 
Jo~al of the Rotal Societ~ of Arts (XXVI (March 22. 18 , )37). Inhis sftua Ion, the ruinous system of 
advanced tax collection was carried out with less hardship 
than in a lean year. 
2 Bouvier, p. 97. 
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without the 3ritish member, but with M. de Blignieres 
(a former prefect and at one time the Inspector of 
Finance) representing France. Herr von Kremer (a counselor 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) from Austria-Hungary, 
and s. Baravelli (Inspector General of Finance) as the 
Italian member. In practice they had no access to funds 
and at this point exercised little power. Since Egyptian 
stocks continued to slip in June, Parisian houses once more 
had to resort to large-scale purchasing on the open market, 1 
but this trend was somewhat slowed with the appearance of 
Mr. Goschen. The Quai d'Orsay, in its attempts to help the 
Syndicate, requested M. Villet to remain in Cairo to make 
a financial report. In so doing. he described the railways 
as flourishing {while, in fact, they were near total col• 
lapse)2 and the newly-published budget as producing a 
surplus.J It is doubtful that anyone, least of all the 
bourses of Europe, were convinced by these ebullient ob-
servations, it being as likely that Ismail had a surplus 
of revenue as that he had stumbled upon the Philosopher's 
Stone. On September 19 Villet was recalled. But these 
1The Times, June 20, 1876, p. 10. 
2 Cromer, II, 312. 
JThe Times, Aug. 9, 1876, pp. 5 and 9. 
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were mere shadows, for the events of substance were being 
enacted in Paris and London by the representatives of the 
Khedive•s creditors. 
Ismail had never thrown down the gauntlet to 
the bondholders by stating that upon a certain date all 
old stock must be turned in for new on pain of forfeiture 
of the investment, but until things were settled, all 
payments to the secured holders ceased. The Council re-
ported that by year's end, £998,280 of Egyptian securities 
were in default.1 
Upon the selection of Mr. Goschen, the French 
Syndicate also chose a representative, Edmond Joubert, 
director of the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas. Little 
is known of the exchanges between these two, which got 
underway promptly after Goschen arrived in the French 
capital on July 22 amidst the tidings of the Carpi decision. 
Joubert visited London for the next meeting, and these 
trans-channel negotiations continued for two months. 
The 
the 
1corp, For~ Bondht Rep., 1876, pp, 58 and 6J. 
situation of t e Egyp !an securities was summed up by 
Council as follows& 
Loan Drawing To Be Held Status 
1862 29th July 24 unpaid 
1867 10th November 22 outstanding 
1870 14th September nothing 1864 2 th August nothing done 
1866 22nd November also suspended 
1868 17th October not held 
1873 6th July not held 
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The Khedive was also involved in these discussions, and 
notes to him were entrusted to England's Consul in Alexan-
dria, Mr. Cookson. 1 The slow pace of these proceedings 
resulted in irritation in certain quarters, as with 
Mr. Legge, the editor of the Whitehall Review. "a vio-
lently Conservative journal,"2 who said aloud what others 
murmured sotto voce, that Prince Halim had a good right 
to the throne and ought to press his claims in the Inter-
national Tribunals.J Perhaps The Times was correct when 
it observed that the English public was not very interested 
in Egypt, 4 but Mr, Goschen remarked, at the completion of 
his mission, that "the strength of public opinion on the 
subject of Egyptian finance, was of incalculable use to 
us in our negotiations."5 Not all the organs reflecting 
and molding general sentiment sounded the same key, which 
must have given some little difficulty to Goschen. Hera-
-
path's Railway Journal, for example, took the Viceroy's 
word as truth and was "quite at a loss to perceive any 
1cookson to Derby, Aug. 18, 1876, PRO FOCP 407/9, 
No. 148, P• 91. 
ACFB, Egypt, V, 92. 
10. 
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substantial grievance in the new terms for Egyptian 
bondholders."1 The Daily News, a third of which was 
owned by Henry Oppenheim, declared, with doubtful validity, 
that the exchange of bonds had picked up and that "the 
unification must now be accepted as an accomplished fact, 
subject to such modifications • • • as can be obtained. •• 2 
The Daily Telegraph also urged holders to acquiesce and 
said that it was untrue that the new stocks would be un-
salable.J The vast majority of investors did not heed 
these counsels and chose to wait. 
'rhe English banks which had 'dealt so long and so 
profitably in Viceregal paper had also reached a crisis 
by the summer, and no doubt made their views known to 
Goschen. Of these institutions, the Ba.~k of Egypt was 
most fortunate, holding £l5J,96J of its total capital of 
£250,000 in Treasury bills and Daira bonds which, valued 
at their market price plus the 25 per cent bonus, still 
represented a loss of £77,000 on the balance sheet at 
mid-year.4 Regarding the pending discussions, their 
chairman Mr. Bramley-Moor assured the holders that their 
Egypt, 
1Herapath's Rail!f!Y Journal, July 8, 1876, ACFB, 
IV, j5o. 
2naily News, July 25, 1876, ~ •• v, 16. 
JDaily Telegraph, Aug. 10, 1876, .!.l2.!i!•• 80. 
4The Times, July 21, 1876, p. 6. 
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bank had not joined the French conversion plan.1 For 
the Bank of Alexandria the crash of Egyptian paper meant 
a reorganization into the Commercial Bank of Alexandria 
with £3 of liability per share. Their August meeting 
grew quite stormy when a number of holders registered 
their indignation upon learning that the bank had in-
volved itself in the Egyptian floating debt. The chair-
men, T. s. Richardson, told the assembly that the market 
value of their securities was £512,000 out of a total capi-
tal of £800,000, and that if the Khedive's plan were im-
plemented, it would raise the former sum to £640,000. 2 
Mr. Fergusson, a holder of 300 shares, who had invested 
in the institution because he had thought it was a purely 
mercantile venture, was outraged to think he had been 
led astrays 
Lancashire men were induced to invest in the bank. 
He [Fergusson] had come to London, and had been told 
that the business was based entirely on cotton, • • • • 
Instead of carrYing on the business of the bank, they 
(the directors] had invested the money of the bank in 
Treasury bills to the amount of £512,000, which were 
worth nothing, and were the same as dishonoured bills, 
in this country,J 
His call for liquidation was overwhelmingly defeated, 
leaving the bank extant but dependent upon the Syndicate 
1IQ!g, •• July 27, 1876, P• 6. 
2Money Market Review, XXXIII (Sept. 2, 1876), 2J6. 
JThe Times, Sept. 1, 1876, p. 4. 
2.35 
to obtain a favorable settlement. 
The largest of the banks was the Anglo-Egyptian, 
which held £1.2 million in Treasury bills though its 
total capital was only £1.6 million.1 As individuals, 
some directors had suffered considerable financial loss, 2 
and as of August Jl, 1876, the market value of its 
"securities" including the bonus was only £44 in the 
hundred.3 As a member of the Syndicate, the Anglo-
Egyptian had contributed £500,000 in the spring towards 
the maintenance of the stock prices by purchases the 
November balance sheet showed the holders that deprecia-
tion had cost them, in all, £620,000 upon their invest-
ments. With so much at stake, it was necessary that 
Goschen be apprised of the bank's views, and, in fact, 
on his mission he was accompanied by a director of this 
institution.4 
September came and still the plenipotentiaries of 
the creditors seemed no closer together. On September 8, 
M. Mazerat, agent for the Cntdit Lyonnais, stated that 
1 
.ll2!,g, •• June 1, 1877, p. 6. 
2An instance of this is the case of P. Lutcher, a 
director and Egyptian merchant who was forced to liquidate 
his business in early March, 1876. with a debt of half a 
million pounds. 
;The Times, Nov. 22, 1876, P• 7. 
4 ~·• Dec. 1, 1876, P• 7. 
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"the combinations of the groups are coming up against 
inextricable difficulties. 01 In three weeks' time the 
situation had altered. On receiving the views of the 
Powers upon the question of the Mixed Courts, the Viceroy 
found that a settlement with his creditors was imperative. 
Ismail telegraphed invitations to the emissaries 
of the creditors to come to Egypt and, after a first-hand 
investigation, to join with him in reaching a settlement. 2 
The Council quickly summoned the bondholders to a meeting 
at the Cannonstreet Hotel on October J, and in an opening 
statement, Mr. Bouverie referred to the Cave Report and 
how it demonstrated that prudent administration of Egypt 
would enable that country to meet its engagements. This 
belief was basic to the Council's position and was also 
a dominant theme in Mr. Goschen's thinking. In his presen-
tation, which was punctuated by voluble signs of support, 
Na-. Goschen announced his intention to go to Egypt if the 
bondholders desired it. The enormous interests involved, 
the suffering of English families, the present critical 
stage of Egyptian finances, and his desire to complete 
the task were cited as reasons for his decision. Although 




_T_h_e_....;Egy.....,_p_t_i_an __ o_e_b_t_ • ...__M_i_s_s_i_o ..... n, Appendix, 
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the modis operandi for an arrangement could not be 
divulged, it being open to modification, still Goschen 
insisted that the Caisse with the authority of the Mixed 
Courts behind it would be an ingredient, and since Downing 
Street had not appointed a commissioner, the bondholders 
could do so and would have the cordial backing of the 
French Government. After an admonition not to believe 
rumors, the speaker received a unanimous vote of confi-
dence and the meeting closed.1 
The attitude of the British Government toward the 
ensuing mission was naturally of prime significance. Events 
in the Balkan Peninsula in the previous months had riveted 
the eyes of Europe upon this portion of the Ottoman Empire 
and had thrust Egypt into the background. Disraeli had 
been but a lukewarm Turkophile and had once told Derby, 
"All the Turks may be in the Propontis, so far as I am 
concerned, 112 but as tempers sharpened, honed razor-thin 
by Gladstone's pamphletry, mass meetings, and the division 
of society into "Russians" and "Turks," the Prime Minister 
was forced to assume an ever more pro-Turkish position. 
Between May JO and June 14 a revolution boiled up in 
1The information on this meeting is drawn from 
Council, The Egyptian Debt. Mission (Appendix, pp. vi-
xix). 
2Buckle and Monypenny, VI, 53. 
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Constantinople, and by July Serbia was at war with the 
new Sultan. In England the anti-Turk furor broke in 
the press on August 26, fanned by accounts of the Bul-
garian horrors. Since the integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire was a sensitive issue, the Beaconsfield Govern-
ment did not want to make any provocative moves upon 
Egypt for fear of initiating a general division of the 
Turkish possessions. On JUne 24, the Cabinet had as-
sured st. Petersburg that Great Britain did not wish to oc-
cupy Egypt, 1 but Bismarck, who still sought to separate 
London and Paris and in the bargain further alienate the 
former from Russia, continued to press England to accept 
real estate which was not his to render. The German Chan-
cellor, while assuring England on October 2J, 1876, that 
Turkey was not worth a European war, again urged Britain 
to take Egypt, 2 Disraeli was piqued at these continuous 
references and thought he knew where British interests lay, 
should Russia attempt to take Constantinoplet 
and 
Not even the command of the sea could help us U."'tder 
such circumstances. People who talk in this manner 
must be utterly ignorant of geography. Our strength 
Po cs 
2
rbid., P• 98. 
-
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is on the sea. Constantinople is the key to India, 
and not Egypt and the Suez Cana1.1 
But Bismarck, who was persistent, presented the topic once 
more before year•s end, this time to Salisbury when he 
visited Berlin on his tour of Continental capitals pre-
ceding the conference in Constantinople, The Prime Minister 
had not altered his opinionss 
I am surprised that Bismarck should go on harping 
about Egypt. Its occupation by us would embitter 
France, and I don't see it would at all benefit us, 
if Russia possessed Constanti~ople. I would sooner 
we had Asia Minor than Egypt. 
Since the abandonment in May, 1876. of the 
"Egyptian policy," or an economic protectorate of the 
Nilotic. England had become circumspect in her relations 
with Egypt. Yet the Goschen mission manifested British 
interest in Egyptian affairs. The prime movers of this 
phenomenon were two, the French Government, and the 
English bondholders. From Deeazes came the diplomatic 
pressure, while Goschen and Joubert were the architects. 
Shortly after accepting his new duties, Goschen 
paid a visit to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to dis-
cuss the matter and received encouragement when he inquired 
into the possibility of some support from the Government. 
1Disraeli to Barrington, Oct. 23, 1876, Buckle 
and Monypenny, VI, 84. 
2Disrael1 to Salisbury, Nov. 29, 1876. Seton-
Watson, p. 109. 
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Northcote wrote to Salisbury1 
They [Goschen's proposals] may succeed or fails but 
at worst they can do no harm. I shall be ready to 
certify through our Consul-General, if desired, 
that Mr. G. is a man who can be trusted, and who 
commands general respect in England.l 
Goschen next addressed himself to the Foreign Office: 
I shall be greatly indebted to your Lordship if, 
in the interests of the English bondholders, I may 
receive such moral support as your Lordship may feel 
yourself at liberty to afford, in my endeavor to ob-
tain a more equitable settlement,2 
In only a few days an affirmative reply for unofficial 
support was received.J Derby's willingness has been 
attributed to pressure applied by Decazes who, still 
desirous of an arrangement, had persuaded the timid 
Foreign Secretary to take this step.4 Both Western 
Powers took the opportunity to send out new Consuls-
General, Hussey Vivian for England and Baron des Michels 
for France. These selections proved salutary for the 
mission, since, as iV'i.r. Goschen told the creditors, "the 
English Consul-General and the French Consul-General 
1Northcote to Salisbury, July 25, 1876, quoted in 
A. R. D. Elliot, p. 173· 
2Goschen to Derby, July 26, 1876, PRO FOCP 407/9, 
No. 141, P• 89. 
3Tenterden to Goschen, Aug. J, 1876, ~., 
No. 144, p. 90. 
4Atkins, pp. 92-93. This appraisal of the situation 
is drawn from the memoirs of des Michels. 
---
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worked together harmoniously,"1 At bottom much of this 
amity was based on familiarity. The two agents had 
labored successfully in Bucharest before their present 
assignment, and the strong personality o1 the Frenchmen 
somewhat drew his English counterpart in its wake. 
Goschen had informed those pre3ent at the meeting 
of October J that if they wished him to represent them, 
he could leave England in forty-eight hours and be in 
Egypt in ten days, his offer was enthusiastically ac-
cepted. Cairenes had become accustomed to European 
dignitaries in their city. but the inundation of financial 
medicinemen in the autumn of 18?6 would have made one wonder 
who was Europe• s "Sick wian." The Englishmen who appeared 
in Cairo included Sir George Elliot and the Deputy Chairman 
of the Bank of Egypt, Mr. Cater. Accompanying the M.P. 
for London was Mr, Romaine2 as well as Henry Drummond 
Wolff, who, having told the holders that "we must give 
Mr. Goschen our blind con:f'idence, .. J chose to make the 
journey with him. Mr. Wolff, a Conservative M.P. who 
1counc11. The EgYptian Debt. Mission, p, 22. 
2The Times, Oct. 10, 1876, p. 7. It was an-
nounced that Mr, Romaine was en route to Egypt to take 
his place as President of the Superior Council of the 
Treasury. 
J.I£!1!., Oct, 4, 1876, P• 7, 
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had supported the shares purchase and the Cave Mission, 1 
in late September, 1876, became a stockholder2 and direc-
tor of the .Anglo-Egyptian Bank. He had obtained the un-
official support of the Government and loyally seconded 
Mr. Goschen in the negotiations • .3 
It has been suggested that Goschen actively worked 
for British political gain through the plan he negotiated, 
and hia visit with Salisbury and Northcote preceding his 
departure4 can be explained in these terms. Certainly 
the so-called .,Goschen Decree" appeared to have this 
result, but it is clear enough that the Foreign Office 
entertained no such thoughts. Goschen's efforts at all 
times were to arrange the best terms possible for the 
1Hansard, Jd ser* Vol. 231 (Aug. 5, 1876), ool, 650. 
2Henry Drummond Wolff (1830•1908) entered the 
Foreign Off ice in 1849 and held a number of minor diplo-
ma tic posts, In 1864 he resigned and became a traveler 
and financier by assisting in the floatation of various 
companies. In 1876 he was a director in the General Credit 
and Discount Company, and also in the British and Foreign 
Exchange Investment Bank. He returned to the Foreign Of-
fice in 1878 for two years. during which he sat upon a 
commission which involved itself in the Balkan boundary 
disputes (Q!':lli., Supp. 2t III, 699-7021 see also Wolff's 
Rambling Recollections J. 
1he shire !!st of the Anglo•Egyptian Banking 
Company for June 14• 1877, shows Wolff holding 100 shares 




3Tenterden to Masterman, Oct. 14, 1876, PRO FOCP 
No. 158• p~ 971 Vivian to Derby• Oet. 27, 1876, 
No, 164~ P• 100~ 






bondholders, obtaining as much Government support as was 
needed to see the discussions to a successful completion, 
and to avoid the embarrassment that would attend him 
should he author a scheme which would be rejected by 
Downing Street. 
The atmosphere of the negotiations was highly 
charged from the outset. Goschen and Joubert arrived 
near the end of Ramadan, 1 generally a dangerous time 
of year for Christians in Egypt, and despite articles 
in the London journals depicting the Egyptians viewing 
Goschen almost as some sort of epiphany, it appears that 
both he and Joubert were kept under heavy guard by the 
Consuls-General and were seldom seen in public. 2 Ismail, 
too, found things unpleasant. Des Michels with his 
bullying bluster, as well as Mr. Vivian,3 provided backing 
for their countrymen, while from the Prince of Wales and 
the King of the Belgians came letters to the Viceroy ex-
pressing the hope that Goschen would meet with success. 4 
1876. 
1Ramadan lasted from September 19 to October 17 in 
2Bouvier, p. 97. 
3vivian to Derby, Oct. 27, 1876. PRO FOCP 407/9, 
No. 165, P• 101. 
4
vivian to Derby, Oct. 15, 1876, .!BJ&..• No. 160, 
p. 99. 
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A sense of urgency was communicated to the Cairo 
Government through the decision of the Powers regarding 
the Courts, for if the negotiations were to break down, 
the Mixed Courts would be forced to arrange a settle-
ment. The Caisse, which had been quiescent until the 
authority of the Tribunals had been clarified, now 
brought the Cairo Government to court since it was 
obvious to everyone, including Goschen, that "the 
Viceroy is wilfully keeping back revenues pledged to 
creditors by the late decrees, to an extent indeed so 
gross, that he defeats his object."1 Therefore, it was 
no surprise that the Tribunals ruled in favor of the 
Caisse, 2 whereupon, as if by a given sign, their coffers 
began to fill. But the stresses upon Ismail were even 
more severe than this. The Viceroy knew that the new 
Sultant disliked him, and would probably remove him 
as Khedive if at all possible,3 once again the avuncular 
shadow of Halim was cast across his path and the negotiators 
1aoschen to Northcote, Oct. 21, 1876, Iddesleigh 
Papers BM Add MSS 50021, P• 245. 
2 The Times, Nov. 11, 1876, p. 6. 
3Jacob M. Landau, "Prolegomena to a Study of 
Secret Societies in Modern Egypt,•• (hereafter "Secret 
Societies") Middle Eastern Studies, I (Jan., 1965), 149. 
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even began to speak of Tewfik, Ismail•s eldest son, as 
a man with whom it might be easier to deal. 1 
Upon the commencement of their conversations, 
Goschen found the Viceroy evincing "cynical indifference 
to paying his creditors in full." 2 The Englishman•s 
initial proposals were quite favorable to the.British 
holders,3 but in the negotiations that followed, both 
France and Egypt were to obtain concessions. Ismail 
exaggerated his liabilities, attempted to disown the 
statistics given to Cave. and fought hard to reduce the 
interest rate. all of which Gosch~n condemnedt 
For my own part, I think it would be very dangerous 
except in the case of 9Xtremity to consent to a 
simple reductiqn 04 interest as a reward for extra-
vagance and lying. 
Yet both sides realized that a oompromise was necessary, 
and slowly one was hammered out, But before such an 
arrangement could be promulgated, conf iden~e in the 




1Bouvier, P• 100. 
2Goschen to Northcote, oot. 21, 1876, Iddesleigh 
BM Add MSS 50021 1 P• 245, 
JGoschen memorandum, Oct. 15, 1876, PRO FOCP 
No. 160, P• 98, 
4aoschen to Northcote, Oct. 21, 1876, Iddesleigh 
BM Add MSS 50021, P• 2*5• 
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the success of the plan--had to be elevated, A scape-
goat was selected. upon whom all blame for Viceregal 
impecuniosity could be placed, and this unlucky person 
was Ismail's own half-brother, the Minister of Finance 
for the preceding three years, Sadyk Pasha. He was cer-
tainly culpable, for Goschen had discovered that earlier 
in the year he had used Parisian houses to manipulate the 
price of securities and had ea.med over £800.000 for his 
master, 1 who had ordered these transactions. Sad1k was 
removed from his office, spirited away at remail's command, 
and was said to have committed suicide, This gambit by 
the Khedive was efficaeious1 within ninety minutes of 
the announcement of Sadyk's dismissal on November 81 
Egyptian stocks experienced a three point rise on the 
Alexandria bourse. 2 
Goschen had been correct when he thought that 
stories would be rife at home during his absence. The 
rumor of Britain's occupation of Egypt was resurrected 
and even began to worry Mr. Gladstone.J The bondholders 
1council, The Eg,yptian Debt, Mission, pp, 45-47. 
2 The Times, Nov. 27, 1876, P• 7. 
3Gladstone to Granville, Nov, 8, 1876, Agatha 
Ramm, ed,, The Political Correspondence of Mrg Gladstone 
and Lord Granville1 18z6-8t> (herea?ter. 76- 6){0X£0@1 
At the Clarendon Press, 1962), I, 18. 
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received palpable signs that all was not well during the 
early stages of the negotiations. Before leaving England, 
Goschen stated that, although he had previously urged 
holders not to send their bonds in for conversion, he now 
thought they might do so since negotiations had reached a 
point where that action would not be prejudicial to their 
interests.1 No sooner had Goschen arrived in Cairo than 
the Paris bourse. reacting to Syndicate urgings, commenced 
the quotation of the new Egyptia..~ scrip, and to the public 
it appeared that the French capitalists had renounced 
Goschen and Joubert and had decided to force the imple-
mentation of their original scheme. Perhaps the Syndicate 
had gotten wind of Goschen•s initial proposals, or felt 
that the Khedive would not yield or that Joubert would be 
too malleable. In any case, the move startled everyone. 
including the Council. Secretary Clarke pursued, with 
E. c. Hardcastle, the London Manager of the Comptoir 
d'Escompte, the question of the position of those investors 
who had sent in their bonds for conversion. Receiving an 
evasive answer, 2 the Secretary of the Corporation of 
Foreign Bondholders published his correspondence with the 
1council, The Egyptian Debt, Mission, P• xviii. 
2The correspondence between Clarke and Hardcastle 













comptoir, which did nothing to improve the image of the 
Syndicate. Fortunately for all concerned, the question 
became moot upon the issuance of the "Goschen Decree" 
of November 18, 1876. 
Under this arrangement the Daira debts were 
totally separated from the burden of the state and, 
since time was short, only broad desiderata were agreed 
upon, The Khedive was willing to discuss a suitable in-
terest rate and sinking fund, and to cede to the holders 
of the 1870 loan and floating debt his personal estates 
to be controlled by three trustees, two of whom would be 
Europeans, The short loans (1864, 1866, and 1867) whose 
combined value was roughly £4,250,000, would be repaid 
at 80 instead of 100, would maintain their former interest, 
and would have the Moukal>ala, which was again restored, as 
their security. 
The rest of the debt was composed of the 1862, 1868, 
and 1873 loans and the Government Treasury bills, all of 
which were combined and divided into two types of securi-
ties: the Preference Bonds, equalling £17 million and 
paying 5 per cent interest; and the Unified Stock, totalling 
£59 million, giving 7 per cent. Through this arrangement, 
holders of the secured loans received 38.4 per cent of the 
privileged debt and the remainder in "Unifieds"; therefore, 
the Preference debt holders tended to be English, while 
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the 7 per cent stock was widely held in France. What 
made the privileged stock special was its new position as 
the first charge upon the revenue of the state, some 
£850,000 the first years should its particular hypo-
thecated income {including the railway receipts and a 
part of the harbor dues of Alexandria) fall short, funds 
would be taken from the money set aside for the Unified 
debt to make up the difference, The Unified debt, with 
a greater interest to maintain, was secured on the general 
revenue and possessed a sinking fund which would eliminate 
the encumbrance in sixty-five years, For the next nine 
years large drawings were to be held in an attempt to 
decrease the pecuniary millstone so that, when the effects 
of the Moukabala were felt by 1886, there would be suffi-
cient revenue to maintain the debt. 1 For both the Prefer-
ence and Unified stocks drawings would be made at par. 2 
The holders of the floating debt, mainly the syndi-
cate of French bankers, were given a bonus of 10 per cent 
on the market price of their securities, and, as stated 
above, were allowed to exchange them for Unified stock, 
Thus, the new funded indebtedness of Egypt was placed at 
1For an explanation of the provisions of the 
Moukabala, see above, Chapter 2. p. 131. 
2
.An English translation of the decree of Novem-
ber 18. 1876, is available in Council, The Egyptian Debt. 
Mission {pp. 1-19). 
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£91,276,444, of which £2,068,397 was the French bonus.1 
Neither the French capitalists nor r1ir. \\folff and his 
Anglo-Egyptian Bank had much to complain of since, 
although the public was unaware of it, a segment of the 
floating debt was left outside the plan. The amount 
withheld has been estimated at anywhere from four to 
eight million pounds, which directly benefited the Credit 
Foncier, Comptoir d'Escompte, and Anglo-Egyptian .Bank. 2 
In addition, the 15 per cent founder's shares in the Canal 
which the Viceroy had mortgaged remained in French hands. 
It should not be supposed, however, that English interests 
were slighted. Greenfield and Company, the contractors 
for the Alexandria harbor, were ably represented by George 
Elliot. This firm was owed £700,000, all of it profit, 
for which they were granted the right to collect the 
bulk of the Alexandria harbor dues. Further, they were 
given £2 million in Preference stock on which they could 
collect dividends until the Khedive had repaid his debt 
to them. 
1 Hamza, p. 240. 
2nouvier,in his article (p. 99), states that 100 
million francs of the unsecured debt held by the Credit 
Foncier was not included in the November plan, nor was 
32.5 million francs of the Comptoir d'Escompte or 













Goschen and Joubert set Egypt's normal revenue 
at more than £7 million, but when the Moukabala, rail-
way income, etc., were added, this figure swelled to more 
than £10.5 million. The Egyptian Government would be 
given £4.5 million yearly with which to operate, and the 
annual interest payment was put at £6,180,000. To have 
this scheme succeed, maladministration had to be eradicated, 
and, as Goschen wrote, 0 the increased introduction of the 
European element is all important."1 The October promise 
to retain the Caisse was honored, and the place for an 
English member was eventually :f'illed. 2 A board was also 
created to administer the railroads and the port of Alexan-
dria 1 here, too, British interests dominated, with two 
Englishmen (one of whom was always to be president), one 
Frenchman, and one native comprising the commission. Final-
ly, a pair of "watchdogs" were placed over Khedivial finance--
two controllers-general, one for receipts and the other 
for expenditure, each to be selected by a Western Power. 
A general outline of the plan had found its way 
into print as early as a week before the publication of 
1Goschen to Gladstone, Dec. 7, 1876, Gladstone 
Papers BM Add MSS 44161, LXXVI, 267• 
2The .Caisse ge J,a Dette Publique rerr.ained in 
existence until 1940. 
r 
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the Goschen Decree and had a favorable effect upon Egypt's 
stocks. In fact, since the London financier had taken 
affairs in hand, these securities had risen steadily, 
leveling off on November 28, the day he formally presented 
his project to a meeting of the bondholders summoned by the 
Corporation. 1 On this occasion Mr. Goschen's speech lasted 
almost two hours and was apologetic in tone. It failed to 
leave a positive impression, and Egyptian bonds began to 
slip. Obviously there were serious doubts in the minds of 
many as to whether the Goschen Decree was workable, 
The attitude of the Government toward this plan 
was most painful to Mr, Goschen. He had always warned the 
Council that the bondholders ought not to expect the Foreign 
Office to come to their aid. Yet, while the negotiations 
1The Times (Nov, JO, 1876, p, 7) gives the following 
figures1 
Value Out- July l, 187 6 November 27, 187 6 
Loan standing Value Value (£) Price (£) Price (£) 
1862 2,559,000 37 946,SJO 55 1,407,450 
1864 2,1)2,000 4g 8Jl,480 67 l,428,440 1866 l,531,620 612,648 62 1,225,296 
1867 1,157,600 46 5.'.32,496 70 717,712 
1868 10,722,500 39 4,181,775 ~~ 6,004,600 1870 6,932,380 37 2,2Jl,980 2,955,866 
187J Jl,JlJ.660 JB.25 11,977,475 5.5 17,222,51.'.3 
To'tal .55,448,760 J8.2.5 21,314,689 55.75 J0,9.51,877 
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were in progress, he had written Northcote: 
I am the last man to ask the Government for more 
countenance than they think they can prudently give, 
but pray go as far as you can.l 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer had been sympathetic and 
said, "I am sending your letter to Derby, and will urge 
him to go as far as he can in giving support, 02 but in 
the end the Foreign Office decided to withhold its recog-
nition of the plan by not appointing the necessary English-
men to the various posts created for them.J Although both 
Northcote4 and Vivian5 advocated British participation, 
Goschen was forced to appear before the investors with 
a plan that Her Majesty•s Government seemed to deprecate 
and which did not have its cooperation. Lord Derby him· 
self was not optimistic that the Viceroy would keep his 
bargain, and told Vivian that, if circumstances permitted, 
Ismail would default at once. 6 
1aoschen to Northcote Oct. 21, 1876 1 Iddesleigh 
Papers BM Add MSS 50021 1 P• 246, 
2Northcote to Goschen, Nov. l, 1876, ~. 50053, 
P• 70 (copy). 
3nerby to Vivian, Nov. 22. 1876, PRO FOCP 407/9, 
No. 179, P• 115. 
4Northcote to Tenterden. Nov. 16, 1876, Tenter-
den Papers PRO FO 363/2. 
5vivian to Derby. Nov. 25. 1876, PRO FOCP 407/9. 
No. 184, P• 128. 
6nerby to Vivian. Dec. 13 1 1876, ~ •• No. 190, 
p. 134. 
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Even more fundamental than these disturbing 
thoughts was the opinion expressed by many that the 
scheme was impracticable. In this respect the atti-
tude of The Times was crucial, for not only was its 
financial staff sound and highly respected, 1 but its 
views were assumed to have a semi-official character. 
After an analysis of the Decree, the verdict came1 
All that we contend is that the scheme here set 
forth does not provide Egypt with the immediate 
relief which is so obviously needful that it renders 
at the very start borrowing indispensable, and is 
therefore like a2pyramid placed apex downward--it cannot stand. 
The Morning Post remarked upon the change in attitude 
toward the arrangements made in Cairo as soon as they 
were fully explained.3 The J21!ilionist of November 18 
argued that Egypt could not pay the burdensome interest 
now placed upon her. 4 and even the Money Market Review 
1The City editor of The Times for almost two 
decades after 1874 was Arthur Crump. He was ably assisted 
by Alexander J. Wilson, who had worked with him on the 
Economist and who went to the Pall Mall Gazette as fin-
ancial editor in 1879• 
2 The Times, Nov. 29, 1876, P• 7• 
)Morning Post. NOV• 30; 1876; ACFB, Egypt, VI, 114. 
4Bullionist, Nov. 18• 1876; ibid., 14• Also sharing 
this view were the Monetary: Gazette (Dec. 20, 1876, ibid., 
80) and the Spectator (XLIX [Dec. 2, 1876], 1505). ~ 
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thought that the plan was unfeasible and that the Eng-
lish financier had played into the hands of the French. 1 
Mr. Goschen was rather upset over the attacks from the 
press, especially when they were aimed at the credibility 
of the Viceroy, for in his view the opposite tactic should 
be employed and the Khedive made to feel that his violation 
of the agreement would be a gross breach of public trust. 2 
A division of opinion existed among those individuals fami-
liar with Egyptian finance. Edwin de Leon, a former agent 
in Cairo, made Sadyk Pasha the evil genius of the Egyptian 
debacle, although warning that the Viceroy would do what-
ever he pleased in the future,J Sir Charles Rivers Wilson 
felt the Goschen plan had a good chance of succeeding; 4 
and J. C. Mc Coan wrote : 
The best-informed opinion, both in London and Cairo, 
••• doubted the ability of the Egyptian exchequer 
to pay 7 per cent. on £59,000,000 out of a reduced 
revenue of about £?,750,000 ••• and was, there-
fore, in favor of a reduction of interest to a 
unified 5 per cent. on all but the short loans.5 
1Money Market Review, XXXIII (Nov. 18, 1876), 496. 
2aoschen to Northcote4 Dec. J, 1876, Iddesleigh Papers BM Add MSS 50021, P• 2 9. 
JnThe Khedive•s Egypt, and Our Route to India," 
Blackwood's Magazine, CXXII (Oct., 1877), 486. 
4wilson to W. H. Smith, Aug. 9, 1877, PRO FOCP 
407/9, No. 254, P• 190. 




Naturally, the Council stood behind its repre-
sentative, as did the great majority of bondholders and 
ba~ks involved.1 Backing by the press was often tepid, 
as in the case of the Economist which saluted Goschen's 
intentions and granted him some achievements, or that of 
London which felt the plan to be a succesoful compro-
mise of claims. 2 In general, those periodicals which 
had most strongly urged holders to send in their scrip 
for conversion, for instance the Daily Telegraph and 
the Daily News, were now Goschen's firmest supporters. 
w~ny of the inhabitants of Alexandria also desired to 
give the plan a cha.nee, and the correspondent for The 
Times of London, the most widely-read paper in Alexan-
dria, gave his employers at home a mild reprimand for 
their negative utterances.3 
1T. c. Bruce, of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, praised 
the settlement at that institution's meeting of June 27, 
1877 (Money Market Review, XXXIV [June JO, 1877], 646). 
Bramley-Moor of the Bank of Egypt also added his tribute 
(The Times, Feb. 8, 1877, p. 7) 1 while the chairman of 
the Angio-Egyptian, though pleased with the settlement, 
remarked that "he did not think this scheme was the one 
which he should have adopted" (The Times, Dec. 1 1 1876, 
p. 7). 
2Eco:nomist, XXXI'! (Nov, 18, 1876), 13411 London. 
Feb. 1, 1877, ACFB, :Egypt, VI, 402. 
JThe Times, Dec. 19, 1876, p, 8. 
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Undeterred, however, Mr. Goschen began to im-
plement the terms of the Decree, He wrote Sir Stafford 
Iiorthcote and informed him that if the Government would 
not appoint the needed officials, the Viceroy had empowered 
him to select them. 1 With this as the topic for discus-
sion, an interview was secured. 2 As will be noted later, 
Downing Street did not actively make selections for these 
posts but allowed Goschen to cull through the list of 
available men. Yet, the London M.P. felt constrained 
to defend his project to Mr. Gladstone: 
There is certainly a revenue leaving a large margin 
for the creditors, The country is not ruined, and 
there is no reason why the engagements should not 
be kept.3 
On December 13, after gentle proddings from the Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer, the Foreign Office finally in-
structed their agent in Cairo to express their pleasure 
on the arrangements which had closed the breach between 
the Egyptian ruler and his creditors.4 Still Goschen 
1rsmail to Goschen, Dec. 4, 1876, A. R. D. Elliot, I, 
P• 170. 
2Goschen to Northcote, Dec. J. 1876, Iddesleigh 
Papers BM Add MSS 50021. P• 250. 
3Goschen to Gladstone, Dec. 7, 1876, Gladstone 
Papers Bf\1 Add KSS 44161, P• 266. 
4Derby to Vivian, Dec. 13, 1876, PRO FOCP 407/9, 




was under intense pressure and was forced to def end 
his plan in the press, 1 since by this point Govern-
ment silence was being interpreted as disa~proval. 2 
The best Goschen could obtain was a general statement 
from the Chancellor that his plan embodied the most 
advantageous terms that could be procured under the 
circumstances and that Government opposition to filling 
the vacancies in Egypt was on general principle. Al-
though the Cabinet would not participate, France and 
:England were closer together with respect to Egypt 
than ever before, and, as Freycinet wrote, from Novem-
ber 18, 1876, .Anglo-French co-operation was assured.J 
There still remained the settlement of the 
Khedive's private debt, the Da.ira, which had fallen 
beyond the scope of the November Decree, On December 12 
a meeting of the Daira creditors was held, chaired by 
R. B. I/artin and addressed by Goschen. The latter ad-
vised rapid action a.~d recapitulated the general terms 
which he and Joubert had obtained from the Viceroy. On 
this occasion Goschen•s words were followed closely in 
Alexandria by telegraph, and as he spoke. the .Egyptian 
l The Times, Dec. 18, 1876, P• 7. 
2Goschen to Northcote, Dec. 19, 1876, Iddesleigh 
Papers BM Add MSS 50021, P• 251. 
JRoberts, "Egypt," p. 62. 
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funds danced until his conclusion, when they dropped. 1 
Most of the floating debt of the Da.ira was held in 
Paris and Alexandria1 2 Goschen thought that committees 
should be formed of holders of the 1870 loan and the 
Da.ira floating debt, and that representatives from 
Paris and London should go to Egypt to examine their 
property and treat with the Viceroy. The consensus of 
the assembly was that they would request the M.P. for 
London to continue in his present capacity as their 
plenipotentiary. Goschen requested ttme for reflection, 
and on December 16 he refused, stating that parliamentary 
labors would not permit it but that he was still interested 
in ·the matter and would help in the selection of a man to 
act in his stead.J 
Hampering the solution of the Daira debt was a 
legal imbroglio which had begun in April of 1876. By 
ruling that the Khedive•s decrees were administrative 
instruments, the courts had done much to drive the Viceroy 
1The Times, Dec. lJ, 1876, p. 7. See above, Chap-
ter J, P• 24i, ?or the Daira terms. 
2over half, or £1,580 1 000, of the floating debt 
of the pa.ira was held by the Credit Foncier. A large 
portion was also in the portfolio of the Anglo-Egyptian. 
3cotp, For, Bondh, Re~., 1876, p. 22, 
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into insolvency.1 Holders had the right to sue for full 
payment, and some 1200 cases were on the Tribunals' dockets 
by November, enough work to keep them busy for the next 
five years. 2 Under these circumstances, it was necessary 
to act quickly in the courts to stop the dissolution of 
the Viceroy's estates and, although none of the suing 
creditors were obliged to accept an arrangement, at least 
to acquire a solution in which all would receive something. 
By early February, two gentlemen had been selected 
to represent the creditors, from England came Thomas 
c. Sandars, a barrister, and from France, M. Joson. also 
a lawyer. After a personal inspection of the Daira by 
Messrs, Joson and Sandars, pourpa.rlers were held in Paris, 
including those two representatives of the bondholders, 
emissaries from Alexandria, and M. Suarez for the Vice-
roy. Out of these discussions emerged the final Daira 
settlement. The Corporation's role in these negotiations 
was central, for, whereas Goschen had borne all the expense 
of his mission, the 'Council' paid the bills for the settle-
ment of the Daira debt.J 
1colvin believed that the courts were the precipi-
tant of the Viceroy's financial collapse (Sir Auckland 
Colvin, The M§ki~ of Mgdern ?zY3t (2d ed., New York1 
E. P. Dutton and<'.io., 1906), p.j). 
2The Times, Nov. 28, 1876, P• 7. 
3corp. For. Bondh. Rep., 1877, P• 7. 
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On May 3, 1877, the Council summoned the last 
meeting of Daira bondholders, at which they were ad-
dressed first by Goschen and then by 3andars. 1 The 
f onner advised the holders that the agreement which 
Mr. Sandars would elucidate would be all the more 
binding if a proper mortgage on the Khedive•s estates 
were obtained by them in the Mixed Tribunals. This 
suggestion was a sound one, and was clearly the best 
course of action, 2 although the process proved long 
and expensiva.3 Sandars presented the arrangement to 
the assembled bondholders, and it was readily approved. 
The contract which was signed on July 12, 1877, 
between the creditors and the Khedive•s delegates, pos-
sessed many of the same concepts which were basic to the 
Decree of November 18. The total debt, £8,815,430, of 
which £2 1 906,150 was unsecured, was consolidated into a 
stock paying 5 per cent per annum with a 1 per cent sinking 
fund. 4 Back interest would be paid at the rate of 5 per 
1The Times, May 4, 1877. p. 6. This journal carried 
a summary o~ the meeting of Daira holders. 
2Wynne, p. 601, n. 92. 
3s1nce fees were an important part of the Tribunals' 
income, they were utilized to the utmost to produce revenue. 
The Standara of February 27, 1877 (ACFB, ~. vr:, 8-10) 
pointea to the case of an individual who was charged £14 
for a copy of a judgment. 
4The interest would rise to 7 per cent when the debt 
had been reduced to £5 million, 
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cent and would be ready for the creditors by the end of 
August. European administrators were introduced to 
dominate the board, audit the finances, and publish 
periodic reports. 1 The bondholders• mortgage lay upon 
the 435,000 acres of the Da.ira Sanieh and the 50.000 
acres of the Da.ira Khassa estates, from which it was 
estimated that, after all expenditures, a revenue of 
£450.000 might be expected. 2 Less land was held by 
Ismail than had been expected, for as early as 1875 he 
had begun giving it away to his family to avoid just such 
a loss. Nonetheless, the Egyptian Government guaranteed 
the 5 per cent interest. As with the November conversion, 
the floating debt creditors also obtained a 10 per cent 
bonus3 which was financed by an issuance of bonds worth 
£700,000, known as "Civil List" or "Khassa" bonds. The 
Khedive pledged a portion of his own income to help in 
may be found in 
Da.ira Debt. Con-
ana !amona Jouoert 
Banking Company this 10 per 
£J4J,OOO (The Times, June l, 
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the repayment of these new obligations which also bore 
a 5 per cent rate of interest. 
The Council considered the settlement of the 
Daira difficulties a clearcut victory for the Corpora-
tion of Foreign Bondholders.1 It had even taken upon 
itself the cost of having the reports and contract 
translated, printed, and distributed, a praiseworthy 
service indeed, for as the eminent financier Henry 
Drummond Wolff observed, "it is astonishing to find how 
few Englishmen--even those dealing with foreign coun-
tries--know anything of modem languages."2 With respect 
to Egypt, the Council had done as much as possible to de-
fend the English investors, and by selecting and backing 
a strong protagonist had given the bondholders a foot-
hold in that country, Henceforth, the Corporation would 
play a supportive role to the newly-appointed officials 
and to Mr. Goschen for as long as he involved himself in 
Egyptian affairs. The Goschen scheme was condemned by 
many as impractical, but for the present the English 
creditors could thank the Council and the M.P. for London 
for placing them in a position of strength. 
1
.Money Marltet Review, XXXVI (May 4, 1878), 435. 
2wolff, II, 59. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ERA OF THE BONDHOLDERS 
MAY 1877 TO JUNE 1879 
The Success of the Goschen Decree 
During the two years which followed the settle-
ment of the Daira debt, the foreign creditors of Egypt 
sought to keep their position in the Nilotic and to 
maintain the annual payment of interest. Another 
adjustment of Egypt's finances was needed, which in 
turn brought about a European ministry headed by Charles 
Wilson and :fubar Pasha. A dominant theme of this period 
was the ever-increasing interposition of Europe, and 
especially of the Western Powers, in the internal af-
fairs of Egypt, which eventually not only increased 
pressure upon the Cairo Government, but also eliminated 
the private character of the officers appointed by 
Mr. Goschen. Thus, the English creditors almost from 
the start found their cause being subverted by the men 
whom Goschen had chosen to fill the vacancies. 
Under Mehemet Ali, Europeans had entered the 
service of the Egyptian ruler as experts occupying 
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technical posts but exerting no influence whatsoever 
upon the Government. With Sald (1854-63) the number 
of foreigners rose significantly as Egypt was thrown 
open to traders and financiers of ever'3 kind. and their 
employment in the ruler's service became less unusual. 1 
rsmail Pasha, as already indicated, utilized the talents 
of Westerners to a great degrees one source estimated 
the number of Europeans added to the Egyptian Govern-
ment service at 160 in 1864-70• 201 in 1871·75, 119 
in 1876, 76 in 1877, and 131 in 1878. 2 Naturally there 
was nationalist competition for these posts, for they 
were a barometer which measured the political influence 
of the various European countries within Egypt. From 
the outset French aggressiveness carried the day, 
reaching its apogee in 1869 on the opening of the 
Canal, when visitors to Egypt could readily observe 
which nation was in t.he ascendancy.3 Although com-
paratively small, the British community in Egypt was 
commercially important, and from the early 1870's the 
1 John Ninet, "Origin of the National Party in 
Egypt," Nineteenth Century, XIII (Jan., 188J), 117 a...,_d 120. 
2Rothstein, p. 64. 
3Edward Dicey, The ~ypt o: the Future (London1 
William Heinemann, 1907), P• • 
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r-chedive began to enlist Englishmen in various capacities. 
The first to attain high off ice was Sir Samuel Baker, 
who from 1869 to 1873 fought the slave trade in the 
Sudan. 1 George Gordon next took up the task and was 
joined by others such as Malcolm Mackillop. By 1876 
the number of Englishmen in KhediYidal pay had risen 
noticeably, especially in those departments involved 
with communicationsr lighthouses, telegraphs, marine, 
post office, and the viceregal packets were all dominated 
by British personnel. 2 Such over-representation often 
created hard feelings in the Europea~ colony.J In many 
cases these appointments were filled by individuals 
selected by the English Government itself or at least 
with its tacit approval, as the Cave p,11ssion illustrated. 
1T. Douglas Murray and Arthur Silva White, 
Sir Samuel Bakers A Memoir (London: Macmillan and Co., 
1895), p. 203. 
2Malet to Derby• May 18, . 1882 • Parliamenta;cy: 
Papers, LXXXII, Egypt NO. 4 (1882), c. 1484, pp. 190-
213. Enclosed in that document is a list of all Europeans 
in the pay of the Viceroy, with their dates of entry, 
nationality, departments, and salaries. 
3.An instance of this can be cited in the elec-
ti?ns for the assessors for the year 1877. These per-
sons participated in the deliberations of the Mixed Courts 
when commercial matters were involved. On this occasion 
only two English merchants were returned, the same as 
for the Dual Monarchy, Germany, and Russia, while the 
Greek, French, and Italian representatives numbered 
seven, six, and four, respectively (The Times, Feb, 28, 
1877, p. 7). 
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By complying with Ismail's request, En.gland not only 
underpinned her own influence, but, as she argued, 
contributed to the general progress of Egypt since, 
as a writer of tha day observed, Egyptian officialdom 
possessed 
most of the usual Eastern defects--of apathy. 
dishonesty, disregard of truth, and general dis-
position to do as little work as possible for the 
largest possible sum of peculative gain,l 
Central to Mr. Goschen•s thinking was the idea 
that European administrators must be introduced, and 
it was natural that he should take up the matter with 
his Government. Those who have studied the Egyptian 
administration after 1882 have shown how important the 
role of the Anglo-Indian official was in the operation 
of the Cairo govern.ment, 2 It has also been suggested, 
and quite rightly, that this "Indianization" had begun 
prior to the British occupation, In a letter to North-
cote on December 19, 1876, Goschen asked for Government 
help in finding a man for the controllership, the most 
sensitive of the available posts, and specifically re-
1McCoa."t'l, P• 115, 
2Robert Tignor, "The •rnd1an1zation' of the 
Egyptian Administration under British Rule," (hereafter 
"Indianization") A,merican Historical Review, LXVIII 
(April, 1963) 1 637, 
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quested an ex-Indian or ex-colonial official.1 Al-
though the Cabinet was not to be enticed into making 
selections, the Chancellor did allow Goschen to confer 
with one of the under secre·taries, who assisted him 
in finding the right man. 2 The upper echelon of the 
Indian civil service was highly paid, but as the 
Khedive was to remit the salaries, this was not a 
hindrance to Goschen. A few of the new Egyptian 
off ioials received stipends equalling that of the 
president of the United States. and, in all, the new 
employees cost the Viceroy £J),500 per year.3 The 
English Cabinet•s position on these appointments 
was ambivalent, for while not responsible for placing 
such individuals as William Romaine or General Mar-
riott, 4 they still allowed these men, as well as others, 
to take extended leaves of absence from their duties in 
1aoschen to Northcote, Dec. 19, 1876, Iddes-
leigh Papers BM Add MSS 50021, p. 251. 
2Northcote to Goschen, Dec. 5, 1876, ~· 
50053, p, 87 (copy), 
3vivian to Derby, Feb. 2, 1877. PRO FOCP 407/9, 
No, 207, P• 149. Of the above sum, £15,000 would go to 
Englishmen. 
4nerby to Vivian, Dec, 21, 1876, ~ •• No. 
195, p. 139. 
---
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India. 1 Considering the sentiments of Secretary 
Clarke and other members of the 'Council.' these-
lection of Anglo-Indian officials to represent the 
bondholders seems to have been most congenially 
accepted. 
The most important of the posts to be f'illed 
was that of Controller-General of Receipts; by early 
December Goschen had a potential candidate. William 
Romaine. Goschen informed Northcote of this gentle-
man •a desire to secure the appointment and the Chan-
cellor replied at once that filr. Romaine was a person 
of strong character who deserved the opportunity~ 2 
Before the year 1876 was out, the names of Romaine 
and Baron de Malaret (representative of the Syndicate) 
had been sent to Ismail as the bondholders' nominees 
for the posts overseeing the Khedive•s expenditures 
and revenues. Time did not permit a careful culling 
1 Hansard. Jd ser., Vol. 232. March 1. 1877, 
cols. 1210-ll. In reply to a question about Mr. Gerald 
Fitzgerald being named Deputy Controller-General of 
Receipts in Egypt, Lord Hamilton said that the Indian 
civil servant was on medical leave and had chosen to 
spend it in Cairo. 
2Goschen to Northcote, Dec. J, 1876, Iddes-
leigh Papers BM Add MSS 50021, p, 2491 Northcote to 
Goschen, Dec. 5, 1876, ibid. 50053, p. 87 (copy). 
William G. Romiliii (1815•93) became a lawyer 
in 1839 and entered Government service, becoming Second 
Secretary of the Admiralty in 1859, and Judge Advocate 
in India later (1869-73) (!ill]., XVII, 177)• 
270 
of the available individuals, for if it had, Romaine 
might not have been selected. He was not a young man, 
nor easy to work with, and "was lacking in the critical 
faculty,"1 but worst of all from the creditors' point 
of view, he was unsympathetic to the bondholderss Sir C. 
Rivers Wilson described him as "a good, well.,;mannered 
man and a most honourable gentleman, but he has not 
grit enough for his place."2 As Goschen later recalled, 
Romaine went to Egypt as a humanitarian, a champion of 
the fellaheen, and "avowedly looked to reform in Egypt 
more than to the interests of the bondholders.") Al-
though well-intentioned, Romaine's gullibility made him 
plastic in the hands of his Gallic counterpart and of 
the Viceroy. Vivian lamented this fact to the Foreign 
Office: 
It cannot be denied, I fear, that almost all the 
influence which Mr. Goschen undoubtedly intended 
to give to the English Controller-General has fallen 4 
away from him into the hands of his French colleague. 
1Lawrence John Lumley Dundas Zetland, Second 
Marquis Zetland, Lord Cromera Bein the Authorized Life 
of Evelyn Barinf, First Earl of Cromer London: Hodder 
and Staughton, 9J2), p. 63. 
2Wilson to his wife, April 29, 1878, Wilson, p. 121. 
JGoschen to Granville, Sept. 19, 1882, Granville 
Papers PRO FO J0/29/150 (copy). 
4vivian to Derby, Aug. 10, 1877, PRO FOCP 407/9, 
No. 256, P• 191. 
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Appeals were made to Goschen from many quarters for 
Romaine's removals Cherif Pasha, a high-ranking Egyp-
tian functionary, personally wrote to Goschen 
that it would be advantageous both to Egypt 
and her creditors if a younger and more ener-
getic man than IVIr. Romaine, professing a better 
knowledge of the French language, were nominat~d 
to the post of Controller-General of Receipts,l 
This missive was inspired by Ismail, who felt both em• 
barrassed and annoyed by the British Controller, and 
who no doubt disliked having the balance of power tipped 
too far to the advantage of Paris. Complaints were 
lodged with Goschen by fJ.lajor Evelyn Baring (later 
Lord Cromer) who also advised Romaine•s withdrawal, 
writing that that gentleman and Mr. Gerald Fitzgerald 
had learned "next door to nothing of any use ... 2 But 
these remonstances were in vain, and for the next two 
years Romaine was a factor in Egyptian administrative 
life. 
Of more immediacy to the English creditors was 
the man who would represent them on the Caisse, The Times 
of January 15. 1877, announced the appointment to that 
p. 214. 
1vivian to Derby, Oct. 2, 1877, ibid., No. 278, 
2Baring to Goschen, Dec. 24, 1877, Cromer 
Papers PRO FO 633/2. 
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position of Major Baring, whose family was in the fore-
front of London finance. 1 Baring was a man of energy, 
quick mind and strong principle. who in Egypt earned 
for himself the soubriquet "OV'erbearing." His politics 
were Whiggish in tone, and he harbored an antipathy to-
ward Lord Beaconsfield. From 1872 to 1876 Baring had 
served in India as secretary to his cousin, Lord North-
brook, and it was upon his return to England that he 
was taken in hand by Sir Louis Mallet of the India 
Office, who brought him into contact with Mr. Goschen. 2 
When he assumed his duties on March 2, 1877. as a private 
delegate of the British bondholders, Baring was sympathetic 
to their interests. However, as time passed his opinions 
modified so that by the time of his elevation to the 
Controller's post, his attitudes had become similar to 
those of Mr. Romaine,3 which dazri.aged his popularity among 
the bondholders. 
'I 
.1..The Times, Jan. 15, 1877, P• 9, Baring formally 
accepted the pos!t!on in a letter to Goschen on January 4, 
1877 (A. R. D. Elliot. I. 171). 
2sir Louis Mallet (1823-90) was a free trader 
and believed that the services, especially the Indian, 
needed to be more responsive to the political and economic 
needs of G~--eat Britain. He was made Permanent Under Secre-
tary of State at the India Off ice in 1874, and sat on the 
India Council for the next ten years (Sir Algernon We~t, 
Contem ora Portraits en of Da in Public Life LNew 
Yorks E. P. ut on, n. , , PP• • 
3aoschen to Granville, Sept. 19, 1882, Granville 
Papers J0/29/150 (copy). 
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Selected as president of the board to administer 
the railways and the harbor of Alexandria was General 
lfarriott, and, as his deputy, Henry le Mesurier, both 
Anglo-Indian recruits. This board, which was responsible 
for the securing of proscribed revenue for the Preference 
stock, found its task all but impossible with the railway 
on the verge of collapse, 1 The Cave Report had only 
hinted at this decrepitude, 2 for it was inexact on several 
accounts. The board was forced to reduce freight rates 
by twenty per cent to compete with barge traffics a 
doubling of the harbor dues was also proposed,3 rt 
had bean supposed by everyone that ipso facto the placing 
of European administrators over various departments would 
miraculously bring reform as well as funds to pay the 
debts. The dismay was great when both the customs and 
the railways, which had been placed in British hands, fell 
far short of anticipated revenues for 1877; the deficit 
of the latter increased thirteen per cent (£190,000) in 
1cromer, II, :312. The author wrote that "few, 
save those behind the scenes, have probably recognised 
fully that the Anglo-French Agreement was only signed just in time to prevent a complete breakdown of the Rail-
way Administrations." 
C, 1425, 
" ~Parliamentary Papers, LXXXII, Egypt No. 7 (1876), 
p. 3, 
JThe Times, March 26, 1877, p, 4, 
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1877 as compared to that of 1876.1 Mr. George H. Scriv-
nor's difficulties as Director of Customs were in part 
caused by smuggling, which the English commander of the 
coastguard could not eradicate, 2 but also by the quality 
of the personnel. Vivian reported home that the number 
of youthful neophytes at the customs sheds was high, 
and they were of little promisa, although their salaries 
were "out of all proportion to what they would have earned 
in England and • • • to the value of their services ... ) 
The last of the appointments were made in early 
November when Alonso Money, former president of the Bank 
of Bengal, and Count de Louvencourt, from the Bank of 
Constantinople, were named commissioners of the Daira. 
The Bullionist commented upon the British candidates1 
The appointment of Anglo-Indian officials to 
responsible posts in :Egypt must be regarded with 
favor and cannot but tend to an improvement in 
the management of the various departments of the 
State.4 
1statist. I (June 29, 1878), J46. The revenue 
for 1877 for the railway amounted to £671,000, not the 
estimated £1 million. 
2ne Kusel, p. 107. The bulk of the illioi t 
traffic was carried on by the Greeks. according to 
de Kusel. 
JVivian to Derby, Sept. 28, 1877, PRO FOCP 
407/9, No. 275, P• 213. 
4Bull!onist. Nov. 17, 1877, ACFB, &gypt, VIII, 188. 
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Despite these two European advisors in key positions, 
as well as Mr. Anderson who directed the sugar mills, 
the Daira estates were to operate in the red for the 
next twenty years. Here, even more than in other de-
partments, the provision of an Egyptian Director General 
allowed the native officials to remain in full control, 
and orders from the European hierarchy were usually 
. d l ignore • 
Such were the European administrators who were 
to execute the Goschen Plan. Before pursuing the results 
of the Decree of November 18, 1876, it would be well to 
return to the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders and 
the settlement of the Egyptian tribute loan difficulties. 
Throughout 1876 the Council was engaged in 
solving all aspects of Egypt•e indebtedness, including 
the so-called tribute loans, those offerings by Turkey 
which had as their security the annual payments of the 
Khedive to the Sultan. After its bout with the press 
and the Palm&r Committee, the Council remained on the 
sidelines, except for the comfort which it extended to 
the Egyptian Tribute Bondholders• League. 2 The Cor-
poration's involvement in the debt difficulties of 
1sir Donald McKenzie Wallace. Ee¥pt and the 
Egyptian Question (New Yorks Russell and Russell, 1967, 
first published in 188)), PP• J48-49. 
2see above, Chapter 2, PP• 153-54 et passim. 
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Egypt in May of 1876 included an interest in settling 
the tribute loan situation. On IVIa.y 26, 1876, a meeting 
of the 1854 loan holders was held by the Leagues chaired 
by George Taylor of the 'Council,' it was also attended 
by several men from Moorgate Street, among them Cornelius 
Surgey and Hyde Clarke. The steps already taken were 
enumerateda legal action to obtain the release of funds, 
the dispatch of a man to gain assurance of the Viceroy's 
continued cooperation, and the visits with Lord Derby 
which had availed little.1 But the determination to 
take their case to Parliament was the most adventurous 
step reported, 
Indeed, the cause was not hopeless, for the 
aid of Gladstone had been enlisted, The Liberal states-
man replied to a letter from a holder in these most 
positive terms1 
When the appeal is made to Parliament, I shall 
think it my duty--unless circumstances come to 
my knowledge in the interval of a nature to alter 
my view of the case--strongly to support the claim 
of the bondholders of 1854 to the support of the 
British Government in the matter of their claims 
by every means short of force. I say short of 
force, because I think it for the Government alone 
to decide whether they shall or shall not make use 
of force, which I consider to be entirely within 
their right,2 
1For accounts of the meeting. see ACFB, Turkey, 
IX, articles from May, 1876. 
2The Times, May 27, 1876, P• 12. 
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With such encouragement, a campaign to win adherents 
in the House was motmted in which the Corporation of 
Foreign Bondholders played a substantial role. Still 
opposing the creditors were the contractors and the 
"Thtmderer," an alliance which annoyed the founder of' 
the Egyptian Tribute Bondholders' League, Captain 
Stewart, who complained that his organization "had 
met with every opposition from Messrs. Dent and 
Palmer, backed up as they had been in the most scandalous 
manner by The Times newspaper."1 Three htmdred letters 
were sent to M.P.'s to garner support. The •council' 
threw its considerable influence into the balance by 
participating in a committee which persuaded the Recorder 
for London to assent to introduce their motion to Commons. 2 
On July 21 1 1876, the question was broached whether France 
was going to live up to her moral responsibility to the 
1854 holders, The moral support of the Government was 
also requested. In the debate which followed, Gladstone 
warmly defended the bondholders, and only after Northcote 
had stated that the Government would pursue the subject 
with Paris was the motion (calling for French action) 
1Hour, June 17, 1876. ACFB. Turkey, IX, 294. 
2Money Market Review, XXXIV (April 14, 1877). J82, 
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withdrawn. 1 
Things had not improved by autumn, in fact, as 
the press reported, some Turkish holders, blithely ig-
noring the hypothecations of fellow Englishmen, had 
sent a memorandum to the Grand Vizier advocating a 
seizure of Egyptian customs, or, if necessary, the 
occupation of the entire province, in order that they 
might be paid. 2 A mission to Constantinople was under-
taken in October by representatives of the Egyptian 
Tribute Bondholders• League, but this effort ended in 
discomf'iture and frustration. So the matter stood 
until the new year. 
With the return of Parliament in January, 1877, 
new appeals to that body were made and a bill was pre-
pared which would have established a committee for the 
tribute loans with the power to distribute the interest 
which had been accumulating in the Bank of England since 
October, 1875. The plan was not greeted with enthusiasm 
by the journals, for Government interference in contracts, 
and in the money market generally, was unpopular.J The 
1ttansard, Jd ser., Vol. 2JO, July 21, 1876, 
cols. 1728-61. 
2Whitehall Review, Sept. 9, 1876, ACFB, E:gypt, 
v, 200. 
JNegative articles on the subject appeared in the 
Economist (XXXV, [Jan. lJ, 1877], J2) and Money Market 
Review (XXXIV. [Jan. lJ, 1877], 32). 
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project was never presented, for many of the holders 
as well as the Corporation were opposed• and besides, 
a joint representation to the Sultan, by England and 
France, wa.s finally presented on February 17, 1877.1 
Throughout the spring M.P.'s friendly to the creditors 
periodically inquired in the House as to the progress 
of affairs. 2 
While the Corporation continued to work with 
a Parliamentary group to reintroduce the motion of 
July, 1876, Bouverie had begun a fence-mending operation 
with the Palmer Committee. In April of 1877 the Tribute 
League placed itself under the aegis of Moorgate Street, 
and an agreement was arrived at between Bouverie and 
Dent, Palmer and Company to work for a common solution. 
The chairman of the •council' saw quite clearly that 
bondholder unity was the key to success.J Such indeed 
was the case, for Turkey, battered by war and economically 
exhausted, especially wished to settle with her tribute 
holders, since not only did the Sultan wish to raise 
1Most of this note is reproduced in Wynne (pp. 421-
22). 
2Among those who kept the issue before Parlia-
ment was Goschen (Hansard. Jd ser., Vol. 2JJ. March 23 1 
18771 col. 378). 
JMoney .Market Review, XX.XVI (May 4, 1878) 1 4J4. 
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another loan using the unmortgaged portion of the 
Egyptian tribute as collateral, but he also desired 
a portion of the hard cash which was inaccessible to 
both parties, Hence, an agent was ordered to London 
with whom Palmer and Bouverie were able to negotiate 
a settlement,1 
On July 24, 1877, the holders assembled to 
discuss the proposals offered by the Sultan, which, 
after vituperative debate, were approved, To the 
chairman of the Corporation such proceedings were 
unpleasant, for they illustrated the lack of harmony 
within the •council.' Both Surgey and Taylor op-
posed Bouverie and urged the holders to obtain better 
terms. 2 Despite this internecine jealousy (for such 
it appeared to be), the composition was ratified and 
the necessary instruments were signed on September 17.J 
Nonetheless, these occasional outbursts of resentment 
of •council' members against the dominance of Bouverie 
were to re cur. 
ll12.1,g_,, XXXIV (May 26, 1877), 528, 
2 ~., XXXV (July 28, 1877), 80. 
JFor a discussion of the final arrangements, 
consult Wynne (p. 42J). 
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One difficulty yet remained--the one shilling 
per pound which had been voted by the Turkish holders 
in the previous year. as the Corporation stated, "to 
defray the expenses of, and the remuneration due to, 
the different persons who have given their time and 
services to the bondholders in the negotiations which 
are now concluded ... l To this request the Col.trlcil's 
nemesis, Mr. J. c. McCoan, took issue, arguing that 
the money was to go into the coffers of the Corporation. 2 
The Turkish ambassador issued a public statement on 
November 24, 1877. in which he declared that Turkey had 
not authorized the contractors to withhold any fl.trlds 
from the shareholders1 this paved the way for legal 
action by a handful of holders captained by Mr, McCoan.J 
While the litigation proceeded, the 'Col.trlcil• 
was silent, and when the subject arose at the General 
Court of 1878 it was ruled out of order by the Chairman. 
In May, however, the Court of Common Pleas ruled in 
favor of McCoan, which so annoyed the Council that it 
considered a resolution to insert into ail future con-
ventions to be negotiated by the organization a clause 
1The Times, Oct. 12, 18771 P• 7~ 












assuring that those who did not palpably assist the associ-
ation should not reap the benefits. 1 The idea was dis-
card.eds nonetheless, it bespoke the Corporation's awk-
ward position, harried by disunity and financial 
problems both in def eat and in success. But even as 
this arrangement was finalized, the Goschen Decree, 
from which much had been expected, was proving unwork-
able, and Egyptian bankruptcy again loomed on the horizon. 
The year 1877 was not as the framers of the 
November Decree had anticipated--the first stage on the 
journey to solvency. The Viceroy had but £1.4 million2 
with which to run his government and also had a rigorous 
schedule of interest payments to meet,J Unpleasant 
stori9s of a floating debt not included in the Goschen 
arrangements were circulated, some placing it as high as 
£15 million, 4 while much criticism was heaped upon the 
Bank of Egypt for covertly, and in violation of the 
Goschen Decree, advancing Ismail £160,000 in early 
1corp. For, Bondb,a Rep •• 1878, P• 7, 
2vivian to Derby, Jan. 17, 1878, PRO FOCP 
407/10, No, 10 1 PP• 7-8, 
JA table of payment dates and amounts due may be 
found in the Economist (XXXV, [July 21, 1877]. 848), 
4~ •• (Nov, 10, 1877), 1335. The Economist 
Francaise reported this story in early' November, but the 
English journal gave it no credence. 
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January of 1877.1 The necessity of such a transaction 
so soon after the new composition gave pause to the 
most sanguine. 
By 1877 the flotsam and jetsam of the Porte's 
domains in the Balkan Peninsula were ablaze with war, 
and the Khedive as a loyal subject was called upon to 
assist the Sultan. Surprisingly. Ismail complied, 
although it placed enormous strain upon his country, 
The creditors of the Vicuroy generally opposed Egypt's 
participation in the conflict since funds needed for 
the coupons were endangered. 2 A special war tax was 
imposed in May as the Egyptian Government made herculean 
efforts to dispatch ll,000 troops to the front. Even 
Ismail was constrained to make many personal sacrifices 
in his mode of living, although not all the splendor 
had gone out of his life.3 Government officials found 
1Economist, XXXV (Aug, 11, 1877), 950. 
2The English colony in Alexandria was generally 
sympathetic to the Turkish cause, which ·added to their 
popularity and influence (The Times, Nov. 17, 18771 p. 4), 
JThe necessities of state went begging while 
Ismail Pasha hosted his lavish entertainments, according 
to a story in the Ec~o d'Orient quoted in The Times (Feb. 27, 1877, P• 4 • 
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their pay falling in arrears, a situation not as serious 
for the Europeans as for the natives, who began to borrow 
at high rates just to survive. The decline in Egyptian 
public health services, education. hospital services 
and similar functions can also be traced from 187?.1 
Extraordinary means of raising revenue were employed, 
such as selling crops while still in the ground. 2 By 
June Alexandria afforded a gloomy spectacle with its 
numerous liquidation notices evident on shop doors.3 
But worse was on the wayr it was soon obvious to all 
that the Nile would not be a good one and consequently 
the outlook for the coming year was dark. 
Since Goschen and Joubert had refused a new 
loan to the Viceroy, his credit standing slipped. The 
haute bang!!!. had been fooled, for they had imagined that 
it would be relatively simple to sell to the general 
public their glut of £9,424,600 of Unified stock.4 But 
1 Tignor, "Indianization," P• 636. 
2By the sum.mer of 1877 Ismail had relapsed into 
his old ways of collecting the land tax nine months in 
advance (Mulhall. p, 528), 
JMorning Advertiser, J\u1e 12, 1877, ACFB, Egypt, 
VII, 254. 
4Economist, XXXVI (Nov. 16, 1878), 1J47, 
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investors were not eager to take up the Syndicate's 
burden, and "unifieds" fell to J0, 1 The heaviest 
loss was incurred by the C~dit Foncier which held a 
reported 106 million francs in unsecured paper2 as 
well as a large block of Unified stock. 
The remainder of the Egyptian stock was like-
wise under pressure, although investors in some issues 
refused to be frightened and hence staved off deoline,J 
The English investor was also cautious due to the state 
of the home economy, the depressed condition of most 
securities, and a new Parliamentary investigation of the 
Stock Exchange which was launched in ~arch, 1877, As 
usual, the journals disagreed as to the advice to be 
given holders, London gaily chirped that "our financial 
guides , • • have turned around, and most of them now 
take quite a rosy view of the future of Egyptian finance, .. 4 
1
"The Difficulties of Egyptian Finance," Bankers 
azine, XLIV (May, 1884), 484, In 1878 the Unified 
stoc a most touched 25, 
2Econom1st, XX:X:V (Nov. 10, 1877), 1JJ8. 
3Ib1d,, 1J68. For example one year after the 
Goschen Plan, the D1ir& loan of 186~ had risen from 52 
to 68, and the Daira offering of 1870 had lost a point. 
4London, April 14, 1877, ACFB, pigYpt, VII, 84, 
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whereas the Public Leader soberly warnede 
Let no bondholders build upon any of the brilliant 
prospects held out with regard to future payment 
of Egyptian coupons, and exercise caution in 
reference to the counsel offered them by certain 
City editors. It is not the business of these 
gentlemen to advise the public where to invest. 1 
The most convincing proof of economic soundness would 
have been the prompt and complete payment of Egypt•s 
interest and the successful operation of the Caisse 
and the control. 
Reflecting upon the utility of the Caisse 
long after his service upon it had ended, Lord Cromer 
wrote that this body had been an obstacle to progress, 
had often promoted anti-British hostilities, and 
whatever reforms have been accomplished with 
the co-operation of the Caisse could have 
been equally well and probably better accomplished 
had the Caisse not existed.2 
This body, which had first been established by the 
Decree of May 2. 1876, and which was included in the 
Goschen settlement, had been very popular among all 
classes of bondholders, All payments for the servicing 
of the debts--taxes, customs, tolls, and. dues--which 
were to be turned over for distribution to the creditors 
would be encashed with the Caisse. and no change in the 
1Public Leader, March 3, 1877, ibid., 26. 
2 Cromer, II, 309. 
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amount of revenue nor any loan by the Government could 
be executed without approval from this commission. 
NJajor Baring joined his colleagues in the 
Caisse on March 2, 1877, considering himself a private 
individual whose function was to represent the interests 
of English investors.1 In time the holders began to prize 
this institution more as it became clear that the con-
trollers were of dubious utility. As Mr. Goschen re-
marked, 
It is a fundamental mistake to consider the 
Controllers as Bondholders• men, so far as the 
English are concernedA and this is almost equally 
true of [the FrenchJ.~ 
The triad which was created for bondholder representa-
tion included Baring in F;eypt, and Goschen and the 
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders at home, As long 
as this trio remained in tandem, the Council found it 
most desirable to leave well enough alone, So long, 
too, as Baring viewed Goschen as his mentor and culti-
vated his influence, there was harmony of purpose, but 
slowly the younger man altered his principles. coming 
to oppose the November Decree. and in so doing estranging 
1 ~., I, 14-15, 24-25. 
2aoschen to Granville, Sept. 19. 1882, Gran-
ville Papers PRO FO 30/29/150. 
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himself from both Goschen and Moorgate Street. 1 Despite 
his private capacity, Major Baring kept the English 
agent fully apprised and profited from the intimacy: 
I always kept Vivian and Malet fully informed of 
everything that went on, but I acted independently 
of them. No doubt lI'f9 position was strengthened 
by the impression which existed that in an extreme 
case, the English Government would lend me a helping 
hand, but I never used to employ language which 
would encourage this impression.2 
On the other hand, Baring was willing, if the Govern-
ment desired it, to take any steps which they deemed 
necessary, but until then he would work closely with 
the Caisse,3 The polestar of Baring's policy was the 
commonality of goals between the holders and the Cairo 
Government: 
I used constantly to point out that the interests 
of the bondholders were really identical with 
Egyptian interestss that what both wanted was good 
govemment--and, in fact, whatever influence I 
gained in Egypt was due to the fact--at least I 
think so--that gradually the Ministers and others 
really believed that I had the interests of the 
country at heart.4 
1cromer, I, J5. 
2Baring quoted in Northbrook to Granville, 
March 14, 1882, Granville Papers PRO FO J0/29/1J8. 
JBaring to Goschen, Feb. 25, 1878, Cromer Papers 
PRO FO 633/2. 
4Baring quoted in Northbrook to Granville, 
March 141 1882, Granville Papers PRO FO 30/29/lJB. 
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From the beginning the Caisse was in an un-
enviable position, with pressure from several directions 
focused upon it. M. Joubert, at the outset, urged the 
commissioners to ignore the limitations of the November 
Decree and to use all funds at hand to meet the January 15 
payment date for the Unified stock. But M, de Bligni~res, 
who was more honest and was a cosmopolite in outlook, 
balked at this suggestion, Observing these activities, 
Mr. Vivian confidentially wrote homes 
I should regret if the principle object of the 
Egyptian Government and of the group of French 
bankers represented by M. Joubert, was simply 
to raise the value of Egyptian stock by providing 
for the interest due on the next coupon without 
regard to the exact execution of the Decree, or 
to what may happen hereafter, whe11
1
they may have 
realized the stock that they held. 
Baron de .Ma.laret, the French Controller-General, also 
busied himself to assure the adequate funds and at-
tempted to have the interest due on England's Canal 
shares postponed, but was met with British resistance. 
Paris firmly backed her nationals and Vivian was dis-
turbed over the futures 
Whether any failure of Egypt to fulfill her 
financial engagements would provoke the French 
Government to push this support so far as to 
1vivian to Derby, Dec. 23, 1876, PRO FOCP 
407/9. No •. 199, P• 142. 
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interfere politically for the protection of the 
French bondholders is another question, but the 
la~guage of the French here would almost warrant 
the suspicion; and the Viceroy certainly appre-
hends the danger.l 
To Ismail the Caisse was an l.mpleasant reality which 
it was his duty to combat, so that payments made by 
the commissioners were a product of their own tenacity 
and not of the Viceroy's good will. 2 
From England, also, criticism was leveled at 
the Commission of the Public Debt. One of the duties 
of this body was the compilation of periodic statements 
which were to be forwarded to Councilhouse. These seem 
to have been issued monthly in Alexa.ndria, and before 
the year was out they were being published regularly 
in England. ~he reports were in turn distributed by 
the Corporation to interested bondholders and to the 
press. The Times led the assault on the statements, 
remonstrating that the Caisse had not explained how the 
July coupon of the Unified stock was mete 
p. 
P• 
Nothing could well be more unsatisfaatory • , • 
than the way in which these statements are put 
out now and again. we learn not one iota regarding 
the outgoings on account of ordinary expenses, or 
174. 
1vivian to Derby, Mav26, 1877, ~ .. No. 2.30, 
2vivian to Derby, 
149. 




indeed regarding anything but the amoW"l.ts 
"encashed" on behalf of this or that loan.l 
The Daily Hews in its support of the commissioners 
quite properly retorteda 
The Debt Commissioners were never provided with 
powers to audit the whole revenues of Egypts 
they sirnply have to deal with the amoW"l.ts 
pledged to the bondholders which are paid in 
to them.2 
There is no doubt that The Times' questions helped 
drive stocks down, but when the disclosure was made 
of the highly irregular loan by the Bank of Egypt. 
the "Thunderer" had real ammunitions 
The Commissioners sent out to control the finances 
of Egypt are either powerless to protect the inter-
ests of bondholders or they are not doing their duty, 
for they have not helped the bondholders to a single 
useful piece of information about the revenues of 
Egypt since they took office,3 
All the English personnel were placed in a bad light, 
and the Khedive, as if to even sc-0res with the Bank of 
Egypt for past policies, refused to honor the obligation. 
The tide of confidence in the Goschen Plan 
(if it had ever been such} had reached its low point by 
late summer. The author of the November· Decree had to 
go before the public to defend his handiwork. The 
1The Times, July 29, 1877, P• 10. 
2Daily News, Aug. 15, 1877, ACFB, Egypt, VII, J66, 
3 The Times, Aug. s. 1877, p. 7. 
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members of the Caisse, said Mr. Goschen were "inexorably 
firm" and of "undeviating honesty," and the loan in 
question had been transacted before the formal in-
stallation of the Commission, 1 Availing himself of 
the opportunity of his open letter, the M,P, for London 
sought to begin the process of disassociation of his 
name from Egyptian finances in the eyes of the public, 
Yet no matter how one saw Gosohen's personal involve-
ment, it was clear that the Khedive•s creditability was 
low. The hardships of the year made another examination 
a necessity, despite Goschen•s cpnviction that undoubtedly 
"it would be a disaster for Egypt as well as for the bond-
holders, if the new organization should be allowed to 
break down,"2 Some newspapers tried to argue that there 
was no floating debt at all,J but the fact could no longer 
be concealed. Local tradesmen and government officials 
called for payment, and the claimants who had won their 
cases in the Mixed Courts also demanded compensation. 
So confronted, the commissioners of the debt decided to 
visit Europe personally to see what could be done to 
1Economist, XX.XV (Aug. 17, 1877), 977. 
2Moneta.ry Gazette, Aug. 25. 1877, ACFB, EgYpt, 
VII, 390. 
JFor example, Daily News, Sept. 20, 1877, ~., 
VIII, 14. 
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salvage the situation. 
European creditors were most dissatisfied to 
find an undisclosed floating debt of £4.5 million, and 
dismayed by the rumors of reduced interest and/or the 
creation of more Unified stock to eliminate the encum-
brance. Many were angry at this new development, 
Truth, an outspoken organ, wrotea 
Speaking generally, there is not, probably, 
one single banker in1Alexandria, who does not deserve hanging. 
Goschen advised the Caisse not to give way before 
Ismail and to press for a complete inquiry of the new 
debtr on no account was the Egyptian ruler to be allowed 
to disown the figures given to him and Joubert. It was 
decided that the settlement of the small individual 
claims should be postponed until after an inquiry and 
that the payment date for the Unified stock should be 
altered to conform with the harvest seasons. 2 Downing 
Street was acquainted with all of these decisions.3 
1 Truth, Oct. 24, 1877, ibid., 128. 
- . 
20n. December 15, 1877, a Khedivial decree al-
tered the payment dates of the Unified stock to the 
first days of May and November. As with other matters 
of interest to the bondholders, this decree was sent to 
Bouverie for translation and dissemination. 
JGoschen to Northcote, Oct. 24. 1877, 
Iddesleigh Papers BM Add MSS 50021, P• 256. 
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M. de Malaret, the French Controller-General, 
had also departed Cairo to negotiate with the Parisian 
Syndicate, and upon his own authority returned in 
December with a plan to give the Viceroy some relief. 
He proposed to do this by permanently removing the 
15 per cent founder's shares in the Canal from Ismail's 
possession, a plan which Vivian thought generally unwise. 1 
Mr. Gerald Fitzgerald refused to consider the scheme, 
and Baring, who had not seen the project, remained 
aloof although agreeing that the Frenchman had gone 
too far. 2 The result was de Malaret•s temporary 
loss of influence and attempted resignation, 
Ismail continued to speak of personal sacri-
fices, but he remained adamant on the point that any 
new inquiry into his affairs should be made on his 
terms. By year's end the economic picture was de-
pressed. The Commission of the Debt successfully 
turned back the suggestion of Egypt's Finance Minister 
to collect taxes officially in advance,3 which made 
Baring•s position difficult: 
407/9. 
Papers 
1vivian to Derby, Dec. 7. 1877, PRO FOCP 
No, J24, P• 245. 
2Baring to Goschen, Dec. Jl, 1877, Cromer 
PRO FO 63J/2. 
3v1v1an to Derby, Dec. 1, 1877. PRO FOCP 
407/9, No. 319, P• 24J. 
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I wish to qualify in the Khedive•s mind the 
supposed hostility of the Caissea at the same 
time it is all-important that I should keep 
well with my colleagues--de Bligni~res 
especia.lly.l 
One way out of the Khedive•s predicament, as Baring 
saw it, would be a loan guaranteed by France and 
Britain. Accordingly, he sent both Goschen and the 
Foreign Off ice a memorandum in which his plan was 
elaborated, but received cool responses f:r;-om both. 2 
As if Egyptian bondholders had not enough to 
cast them into a lugubrious mood, the Mi~ed Courts of 
Egypt were also threatening the Caisse. Using the 
Twycross vs. Dreyfuss case as a precedent, the Cairo 
Court of Appeals ruled on December 10 that an employee 
of the Egyptian Government, Mr. Keller,J should be 
paid back salary and damages. The Government argued 
that its public creditors had first claims on the 
Treasury, but the principle upheld was that the first 
duty of a state is self-preservation, and that hence 
1Baril18 to Goschen, Dec. 19, 1877, Cromer 
Papers PRO FO 6JJ/2. 
2vivian to Derby, Dec. 22, 1877. PRO FOCP 
407/9, No. 344, p. 266 (enclosure h Baring to Goschen, 
Jan. 11, 1878, Cromer Papers PRO FO 633/2. 
JKeller was an Austrian lawyer who served as 
a legal advisor to the Egyptian Government. He sued his 
employer for five months back pay, a termination of his 
five-year contract, and damages. 
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payment of its own officials was paramount. After 
such a ruling, it was felt by many that the funds in 
the Caisse might be sequestered to meet administrative 
expenses. It was suggested that Keller had been in-
spired by the Khedive to bring the matter forward, 
and subsequent events lend credence to this opinion.1 
Using this ruling as his justification, the Viceroy 
stanched the flow of receipts into the ca;sse, immedi-
ately forcing that body into court. Baring was correct 
in assuming, however, that the Keller decision would 
not impinge upon the activities of the commissioners, 
they being pa.rt of the financial make-up of the Govern-
ment. As events unfolded, the Tribunals upheld the 
position of the Cgisse in a decision of March 2, 1878, 
and as expected, when the Egyptian Finance Minister 
and his records were summoned to appear. money again 
began to fill the empty Treasury. The ruling was one 
of the elements which forced the Viceroy to accept a com-
mission of inquiry with broad powers. 
Despite the dearth of good financial news from 
Egypt in 1877, the year was marked by a second wave of 
1The British agent later reported that Keller 
was reinstated in Khedivial service (Vivian to Salis-
bury, July 13, 1878, PRO FOCP 407/10, NO. 199t P• 190), 
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English interest in the future of the Nile Valley. 
During April the Russian army finally lumbered into 
action against Turkey, and by late July had been 
halted before Plevna, where it was to remain until 
early December when the fortress eapitulatedt with 
this obstacle removed, it was only a few weeks until 
the Sultan sued for terms. The first concern of 
Downing Street was the Canal, although Count Peter 
Shuvalov, Russian Ambassador to Britain, told Derby 
that a Russian blockade of the waterway was "pure 
phantasy."1 On May 6, the Foreign secretary again 
told st. Petersburg that the Suez Canal must remain 
open, and at a meeting of the Compa.gnie Universelle 
in early June, a letter was read to the holders assuring 
English action should their property be endangered. 
Prince Alexander Gorohakov, Russian Foreign Minister, 
immediately replied that Russia neither possessed the 
force nor the inclination to implement such designs. 2 
Many members of the Government, by the spring 
of 1877, were quite concerned over .Egypt~ but only Lord 
1seton-Watson. P• 172. The remainder of this 
paragraph is drawn from this work also (pp. 17) and 193). 
2~ •• P• 19), 
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Derby was unalterably opposed to an occupation. The 
Secretary of State for India, Lord Salisbury, who was 
to take the reins of the Foreign Office in April, 1878, 
harbored a dislike for Turkey and wrote in March that a 
division of the Ottoman Empire was now possible. 1 In 
appraising British policy in the Levant over the previous 
two years, Salisbury wrotet 
I would have devoted my whole efforts to securing 
the waterway to India--by the acquisition of Egypt 
or of Crete, and would in no way have discouraged 
the obliteration of Turkey.2 
Lord Beaconsfield's actions in Egypt were defensive 
in character and contingent upon French maneuvering.J 
Lord Carnarvon, the Colonial Secretary, who was to re-
sign his office in January, 1878, was still in favor 
of occupying Egypt: 
I desire that we should consider the occupation 
of Egypt, and should have been perfectly ready to 
incur considerable risks in such a case, but any 
such suggestion, whether proceeding from4me or others, has • • • been always put aside. 
1salisbury to Lytton. March 9, 1877, Cecil, I~ 130. 
2saiisbury to Lytton, June 15, 1877, ~.,145-46. 
;Disraeli to Queen Victoria, Oct. 18, 18771 
Buckle and Monypenny, VI, 188. The Prime Minister wrote 
that should Bismarck encourage France to look toward the 
Nilotic for compensation for 1870, England would have 
to occupy Egypt, 
4
carnarvon to Northcote, Dec. 15, 1877, Har-
dinge, II, 365. 
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Northcote 1fo{as also nervous and feared that a comb!na-
tion of the Northern Powers might divide the Ottoman 
dominions and gain France's adherence with the promise 
of Egypt. 1 Aware of England's uneasiness, Bismarck 
again introduced the theme of English hegemony over 
the Nile Valley. 2 
After the Goschen-Joubert arrangements, the 
political influence of the Western Powers within Egypt 
could be exercised by means of the recently-established 
bondholder machinecy. Such an outcome was inevitable, 
since these newly appointed officials, especially the 
British, felt little allegiance to the wishes of the 
investors, and looked to Downing Street (in the case 
of the English) as the source of their power. Salis-
bury, as Foreign Secretacy, later explained that in 
backward regions such as the Middle Ea.st, having Eng-
lishinen in the highest posts was a sine gua non for 
success.3 
1Northcote to Disraeli, April 21, 1877, Iddes-
leigh Papers BM Add MSS 50018• P• 22 (copy). 
Layard, June 25, 1878, Cecil. 
II, 304. 
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The bondholders might have obtained some 
comfort from the wave of sentiment favoring the 
occupation of Egypt which again rose in Britain in 
1877• The primary cause of this phenomenon was the 
visit of Nubar Pasha to Britain in April when he 
proposed English domination over his country in exchange 
for her assumption of the Turkish tribute, The Foreign 
Secretary's answer was negative, for as Nubar later saida 
Although he had been well received in the City, 
at the India Clffice and the Treasury, Lord Derby 
was impervious to his advances, arguing that if 
En.gland added to her possessions! she could not 
blame Russia for doing the same. 
Yet his journey was not a total failure, for while in 
the English capital he made the acquaintance of the 
editor of the Observer, Mr, Edward Dicey. 2 Nubar•s 
object was to launch a press campaign in England 
to win public opinion for the idea of annexing Egypt 
to the Empire. The spearhead of the drive was a series 
of articles by Dicey in the Nineteenth Century, ex-
tending into 1878, which was W9ll constructed and widely 
l Seton-Watson, P• 309. 
2Edward Dicey (1832-1911) entered business but 
soon turned his talents to journalism, becoming a per-
manent member of the staff of the Dai11 Telefrahh in 
1862, From 1870 to 1889 he was the ed tor o t e 
Observer, a weekly publication (DNB, Supp. 1901-1911, 
I, 497), 
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read. 1 Th~ themes of the articles were England's 
maritime link with India, the Russian threat, and 
the desire of the bondholders to receive fair treat-
ment. The T~mes made a sound observation, and one 
which was to be equally true in 18821 
Appeals are made to the patriotism of English-
men in words which would have more weight if they 
could be disconnected from the interests of the 
Egyptian bondholders.2 
National interest is but a composite of many group 
interests1 bondholder concerns were at least as im-
portant as imperial and mercantile considerations. 
Gladstone, the defender of a "little England" 
policy, added fuel to the fire of controversy with his 
own pieces in the Nipeteenth Centw::r. but his efforts 
were directed toward illustrating the hazards of an 
Egyptian seizure, which he envisioned, quite correctly, 
as the nucleus of an African Empire. other writers 
joined Dicey•s causes Grant E. Duff', M.P. (former 
Under Secretary for India) was one who urged the ac-
quisition of some real estate in the Ea.stern Mediter-
1Baring to Goschen, Dec. 19, 1877, Cromer 
Papers PRO FO 6'J/2. Even in Egypt these articles were 
perused and discussed. 
2The Times, Jan. 8, 1878, P• 9. 
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ranean should Russia annex Turkish territory.1 Con-
servative papers joined the campaign, as did such popu-
lar sheets as Truth, edited by the finano!er and Egyp-
tian bondholder Labouchere. 2 Even at a meeting of the 
African Section of the Royal Society of Arts. a politi-
cal discussion arose when a paper on Egyptian commerce 
was read. It was agreed that the Canal should be well-
guarded, and the chairman, Sir George Elliot, remarked 
that should Britain "stretoh out her arms to embrace 
Egypt. he believed the people would not be unwilling 
to be under English care."J 
This movement was quite successful for a time, 
gaining wide endorsement for Egyptian annexation*4 
1Thompson, I, 180. Grant Duff was an M.P. who joined the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders in the 188o•s. 
His interest in Egypt was not only political, but economic 
as well, since he was a shareholder in the Commercial Bank 
of Alexandria (Share List of the Bank of Alexandria for 
1877, BT Jl/2257/10783). 
2Algar L. Thorold, Life of Hen:r;y La.bouchere (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 191j), pp. 160 and l98. 
Truth, for example, praised Nubar as the Khedive•s only 
enlightened minister (Truth, June 26. 1877, ACFB, §gypt, 
VII, 282). 
3Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, XXVI, 
(March 22, 1878), J61. 
4Halford L. Hoskins, British Routes to India (New Yorkt Longmans, Green and Co., i92S), p. 476. 
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E:ngland 1 s agent in Cairo was so concerned that he in-
quired whether there was substance to the rumor. 1 
But this public support was mercurial, and as the 
heroism of the Turks at Plevna became manifest, ad-
miration for the underdog supplanted other feelings. 
Still, Dicey's aid was appreciated. Wilson and Nubar 
first considered appointing their journalistic friend 
to an Egyptian sinecure, but instead granted to him and 
to the Imperial Ottoman Bank a concession for a c~dlt 
foneier which was eventually established. 2 
The Commission of Inquiry 
"I would put it thus--that economy on his 
[the Khedive•s] part should precede sacrifices on the 
part of the creditors"-such was the opinion of Major 
Baring on his return to Cairo from his trip to Europe.J 
Conversations with holders, as well as the discussions 
at Goschen's home at Seacox, had formalized the view that 
1vivian to Tenterden, July 1, 1877, Tenterden 
Papers PRO FO 363/2. ' 
2nicey, EgYpt of the Future, p. 16. 
3Barir!.g to Goschen, Dec. 19, 1877, Cromer 
Papers PRO FO 633/2. 
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no relief should be extended to Ismail until there was 
a full inquiry into his affairs. Many pressures were 
exerted upon the reluctant Khedive to comply with such 
investigations, and among the most forceful was that of 
the combination of Ca!sse, Corporation, and Goschen. 
Ismail proved willing to permit a partial in-
quiry,1 but adamantly fought to keep his expenditures 
beyond the pale of the examination. Although German 
and Austrian bondholders complained about the favoritism 
shown the secured creditors, 2 their governments, as well 
as those of England and France, supported the demand of 
the Ca.isse, on January 9, 1878, for a complete inquiry.J 
For the English commissioner, the survival of the Caisse 
was at stake. 
Unity of the various European administrators 
would have aided the cause of the full inquiry, but 
squabbles and personal antagonisms seemed to have marred 
the entire period. Although Mr. Money was content to 
see a reduction of the taxes without an investigation, 
1Baring informed Vivian that Ismail's plans 
for an inquiry were unsatisfactory (Bari;ng to Vivian, 
Dec. 2J, 18771 Cromer Papers PRO FO 6JJ/2J. 
2Baring to Goschen, Dec. 19, 1877, ~· 
3cromer, I, 44. As this author indicated. 
French support became lukewarm as it became clear that 
a cut in interest to the bondholders would have to be made. 
r 
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the most persistent advocate of the unilateral vio-
lation of the bondholder agreement was Mr. Romaine. 
This gentleman encouraged the Khedive to resist any 
inquiry and proposed that Ismail declare bankruptcy. 1 
To support his contention of F.gyptian insolvency, 
Romaine compiled a report, monopolizing materials 
which Baring needed for his own Compte Rendu for 1877, 
and had it published in the Egyptian Journal Official 
on February 7. 2 For the British bondholders this report 
from Romaine acted as a depressant, as the Bondholders 
Rpgister said, "·there is no room, therefore, for clinging 
to the .hope that the views expressed by him (Romaine] 
have been overcoloured."J Baring, however, went to 
the press to defend the proposition of a complete inquirya 
The experience of the last two years has abundantly 
proved how utterly unreliable are the estimates of 
native Egyptian officials• and I venture to think 
that it is wholly out of the power of a single 
1Baring to Goschen, Dec. 21, 1877, Cromer Papers 
PRO FO 6JJ/2. 
2 rsmail was greatly amused by this report (L. J. L, D. Zetland, p. 64J, and only permitted its 
insertion in the Journal Off iciel to depress the credi-
tors so that his own plans for a commission of inquiry 
could be facilitated1 this at least was the o'!nion of 
the Money lVlarket Review (XX.XVI fMarch 2, 1878 , 212). 
It was quickly announced that the inolusion]o the docu-
ment had been an error (iJ2.i4, LFeb, 9, 1878 , lJO). 
JBondholders Register, Feb. 12, 1878, ACFB. 
EgYpt, IX, io. 
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European official, however able or zealous, 
sitting in an office in Cairo, to form a trust-
worthy opinion as to their reliability.l 
Thus, friction in the Egyptian capital, including 
de Blignieres' abhorrence of de Malaret, did not 
further the goals of the Commission of the Public 
Debt. 
Although Baring won the journalistic joust 
with Romaine, the Compte Rendu of 1877 was hardly a 
success. Telling against the report was its length 
(sixty-eight pages), its incompleteness, and its 
composition in the French format and language. The 
report showed that in 1877. after both the Preference 
and short loans were paid, there was but £2 • .5 million 
for the Unified stocks hence, £1.7 million had been 
obtained from the Government by means which were 
unknown to the Caisse, 2 
Baring told Goschen1 
I am rather inclined to think that a moment may 
arrive--even if there is but little chance of 
doing good--it would be desirable for you to 
speak out in order that we may all of us after-
wards think that no stone was left unturned to 
bring the Khedive to reason,J 
1Economist, XXXVI (Feb. 23, 1878), 21J. 
2rbid., (March 9, 1878), 267, 
)Baring to Goschen, Dec. 24, 1877, Cromer 
Papers PRO FO 6JJ/2. 
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The moment arrived on January 27, 1878, when Ismail 
elected to establish a commission. according to his 
lights, and to beard the wrath of the bondholders. 
Gosehen could not stand idly by and thus entered the 
fray as the champion of the investors1 
It will thus be seen that the decree has been 
issued in the teeth of the strongest remonstrances, 
and after a declaration of the Commissioners of 
the Public Debt that they could not in any way 
be parties to it.l 
To the English financier the decree was a eausus bellia 
I shall certainly not shrink from making every 
effort and using all the influence I can command 
to def eat the apparent attempt of the Egyptian 
Government to institute an incomplete inquiry , 
provided always I can feel that I am backed up 
by public opinion in this course.2 
• • 
In the ensuing struggle, The Times and other papers 
closed ranks to oppose the Khedive. Goschen•s diary 
for February 20 1 1878, gives further testimony of 
his endeavors for the bondholders1 
Am now working to get the Khedive deposed if he 
won't give way. Final telegram. Prepared letter 
for the bondholders. All day Egypt. • • • Un-
satisfactory interview with Tenterden, Every-
thing appeared impossible to him.J . 
l The Times, Jan. Jl. 1878, p. 6. 
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If their efforts led to Ismail's downfall• Baring 
thought "it would be a monstrous good thing for 
everyone concerned."1 Goschen carried his cause not 
only to Downing Street, but threatened on February 25 
to bring the matter before the upcoming Berlin Congress, 2 
Certainly other factors aided the British financier's 
crusade, but it was with great satisfaction that Baring 
informed Goschen of Ismail's capitulation in mid-March 
of 1878.J 
It was during this two-month period that Baring 
decided that he had responsibilities which superseded 
his allegiance to the bondholders, thus weakening the 
influence of the English creditors. In early February 
the British commissioner wrotea 
My duty is to do those things which the Decree 
says I ought to do. Nevertheless I consider the 
fellah quite as interesting, to use the French 
phrase, as the creltors--perhaps more so.~ 
This alteration of views might have been partially 
inspired by pique over the journalistic attacks and 
1Baring to Goschen, Feb. 15, 1878, Cromer 
Papers PRO FO 6J)/2, 
2Rothstein, p. 53. 
Jcromer, I, 44. 
4Baring to Goschen, Feb. 8, 1878, L. J. L. D. Zet-
land, pp. 70.71. 
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by his belief that not all the bondholders stood at 
his backs 
So long, however, as m.y_ conduct has the approval 
of the intelligent anO:-well informed minority. I 
shall bear the newspaper attacks with equanimity, 
and shall certainly not attempt to answer them.l 
Exercising complete candor, Baring spelled out his 
views1x> the British shareholders1 
For my own part, I wish most distinctly to say 
that, whatever might be the views of the bondholders--
and I believe that as a body they're perfectly rea-
sonable on the subject--! should decline to make 
myself the instrument of urging any claims on the 
Egyptian Government which could fairly be charac-
terised as over-exacting, or as necessarily in-
volving the oppression of the people.2 
On March 8, 1878, he informed Vivian that upon joining 
any investigative body, he would, of course, be rep-
resenting the interests of the bondholders,J However, 
a fortnight later he wrotea 
Remember that the moment I become a member of the 
Commission I shall consider that I have wider 
interests to think of than those of4the bond-holders, and shall act accordingly. 
1Baring to 
PRO FO 6JJ/2 • 
Go so hen, Feb, 8, 18781 Cromer Papers 
2The Times, Feb. 21, 1878, p. 10. 
)Baring to Gose hen, March 8, 1878, Cromer Papers 
PRO FO 6JJ/2. 
4Baring to Goschen, March 22, 1878, ibid. 
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In addition to that of the Caisse, there were 
other opinions proffered as to the necessity of an in-
quiry which hardly escaped the ear of the Khedive. The 
holders were seriously divided upon the question of an 
investigations some foresaw a reduction of interest, 
while others considered a steady albeit smaller income 
a more desirable goal. Pro-Khedivial literature was 
available, yet most of the discourse in England was 
uncomplimentary to rsmail.1 Those in Egypt who wished 
the inquiry to proceed categorically insisted that the 
Caisse participate12 on the other hand, a committee 
opposed to an inquiry was established in Alexandria in 
early February, 1878, and delegates were dispatched to 
Paris and London to gather support, The French creditors 
responded warmly to their Leva.ntine confreres with a 
counter-contingent to EgyptJ in Britain, the committee 
1
.An example of pro-Khedivial literature was a 
pamphlet by w. Raston, "The Khedive and His Calumniators" (ACFB, ~. IX, insert). On the other hand, in a speech 
at Kens!ngt'O:~ in early 1878, Dilke told 'his listeners 
that the Viceroy was "the greatest robber that ever sat 
upon a throne" (Seton-Watson, P• 277). 
2vivian to Derby, Sept. 27. 1877. PRO FOCP 
407/9, No. 274, P• 21J. 
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had to be satisfied with bombarding Goschen with a 
series of notes. Petitions and reports were likewise 
composed and forwarded to any and all interested parties. 1 
A bondholders' weekly bulletin was even published to keep 
investors on the gui vive. Baring did not like to keep 
in contact with this ad hoc group, and justified his 
polite inaccessibility by the fact that no Englishmen 
were counted among them. 2 
The British banks also meant to see an inquiry 
carried through, and as Masterman of the Anglo-Egyptian 
said a 
The directors were assured of this one thing--that 
their good friends across the Channel did not mean 
to lose a farthing of their money, and this bank 
was in the same boat with them. Frenchmen had a 
great dislike to losing money--and they did not 
mean to lose it.J 
Both Mr. Dicey and Nubar Pasha, as well as the exiled 
Prince Halim, encouraged the creditors.4 Halim, a para-
gon of duplicity whose machinations knew little bound, 
had revived his intrigues in Constantinople and had made 
1The protest which this committee· forwarded to 
Mr. Vivian to transmit to the Egyptian Government was so 
insulting that Vivian refused to notice it (Cromer, I, 4J). 
2Baring to Goschen, March 1, 1878, Cromer Papers 
PRO FO 6JJ/2, 
JMoney Market Review, XXXV (Dec. l, 1877), 511. 
4Edward Dicey, "The ~ptian Crisis," Nineteenth 
Century, V (April, 1879), 671. 
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a bid for his nephew to cease his objections to the 
financial probe. 1 The implication was obvious: if 
rsmail could not be depended upon, another could. 
The Khedive had yet refrained from actually 
commencing the investigation he had decided upon, as 
a new convolution in his already complex affairs had 
revealed itself. If his floating debt. whieh had 
risen ·to an estimated £11 million by early 1878, 2 
could be converted by some financial combination into 
a salable security, no investigation would be necessary. 
Rumors reached Major Baring in early January that an 
English group would attempt such a maneuver. The plan 
succeeded insofar as a shady stockbroker, Montgomery 
Walker, did appear in Cairo with a letter of introduo ... 
tion from Lord Derby. His reception by the official 
English commW'lity was frigid, Vivian informed him 
pointedly that no bonanza was to be found in Egypt, 
and, in any oase, the creditors would have to approve 
1The missive first appeared on M&rch 29, 1878, 
in Le Temps (Landau, "Secret Societies,•• P• 184, n. 198). 
It was also reprinted in the weekly Bulletin of the Com-
mittee of ~yptian Gz;:tditors in Alexandria in early 
Aprli {Stat st," I (Aprl1'~l. 1878], 143). 
2vivian to Derby, Feb. 16, 1878, PRO FOCP 
407/10, No. J6, P• 52. 
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all new projects.1 After tarrying a few weeks, the 
unwelcome visitor departed. 
Diplomatic pressure was also exercised upon 
the Viceroy to make him keep faith with his creditors 
and allow a full examination of his finances. Britain 
had advised this course, while also assuring the new 
French Government, with Waddington as Foreign Minister, 
that England had no designs on Egypt. 2 Baring warned 
Goschen that the longer Britain postponed acting de-
cisively in Egyptian inte:rnal affairs, the worse matters 
would be for the financial situation and for the in• 
habitants. One such appeal came as late as March 8: 
My own opinion is that by the display of a little 
energy, English influence might be much strengthened 
and the wholt thing put straight without any serious 
disturbance.3 
The French Government was not idle. Her citizens still 
held a considerable portion of Egypt's indebtedness, 4 
1vivian to Tenterden, .March 23, 1878, Tenter-
den Papers PRO FO 36J/4. 
2Derby to Lyons, Dec. 21, 1877,.Newton, II, 122. 
The new French Gove:rnment had only taken off ice the week 
before. 
J Baring to Goseh&n, warch 8, 1878. L. J. L. 
D. Zetland, P• 62, 
4Mulhall, p. 529. As of April 1878, the debt 
of Egypt was held chiefly in England c£42.2 million). 
France (£JO.l million), and Egypt (£6.9 million). 
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especially of the Unified stock. In spite of Vivian•s 
assessment of Egyptian finance--as impossible of be-
coming worse1--the cause of the Syndicate was still 
warmly espoused by the Quai d'Orsay, 2 To London the 
upcoming Congress of Berlin was the prime consideration, 
for as Salisbury wrotea 
I am afraid that if we declined to assist the 
French to any extent in pressing the claims of 
the bondholders, we should alienate France, 
cause her to work against us prematurely, and 
injure our future position seriously without 
muoh helping either the Canal Shares or the 
Tribute,J 
As for the method to be employed to encourage the 
Viceroy to pay the May coupon, the new Foreign Secre-
tary felt that 
the Khedive , •• can only be influenced by sheer 
terror or necessity, The immediate prospect of 
bankruptcy and of the political danger to him-
self that will follow it is the only mptive 
strong enough to induce him to submit.4 
By the end of March, the Caisse had but a quarter of 
the necessary £2 million for the May coupon.5 The 
1vi vian to Derby. Jan. 11, 1878 ,· PRO FOCP 
407/10 1 No, 7, P• 3. 
2cromer, I, '.37. 
Jsa1isbury to Northcote, April 19, 1878, 
Iddesleigh Papers BM Add MSS 50019, P• 66. 
4~. 5cromer, I, 35-JS. 
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entire country was wrung out like a sponge to obtain 
the last piastre for the payment. The Caisse, dis-
approving of these tactics, on April 19 lodged protests 
with the governments it represented, but accepted the 
money when it was delivered. 1 But even the scourge 
had its limits. c. R. Wilson, who had been recently 
sent to Egypt, pressured everyone he could to raise 
the payment, including viceregal confidants. He 
assessed the situation in mid-April as follower 
My object was to put this indirect pressure on 
the Khedive to induce him to pay the important 
coupon due to the creditors on the 1st of May, 
which is the great question of the moment. If 
he does not pay, it is bankruptcy, but the money 
is not yet in the hands of the Commissioners of 
the Debt, and no one believes that it will come 
in,2 
The sum was amassed, however, after a number of wealthy 
Egyptian families underwrote a loan at 10 per cent from 
some French bankers, to make up for the deficiency.J 
The Commission of Inquiry, which sat from 
April J to August 19. 1878. was composed of the members 
of the Caisse. as well as the President, ·M. de Lesseps, 
1Baring to Gosehen. April 19, 18781 Cromer 
Papers PRO FO 6JJ/2. 
2wilson to his wife, April 15, 1878• c. R. Wil-
son, p. 115. 
JThe Times, May 15. 1878, p. 5. 
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who soon left the country, and Charles Rivers Wilson 
and Riaz Pasha, both Vice·Presidents, the latter also 
holding the office of Minister of Justice. Downing 
Street had insisted that Wilson take pre-eminence 
after de Lesseps,1 which made him acting president for 
most of the Commission's life. The adopted plan called 
first for collecting evidence and submitting a pre-
liminary report to the Viceroy, Those claiming repay-
ment from the Government in excess of 100,000 piastres 
were asked to come forward and document their demandss 
government officials at all levels were interrogated 
and records examined. After great difficulty the deeds 
to rsmail's land were procured, and the program of the 
bondholders was considered, 2 One creditor was secure. 
Others might have to make sacrifices, but .England would 
not1 
The payment o~ the tribute and of the English 
shares in the Suez canal are obligations of a 
more binding character than any others, and , • • 
1nerby to Vivian, March 23, 1878. PRO FOCP 
407/10• No, 79t P• 82. 
2The main points of the bondholders• program 
were the reduction of governmental revenue, the ac-
celeration of the Europeanization of the Egyptian 
administration. and the rejection of any cut in the 
interest (Echo, June 14, 1878, ACFB, ;§g:Ypt, X, 32), 
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H.M.G. have a special
1
interest in their 
punctual fulfillment. 
Not all the Commission's work went smoothly, 
for Mr. Wilson had difficulty working with both Baring 
and Vivian, which led to much acrimony. Still, they 
made headway and inspired a good deal of confidences 
We are wonderfully supported so far by public 
opinion. which attributes to the Commission the 
great rise in stocks which have rejoiced the 
hearts of the speculating and investing public 
of Alexandria,2 
Even Goschen--one of the severist critics of the 
investigation-·wrote approvingly of Wilson's efforts.J 
When the Khedive relented and offered his 917,000 acres 
of land to the holders as a means of salvaging his 
finances, the oountry•s stocks soared.4 Since much of 
this land was not mortgaged, a new loan was contemplated 
using this acreage as security. 
The Commission's preliminary findings, which 
were presented to Ismail just as the members were pre-
1sa1isbury ·co Vivian, Apri:J. 16. ·1a78, PRO FOCP 
407/10, No, 127, P• 118. 
2w11son to his wife, June 12, 1878, c. R. Wil-
son, P• 1.3:3 • 
.)Ibid,, P• 146. 
4The Unified stock hit its low of 28 on March 29, 
1878, but by late June it had climbed twenty-seven points. 
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paring for their vacations, was hardly a document to 
cheer the bondholders.1 As Wilson wrote1 
I think it may at first produce a certain disap-
pointment among the common speculators, and the 
unreasonable creditors, who build their hopes on 
the Commission and who expect us to discover a 
mine of gold.2 
Nor was the impression given that Ismail was deserving 
of any kudosa 
Had his subjects been his worst enemies, and their 
prosperity his perpetual eyesore• he could not have 
been more ingenious at devising combinations tor 
their sure and not~very slow reduction to insol-
vency and beggary.~ 
In the report, the blame for the failure of the Goschen 
plan was placed on the Control, although no names were 
mentioned. It was disclosed that there was a floating 
debt of &6,25 million (after all deductions), and that 
the present year would show a deficit of £2,6 million. 
After establishing a budget for 1879, the Commission 
found a total imbalance equalling £9 1 243,928.4 The 
investigators did not view Egypt's revenue as optimis-
1The discussion of the preliminary report of the 
Commission of Inquiry is drawn from Wynne (PP• 594-96), 
2wilson to his wife, Aug, 18, 1878, c. R. Wil-
son, P• 152. 
3The Times, Sept. 30 1 1878, P• 7, 
4Economist, XXXVI (Sept. 21, 1878), 1121, 
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tically as had Goschen and Joubert. although expenditures 
remained about as high. In addition, many suggestions 
for internal reform were introduced.1 The most impor-
tant of these were the circumscription of the Khedive•s 
power, the appointment of responsible ministers, and 
the allotment to Ismail of a fixed civil list, out-
wardly the Vice~y seemed willing to make even these 
supreme sacrifices in his power, and on August 28, 1878, 
he wrote to Nubar Pasha, a favorite among the Europeans, 
urging him to hasten home to become the President of 
the Council of Ministers. 2 
For much of 1878 Ismail had been ill-disposed 
toward France, and consequently English influence had 
prospered. This had not occurred with the total indif-
ference of London, In December of 1877 the Cairo Govern-
ment and Britain had discussed the possible.appointment 
of an Inspector-General who would enjoy power over the 
collection of taxes and over the inferior eoµrts, but 
these conversations were suspended until the question of 
1These included the elimination of the petty 
taxes, the abolition of tax collection in advance and 
in arbitrary amounts, proper government budgeting, and 
a fair distribution of the ws,.ter supply, as well as court 
and military reforms. 
2rsmail Pasha to Nub~r Pasha, Aug. 28, 1878, 
C, R, Wilson, PP• 167-69. 
r 
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a Commission of Inquiry could be settled.1 The topic 
was presented afresh by Mr. Wilson in early May, for it 
had been determined to use the debt issue to force upon 
the Khedive stricter supervision of his affairs. But 
Salisbury saw that both Cairo and Paris would be dis-
contented with such an official, and eventually the 
idea was abandoned, 2 Instead, the Viceroy offered the 
post of Minister of Finance to Wilson on May 7, which, 
when a.~nounced, sent stocks up on the bourses. The 
Cabinet's response to this offer was affirmative and 
was made without French parity in mind• "We agree 
with you in thinking that you would be better without 
a French 'double.'"J The Khedive was honest insofar 
as he desired to place Englishmen in posts of influence. 
and the French creditors were not averse to seeing Egyp• 
tian finance run properly, especially when the man had 
French propensities. Wilson saw Ismail's actions in 
another light: 
1v1vian to Derby, Dec. 22, 1877, PRO FOCP 
No. 344, P• 266. 
2salisbury to Vivian, May J, 1878, Cecil. 
II, JJO. 
3r:orthcote quoted in Wilson to his wife, 
May 31, 1878, c. R. Wilson, P• 129, 
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I suspect that the sudden goodwill of the Khedive 
to the English is owing to two circumstances: the 
alliance between Nubar and myself, and the occupa-
tion of the Island of Cyprus, which proves to him 
that we are going to be the big people of the future 
in these parts, and not the French.l 
Although England was not prepared to play a 
lone hand in Egypt, she was ready to assert her pre-
rogatives over those of France. The English .Poreign 
Secretary wished to maintain his freedom of action, 
as the very least, and "if the screw is to be turned 
piteously upon the I-:hedive we must take care that the 
French have their full share in turning it."2 Never-
theless, he saw the inevitable growth of British power 
in the Nilotict 
I told Goschen that we were very anxious to work 
with the French, and that we intend to take no 
violent means of placing ourselves in a position 
which would make them subordinate. But I told him 
I nevertheless had faith in the English influence 
in Egypt drawing ahead, a result which in my be-
lief depended, not on any formal acts, but on the 
natural superiority which a good Englishman in 
such a position was pretty sure to show.J 
Hence, by the early autumn of 1878 a new 
stage in Egypt's development had been reached. The 
intimacy between Goschen and Baring evaporated when the 
1w11son to his wife, July 20, 1878, !J21d.,, P• 147. 
2salisbury to Northcote, July J, 1878, Iddes-
leigh Papers BM Add MSS 50019, P• 87, 
3salisbury to Lyons, Aug,, lo, 1878, Cecil, II, 335. 
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former joined the Commission of Inquiry, leaving the 
latter as the chief spokesman of the English creditors. 
The Council, it is true, was still available to the 
holders, but it had been content to give Goschen full 
rein and took his services for granted, Baring had 
kept the 'Council• supplied with all needed reports 
and had afforded them cursory descriptions of a.f'fairs. 1 
Yet the Corporation was clear enough on its role in 
Egyptian finances 
Although it was by the action of the Council that 
negotiations for a settlement were initiated, they 
had no part in the final arrangement, which was 
accepted by the Bondholders as satisfaetory.2 
Thus, Moorgate Street could lay to its credit positive 
action in Egypt, but was not liable to be castigated 
should the arrangements be unsatisfactory. Neverthe-
less, the Council did defend the Goschen Decree and did 
what it could to promote the work of Major Baring.3 
But the Council was plagued with many diffi-
culties by 1878, including a still declining stock 
1naring to Bouverie, March 2, 1878, Cromer 
Papers PRO FO 6,J/2. 
2porp, For. Bondh, Rep., 1877. P• 7 • 
.3Ma'l1y influential journals called :for meetings 
of the holders in February and March of 1878, to support 
the cause of a commission of inquiry. The Corporation 
made no move in this direction, perhaps rearing the 
image which a divided and caviling assemblage would 
project. 
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market which kept the society busy on many fronts. 
The perennial question raised at the General Courts, 
that of the financial soundness of the institution, 
was answered fairly directly by the chairman at the 
1878 meeting. Table 8 indicates the rough figures 
presented. 
Complaints were voiced that the certificates 
were not being paid off rapidly enough, that almost 
£2,000 went for testimonials, and that a great deal 
of money was going to help holders where there was 
little chanee for its repayment. 1 But greater out-
bursts than these were in the offing. The Corporation 
also underwent some changes within the 'Council.' There 
was a question of whether or not the bylaws of the or-
ganization prescribed that all 'Council• members were to 
1From 1875 to 1878 the Corporation spent £22,838 
in "advances made in prosecuting claims on foreign loans .. (Money Market Review, XL (March 6, 1880], 280). Special 
missIOns on behalf of the bondholders by 'Council' mem-
bers consumed some of this revenue. The most important 
of these journeys were undertaken by Robert Bourke (to 
Constantinople, 1881), Roger Eykyn {to Madrid, 1874-75), 
Isadore Gerstenberg (to Vienna, 1871, and to Geneva Con-
gress on Inteznational Law, 1874), Hugh McCulloch (to 
Virginia, 1874), and Sir Thomas w. Snagge {to Frankfort 




retire after five years. The apparent disagreement 
seems to have led to an acceleration of retirements 
from the society's executive commencing in 1878, with 
the result that many new faces were seen at Council-
house. 
After a decade of existence, the Council could 
gaze back ruefully to its inception and to those groups 
which had aided in midwifing the institution in 1868. 
The press had soured since then, and, led by The Times, 
found little flattery for the Corporation. For example, 
the "Thunderer" summed up the Council's labors thusa 
"Beyond the organization of meetings and fathering of 
schemes. the Council has, in fact, done little or nothing 
calling for notice."1 The contractors, too, who had been 
helpful albeit suspicious, saw their worst chimeras re-
alized, for a resolution which Mr. Bishop, a dissident 
within the Corporation, wished passed in 1878 reads 
In the opinion of this Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders, it would be of great use to the 
public if the proposals for the issue of foreign 
loans were submitted to their Council for examina-
tion, and to report thereon prior to .the issuing 
of the2prospectus to the public of any foreign loans. 
1 The Times, Feb. 27, 1877, P• 10. 
2Money Market Review, XX.XVI (May 4, 1878), 4J6. 
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The chair was quick to quash this statement. but with 
such zealots in the organization the Corporation's 
position among the contractors was undermined. The 
Stock Exchange had fallen on hard times also, and 
Bouverie was a member of the Commission of 1878 to 
investigate its activities. Certainly Capel Court was 
in need of reform, although without its friendly coopera-
tion the Corporation would have been greatly weakened. 
Secretary Clarke, writing in 1878, took the position 
that although the Committee of the Stock Exchange had 
been helpful, its machinery had quite often fostered 
fraud. 1 It is interesting that the chairman of the 
Corporation rarely appeared at the Commission's hearings. 
In June of 1878 Hyde Clarke read a paper before 
the Statistical Society (of which he was the vice-presi-
dent) on the subject of foreign loans, in which were 
raised many points of Council thinking. The Berlin Con-
gress had just begun, and among the many rumors then in 
circulation was one that the Egyptian tribute to Turkey 
might be given to Russia as a war indemnity. Clarke 
addressed himself generally to the problem of debt prior-
i ties as followsa 
l Clarke, p. 8. 
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The bondholders ought to have priority of claim 
over any fresh debt, be this in the form of a 
war indemnity or of any other charge posterior 
to the creation of the original one.l 
In consequence of this the 'Council' had been concerned 
about any radical changes in the financial situation in 
Egypt, for such an alteration would damage Egyptian 
securities, especially those of the tribute loans. 2 The 
only defenses the investors had, he argued, were the 
Council and the Stock Exchange, and, perhaps eyeing the 
Tribute Courts of Egypt, he observed that "the moral 
action of these latter bodies would be much strengthened, 
if the decision of a court of municipal jurisdiction 
could be obtained."3 
The Council's Secretary thought that the lack 
of support from Downing Street encouraged refractory 
conduct abroad toward English citizensa 
The Foreign Office has had to contend with ••• 
spasmodic restrictions by the doctrine of non-
intervention and by epochs of national cowardice. 
Thus the Foreign Office was led to abandon its 
protection of our citizens to a very great degree, 
and at length to proclaim to every petty State 
that such was its avowed condition of impotence. 
1 IQ.1.9.., p. 41. 
2Bouverie to Salisbury, June 4, 1878, cited in 
Atkins, p. 168. 
3c1arke, p. J9. 
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There is consequently no such State, however 
contemptible, which is not aware of its pre-
rogative of defiance, and that it has only to 
regulate the exercise of it by its own judgment. 1 
The answer to such outrages was not far to seeks 
The blockade of a port, the occupation of a 
customhouse until the receipts provided an indemnity, 
or the arrest of a Government vessel, would, in many 
cases, put a stop to the proceedings of some of the 
offenders, and be an example to others.2 
In the brisk discussion which followed it was clear that 
most of the members on hand felt that the Government had 
no place in retrieving debts for the bondholders.J 
The Wilson-Nubar Ministry 
In August of 1878 Ismail Pasha was driven by 
necessity into the arms of Nubar Pasha, who had been 
exiled in Paris for some time. Nubar, like Prince Halim, 
was a consummate intrigant4 who had been pro-English since 
186), when he had opposed the building of the Suez Canal. 
France was not happy over Nubar's return to Egypt,5 and 
1Ibid., PP• J5-J6. 
2~ •• p, J6, Jibid., PP• 44-49. 
4Nubar's schemings even led him to offer Colonel 
Arabi his services as Prime Minister during that officer's 
brief day of power. Nonetheless, he seems to have pros-
pered financially since his estate was valued at £JOO,OOO 
at the time of his death (Blunt, Secret History, p, 399). 
5vivian to Tenterden, July 20, 1878, Tenterden 
Papers PRO FO J6J/4, 
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even less so over his imperious dictation of terms. On 
August JO, Nubar officially requested the services of 
Wilson as Egypt's Finance Minister, and despite French 
displeasure, London granted their controller of the 
National Debt Office a two-year leave of absence. The 
new Egyptian President of the Council of Ministers did 
not wish the inclusion of a Frenchman in his adminis-
tration, nor did Downing Street. But, as will be seen, 
the off ice of Minister of Public Works was eventually 
given to Paris as a sop to Gallic pride, Although Wad-
dington was quick to assert France's equality with Bri-
tain,1 matters hung fire for some time. 
The post which was finally accepted by de Blig-
niares was given some added luster by England, since 
Nubar allowed Wilson to delineate the attributes of 
the position, But the Frenchman had little power, for 
the English kept their hold on the various branches of 
communications. The Western Powers trusted that the 
Viceroy would heed the advice of his new ministers since, 
as they warned, "H[is] H[ighness] would seriously com• 
promise his own position and that of his dynasty should 
he act contrary to their demands."2 
1Adams to Salisbury, Aug. 
No, 224, P• 277, 
30 1 1878, PRO FOCP 
2 c. R. Wilson, p. 176, 
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To some European states it appeared that arrange-
ments would be made in the Nile Valley without their con-
currence. Italy was persistent in demanding that she be 
given the portfolio of the Minister of Justice, and when 
it was not forthcoming, she attempted to engender hos-
tility toward Ismail. 1 Martino, the Italian agent in 
Cairo, became the focal point of anti-government senti-
ment. St, Petersburg likewise instigated a press cam-
paign built about the theme of the importance of Egypt 
to Russia's China trade, while Austria tried to work 
one of her nationals into the Department of Education. 
All such efforts met with failure. 2 
A severe and persistent critic of the finances 
of Egypt, Sir George Campbell, in anathematizing the 
Wilson-Nubar government called it a "Bondholders• Minis-
try," and attacked it upon the floor of the House as a 
stockjobbing venture.J It was true that, legally, Wilson 
1Lucien E. Roberts, "Italy and the Egyptian Ques-
tion, 1878-1882," (hereafter ''Italy") Journal of Modern 
History, XVIII (1946), 315. 
2The Italian agent's hostility toward the Egyp-
tian Gove!"nment was reported in a letter from Laseelles 
to Salisbury, Oct. 25, 1878 ( PRO FOCP 407/10, No. 352, 
p, J70). For the attitude of the Russian press, see The 
Times (Oct. 23 1878, p. 5), Austrian interest in EgYpt 
was discussed ln a letter from Salisbury to Lyons, Oct. 11, 
1878 (PRO FOCP 407/10, No. J.02, P• JJO). 
3s1r George Campbell, "The Situation in Egypt," 
Fortnightly Review, XXXI (April 25, 1879), 787. 
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headed a mixed board under the general supervision of 
the bondholders, who could be kept happy by prompt 
payments of interest. With great show, the Viceroy 
had withdrawn himself from politics, while the British 
Cabinet could tell Parliament that they had no control 
over Egypt's Finance Minister. The Prime Minister 
told the Queen, "We have not only never aclmowledged 
Wilson as an agent of yr. Majesty's Government, but have 
always studiously and repeatedly disclaimed his being 
so."1 In reality, however, Downing Street was Wilson's 
only sure pillar of strength. 
It was confidently rumored, and was possibly 
true, that Wilson had made an agreement with the French 
creditors to keep up the coupon payments as long as 
possible, since the Commission of Inquiry, which was 
to resume sitting, would eventually advocate a reduc-
tion of interest. This view takes on greater plausibility 
when one considers the negotiations which revolved about 
the Rothschild loan, to be discussed shortly. Wilson per-
sonally was also a factor. He possessed no particular 
qualifications for his new post and could be enthralled 
by charismatic individuals such as Nubar, or by sentiments 
1nisraeli to Queen Victoria, April 11, 1879, 
Buckle and Monypenny, VI, 442, 
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such as his favorable predisposition to those things 
Gallic. As one author remarked, "Rivers Wilson was an 
ardent Francophyle and at least as much under the in-
fluence of the French as he was under that of the 
British Government."1 As long as he could. Wilson 
attempted to keep the Goschen Plan alive, and if this 
meant using the kurbash (an Egyptian whip) to obtain 
needed revenue. the Minister of Finance would not 
object. 2 Upon this point Paris agreed, and the Viceroy 
was warned that no arbitrary cut in interest would be 
permitted.J Despite Vivian's opinion that Wilson's 
policy seemed directed by the bourses of London and 
Paris, 4 and that the Finance Minister was incurring 
heavy responsibilities for economic collapse, the in-
vestors still insisted upon full support.5 
The influx of Englishmen into Egypt also con-




l Marlowe, p. 98. 
2c. R. Wilson, p, 182. 
Jvivian to Salisbury, Feb, 18, 1879, PRO FOCP 
No. 49, P• 35. 
4vivian to Salisbury, Jan, 11, 1879, cited in 
p. 157. 
5salisbury to Vivian, Jan. 21, 1879, PRO FOCP 
No, JO, P• 24. 
(;1 
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Wilson, whose job in England paid £1,500 per annum, now 
received £8,000 in pay and allowances, 1 Some of those 
joining the Government were Captain Richard Blomfield 
as Director of the Port of Alexandria, Arthur Shee 
(brother-in-law of Julian Pauncef ote at the Foreign 
Office) in the Customs Office, Auckland Colvin from 
India, 2 and some one hundred men to help in a general 
cadastral survey. The salaries of the surveyors amounted 
to another £27,000 a year, considered an unnecessary ex-
pense by Lord Dufferin in his famous report of 1882,3 
The greatest misjudgment of the new administration 
was the treatment accorded the Khedive. They assumed that 
overnight Ismail's power could be broken and his wishes 
ignored. Lord Salisbury told Wilson that he was to win 
the Viceroy's favor, but the Finance Minister's plan was 
rather to trim the power of the Egyptian ruler and to put 
his faith in Tewfik, the heir apparent. 4 Nubar openly 
1 Atkins, p, 154. 
2Auckland Colvin (1838-1908) was.born in Calcutta 
but was educated in England. He returned home in 1858, 
and by 1877 held the post of Commissioner of Inland Cus-
toms, In fact, the Indian Service seems to have been 
favored by his family, as he had four brothers serving 
in various capacities in the subcontinent. He arrived 
in Egypt in January of 1879 and in May took Earing's post 
on the Caisse (~, Supp. II, 395-96). 
JAtkins, p. 154. 
4For these views, see Wilson to his wife, June 
22 and June 29, 1878, c. R. Wilson, pp. 1J6-J7. 
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made derisive remarks about the Khedive. 1 which at best 
was imprudent, and both Baring and the British Consul 
General warned Wilson of the folly of such a course. 2 
But Ismail remained silent until his ministers should 
arrange a new loan. 
When these negotiations began, the Khedive 
still possessed an asset--the unmortgaged 426,000 acres 
of Khedivial property henceforth called the Domains 
(to distinguish it from Daira estates already under 
European supervision)--which it was hoped Wilson's 
friends the Rothschilds might be induced to use as 
collateral for a loan. A temporary loan of £250,000 
from the Imperial ottoman Bank was raised upon the 
Domains, but with the rising floating debt and with 
the Caisse in need of £1.7 million a fortnight before 
Unified interest was due,J a larger transaction was 
imperative. Wilson set out for Paris to take up the 
discussions but found that political stumbling blocks 
existed. It had not yet been decided what powers were 
to be accorded the Egyptian Minister of Public Works 
407/12, 
l Bell, P• 48. 
2vivian to Salisbury, Feb. 21. 1878, PRO FOCP 
No. 108, P• 59. 
JThe Times, Oct. 15, 1878, P• 5. 
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(a post to be held by a Frenchman), and until Paris 
was satisfied, the loan proposition was held in 
abeyance. This impasse was broken when 3alisbury 
informed Lyons that others besides the Rothschilds 
were interested in the project, which removed the main 
French bargaining point. Besides, it was the French 
bankers who would profit from the payment of the Novem-
ber coupon. The Quai d•orsay yielded, and the public 
works post, with its powers nominally extended, was 
aecepted. 1 
The Rothschilds, however, were not going to 
participate in such an arrangement unless certain points 
were clarified. The firm would have liked to have ob-
tained an Anglo-French guarantee on the loan but, this 
being out of the question, the Western Powers were never-
theless involved by their agreement to appoint adminis-
trators in overseeing the collection of the revenue of 
the Domains. Disraeli promised the contractors that all 
money would go directly to them without passing through 
Egyptian hands. 2 In the prospectus advertising the loan, 
the position of the Foreign Office toward their appoint-
ment of a Commissioner of the Domains was expressed thus1 
1Atkins, p. 144. 
2 ~., P• 146. 
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They undertake his nomination in order to provide 
to the creditors a security that the manager so 
nominated shall not be divested1of his functions without their previous consent. 
The man chosen by England for Commissioner of the 
Domains was Francis Rowsell of the Middle Temple, who 
had been director of naval contracts. Despite the 
statement by the Foreign Office that Britain had 
assumed no financial obligations in case of default. 
such an interposition was a departure from tradition. 
Rothsehilds also wished to have an exact survey done of 
the land ceded, which resulted in the arrival in Egypt 
of Auckland Colvin and his team of surveyors. 
On October )1, 1878, the contra.ct was signed 
for the loan of £8.5 million at S per cent, of which 
£5 1 992,000 went to Ismail. 2 The loan was issued at 7), 
being purchased mainly in the United Kingdom. Despite 
the Daily News remark that the money was "borrowed at 
a much lower rate of interest than Egypt has been ac-
customed to pay,"J the transaction cost the Cairo Govern-
ment 11 per cent. One further problem had yet to be 
ironed out. The Syndicate still held a large block of 
1Economist, XXXVI (Nov. 9, 1878), 1JJ9. 
2
crouehley, PP• 12)-24. 
3Daily News, Oct. 29, 1878, ACFB, Egypt, XI, 22. 
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securities which, if it chose to sell, could ruin 
the new offering in a flood of paper. To avoid this, 
in early November Wilson signed an agreement with these 
bankers which drew from them a promise not to tap their 
reservoir of stock for at least a year in exchange for 
transfer of a large amount of Unified stock on which 
the French would collect interest. 1 
The loan did ve-ry well for Rothschild. 2 Some 
English journals made sharp attacks upon the Cabinet 
for intervening in the Egyptian offering, but this 
participation plus the involvement of the great house 
was an inducement to swell the lists of subscribers. 
In addition, Wilson could rely on Mr, Dicey to do his 
bests 
Those who are in the habit of reading the Observer 
must have been struck with the efforts made to 
keep up the prices of these particular (.Egyptian] 
stocks by every possible means,J 
1882, 
1Economist, XXXVI (Nov, 16. 1878) 1 lJ49, 
2Alphonse de Rothschild to Granville, Sept, 21, 
Granville Papers PRO FO J0/29/152. 
JBullionist, Nov, 16, 1878, ACFB, ~. XI, 76. 
According to Edward Ridsdale, in his pamphlit"Ii'>. In• 
qui-ry into the Capacity of Egypt Paying the Interest 
on Her Debt," 1878, only The Times and the Standard 
were not puffing Egyptian securities (ACFB, !gYpt, XI, 
insert). 
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Yet not all contingencies had been considered. 
The Rothschilds, neglecting to enter immediately upon 
the long and expensive task of having the new estates 
registered in the Mixed Courts, found that as soon as 
Ismail promulgated his decree of October 29, 1878--
relinquishing his land to the State preparatory to 
the loan--a swarm of floating debt holders rushed to 
the Tribunals, obtained first mortgages, and awaited 
the Rothschilds' payments which they intended to 
gobble up. The contractor, therefore, suspended pay-
ments and the entire matter was thrashed out in the 
courts. 
The Goschen Plan was modified by a decree of 
December 12, 1878, by which the controllers were re-
placed by the regime of Wilson and de Bligniares, with 
the understanding that should Ismail dismiss his Euro-
pean ministers, the old system would automatically be 
reinstated. The Caisse was also strengthened by the 
creation of its own auditing procedure which was placed 
under Baravell!. The Commission of Inquiry resumed its 
work on December 14, 1878, to prepare a final report for 
the Viceroy. Egypt's financial future was not promising. 
Neither Vivian, Baring, nor de Blignieres believed that 
the coupon of May 1879 could be met, and in fact the 
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sinking fund for November had remained unpaid altogether. 
Baring, in one of his rare missives to Goschen during 
this period, thought that the holders had no complaints 
against them except for the affair of the sinking fund, 
concerning which an appeal to the courts had been deemed 
inopportune. 1 The Compte Rendu for the year showed that 
the bondholders certainly had little for which to be 
happy. The Moukabala had not quite covered the payment 
of the so-called short loans, while the hypothecated 
revenue for the Preference stock was lacking more than 
£400,000 to meet the interest. The total deficit for 
the year stood at £1,392,994, which was some improve-
ment over that of 1877. The secured debt was now placed 
at £84,732.000, but the floating debt of £9,135,000 in-
dicated that Egypt's indebtedness had baen growing 
steadily since the November Decree of 1876. 2 In closing, 
the Caisse gave the bondholders something to ponders 
The Egyptian bondholders are so numerous that our 
conduct can hardly meet with the approval of all. 
We alone are judges of our conduct, which will be 
dictated by what is beneficial to the boudholders 
and justifiable from all points of view,; 
Baring left the Caisse on May 24, 1879, and was replaced 
1Baring to Goschen, Nov. JO, 1878, Cromer 
Papers PRO FO 633/2. 
2Econom1st, XXXVII (Feb. 22, 1879), 205-206. 
JThe Times, Feb, 11, 1879, P• 5. 
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by Auckland Colvin. He was not sad over severing his 
ties with the investorsa 
I was interested in the work of Egyptian reform; 
but I had no wish to remain in Egypt as a mere 
receiver of money for the bondholder~. I was 
their representatives but my sympathi~s lay more 
with the wretched taxpayers of Egypt.l 
By February of 1879 Ismail had had enough of 
ministerial insolence and reform. The army had been 
halved to 7,500 men and the officers, already in arrears 
on salaries, were placed on half pay. The Khedive in-
spired or at least made use of a military uprising on 
February 18, which after a brief time he himself put 
down. 2 After taking this action, the Viceroy manifested 
the will of the people, so he said, in dismissing Nubar 
and replacing him with Tewfik. Wilson was outraged, and 
complained that the demarche of the eighteenth was due 
to Vivian's tepid assistance.3 Vivian was replaced in 
early March by Frank Lasoelles (temporary British Con-
sul General in Cairo), for Salisbury believed the former 
to be excessively pro-Egyptian,4 
l L. J. L. D. Zetland, P• 72. 
2NJany at the time laid the responsibility for 
the uprising at Ismail's door (Bell, p. 50s Wallace, 
PP• 64-651 C. R. Wilson, P• 187). 
3viv1an denied this assertion (Vivian to 
Salisbury, Feb, 20, 1879, PRO FOCP 407/12, No. 39, P• 59). 
4salisbury to Tsnterden, June 23, 1879, Tenter-
den Papers PRO FO 363/5. 
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London's first response to the Khedive•s 
coup had been to instruct Wilson not to resign, 
promising him full support. 1 It was decided to 
allow the dismissal of Nubar to stand, but to work 
with France to sustain their nationals. Ismail de-
clared a willingness to allow his European ministers 
the right of veto over financial affairs as long as 
Nubar was excluded. Despite this concession, Salisbury 
indirectly advised Wilson to make greater use of the 
carrot than of the stick, since "we cannot at present 
act materially against the Khedive by occupying Egypt, 
and if we cannot do it ourselves we certainly cannot 
allow France to do it alone,"2 
When these proceedings came up in the House, 
Northcote stated that Wilson was an Egyptian official and 
hence could be removed at any time by the Viceroy.J There-
fore, on April 7 Ismail summoned the diplomatic community 
to announce the formation of a native administration and 
his intention to devise an economic solution to satisfy 
his creditors, The pretext for this move·was Wilson's 
407/12, 
1salisbury to Vivian, Feb, 21, PRO FOCP 
No, 68, p, 41, 
2salisbury to Lascelles, March 28, 1879. Cecil, 









insistence that the coupon of the 1864 loan for 
£240,000, due in early April, be put off for a month 
since the Caisse possessed but £44,ooo. The Khedive 
argued that this was bankruptcy. However, the Com-
mission of Inquiry had completed its labors and presented 
its final report on April 8. 1 Their opinion was that 
the country had been bankrupt since April, 1876, and 
that the Powers must form a Commission of Liquidation 
which would make a final and binding settlement for 
all parties. The Commission made several other sugges-
tions, 2 including a reduction of the interest on the 
Unified debt to 5 per cent, continuance of the Prefer-
ence stock intact, and the payment of the floating debt 
at 50 per cent of value in cash out of the available 
assets. The Commission resigned immediately upon the 
Khedive•s release of Wilson. In short order the Domains 
Administration also reported to Rothschilds that they 
could no longer perform their duties.J 
1 Wynne, PP• 602-603. 
2The report advised that the OUchouri land pay 
greater taxes, that the Khedive be placed on a civil list 
of £300 1 000 a year. that the Moukabala be ended, and that 
the Rouznameh loan of 1874 be converted into an internal 
tax. 
3vivian to Salisbury, April 10, 1879, PRO FOCP 
407/12, No. 273, p, l5J. 
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Wilson was enra.geds he wrote Salisbury. suggesting 
the deposition of the Khedive and the suspension of all 
funds by the Rothschilds. 1 The firm did, in fact, take 
this course of action. Ismail had promised frugality 
for the months ahead, and Punch envisioned the commence-
ment of economy in the "departure of rra-. Rivers Wilson 
and Mons. de Bligniires by deck-passage and third-class 
night excursion train for Paris and London."2 
But the British Government found Wilson's con-
tinued presence in Cairo embarrassing, so that Disraeli 
observed "the sooner Wilson disappears from the scene 
the better.".3 Thus, for a second time Wilson retreated 
from Egypt, to the delight of most of the Europeans, and, 
significantly, Vivian was returned to his old duties. 
As for Wilson, his reception at home was cold, and North-
cote, who tried to speak well of him, was forced to admit 
1Atkins, P• 170. Wilson freely expressed his 
opinion in a letter to Blunt on April JO, 1879 (Blunt, 
Secret History, P• 37)• 
"You will I daresay have heard that I have been 
upset by that little scoundrel the Khedive •••• 
Crepy Vivian is the cause and chief abettor of this 
sudden overthrow of arrangements which he was in-
structed speci.ally to protect." 
2Punch, LXXVI (April 19, 1879). 179. 
;Disraeli to Salisbury, April lJ, 1879, Buckle 
and Monypenny, VI, 44J. 
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that "one may think that he has spoilt what appeared 
to be a promising chance by a certain want of tact,"1 
while the Foreign secretary busied himself trying to 
mend matters. 2 
On April 22 the Viceroy decreed into law his 
new financial project which clearly favored the floating 
creditors over the bondholders. The interest on the 
Unified stock was slashed to 5 per cent. as had been 
proposed by the Commission of Inquiry, but it was recom-
mended to pay the judgment creditors, those who had won 
in the Mixed Courts, in full, 55 per cent in cash and 
the remainder in bonds at 5 per cent payable in five years. 
The Caisse, although forced to pay the 5 per cent for the 
May coupon, immediately went into court challenging the 
Khedive•s right to upset existing contracts. The Vice-
roy's plan was to appeal to those creditors who were on 
the scene, and run the risk of raising the ire of the 
bondholders. The floating debt was increased at a rate 
of £80,000 a month3 and required attention, but in osten-
1Northcote to Tenterden, May Jl, 1879, Tenterden 
Papers PRO FO 363/2. 
2w11son was so loud and persistent in his own 
defense that the Cabinet decided to reward him with a 
Jrn.ighthood for his services in .Egypt, 
3v1v1an to Salisbury, May 24, 1879. PRO FOCP 






tatiously ignoring the old investors the Khedive had 
needlessly stirred up hostile sentiments. 
There was a distinction made between speculators 
and investorsa the former were considered to be purchasers 
for the short term, interested in immediate profits, and 
often unencumbered by scruples. The investor, on the 
other hand, was considered respectable, placed his capi-
tal with a view to long-term income, and was less mindful 
of market fluctuations. When the Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders took up the dilemma of the Egyptian creditors 
in 1876, a large number of investors cooperated to defend 
their property from the caprices of the Cairo Government. 
The fluctuations i~ these securities had probably driven 
many of these men out of the market, and it appears that 
the preliminary report of the Commission of Inquiry was 
particularly damaging in this respect. The Financier 
wrote in September of 1878s 
Many holders, disgusted with everything Egyptian, 
sacrificed their Bonds at half their previous value, 
and even registered a vow never more to have any-
thing to do with so disappointing an lnvestment.l 
In the opinion of this journal, the previous three weeks 
had seen a great exodus, or "to put the case broadly, the 
l Financier, Sept. 11, 1878, ACFB, EgYpt, X, 308. 
whole mass of old Egyptian Bondholders may almost 
be said to have passed away, and their places to have been 
taken by a new set of people."1 In this way the Egyptian 
market became less stable, with speculators selling when 
the stocks rose, admitting continuous waves of new people. 
Also, since the issuance of the Domains loan, Englishmen 
were purchasing ever greater amounts of Egyptian stocks, 2 
and this no doubt was accelerated by the activities of 
England. Besides the involvement in the Rothschild loan, 
the Cabinet had loudly proclaimed its interest in the Nile 
Valley which in the opinion of some financial editors had 
directly stimulated stock purchases, .3 I'he volatile Egyp-
tian market quivered with every rumors it rose in January 
of 1879 on hearing that Robert Lowe was to accept the 
post of director of a national bank of Egypts it dropped 
on the release of the report of the Caisses it panicked 
over the dismissal of the Control by Ismail on April 28r 
and it became buoyant as Ismail 1 s deposition approached. 
Canards on the Exchange became so frequent that suspicion 
was thrown on the Reuter service in Egypt; 4 
1F!nancier, Sept. 11, 1878, ACFB, F.p;Ypt, x, JOB. 
2Ec9nomist, XXXVII (April 12, 1879), 421. 
3statist, III (May J, 1879), 201, 
4Pa.ll Mall Gazette, April 1, 1879, ACFB, Egypt, 
XII, 54. 
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The spring of 1879 witnessed a press campaicn 
of sympathy for the Egyptian peasantry, sparked by 
visits to Egypt of M.P.'s and by the Khedive•s dif-
ficulty in paying his creditors.1 The holders were 
portrayed as the villains who were ultimately respon-
sible for grinding down the fellaheen. Papers, such 
as the Spectator, which lamented over the plight of the 
fellah might also be in favor of the occupation of Egypt. 
but on human! tarian rather than financial growi.d.s. This 
situation often arose, illustrating the combinations of 
motives which could operate simultaneously. The opinions 
which the bondholders generally endorsed seem to have 
vacillated between a desire for European intervention 
for the removal of Ismail and the desire for an accom-
modation with the Viceroy lest the Sultan's authority 
be re-established in Egypt. But after the Khedive•s 
decision to ignore the bondholders• rights, they seemed 
to have opted for his ouster. 
Pressure upon the Goveniment was applied through 
various means by individual bondholders. Letters to 
House members such as George Campbell, a well-known 
opponent of the bondholders, became numerous, One such 
1see ACFB, EgyEt, XIII, for the press attitudes 
on British action in Egypt, 
I: 
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letter writer, a clerk for twenty-five years, had in-
vested £400 in Egyptian stocks he wrote Campbell1 
I selected Egyptian oonds under the impression 
that Etc;ypt was a rich and fertile country, producing 
in great profusion the essential necessaries of life, 
and quite capable of paying the interest I was to 
receive if her affairs were properly managed. • • • 
Your getting up now and again in the House, and lending 
your influence to those who are interested in de-
frauding the bondholders, cannot but have a pre-judicial effect on the governing power in Egypt. 
No one advocates the position of the bondholders 
in the House, and I am at a loss to see why you 
should gp against them by encouraging Egypt to 
default.l 
In mid-April Lasoelles received a letter from a friend 
in the Foreign Off ice saying that the bondholders were 
putting great pressure upon the Government to act in 
Egypt. 2 The press in this campaign was less active 
than it would be in 1882, and not as homogeneous in 
opinion. The Times and some other leading journals 
did not take up the cause of the holders, but this 
does not mean that other organs were not iii. favor of 
Government action, and this number seems to have in-
creased as time passed. 
The •council' of the Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders assumed a low profile as to these events, 
with its chairman remarking merely that he hoped that 
1campbell, p. 792. 2 Atkins, p. 169. 
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the problems of the East could soon be settled. 1 As 
individuals, Corporation members could and did air 
their views on Egypt and its finances. Mr. w. H. Bishop 
released a circular in May, at the Stock Exchange, in 
which he complained that the Foreign Off ice had done 
little for the bondholders, and added1 
English capital has been freely lent on conditions 
that have tended to the welfare of Egypt and the 
Egyptians. It would be a manifest and a fatal 
neglect of considerations affecting the employment 
of surplus capital in one country for the benefit 
of another where capital is needful if that pro-
tection which the English Government is able to 
afford were withheld,2 
Also of interest were the observations of Hyde 
Clarke, made when he chaired a meeting of the African 
Section of the Royal Society of Arts. He thought Egypt 
was still able to pay its debt since Wilson would have 
reduced the interest on the Unified stock if he had had 
any doubts upon the subject. Considering his position 
in the Corporation, Clarke was reluctant to speak freely, 
and therefore he cautioned the public, although personally 
he was not pessimistic about Egypt's future. Anglo-French 
cooperation was desirable in Egypt but it appeared less 
attainable as time passed, for as he observed, 
1Money Market Review, XXXVIII (March 8, 1879), 273. 
2 I!?.!,g,., (May 24, 1879), 580. 
349 
even during the last few months there had been 
evidence that feelings of jealousy might prevail 
between the two powers, and they must look forward 
to a time when they must be in antagonism with 
respect to this very country.l 
Clarke still believed that a substantial part of the 
Egyptian stock was held by solid middle class investors 
and that it was a form of savings which deserved pro-
tection, To the Secretary of the Corporation, Egypt 
was not being administered properly for all concerned. 
He disliked the quality of the Indian officials employed 
as well as what they had accomplished. Egyptians were 
a "slavish people," he argued, over whom strong govern-
ment must be maintained. Such an approach, and not the 
concoction of financial schemes, would pay the bondholders, 
for 
already there were grounds for fearing that the 
new administration would not do all that was expected 
of it, and it was a question even whether2it had not already slackened the bond of Government. 
In closing, Mr. Clarke considered the position of the 
holders a 
The problem to be solved was, whether it was possible 
to give the Fellaheen a greater proportion of the 
produce which they raiseda but it really might be for 
their benefit to have a smaller portion.3 
1J~Mrnal !; the R9Yal Society of Arts, XXVII (Jan. 24, 79),3. 
2 Ibid., 134. 
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Although the majority of public opinion was not 
in the camp of the bondholders, the British Foreign 
Off ice could not totally disregard the demands of the 
creditors, especially after the abrupt dismissal of 
Wilson. Lord Salisbury felt that 
it may be quite tolerable and even agreeable to 
the French Government to go into partnership 
with the bondholderss or rather, to act as Sheriff's 
officer for them. But to us it is a new and em-
barrassing sensation.l 
This companionship with the creditors which the English 
Foreign Secretary found so distasteful was not so easily 
shaken off. Despite the Khedive's coup, his new finan-
cial decree, and the efforts of the bondholdars, the 
Western Powers had made no move in Egypt to regain their 
lost position. But a move from an unexpected quarter 
altered affairs, for on May 18, 1879 1 Bismarck informed 
the Viceroy that his decree of April 22 violated the ar-
rangements establishing the Mixed Courts. Ismail had 
heretofore ignored the Anglo-French sputterings but 
German demands gave him pause. Salisbury felt that to 
abstain from joining the protest was impossible, as it 
would lay Government open to "reproaches from our own 
1sa1isbury to Lyons, April 71 1879, Cecil, 
II, J.52. 
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subjects who are creditors."1 
Berlin's motives in this instance were politi-
cal, and were probably based on a desire to keep the 
Western Powers acting in harmony, since Bismarck feared 
a French courtship of isolated Russia. 2 At the time, it 
was felt by many that where the bondholders had failed 
in France and England, they had succeeded in Germany. 
There were conjectures that perhaps the Rothschilds had 
utilized their family influence in the German capital 
to sway Germany's Chancellor, or that the court banker 
Bleichroder, possessing Egyptian securities, had asked 
for assistance.J To Salisbury the Bleichroder story 
4 seemed a plausible explanation for Bismarck's action. 
The Conservative Kreutz Zeitung contributed to the 
controversy by observing that Germans possessed 
£4 million worth of Egyptian stocks and that the 
1salisbury to Lyons, May 23, 1879, quoted in 
Atkins, p. 177. 
2william N, Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, and 
the Concert of Euro~e (Londona university of London, 
Athalone Press, 195 ), PP• 117-19. 
JLittle credence is now placed in such motives 
for Bismarck's actions by historians such as Medlicott 
(pp. 118-19) and Langer (p. 261}. 
4salisbury to Odo Russell (British Ambassador 
to Berlin), June 11, 1879, cited in Atkins, p. 175. 
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nation was obliged to act in their behalf •1 
Disraeli was prepared to act firmly in Egypt, 
and was anxious that his policy not be interpreted as 
merely a bondholders• program. Complications existed 
in the diplomatic arena as both Italy and Russia took 
the opportunity to fish in the troubled waters, 2 while 
the Sultan saw in the deposition of the Khedive a chance 
to regain lost power in the Nile Valley. The task of 
Downing Street was to encounter these problems success-
fully while keeping in step with France, The Cabinets 
of Paris and London soon decided that Ismail's departure 
from Egypt would be best for all concerned, and there-
fore supported Bismarck's protest, in order "to push 
the KheC.ive a little nearer the edge," as the British 
Foreign Secretary said, "because until we get him thrown 
over.., there will be no decent government in Egypt ... .3 
1Morning Post July l, 1879, ACFB, ~. XIII, 22. 
German holdings of Egyptian securities rema~low since 
the Frankfort bourse did not commence trading in "unifieds" 
until 1882, nor the Berlin bourse until ~he following year. 
German investments rose substantially, however, to an es-
timated £15 million by the mid-188o•s (Charles K Hobson, 
The Export of Capital (New Yorks Macmillan, 1914j, p. 146), 
2The Khedive•s abdication was probably postponed 
due to the diplomatic support given by Italy and Russia (Roberts, "Italy, .. p, Jl6). 
3salisbury to Odo Russell, June 11, 1879, Cecil, 
II, JSJ. 
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Sensing his danger, the Viceroy immediately 
began using his influence in Constantinople and dis-
patched an agent with a reported £10,000 to plead his 
case before the Divan. 1 While applying pressure on 
the Sultan, Britain attempted to bring about the ab-
dication of the Khedive since the Foreign Off ice was 
at a loss as to the results should both Cairo and the 
Porte hold firm. The Sultan yielded under intense 
European pressure on June 26, 1879, whereupon the 
Viceroy received a telegram from his suzerain• who 
addressed him as "my dear Ex-Khedive." The firman 
which deposed Ismail placed his son, Prince Tewfik, on 
the throne, and it was with little outward show of emo-
tion that.the old ruler gathered up his seraglio and 
whatever money there remained in the treasury. and took 
ship to Brindisi. So it was that "by anticipating 
Keynes:ian economic policies in a country wedded to the 
doctrines of Macawber," Ismail Pasha had in great 
measure caused the ruin of his land. 2 
1Layard to Salisbury, May lJ, 1879, PRO FOCP 
407/12, No. 472, P• 329. 
2cedric J. Lowe, The Reluctant Imperialistsa 
British Foreif? Policy 1878-1902 {Londona Routledge 
and Kegan Pau , 1967), I, 41. 
CHAPTER V 
FROM CONDOMINIUM TO BRITISH OCCUPATION 
JUNE 1879 TO SEPTEMBER 1882 
Commission of Liquidation 
The new Khedive. Prince Tewfik, who assumed his 
father's dignities in June of 1879. was neither well-
educated nor widely-traveled. He was "perhaps not quite 
so sharp [as his father), but infinitely more honest," 
and had "plenty of commonsense."1 He knew full well 
that the Western Powers had put him on the throne and 
that they would protect his interests from encroach-
ments by the Sultan. Tewfik's loyalty, to London 
especially, would lead him into considerable danger in 
1882. 
France and England faced a two-fold problem in 
Egyptt the arrangement of both a political and a finan-
cial settlement. Charles Rivers Wilson, perhaps en-
354 
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visioning his own return to Cairo, suggested to North-
cote that European economic ministers were essential, 
and for a time a plan was discussed which would have 
allowed a division of Egypt into two spheres of influence. 1 
Under this scheme England would have administered the 
litoral of the country, which could easily be protected 
by sea, while France would look after the interior. Salis-
bury desired a situation where the strings of power were 
concealed a 
We want to have some hold over the government of 
Egypt, though we do not want to assume any overt 
responsibility. The great object seems to me to 
be to have representatives inside the offices who 
shall be able to report what the Government are 
doing to the Agents, and shall be able to give 
advice to the Government in accordance with the 
instructions of the Agents.2 
"But ••• after having a Khedive deposed," remarked the 
Foreign Secretary, "the character of non-intervention is 
not easy to retaina and any further prudery would be out 
of place.".3 Downing Street intended to maintain English-
men in key posts, and as Salisbury informed Malet, his 
new agent in Cairo, the Western Powers had decided that 
1Lyons to Salisbury, July 9, 1879, PRO FOCP 
407/12, No. 825, P• 499. 
2salisbury to Lyons, July 7. 1879. Newton, P• 187. 
3salisbury to Lyons, 
.356-57. 
July 17, 1879, Cecil, II, 
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no other nation was to be permitted a foothold in 
Egypt. 1 In a further amplification of the Government's 
Egyptian policy. the Foreign Secretary stated that native 
authority must be bolstered, but that Britain must stand 
first in influence, Should a tour de force be necessary. 
it must be Turkish, for an English occupation was a last 
resort since the capitalists would be the beneficiaries. 2 
In September of 1879 Waddington and Salisbury met 
to work out an accommodation by which their interests in 
Egypt would be safeguarded. The main points of agreement 
were that a commission of liquidation should be established 
to deal with all aspects of the Egyptian debt (a point upon 
which the English Cabinet had been particularly sensitive). 
that native officialdom should be supported, that the con-
tinued life of the Mixed Courts should be carefully con-
sidered, and that the system of control be reinstated with 
the concomitant appointment of Baring and de Blignieres, 
These latter gentlemen drew up a decree which the Viceroy 
issued on November 15, in which the powers and prerogatives 
of the new controllers were delineated. -The controllers-
general were no longer even under the nominal authority of 
1salisbury to Malet, Sept. 19, 1879. PRO FOCP 
407/lJ, No, 1219, P• 721, 
2salisbury to Malet, Oct. 16, 1879, ~ •• No. 1304, 
PP• 771-73. 
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the bondholders, but were appointed and dismissed by 
their governments. 1 They possessed ministerial rank 
and had the power to inspect every aspect of finances 
in the Council of Ministers their opinions were merely 
advisory, although they could always appeal to their home 
governments. A staff of the controllers' own choice was 
provided, and all salaries were paid by Egypt. To avoid 
friction, it was deemed advisable not to differentiate 
the duties of the two off ices so that on-the-spot accom-
modations could be made by Baring and de Blignieres. 2 
Almost immediately the Western Powers were confronted 
by an obstacle. The judgment creditors, who from October 29, 
1878, until Februa._1if J, 1879, had taken out mortgages on 
the domains equalling some £1.7 million, had discovered 
a new champion. The Commission of Inquiry had suggested 
that these mortgages be nullified, and Britain and France 
had concurred. Austria, however, now objected, and, seconded 
1The decree was based on a plan submitted to Eng-
land by Waddington, the French Foreign Minister. One of 
the provisions was what the English Foreign Secretary called 
a "novelty" which he dislikeda "The English Controller ••• 
is to obey English orders. This is a considerable advance 
in the direction of 'i~rence' over anything we did either 
in the case of Rivers Wilson or Romaine" (Salisbury to 
Lyons, July 17, 1879, Cecil, II, 356). 
2The main points of the decree are enumerated in 
Wynne (p. 607). 
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by Italy and Germany, took up the matter. 1 The new con-
trollers met in Vienna with Austrian officials who per-
sisted in their demands for a third controller to def end 
their interests. The impasse concerning the establish-
ment of a European control in Egypt was temporary, and 
such intermeddling merely solidified Anglo-French co-
operation. 2 
Salisbury wished to have a rapid liquidation 
"because the creditors form a public opinion of very 
respectable strength, and they have ready access to the 
various Foreign Offices."J As far as Downing Street was 
concerned a 
We desire that the creditors should get all that can 
fairly 'be assigned to them1 but whether that is much 
or little i~ a question which does not immediately 
concern us,l.J. 
1out of the thirty-four million francs of judgment 
debt, Austrian nationals owned approximately one million 
francs, while Germans held somewhat more. One of the !arger 
creditors of this class was the Bank of Egypt, with £190,000. 
A list of the major holders appears in the letter of Adams 
to Salisbury, Sept. 27 1 1879 (PRO FOCP 407/13 1 No. 1247, 
p. 734). . 
2Roberts, "Italy," p. Jl6, Anglo-French cooperation 
was advantageous to Britain since France promised neutrality 
should war between England and Russia erupt in the East (Lowe, I, 40). 
Jsalisbury to Baring, Sept. 25, 1879, Cromer Papers 
PRO FO 6JJ/2, 
4salisbury to Baring, Oct. 29, 1879, ibid, 
r 
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But it was doubtful that the English holders would tolerate 
an imposed settlement, for such a demarche would. as Lord 
Salisbury 1mew, probably lead to a general sell-off of 
securities and the intervention of the Mixed Courts which 
would be embarrassing. 1 The International Tribunals were 
so disliked by the Foreign Secretary because of their 
nationalistic bias, as well as their involvement in the 
controversy over the public debt. that he even contemplated 
the postponement of the Commission of Liquidation until the 
Courts had expired. 
The Egyptian investors soon discovered where the 
sympathy of the controllers lay. On October 14, 1879, 
Baring and de Bligniares, who were "bone of one bone and 
flesh of one flesh" in their actions, 2 notified the Presi-
dent of the Council of Ministers that no funds should be 
borrowed to meet either the Turkish tribute or the Unified 
debt coupon, due in November,3 Consequently, the Egyptian 
tribute bondholders were not paid, and the Caisse had only 
enough on hand to remit 2 per cent for th~ half-yearly pay-
1salisbury to Malet. Jan, 6, 1880, PRO FOCP 407/17, 
No, 8, P• 4, 
2Malet to Tenterden, Nov, 28, 1879, Tenterden 
Papers PRO FO J6J/2. 
3Money Market Review. XXXIX (Oct, 25, 1879). 
441-42. 
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ment on the Unified stock. Faced by this breach of 
contract, the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders felt 
it incumbent upon them to act. On October 31 Secretary 
Clarke "requested Mr. Goschen to inform them of the course 
he proposed to take on behalf of those Bondholders whose 
interests were thus detrimentally affected, 111 Mr. Goschen, 
who since the Commission of Inquiry and the intervention 
of France and England had disassociated himself from the 
entire situation, replied two weeks later1 
Since it has become apparent how competent the Com-
mission of the Public Debt is to look after the in-
terests of the Bondholders it would have been quite 
out of place for me to interfere, nor could I have 
doHe so with effect if I had wished •••• But if 
the Bondholders think that protests. beyond those 
which, no doubt, will be made by the Commissioners 
of the Public Debt, as to the coupons not being paid 
in full, are necessary they have in the Council of 
Foreign Bondholders a body well qualified to give 
expression to their wishes and defend their interests 
and with all the necessary experience.2 
Hence the Council was forced to stand alone, but Goschen, 
although removing himself from officially assisting the 
English investors, remained a friendly observer, 
The •council' acknowledged Goschen•s withdrawal, 
but promised the bondholders that all steps adjudged neces-
sary would be taken on their behalf. The Corporation was 
1corp. For. Bondh, Rep., 1879, P• 24. 
2standard, Nov. 22, 1879, ACFB, EgYpt, XIII, 117. 
r 
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still regarded as the representative of the English in-
vestors, receiving all reports, budgets, and statements, 
and it was their duty to take up the matter with the 
Caisse.1 Clarke wrote the Commission of the Public Debt 
on November 24, "requesting the favor of their immediate 
attention to the adjustment of the claims of the Bond-
holders, on the basis of the agreement of 1876."2 In 
response, Colvin informed the holders that the Caisse 
had lodged a protest with the Egyptian Government, deeming 
this action sufficient at present. Not completely satis-
fied with this reply, Councilhouse continued to report 
the deficits due on the Unified stocks in all its pub-
lications, and gave moral support to Sursook, who sued 
for repayment in the Mixed Courts, This case was lost in 
the Alexandria Court of Appeals on April 22, but by then 
a Commission of Liquidation had finally been assembled. 
Goschen found it hard to remain altogether aloof, 
and in January, 1880, he wrote Baring a long letter, urging 
the maintenance of the Caisse as the "sheetanchor.. of the 
situation and expressing his satisfaction with Colvin as 
a strong personality, although the two had never corres-
1rn November of 1879, the members of the Caisse 
werea w. Mog, P. Baravelli, B. Bughas, and A. Colvin (who 
was appointed by Britain). 
2corp. For. Bondh, Rep., 1879, PP• 24-25. 
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ponded. After raking the mortgage creditors over the 
cinders, Goschen concluded by chiding Baring over his 
eagerness to sacrifice the material welfare of the bond-
holders in pursuit of an evanescent principle. Were he 
a creditor, wrote the M.P., he would be quite upset over 
the many reductions made in the name of a final settlement.1 
But just such a settlement was being launched, and 
in general it met with approval. The Viceroy, the Western 
Powers, and eventually the states of Europe agreed that a 
liquidation commission should be established. 2 Rothschild 
was likewise in favor of this plan and would not release 
additional funds until all parties involved had given 
their assent.J A just arrangement was also to the advan-
tage of the bondholders, for as Bouverie said, only the 
stockjobbers and loanmongers now profited. He continueda 
1The remarks from Mr. Goschen are drawn from 
a letter from Goschen to Baring, Jan. 17, 1880 (Cromer 
Papers PRO FO 6JJ/2) • · 
2Much to the annoyance of Riaz Pa.aha, the Egyptian 
President of the Council, Italy withheld her approval of 
the Commission of Liquidation the longest, which cost the 
Malieh £1,JOO per day in accumulating interest (~alet to 
Salisbury, March 15. 1880, PRO FOCP 407/17, No. 255, P• 196) • 
.)Salisbury to Baring, Feb. 6, 1880, Cromer Papers 
PRO FO 6JJ/2. 
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I am quite sure that it is of far more importance for 
all parties concerned--the state, and its creditors--
to have a steady, fair equilibrium between the public 
expenditure of Egypt ••• and the public revenue, 
than to have fitful gleams of superabundant means--
with corresponding extravagance, accompanied by high 
rates of interest of doubtful stability.1 
But on this occasion it appeared that the Chairman of the 
Corporation ran into difficulties with his confreres. 
Baring had privately written Bouverie requesting that a 
letter be forwarded to Egypt in which the Council would 
officially approve, in the name of the English bondholders, 
modifications in the existing contracts. Bouverie complied 
on April 26, but trouble erupted at Moorgate Streeta 
I had no o~portunity of submitting it to the Council, 
before it Lhis letter] was despatched, and when I 
did so afterwards one or two objected that I should 
not have committed them and the Council to definite 
views--which might be open to question if the letter 
were published.2 
Whatever course the Council chose, it was clear that 
by 1880 the bondholders which it represented in England 
were not one of the parties included in the negotiations, 
and that no vestige of the authority granted by the Goschen 
Decree remained, nor had they friends in .the Foreign Office. 
Bouverie summed up the situation of his organization thusa 
I do not think my city friends quite understand that 
the question of the arrangement of the Egyptian debt 
1Bouverie to Baring. April 27, 1880• ~. 
2Bouverie to Baring, May 71 1880, ~· 
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is no longer one between debtor and creditors, 
to be arranged between them alone, but is become 
one of haute politigue which will be finally 
decided, tant4bien Pue mal, by the representa-
tives of the Great owers in the Commission--
without t~e assent of the original parties to 
the debt. . 
Delays in the commencement of liquidation pro-
ceedings were experienced because of the illness of 
Lord Salisbury and the insistence of the new Khedive 
that the French bankers be given special consideration, 
De Bligniares was sent to Paris to complete an agreement 
with the Syndicate. In excess of IA- million of securities 
were to be repaid by Cairo, a debt which had blossomed at 
interest rates ranging from 10 to 28 per cents 2 in addition, 
the 15 per cent founders shares were sold outright to the 
C~dit Foncier for twenty-two million francs, a move 
condemned by Egyptophiles since it appeared that twice 
this amount could have been obtained by remortgaging this 
asset. Wilson estimated these shares at over twenty-five 
million francs, and thought they were likely to double in 
value before long, The controllers gave Britain an oppor-
tunity to purchase this stock at the same price which the 
Syndicate was to pay later, but the offer was refused,J 
l~. 2The Times, Feb. 26, 1880, P• 10, 
Jsalisbury to Malet, Jan. 22, 1880, PRO FOCP 




This decision was probably based less upon concern that 
difficulties would arise with the English shippers over 
toll controversies than the placation of French sensi-
bilities for the British acquisition of Cyprus, 1 
The circular of March Jl, 1880, announcing the 
Commission of Liquidation, was what the Western Powers had 
desired, an agreement by the other states involved to abide 
by whatever document would emerge from the proceedings, 
The controllers had made preparations to def end stoutly 
the Egyptian interest and thereby had alienated the bond-
holding community, The Motikabala was ended by decree, and 
a financial plan as well as a budget for 1880 was presented 
to the Commissioners as a basis upon which to negotiate. 
The Commission of Liquidation was composed of the members 
of the Caisse, plus M. d'Airolles of France, Herr von 
Trescow from Germany. and as England's choice for Presi-
dent, Sir Charles Rivers Wilson. 2 
Some eyebrows must have been raised when the .QQ.-
server announced Wilson's new post in mid-February. A 
volte face had occurred in Government thinkings in dis-
1crabites, The Spoliation of Suez, pp. 201-202. 
2salisbury to Malet, March Jl, 1880, PRO FOCP 
407/17, No, J16, P• 242, London insisted that Wilson be 
named President of the Commission. 
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cussing the possibility of appointing Wilson, Salisbury 
had informed Northcote that Baring was now opposed to 
Wilson a 
I have no conception what has produced the change 
but taking it in connection with Tewfik's reiter-
ated objection, I am inclined to think with you 
that the appointment is undesirable and should 
not be made.l 
Baring persisted in his opinion, observing in February 
that Wilson was unpopular in Egypt, and that neither he 
nor his associate, Nubar, carried weight with any class 
in the country. 2 Nonetheless, after a lecture from 
Salisbury which stressed the necessity for good relations, 
Wilson was packed off to the East. Considering his pre-
vious performance, it seems hard to imagine this maneuver 
unless there was intense pressure in his behalf. This, 
says Mr. Dicey, was the case, fer Downing Street sub-
mitted in the face of' "the strong opinion expressed in 
favor of Sir Rivers by leading London financiers,") The 
arrangement for the Commission of Liquidation was the 
last important business to be completed in Egypt under 
the Conservative Government, for the Prime Minister had 
1salisbury to Northcote, Feb, 17, 1880, Iddes-
leigh Papers BM Add MSS 50019, p. 179. 
2Baring to Salisbury, Feb, 17, 1880, Cromer 
Papers PRO FO 633/2 • 
JDicey, "Egyptian Liquidation," p. 46.5. 
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called for new elections. and the result was a changing 
of the guard. 
From the sixteenth to the twenty-fourth of March, 
1880, Gladstone carried out his famous Midlothian Campaign, 
and at the hustings won a surprising triumph, gaining 353 
seats, to 258 for the opposition and 61 for the Home Rulers. 
But the new Goveniment was weak, for it was divided into 
various groups--the Radicals, the Irish, the Whigs--and 
its leader Gladstone seemed more interested in popular 
politics than in party unity or Parliament. 1 Neither 
did Gladstone stand well at court, for Victoria considered 
his assumption to the off ice of Prime Minister almost an 
act of treason, and their ensuing relations were marred by 
her hostility, particularly on imperial matters. Cabinet 
decisions were no longer reached by compromise among all 
of the members, but merely by majority vote, which under-
mined Goveniment solidarity and hindered policy-making. 2 
Gladstone promised a new direction in foreign policy and 
spoke warmly of the concert of Europe just at a time when 
alliances were being formed on the Continent. The Liberal 
1Ramm, 1876-86, II, xvi. 
2rn 1882 Lord Derby joined the Liberal Government 
as Colonial Secretary, which added another vacillating 
member to an already indecisive Cabinet. 
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leader had often attacked Beaconsfield's diplomacy, but 
in imperial policy on the Nile, ••• the Ministry 
formed to reverse Disraeli's policy became his 
executors by an irony of contradiction seldom 
seen,1 
Great Britain kept Cyprus, expanded the Indian frontiers, 
and occupied Egypt. The differences between Gladstone and 
Disraeli were not so great despite the bluster of the for-
mer,2 The Liberal Cabinet of 1880 exhibited continuity 
with the previous Government in foreign affairs, Seven 
members of the new Government were Whigs or Moderate 
Liberals who, like Hardington, had been in general accord 
with the policies of the Conservatives, 
In the flush of victory, Gladstone gave a sobering 
assessment of Britain's position in the worldt 
The gradual unravelling of the tangled knots of 
the foreign and Indian policy will indeed be a 
task for skilled and strong hands, if they can 
be found,3 
The man upon whom this responsibility devolved was 
Lord Granville, ''the amiable and witty, but not 
1James L. Garvin, Life of Jose~h Chamberlain (Londona Macmillan and Co,, Ltd,, 193 ), I, 442-43, 
2Robinson and Gallagher, P• 91. 
JGladstone to the Duke of Argyl, April 12, 1880, 
John Morley, Viscount, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone (New Yorks Macmillan Co,, i9oj), II, 615. 
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efficacious Foreign Secreta?"'IJ. ,.l From 1880 to 188J, 
the Prime Minister and Lord Granville did not work in 
tandem, and British diplomacy suffered because of this. 
Nowhere was this more visible than in the handling of the 
Egyptian crisis. The English community in Egypt felt 
uneasy over the change of government, and discussed the 
impact it would have on the future of the Nile Valley. 2 
On Aprll 17, 1880, the Commission of Liquidation 
inaugurated its proceedings, which continued for three 
months. Because of the acrimony created by these investi-
gative discussions, no day-to-day account of the Commission's 
activities were published, and its conclusions were simply 
embodied in a decree, Baring, until his departure for 
India in May, as well as his replacement, Auckland Colvin, 
was notable in the defense of Egyptian interests, while 
the Commission, presided over by Charles Rivers Wilson, 
was well-disposed toward the creditors,3 Lacking the 
power to depose the Khedive should their proposals be 
rejected, the Commission was obliged to make concessions. 
The Western Powers placed their diplomatic strength behind 
the controllers, As Malet saids 
l Garvin, I, 444, 
2The Times, April 27, 1880, p, 10, 
Jcromer, I, 162, 
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My own instructions are very strong on the point 
of making the satisfaction of the creditors sub-
sidiary to an ample f rovision for the administra-
tion of the country, 
In so doing, the English Cabinet opposed the ambitions of 
some of the creditors, but such a course was inevitable 
when economic and political affairs were so closely in-
tertwined. 
In the course of these thorny negotiations Wilson 
often sided with the Italian, German, and Austrian dele-
gates to form a majority in defense of the holders. These 
actions indicated to some that Wilson had perhaps made 
promises at home which were impossible to fulfill. 2 Much 
haggling had occurred over the amount of money to be granted 
the Egyptian Government for ordinary administrative expenses. 
The figure which was finally decided upon, £4.9 million, 
was higher than the Commission had desired, The Presi-
dent of the Commission def ended himself to Malet by asser-
ting that he had been afforded complete freedom of dis-
cretion by Lord Salisbury, Most of the other commissioners 
agreed with Wilson that only by keeping revenue high and 
administrative expenditures low could the bondholders hope 
1Malet to Granville, May 14, 1880, PRO FOCP 
407/17, No. 437, P• 370, 
2Ma.let to Tenterden, May 19, 1880, Tenterden 
Papers PRO FO J6J/2, 
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to receive just compensation.1 Furthermore. should 
native creditors be sacrificed. as with the revision 
of the Moukabala, additional funds would be freed by 
the bondholders. This was just, Wilson argued, for 
the country would gain greatly from the English presence. 2 
Wilson's attention was not limited to Commission 
business, for Nubar had been allowed to return to Egypt, 
and Wilson hoped for the re-establishment of their old 
ministry. He broached the subject to Dilke in May,J 
and, ignoring advice to the contrary, remained in con-
stant communication with Nubar, heedless of Britain's 
policy or of any crisis which might follow. 4 Wilson 
admitted that Salisbury and Lyons had warned him to 
avoid Nubar, yet the visitations continued, much to 
Malet•s exasperation.5 Both indirect and direct appeals 
were made to Wilson, although it was not until June, 
when Nubar left Cairo, that tranquility was achieved. 6 
l Cromer, I, 172. 
2w11son to Granville, Aug, 14, 1880, PRO FOCP 
407/17, No, 644, P• 509, 
JGwynn and Tuckwell, I, 325-26, 
4Malet to Granville, May 17, 1880, Granville 
Papers PRO FO J0/29/159. 
5Malet to Granville, May 27, 1880, lQ.1.9.. 
6Malet to Granville, June .3, 1880, ibid •• Dilke 
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The.decree of July 17, 1880, implementing the 
recommendations of the Commission of Liquidation, left 
both the interest and the sinking fund of the Preference 
stock undisturbed, while adding to its hypothecated 
revenues. However, £5.7 million was added to this 
privileged debt and used in the repayment of floating 
debt creditors. 
As for the Unified scrip, its interest was per-
manently reduced to 4 per cent, it lost some of its 
security. and was not redeemable by purchase on the open 
market. The so-called short loans were converted into 
"unifieds" at a ratio of £133 of new scrip for £100 of 
old. Consequently, £2 million was added to this segment 
of the debt. 
The maximum interest to be paid on the Daira Sanieh 
was 5 per cent, the Government assuring a 4 per cent mini-
mum, and the outstanding debt was increased to £9.5 mil-
lion with the absorption of the Daira Khassa bonds,1 
Some questions of procedure remained in doubt after the 
settlement, which necessitated the successful intervention 
of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders on behalf of 
stated that things had come to such a pass that Tenterden 
had written personally to Wilson, begging him to cooperate 
with Malet {Dilke to Lord Ripon, May 21, 1880, Ripon 
Papers BM Add MSS 43528). 
1see above, Chapter 3, pp. 261-63. 
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the Daira holders, 1 The Commission did not tamper with 
the Domains loan and it continued to pay 5 per cent in-
terest, 
The floating debt was subsumed under three cate-
gories a privileged, secured, and ordinary obligations, 
In the first class were the tribute to the Porte, the 
interest to Great Britain on the Canal shares, and the 
claims of the judgment creditors who had obtained their 
mortgages upon the domain lands before February J, 1879,2 
These claims were to be paid in cash and in full, The 
secured creditors were, in the main, contractors of 
various sorts, and were likewise paid in cash, minus 
7 per cent, Excluded from this group was Greenfield and 
Company, the contractor for the Alexandria harbor, In 
the summer of 1879 Sir George Elliot had written the 
Government on behalf of the Greenfield claims, since 
both Baring and Wilson seemed prone to give the firm 
short shrift.J By 1880, £500 1 000 was still owed these 
1corp. For. Bondh, Rep., 1880, P• JO, 
2Also included in the privileged class of creditors 
were those who had deposits entrusted to the M&l'eh, and 
charitable institutions, 
)Appendices ) and 4 to PRO FOCP 407/13 contain 




contractorsr the Commission of Liquidation, however, 
placed them among the ordinary class of creditors, 
those possessing merely a pledge of good faith from 
the Egyptian Government. Since the company had al-
ready given up the administration of the harbor dues and 
could show no cause why its case demanded special treat-
ment, the ruling stood. With this settlement a heavy 
burden was removed from the State. 
The ordinary creditors were paid JO per cent in 
cash and the remainder in Preference stock at face value, 
which accounted for the £5. 7 million rise in that portion 
of the debt. In this classification fell such claims as 
the Rouznameh, which was dismissed, and the Moukabala. 
Although the Egyptian Government had recently abolished 
the Moukabala, the Commission desired some recognition 
for those who had faithfully kept up their provisions of 
the plan. It was not sympathy for the natives which 
brought about this compromise, but the threat of numerous 
suits by Westerners, especially Greeks, who had paid the 
Moukabala and would be disbarred from the benefits of 
the law. Dicey reported that Nubar had taken up the cause 
of these creditors, which might explain Wilson's position. 1 
1nicey, "Egyptian Liquidation," P• 468, 
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One and a half per cent interest was grudgingly extracted 
from the Malieh as an annual compensation to those who 
had actually paid the Moukabala. Here, as with the 
judgment creditors, those who were on the spot and who 
made the greatest stir received the most favorable 
attention. 
The final article of the decree declared that, 
after the publication of this law, no one could pursue 
claims against F.gypt on rights acquired before December Jl, 
1879. The Caisse was to be maintained and recognized as 
the legal defender of the bondholders, Government loans 
still needed the approval ~f the Caisse, and, in the 
case of breach of contract, appeals could be lodged with 
the International Tribunals.1 The Commission of the 
Public Debt remained the cashier for the creditors, dis-
bursing, in 1880, £2.J million on the Unified debt of 
over £58 million at 4 per cent, and £1.2 million on the 
Preference bonds of £22.7 million at 5 per cent per annum. 2 
Most journals and interested institutions were pleased 
with the Law of Liquidation.J The Corporation of Foreign 
1A copy of the Law of Liquidation appears in the 
Parliamentary Papers (LIX, Egypt No. 4 (1880), c. 2662). 
2Monet Market Review, XLI (Sept. 11, 1880), 297. 
The figuresn the text above have been rounded off to 
the nearest hundred thousand, 
JPraise for the Law of Liquidation came, for ex-
ample, from the Board of the Anglo-Egyptian Bank {Bankers 
Magazine, XLI [Feb., 1881], 98). 
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Bondholders, which published and circulated the new decree, 
also lauded the Commission's effortsa 
In Egypt, the Law of Liquidation, published on 
the 19th of July, 1880, has finally adjusted, it 
is hoped, the various difficult and complicated 
questions between the creditors of F.gypt and the 
State on the one hand, and between different classes 
of Bondholders inter se on the other. • • • It is 
impossible, when regarding the final issue of the 
long and difficult transactions connected with 
the arrangement of the Egyptian Finances, not to 
be convinced of the eminent ability, skill, and 
integrity which have been brought1to bear in effecting this successful result. 
Unfortunately for Egypt, the spectre of the floating debt 
was not laid to rest, for costs incidental to the liquida-
tion, in conjunction with the damage done by revolutionary 
upheaval in 1882, created an unsecured debt of £16,646,023 
by December of 188J, 2 
Improving Prospects in Egypt 
In some ways the Anglo-French condominium in Egypt 
worked well, for only through cooperative action could 
the system have endured at all. Nonetheless, below the 
surface there ran cross-currents of national interest 
which resulted in a continuous jostling for influence 
between the Western Powers. About 21,000 functionaries 
were in the pay of the Egyptian Government, consuming 
l Corp, For, Bondh. Rep •• 1880, p. 7. 
2Ibid., 1884, P• 34. 
377 
£1,250,000 a year. 1 Some of these received as little 
as £2 a month while others occupied well-endowed sine-
cures. The upper-echelon positions were often filled 
by Englishmen, but at the lower rungs of the service 
Frenchmen predominated over Britishers in a ratio of 
seven to two. 2 Englishmen who possessed patronage were 
told by London to advance fellow nationals,J but Galli-
cization continued in many forms. A returning visitor 
to Cairo in 1881 remarked how spoiled the city was since 
it had "become a tenth-rate French provincial town ... 4 
Malet went so far as to woo the .American Consul General 
for the establishment of some sort of English-speaking 
I 
confraternity. 
The condominium spawned 111 will in the French 
camp, particularly between de Blignieres and the Consul 
General, de Ring. The former was disliked by the French 
1wallace, PP• 1J8-J9. 
2Malet to Granville, Jan, 31, 1881, quoted in 
Atkins, p, 248, 
JGranville to Malet, Feb, 17, 1881, quoted in 
Atkins, p, 249, 
4sir William Gregory to Layard, Nov. 27, 1881, 
Sir William H. Gregory, Sir William Grefory, K,C.M,G., 
Formerly Member of Parliament and Somet me Governor of 
Ceylon, An Auto§lograpfiY (Londons Johri Murray, 1894), 
P• 37l. 
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colony because he wouldn't "do their dirty work for them," 
reported Malet, who then opined, "For our interests I have 
no doubt that M. de Blignieres is the man to keep."1 
The fears of the Foreign Secretary were not allayed. He 
had heard that Colvin did not have the strength of charac-
ter to stand up to his French counterpart, 2 and that posi-
tions were still being filled by the Quai d'Orsay. Malet 
was probably correct when he assured Granville that the 
French controller was not going out of his way to favor 
his countrymen, nor was Colvin being manipulated.J French 
opinion seemed to bear Malet out. M. Delafosse, a member 
of the French Chamber of Deputies, moved that that portion 
of the budget which contained the salary for their agent 
in Egypt be eliminated. He argued that 
M. de Blignit!res seemed to consider hime:elf as a 
cosmopolitan agent, and boasted that he repre-
sented Frances but he acted as though he con-
sidered the absorption of Egypt by England as a 
matter of course •••• French influence is being 
persistently r::enaced by lflgland, who is making 
daily progress in Egypt. 
1Malet to Granville, Jan. 26, 1881, Granville 
Papers PRO FO J0/29/159. 
2Granville to Malet, March 11, 1881, !!?.!S· 
30/29/121 (copy). 
;Malet to Granville, March 18, 1881, iQ!.9., 
J0/29/159. 
4standard, July 7, 1881, ACFB, EgYpt, x:v, 88. 
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On May 12, 1881, France moved upon Tunis, and on 
the same day Granville, Dilke, and Hardington met to dis-
cuss countersteps, albeit fully aware that Salisbury had 
approved this action before leaving office.1 It was 
natural that Egypt should come up in the conversations.2 
The Foreign Secretary continued to receive disquieting 
communications. Queen Victoria wrote in late June that 
she had 
heard accidentally from a friend of hers that the 
French were talking of Egypt as an ultimate object 
and that Bismarck encouraged it. Lora'. Granville 
said the other day to the Queen that this we could 
not tolerate and she trusts that he will take care 
that our unfortunate apparent acquiescence in ~ 
annexation of Tunis does not lead France and Europe 
to believe we shall stand that.3 
-
Wilson proffered the Government similar appraisals of 
the expansion of French influence obtained through his 
liaison with Nubar. 4 Thus Granville's reply to Victoria 
1sa1isbury had indicated Britain's disinterested-
ness in Tunis at the Berlin Congress in exchange for 
France's recognition of the Cyprus Convention (Lowe, I, 41). 
20n July 28, 1881. there took place the first meeting 
of the committee "to consider the affairs of Egypt." Those 
in attendance included Malet, Judge Scott, Wilson, Dilke, 
and Tenterden (Gwynn and Tuckwell, I, 4.50-.51). 
JQueen Victoria to Granville, June 22, 1881, 
Buckle, III, 22J. 
4wilson to Granville, June 22, 1881, Granville 
Papers PRO FO 30/29/168. 
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was sobers 
The dual arrangement in Egypt has led to great 
prosperity in Egypt, and ought not to be lightly 
disturbed, but our proportion of influence has 
been diminished, and will require great vigilance 
to maintain it for the future,I 
Measures were taken to seek out British subjects with 
a knowledge of French, 2 but the jockeying for influence 
continued unabated into the period of upheaval. 
For the bondholders, the Anglo-French partnership 
was a bright episode in the turbulent financial history 
of Egypt. The English investor in Egyptian Government 
stocks had earnod only 3.2 per cent per annum on his money 
in the decade 1869-79, far less than the average 6,6 per 
cent per annum yielded by similar securities, another 
disadvantage of "Egyptians" was the wild fluctuation 
which they experienced,3 Never.theless, optimism, 
engendered by the dethronement of Ismail Pasha and 
the establishment of the Commission of Liquidation, 
began to pervade officials4 as well as the investing 
1aranville to Queen Victoria, June 28, 1881, 
Buckle, III, 224, 
2Granville to Malet, March 11, 1881, Granville 
Papers PRO FO J0/29/121 (copy), , 
)Economist, XXXVII (Aug. 91 1879), 911. The in-
come from F.gyptlan stock was estimated at £1 1 747,000 per 
annum for the decade of the 1870's. The Economist car-
ries a table illustrating the fluctuation mentioned above (XL, (Oct. 7, 1882], 1237), 
4Baring to Ponsonby, Dec. 29, 1879, Ponsonby, p. 222. 
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community. The rise in Egyptian stock prices was 
dramatic between May 1879 and May 1881,1 and in part 
reflected improving economic conditions in England. 2 
With the tranquility of the Nile Valley apparently 
assured, capitalists no longer hesitated in making con-
siderable investments in this region. The resulting 
prosperity benefited the bondholders by assuring the 
prompt payment of the interest and by enhancing the value 
of their holdings. 
Journals that warned against the overpriced con-
dition of Egyptian stocks were ignored,J for good tidings 
dominated the news from Cai~• in the years 1880 and 1881 
the Caisse accumulated a surplus of £1,083,515 with which 
it purchased stock wor'th £1,454, 820 from the open market. 4 
The Daira administrators likewise used this method to re-
1Economist, XXXIX (May 28, 1881), 660. In this 
period the unified stock rose from 40-J/4 to 77, the 
Preference from 61-1/2 to 98-1/4, and the Daira from 
45-1/2 to 77, 
2ooost loans on the British Exchange prospered 
in these years and a large number of new offerings made 
their appearance on the market. By 1880, Englishmen held 
some £750 million in foreign securities, and earned an 
estimated t.28 million a year ("An Estimate of British 
Investments--Principal and Interest," Bankers M!gazine, 
XLI (Feb,, 1881], 158). 
3For example, Financier, Dec. 21, 1881, p. 5. 
4 Wallace, p. 490, n, 1. 
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duce the outstanding debt, but in their case, land had 
to be sold to raise the necessary capital, which dis-
pleased many holders. 1 Both the telegraphs and the 
railways began to show profits which were used for much-
needed modernization. 
The French bankers took advantage of the altered 
situation and, upon the dissolution of the Grand Syndi-
cate on January 2, 1880, 2 began unloading their store of 
paper. Consequently, the CI'i8dit Foncier, which held fifty-
nine million francs in "unifieds,n engaged, among others, 
Louis Cohen and Sons (a firm long connected with the 
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders) to sell a portion of 
its scrip in London.J One can date the decline of interest 
in Egyptian affairs among the French investors from this 
period. So successful were these operations for the Credit 
Foncier that instead of showing a substantial loss, the 
organization's report for 1880 indicated a slight profit. 4 
1corp. For. Bondh. Rep., 1882, p. J6. In 1880, 
for example, £241,400 of Daira stock was purchased {ibid., 
1881, p. 40). 
2Economist, XXXVIII (Jan. J, 1880), 10, 
Jibid •• (Feb. 14, 1880), 180. The absorption of 
these securities by the British market was accomplished 
with little difficulty (ibid., (March 20, 1880], JJJ). 
4The Times, Dec. JO, 1880, p. 6. 
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For the English banks doing business in Egypt, the 
golden days had ended with 1876. The Anglo-Egyptian 
Banking Company had suspended the payment of interest 
for eighteen months in 1876, and when resumed, its rate 
never exceeded 7-l/2 per cent per annum. Its competitors 
fared no better with respect to dividends and the depressed 
condition of their shares. 1 Despite stockholder urgings, 
none of these institutions increased their capital or 
parted with a large percentage of their Egyptian securi-
ties when the situation improved. Legitimate banking 
business had become highly competitive by 1881 despite 
the prosperity, while transactions with the Cairo Govern-
ment were on a most modest scale. 2 This did not discourage 
several now firms--most notably La Banque at;;neral d'igypte 
(with a capital of sixty million francs) and a branch of 
Joubert•s Banque de Paris et Pays-bas3~-from opening their 
doors and adding to the superfluity of wealth then entering 
1The bottom was reached in February 1878, with 
stock of the Anglo-Egyptian quoted at 9-J/4, the Bank of 
Egypt at 19-1/2, and the Commercial Bank of Alexandria 
at 2-J/8 {Bankers Magazine, XXXVIII [March, 1878], 284). 
2rn March, 1880, for example, the Anglo-Egyptian 
Banking Company lent the Khedive's Gove!'l"lment £150,000 
at 6.6 per cent (Malet to Salisbury, March 20. 1880, 
PRO FOCP 407/17, No. 318, P• 24J). 
3naily News, April 15, 1881, ACF3, :Egypt, XV, 59. 
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Egypt.1 
The revived Egyptian trade helped to stimulate 
investments by Englishmen, so that Dilke (Under Secre-
tary at the Foreign Office) was constrained to remind 
the British agent in Cairo to keep a protective eye upon 
British interests. 2 The infusion of new money was chan-
neled into both commerce and agriculture. It was esti-
mated that by 1882 Frenchmen had invested £57 million 
in Egypt,3 while in the six-year period prior to the 
British occupation. twelve English companies came into 
existence in Egypt with a combined capital of £8 million, 
a quarter of which was paid up. 4 The French firms were 
diverse in charaeter,5 while English undertakings were 
1From 1879 to 1886, £22,24J,OOO in gold and silver 
bullion was imported into Egypt, while only £5,110,800 
was exported. This meant that the Nilotic, with 1/240 
of the F.arth's population, absorbed one-twelfth of the 
world's yearly production of the precious metals (£2rl2.. 
For. Bondh. Rep., 1886, p. 47). 
2Dilke to Malet, Aug. J, 1881, cited in Atkins, 
P• 24J. 
3cromer, I, )02-JOJ, n. 1. 
4Atkins, p. 200. Hershlag (p. 99) states that by 
1902 there were six French companies with a combined 
capital of £11,548,000, while twenty-six British firms 
possessed £9,977,000, 
5These included sugar refineries in Alexandria 
and land improvement societies such as de Bligniares• 
Soci~tl d'Enterprisee et des Travaux Publiquee. 
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generally concentrated in communications. 1 utilities, 2 
and various aspects of trade, most especially cotton.J 
Of even greater importance to Egypt was the influx 
of capital into organizations designed to reap profits 
from the vaunted alluvium of the Nile. In June of 1878, 
the Stand!rd remarkeda 
1The Duke of Sutherland, who had onoe told Dis-
raeli that English capital must dominate the Nile Valley (Atkins, p. 200), failed along with another group headed 
by Sir George Elliot in a project to lease the Egyptian 
railroads, which the controllers had opposed (Baring to 
Salisbury, March 15. 1880, Cromer Papers PRO FO 63372). 
Mor.e successful were the Public Works Company, established 
January 3, 1881 with £400,000 capital for building canals, 
roads, and bridges (Prospectus for the Public Works Company, 
ACFB, Egypt, xv, insert), and the Oriental Telephone Com-
pany, also originating in 1881, with £300,000 capital. 
2For example, the Alexandria Waterworks was pur-
chased in 1880 by an English combination headed by the 
Duke of Sutherland. In its first year it yielded 7 per 
cent profit for its new owners (The Times, May 26, 1880, 
P. 13). 
JAmong these firms was the Anglo-Egyptian Coal 
and Iron Company (BT 31/2800/15327), dealers in coal, 
metals, and machinery, with a capital of £10,000, 26 per 
cent of which was held by the parent firm, the Anglo-
Egyptian Banking Companyt the Alexandria Market Com-
pany (BT Jl/2439/12369) with £25,000 capital in £20 
shares, the Alexandria Cotton Pressing Company (BT 
31/1573/5147) possessing £30,000 capital and dominated 
by the same Lancashire spinners who operated the Commer-
cial Bank of Alexandrias and finally, the Mansourah 
Trading Company, a cotton ginning factory with assets of 
£30,000 (BT Jl/2553/13289). 
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Considering the low prices at which land is now 
being sold and the cheapness of agricultural labor, 
there can be very little doubt that, with proper 
management, Associations of this kind will have a 
good chance of suceess.l 
In January of the following year, the Daily Telegraph 
urged the creation of a land and mortgage bank which 
could borrow in England at 5 per cent and lend in Egypt 
a.t 12 per cent, 2 By 1880 a land boom was in full flower. 
with prices steadily rising,3 The prospects for large 
dividends weJ.'"'e alluring and as Mr. Na.sterman told his 
stockholders in May, 1880, "our fingers have rather 
itched, I must say, at times, to venture upon that kind 
of busineas,"4 Land and mortgage companies had been a 
good investment in the previous decade, and despite the 
drop in market prices of Egyptian crops, more land was 
being brought under the plough.5 
1standard, June 18. 1878, ACFB, Egypt, x, 46. 
2Daily Telegraph, Jan, 28, 1879, ibid., XI, 137. 
3The Times, Aug. JO, 1881, P• 6, 
4Money Market Review, XL {May 29,· 1880), 638. 
5ca1rncross 1 Home and Foreign Investment. p. 229, 
Table 53. Cairn.cross' believes that the British investor 
earned 16 per cent return on his money in these securities 
in the l870's. Despite the increasing amount of land being 
cultivated, produce prices fell from 1880 to 1884 as follows1 
cotton. 22 per cents cotton seed, 5.5 per cents wheat, 
J4 per cents beans, 29 per cent (Corp. For, Bondh. ReE•• 
1885, P• 42). 
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Unlike other provinces of the Ottoman Empire, 
Egypt permitted foreigners to own lands the mortgage 
companies, with the International Tribunals to support 
them, found it easy to dispossess the indebted fellah 
of his farm. Little wonder, then, that the peasants 
hated the Mixed Courts as well as the irrigation projects 
l 
which inevitably led to a loss of acreage. The pros-
perity was therefore illusory, for the peasantry was 
becoming impoverished and had increased its indebtedness 
from £500,000 to £7,000,000 between the years 1876 and 
1882.2 Capital for these new operations was not only 
drawn from EnglandJ and Prance, 4 but from Egypt as 
1villiers Stuart, t After the Wars Bein the 
Narrative of a Tour of Inspect on Lon on1 John Murray, 
188j), p. 56a w. Fowler to Granville, April J, 1882, 
Granville Papers PRO FO J0/29/150. 
2rssawi, P• 9, n. 17, This figure is also cited 
by Lord Dufferin in his report of 1882. 
JFor instance, the Duke of Sutherland's investments 
included £14,ooo in the Bedruschen Land Company, £24,ooo 
in the Land and Irrigation Company of Egypt, and £10,000 
in the Soci~t' d'Industrielle du Delta du Nil. The Land 
and Mortgage Company of Egypt, a purely English venture, 
was born in early 1880, The organization planned to do 
all sorts of land agency operations, and commanded a 
capital of £1 million (half of which was called up) in 
£20 shares (Prospectus for the Land and Mortgage Company 
of Egypt, ACFB, Egyp~. xrv. insert). 
· 
4The largest of all the mortgage organizations, the 
Cri3dit Foncier £gyptien, by 1891 was the fifth largest 
landowner in the country (Baer, p. 69). The assets of 
the firm came to £EJ,2J8,000, and upon its board were 
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well. 1 
The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders viewed 
the condition of Egypt in a positive light after the 
promulgation of the Law of Liquidation. Bouverie, at 
the General Court of 1881, drew a parallel between their 
success in Egypt and the Turkish situation. "Egypt," 
said the chairman, "was now finally sound, after being 
on the verge of national bankruptcy."2 The 'Council' 
seemed to have shared this optimism, for many of its 
members took an interest in the new wave of investments 
the Deputy Chairman, R. B. Martin, was a trustee for the 
.... 
Egyptian Delta Land Company,> while Arthur Kinnaird owned 
100 shares of Beltim Land and Irrigation Company. 4 
directors from the major French houses and the Bank of 
Egypt. Edward Dicey was also a director (Prospectus 
for the Crt&dit Foncier lgyptien, ACFBP ~. XIV, insert), 
since he possessed the concession for estii'blishing the 
society as a reward for past services. 
1rn 1881, Nubar Pasha established La Socie~ .Anonyme 
d'Irrigation dans le BehiSra with £200 1 000 capital dravm 
from English, French, and Egyptian investors, and was 
successful for some years (Baer, pp. 68-69). 
2Money Market Review, XLII (March 5, 1881), Jl6. 
3Bullionist, Nov. 22, 1880, ACFB, Egypt, XIV, 202. 
4The Beltim Land and Irrigation Company was created 
to improve the land of Egypt as well as to lend money to 
the cuitivators. Its capital was £240,000 in £20 shares (BT 31/2732/14800), 
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G. A. F. Bentinck was a heavy investor in this period, 
holding 1,000 shares in the Oriental Telephone Company1 
and 200 in the Land and Mortgage Company of Egypt. Robert 
Bourke, the Parliamentary Under Secretary to the Foreign 
Office under Beaconsfield, joined the Council in 1880s 
he took up 100 shares in the Land and Mortgage Company 
of Egypt, becoming a fellow shareholder of John H. Daniell, 
who owned 100 shares, and Walter Farquhar and William 
Trotter, each with 20 shares. 2 When difficulties arose 
in 1882, the Council, perhaps not surprisingly, was a 
staunch supporter of strong Government measures. 
Within the organization, divisions--which had long 
hampered vigorous action--surfaced in 1880. At a meeting 
of the 'Council,' on December 2, 1879, it was decided to 
amend the articles of the society which governed the 
remuneration to the executive.3 The reason given for 
this proposed revision was the sparse attendance at meetings. 
Some members felt that after their £100 permanent certifi-
cates were drawn and paid, there was little reason to remain 
1oriental Telephone Company Share Lists, BT 
31/2748/14922. 
2La:nd and Mortgage Company of Egypt Share Lists, 
BT Jl/14647/1)996. 
Jcorp, For. Bondh. Rep •• 1879, p. 8. 
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in the organization or to fulfill any 'Council' duties 
they might have. Bennoch remarked that "before the 
introduction of that system [salaries for the •council'] 
great difficulty was experienced in getting a quorum. ,,l 
This move might have helped in bringing up the attendance 
of the •council,' but the General Courts remained small. 
During a special meeting following the General Court of 
1880 (when less than one-eighth of the membership, minus 
the 'Council,' was present), it was resolved1 
That this meeting authorizes and approves the pay-
ment to the Council, as remuneration for their 
services, of the sum of £100 per annum in respect 
of each member of the Council for the time being 
(other than the Chairman), such sum to be divided 
amongst them as the Council may determine.2 
The proposal was passed, but only after a resort to 
proxies by the chairman. Thus, the 'Council' was 
granted £2,000 a year to disburse as it chose, and it 
appears that a portion of this money went to Secretary 
Clarke's salary of £600 a year. 
The dissidents within the Corporation were angry 
over the timing of this demarche as well·as the mean.s 
which the executive had discovered to benefit from the 
1Bishop, p. 15. 
2corp, For, Bondh. Rep., 1880, p, 19. 
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ever-growing fund, which amounted to £)8,000 by 1881.1 
Augustus Abraham was so incensed by these proceedings 
that he forwarded a twelve-page epistle to the Board of 
Trade, describing the 'Council's' misdeeds. 2 Mr. Cham-
berlain, the President of the Board of Trade, was not 
sufficiently impressed to act, which irritated Mr. Abraham 
and his associates, who felt frustrated and aggrieved. 
Although a large surplus existed, they thought the 
drawings of permanent certificates were ve-ry slow,J 
and (to their minds) too much was spent for the agents 
and the general Council expenditures.4 Worse still, there 
1By 1897 this fund had grown to over £100,000 (Economist, LV (Nov. 20, 1897], 1624). 
2Bishop, pp. 12-lJ. 
JMonet Market Review, XLVIII (Feb. 23, 1884), 289. 
The repaymen scheau!e of permanent certificates, ex-
cluding those returned upon incorporation, was as follows1 
Year Number of Year Number of 
Certificates Certificates 
1874 0 1880 50 
1875 so 1881 JO 
1876 0 1882 50 
1877 10 188J 103 
1878 JO 1884 120 
1879 50 1885 12J 
4Bishop, p. 17. Through 1878, £7,400 was paid to 
the Council's agents, and another £2,180 for testimonials. 
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was a growing suspicion that all was not being administered 
properly at Moorgate Street. Rumors were widespread, as 
the decade advanced, that settlements arranged by Council-
house were not the most advantageous for the holders, and 
that large commissions, the rewards for such negotiations, 
were piling up in the coffers of the organization beyond 
the reach of its members. There were also charges con-
cerning the transfer of certificates. It was alleged 
that clerks sold certificates for what they would bring 
or gave them gratis to friends of the Corporation. 1 
The opponents of the 'Council' found their weak 
position exacerbating. When they threatened the society 
with liquidation. they were told that in that event no 
one would receive a penny, as the courts would not allow 
its when they demanded a yearly dividend from the profits, 
the chairman declared that legal opinion had been consulted, 
and that no such course of action was possible. Attempts 
at internal mutiny were likewise abortive. At the General 
Court of 1880 Abraham moved that a committee be appointed 
to investigate the workings of the Corporation. The motion 
1rbid, pp, 28-29. This author. toth a •council' 
member an<f'"i' ~issident, and a friend of Mro Abraham, re-
ported that thirty permanent certificates had been drawn 
and never collected. In the face of such apathy, it is 
possible that certain violations of trust had occurred. 
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was negatived and even a request for more extensive 
figures on the annual balance sheet was defeated. 1 
The executive body of the Corporation became increasingly 
touchy as to its rights, and according to w. H. Bishop, 
all accounts of meetings by the press had to be submitted 
to Councilhouse for approva1. 2 Mr. Bouverie and associates, 
correctly or not, viewed those who disagreed with 'Council' 
policy as enemies, which seriously impaired whatever in-
fluence remained to the institution. 
Descent into Chaos1 September 1881 
to September 1882 
Although the prospects for Egypt appeared fair in 
1881, there was a storm gathering which would upset many 
calculations. One of the last places on earth where one 
might have looked for a revolution was in Egypt, and, in 
fact, for some time after the September rising the British 
journals of the day persisted in disregarding the tele-
graphic reports. The grievances of the population were 
certainly numerous, Foreigners dominated the country's 
trade, finances, government, and even the army, where 
Turks occupied the highest ranks, The dual control 
1Money Market Review, XL (March 6, 1880), 281, 
2 Bishop, p. J4. 
394 
produced many job dupl~~a.tio'1fJ which created in.flfflci9.·"\~y 
'1:'.'ld waste. 1 A:nti-:.ihristian :feali:'l..qs had also been 11:.iildLl'' 
in.flue·'1.ce of' tha ::hedive was ebbinA:, and -~hrour7hout 'iorth 
Africa provinces of the Ottoman Empire were slippin.P;' i1.to 
European hands. 
,Joining the revolut5.ona.ry movement were native 
merchants, large la.."'1.dlo1·ds, constitutional liberals. and, 
a.t the heart, the army. There were· al~::>o external slo:me~·1ts--
the ::)ul tan, Halim, and the :.t'ormsr '.'.hedi ve, all direrytin,;"· 
thei:c ovm parties of intrip:anti:;--and it was said that evc'l(). 
~uropea.ns, wishing to return -~o the old-style f inancL1·"· 
<'Y:t l maail' s heyda:/, gave succor to the im:;urgen.ts. J 
Leadins the conspira.cy ware the colonels headad by Ara:-:.1 
Jey • a fellah who had risen i:1 "che army under Ismail 
L~ Pasha. The emeute oi' lebl"'Ual"".f t 1879, had given the 
rnili tary a.t1 indication of what might be achieved h." the 
threat of force were used, which led directly to tha z·iRlrv 
1::;tuart, PP• 46l-6l.J.. .~uropean omplo~rees cost 3;,rr~,··ot 
£8515.000 per year. 
2111 dli "'". 7~ 
.,,e c o ., -c , p • -~, • 
)Landau, "Secret Sociatie3," p. li~R. 
4For a brief biography of Arabi, see 3lunt, 6ec2'."et 
jj.St.Q.tu_ (p. 99). 
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of September 9, 1881. 
Although the explosive Egyptian situation was 
temporarily defused by the Khedive•s concessions to 
the army, Gladstone stated his opinion that in case 
of a repetition of such events, all the Powers should 
be discouraged from meddling, and that only the Sultan 
had the right to employ force. 1 For the Quai d'Orsay, 
Turkish interYention under any eircumsta~ces was an 
anathema, a position which was to cause hard feelings 
later. Granville was not reassured that the troubles 
in E,gypt were over, and expressed his uneasiness that 
En~land would be drawn ever deeper into EtSYptia.~ inter-
nal affairs. 2 Only if a state of anarchy existed in 
Egypt, said the British Foreign Secretary, would Eng-
land contemplate the use of force.J 
The colonels were not long satisfied, and soon 
demanded additional funds which, if granted, would un-
balance the budget for the coming year, Auckland Colvin, 
the most pro-Egyptian expert Granville had, 4 submitted 
1Gladstone to Granville, Sept. 13, 1881, Ramm, 
1876-86, I, 291, 
2Granv11le to Gladstone, Oet. 4, lt81, ~., 298-99. 
3Granville to Malet4 Nov. 4, 1881, PRO FOCP 407/18, No, 2.57, PP• 14:3-4 • 
4aranville to Gladstone, Sept. 21, 1882, Ramm, 
1876-86, I, 427. 
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a memorandum in late December in which he predicted the 
exclusion of Europeans from the administration, a re-
pudiation of the financial arrangements, and a neutraliza-
tion of the Con·trol. He thought that the Chamber, which 
had been summoned, would insist on voting the budget and 
would require a responsible ministry. 1 Tenterden and 
Wilson pursued the Foreign Secretary as to what pre-
parations were being made in case of hostilities, so that 
Granville took up the matter in mid-December with Childers 
and Northbrook. Granville had again turned pessimistic. 
"Egypt is our great stumbling block•" he wrote, "[and] 
it seems quite on the cards that we shall soon have dis-
order there again."2 In this frame of mind, Granville 
agreed to a joint note with France, to be sent to Cairo, 
holding out the possibility of intervention in support 
of the Viceroy should there be a recurrence of trouble. 
The note was delivered on January 8, 1882, and elicited 
an unexpectedly hostile reaction, for as soon as it was 
clear to the Egyptians that the maneuver,had been a bluff, 
their wrath and disdain were kindled. 
1Malet to Granville, Jan. 2, 1882, PRO FOCP 
407/19, No. 2, pp. 2-5 (enclosure). 
2Granville to Dilke, Dec. 21, 1881, Gra_~ville 
Papers PRO FO 30/29/121. 
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Ma.let reported home on the ill eff eets of the 
note, and observed that "there was a. cha.nee of arriving 
at an understanding, but this is apparently now passed."1 
The British agent remained conciliatory, albeit vacillating, 
on whether force was neoessary. 2 The Chamber succeeded 
in obtaining a strong reply to the Western Powers, and 
expected no reprisals, trusting to division in Europe 
and to Gladstone, whose views on struggling nationalities 
were well-publicized. 
With this accomplished, the assembly turned to 
the task of giving Egypt a constitution. The financial 
aspects of the resulting document were particularly sen-
sitive, as the Chamber desired jurisdiction over all 
contracts, concessions, and treaties, as well as the com-
position of the annual budget.3 Granville did not be-
lieve the Chamber competent to vote the budgets however, 
caution was paramount.4 Although the assembly agreed that 
the debt settlement was beyond their purview, Colvin 
407/18, 
P• 41. 
1Malet to Granv:tlle,. 
No. J4, P• 27. 
2Malet to Granville, 
Jan. 91 188~,. PRO FOCP 
Jan. 11, 1882, ibid., No, 77, 
JThe important articles of the constitution a.re 
Nos. 34 and J8s the text of the whole document appears 
in Blunt, Secret History (pp. 390-96). 
4Granville to Malet. Feb. 10, 1882, PRO FOCP 
407/19, No, 212, P• 110. 
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considered 
that the right claimed by the Chamber. seriously 
affects the guarantees given to the creditors, 
because it necessarily transfers the conduct of 
affairs from the Council to the Chamber.l 
As for France, Gambetta strongly objected to native in-
terference with the budgets still, Paris was not inclined 
to take stern measures. In a discussion on February 1, 
the London Cabinet found itself divided, with the jingos 
Hardington and Northbrook outnumbered by those who pre. 
f erred circumspection, which lead to a temporary feud 
between Hardington and the Foreign Secretary. 2 It was 
decided to propose changes in the Egyptian constitution 
and to submit them to Europe for consideration, since the 
Powers were involved in the guarantee on the secured debt. 
Within the Government the strongest voice in defense of 
bondholders'rights was Hardington's. In early February, 
Tewfik signed the new constitution into force, causing 
a change of government, with Arabi Bey as the new Minister 
of War. 
For the bondholders the events of September, 1881, 
brought down the curtain on the period of prosperity in 
Egypt. Letters from the region took on a frightened tone 
lMa.let to Granville, Jan. 12, 1882! flid., No. 45, 
p. 291 Lyons to Granville, Jan. 12, 1882, _:e_., No. 46, 
P• 29. 
2Gwynn and Tuckwell, I, 456. 
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and an exodus of women and children began. 1 Like Colvin, 
many investors feared that the Caisse would be swept 
away and that the liquidation arrangements might not 
be respected. 2 Anxiety increased as the Chamber pressed 
new demands upon the controllers, whose authority suffered 
in the Council of Ministers. By February Egyptian finances 
appeared as chaotic as in the era before 1876, and Colvin 
warned of impending disaster.) 
The shock wave of the September rising hit an al-
ready shaky market, immediately dropping the "unifieds" 
1-1/8, and the Preference and Daira stocks l•J/4 points.4 
A syndicate wa.s formed in Alexandria to keep the Unified 
scrip above 75 while speculators fished the turbulent 
waters (a dangerous game when the bulk of "unifieds"--
which made up 62 per cent of the entire debt--was still 
in the hands of a few intermediaries).S Sir John Pender, 
of Duffe~~r~af~~ ~~:~o~~a~~hn T~:~~ ~~O~': ~;sf~~ 
2Malet to Granville, Jan. 2, 1882, PRO FOCP 
407/19, No. 2, P• 4 (enclosure). 
)Cookson to Granville, March 6, 1882, ~·• 
No. 352, P• 196 (enclosure). 
4Finaneier, Sept. 13, 1881, ACFB, Egypt, x:v. 125. 
5Pall Mall Gazette, Jan. 21, 1882, ibid., 240. 
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as the head of the Eastern Telegraph Company, intercepted 
a message supposedly from James Macdonald in England to 
Cherif and the President of the Chamber, urging the re-
duction of the Egyptian debt by two-thirds, which if 
acted upon or even published would have caused a panic.1 
Not even the knowledge that by January, 1882, the Caisse 
possessed su:ff ioient money to meet the April and May coupons 
could improve the prices of Egyptian stocks. 2 Across the 
Channel, the opening of the year 1882 witnessed a crash on 
the Paris bourse, and the concomitant wave of selling added 
to the depressed condition of "Egyptians."' At "bargain 
prices" Egyptian securities began to flow to London, so that 
by the time of the occupation an estimated two-thirds of 
the entire debt of Egypt was in British hands.4 
From the start the English journals, and particularly 
the f inaneial periodicals, were unsympathetic toward the 
Arabist cause. For example, the Bullionist wrote in 
1Pender to Granville, Feb. 3, 1882, Granville 
Papers PRO FO ,30/29/1.52. 
2 Economist, XL (Jan. 28; 1882), lll. 
Jibid., (March 25, 1882), J46. The decline in 
Egyptian stocks was considerablea from January 3, 1882, 
to February 2, 1882, the Unified stock went from 71-1/2 
to 64, the Daira from 72 to 64, and. the Preference from 
92 to 88. 
4 ~·• (Sept. 16, 1882), 1149, 
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October, 18811 
The Army, then, is masters but it cannot be per-
mitted to remain so. '!'here must be reassertion of 
the right to rule by the only defacto Government • 
• • • It must, in fact, be England and France.l 
The French press was also aroused against the colonels 
and was widely quoted in England. After the failure of 
the January note, pressure was increased upon the Foreign 
Office to take some action. Punch interpreted the pre-
ferences of the investors in its "Egyptian Barometer"• 
English Annexation.--Enthusiasm, white heat. 
Anglo-French Intervention.--Delight, red hot. 
100. 
Egyptian Independence.--Approval, summer heat. 
so. 
Continental Interference.--Anger. blood heat. 
60. 






The banks filed with Downing Street their objec-
tions to the activities of the Chamber, while advice was 
offered from many quarters. One of the most persistent 
correspondents was Edward Dicey, who wrote from Cairo through 
his friend Rivers Wilson that 
a new danger is presenting itself (which I have long 
dreaded but never dared speak about), that an anti-
lBullionist~ Oct. 15, 1881, ACFB, Eg.ypt, XV, 166. 
2Punch, LXXVII (Jan. 14, 1882), 14. 
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taxpayer movement would declare itself. If that 
happens the Bondholders will come to the front 
again and pressure will be put upon the Foreign 
Governments by the creditors to interfere and 
enforce the provisions of the Law of Liquidation.l 
Dicey suggested sending in the army. and in another 
letter declared Ara.bi to be half fanatic, half knave. 2 
England was aware, from the start, that the bond-
holders would not stand idly by if yet another "final" 
arrangement were overturned. Lord Lyons wrote home in 
September of 18811 
If we let either the Egyptians or Foreign Powers 
suppose they can upset that [Law of Liquidationl, 
we shall not be able to maintain the English and 
French Controllers, and if they disappear, the 
financial prosperity will disappear with them, 
and we shall have the bon1holders, French and 
English, on our backs again.J 
Investors saw the British presence in the Nile Valley as 
a guarantee of proper administration, and even Gladstone 
recognized Britain's responsibilitiesa 
I suppose we are entitled to hold the present position 
so far as it is necessary to guarantee the pecuniary 
interests on behalf of which we have in this somewhat 
1wilson to Granville, Jan, Jl, 1882, Granville 
Papers PRO FO J0/29/168. 
2Dicey to Granville, Jan. 22. 1882• ibid. 
J0/29/1~9; Dicey to Granville, Feb. 6, 1882, ibid. 
JLyons to Granville, Sept. JO, 1881, Newton, II, 258. 
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exceptional case been acting with. 1 
Besides, as Lyons observed, the Khedive "could not con-
front the mass of enraged bondholders if he abandoned 
their interests,"2 especially if France chose to act. 
On February 19, 1882, the controllers dispatched 
a letter to the Council of Ministers in which the attri-
butes of their offices were restated for the Egyptian 
Government.J Colvin, who took an elevated view of his 
duties, was greatly disturbed over the turn events had 
taken1 
The Ministry professes to regard the Control as an 
institution existing solely in the interests of the 
holders of the bonded debt, • • • We, on the other 
hand, view the Control as intended to secure more than 
a mere guarantee for the payment from year to year of 
the interests in the bonded debt. Our business, as 
we understand it, is to do this, but also to prevent 
a possible recurrence of the difficulties4which were finally closed by the Law of Liquidation. 
Since early February, Wilson had been working on a plan 
for revising the Egyptian constitution, in order to gain 
1Gladstone to Granville, Jan, 11, 1882, Ramm, 
1876-86, I, 32), 
2Lyons to Granville, Jan. 19, 1882, Newton, II, 274. 
3Malet to Granville, Feb, 91 1882 1 PRO FOCP 
407/19, No, 267, P• 135. 
4~'1alet to Granville, Feb, 13, 1882, ~ •• No, 142, 
p. 273 (enclosure No. l). 
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security for the foreign creditors. His labors were em-
bodied in a memorandum of February 13, which formed the 
nucleus of Granville's proposals passed on for European 
consideration. 1 Arabi was master of the situation, and 
Malet soon suspected that the Porte was flirting with the 
colonels. The French Foreign Minister Freycinet presented 
modifications to Granville's plan, after which the assent 
of the interested Powers had to be obtained. 
Paris seemed to place little hope in England's 
project, and entered into a policy which gave the impres-
sion of a weakening of Anglo-French solidarity. Many dis-
quieting reports were brought to Granville's attention. 
From Cairo came rumors of contacts between French agents 
and Arabi and even stranger news that the ex-Khedive Is-
mail Pasha had gained the ear of the Quai d'Orsay. At 
the same time, Lyons reported that Freycinet was blaming 
the situation in Egypt upon Tewfik's weak character and 
suggesting his deposition in favor of Halim. 2 M. de Blig-
1Memorandum of c. Wilson, Feb. lJ, 1882, .!!?.!!!•• 
No. 126, P• 240. 
2The French overtures to Arabi are reported ina 
Cookson to Granville, March 15, 1882, PRO FOCP 407/19, 
No. 374, p. 208. For Ismail's liaison with the French, sees 
Wilson to Granville, March 18, 1882, Granville Papers PRO 
FO 30/29/170. The removal of Tewfik was mentioned ina 
Lyons to Granville, March 17, 1882, PRO FOCP 407/19, 
No. 385, P• 214. 
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nieres, who was anti-Arabist and pro-English in his 
sentiments, was recalled in mid-March and replaced by 
Bridif. This move was part of a general program to 
eliminate dissension in the French camp in order to give 
their agent Sienkiewicz a stronger hand. 1 The English 
Foreign Secretary found hazards on every side, and because 
he did "not trust Freycinet much, ••2 his ally, unbending 
in outward diplomacy toward Arabi, afforded scanty comfort. 
As April advanced, Downing Street became increasingly 
anti-Arabist, and stronger measures were contemplated.J The 
Powers had agreed to the proposed modifications of the Egyp-
tian constitution, but although the Chamber of Notables was 
left with considerable influence, the time for compromise 
had slipped past. By May Tewfik undoubtedly had decided 
that his only hope of weathering the future lay in following 
the advice of the British agent. 
On May 11, Granville stated his willingness that 
England join with France in a naval demonstration, which 
1Lyons to Granville, March 15 1 1882, PRO FOCP 
407/19, No. 377, P• 209. 
2Granville to Malet, March 17, 1882, Granville 
Papers PRO FO J0/29/199 {copy). 
JThe English envoy to Paris proposed a naval de-
monstration as early as mid-.A.Pril (Lyons to Granville• 
April lJ, 1882, PRO FOCP 407/20, No. J4, P• 2J). 
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was undertaken with W!alet•s concurrence. 1 On the following 
day, Paris reluctantly agreed to allow Turkish troops to 
be used in Egypt, should the need arise, which served as 
a rejuvenating tonic to Lord Granville. 2 London decided 
to call upon the Sultan•s troops, but was shocked when 
the Quai d'Orsay executed a volte face,3 Dilke was quite 
unhappy that "the French completely sold us, and we once 
more realized the fact that they are not pleasant people 
to go tiger-hunting with,"4 
The arrival of the ships at Alexandria, in conjunc-
tion with firmness on the part of the Khedive who was sup-
ported by the British and French agents, brought the tem-
porary resignation of the Egyptian ministers on May 27,5 
Arabi declared the Sultan his only suzerain, 6 whereupon the 
Viceroy, rapidly losing control, formally requested the 
1Granville to Lyons, May ll, 1882, PRO FOCP 407/~o, 
No, 170, P• 85t Granville to Queen Victoria, May 12, 1882, 
Buckle, II, 294, 
2Gwynn and Tuckwell, I, 457. 
)Lyons to Granville, May 19, 1882, PRO FOCP 407/20, 
No, J66, PP• 162-63, 
4Gwynn and Tuekwell, I, 458, 
5Malet to Granville, May 27, 1882, PRO FOCP 407/20, 
No, 538, P• 2)6, 
6Malet to Granville, May 27, 1882, !12.!!!•• No. 575, 
p. 241. 
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Turkish mission, which was dispatched on June J. By the 
end of May, Tenterden, Northbrook, and Dilke had joined 
Hardington and others in desiring strong action, without 
France if neeessary. 1 Granville, who had always striven 
for compromise and strongly opposed occupation, was now 
beginning to place his hopes in a European conferenee. 2 
Panic reigned among Westerners in Egypt upon the 
return of Arabi to power,J Govemraent had ground to a 
halt and economic chaos spread as lending institutions 
ceased operations. 4 The Turkish commissioners proved 
useless, expending energy on spying upon one another and 
coquetting with both sides rather than aiding in a settle-
ment.5 England found herself being isolated as the Italian, 
Austro-Hungarian, and German consuls turned their support 
to Arabi, and even the French were not averse to dealing 
with him in a sub rosa fashion. 6 In one of his last 
1 Atkins, p • .357. 
2aranville to Gladstone, May 29, 1882, Ramm, 18~6-86, 
I, J75s Granville to Lyons, May .)0, 1882, .PRO FOCP 407/ O, 
No. 678, P• 273. 
JMalet to Granville, May 31 1 1882, !.121!!•• No. 705, 
P• 282. 
P• 74. 
4Malet to Granville, May 2, 1882, ibid,, No, 147, 
5For an account of this mission, see Wallace 
(pp. 85-86). 
6Roberts, "Italy," p • .3221 Knaplund, p. 181. 
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dispatches from Egypt, Malet observed that in his opinion 
French and British policy had come to a dividing point in 
the road. 1 
As the Egyptian situation grew increasingly chaotic, 
all those with a vested interest in the area came forward 
to urge some course of positive action which would re-estab-
lish tranquility and prosperity. Shippers, bankers, capi-
talists, imperialists, and Anglo-Egyptian officials all 
found common ground upon which to stand. Bondholders, 
naturally enough, .formed an important element as well, but 
they were not the major component in this combination. Their 
cause was more palatable to the E:nglish public when it was 
heavily seasoned with the rhetoric of imperial defense 
and the paramountcy of British trade. 
Egyptian stocks, although having recovered somewhat 
by March, 1882, from the effects of the Paris crash of 
January, again began to decline. The Bondholders Register 
advised its readers in early Maya 
Under the existing uncertain conditions no person 
ought to hold Egyptian Bonds who is not prepared to 
. 
1Malet to Granville, June lC, 1882, PRO FOCP 
407/20, No. 872, p, J44. Malet wrot• that after moving 
from Cairo to Alexandria in early June, he fell seriously 
ill, 2'?ld was removed to Italy (Sir Edward B. Malet, Shifti~ 
Scenes1 or Memories of Man Men in Man Lands fLondon1 Jo 
Murray, 9 , p. o • He later ascr be h s i!lness to 
a "c~p of coffee." 
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view with equanimity the possibility of a sharp 
fall in their market value,l 
The banks, being the largest holders, were the most dis-
satisfied. On May 26, the Anglo-F.gyptian announced a loss 
of £41,000 on its holdings for the half-year, while a 
shareholder of the Bank of Egypt, which also suffered, 
took the opportunity at its August meeting to place the 
blame for the Egyptian difficulties on Lord Granville's 
procrastination. 2 By the end of May many bondholders would 
have agreed with the City man who remarked to the editor 
of the Pall Mall Gazette, "what we want is 'unifieds' 
at so ... 3 
The holders felt that if the Government insisted on 
the fulfillment of the stipulations of the Law of Liquida· 
tion and supported the European officials, all might be 
saved. The English Foreign Secretary had indeed been 
trying to maintain the Control and throughout the spring 
was engaged in defending the British position in the Egyp-
tian Custom Service from the assaults of Arabi. 4 But as 
1Bondholders Register, May 9, 1882, ACFB, Egypt, 
XVI, 149, . 
2Money Market Review, XLIV (June J, 1882), 8491 
ibid,, XLV (Aug, 12, 1982), 259. 
)Francis w. Hirst, Early Life and Letters of John 
Morley (Londona Macmillan and Co •• Ltd,, 1927). II, 115. 
4Malet to Granville, March JO. 1882. PRO FOCP 
407/20, No. 21 1 P• lJ. 
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the colonels became more daring, and Granville's dip-
lomatic efforts met with defeat, it was debated how far 
England was prepared to retreat, Europeans in Egypt called 
for support, 1 and the French investors, who had reduced 
their holdings in Egyptian securities, were reasonably 
modest in their protestations. As Wilson later observed1 
I must • • • point out that the interest of the French 
public in Egyptian Finance (e.g. as creditors of Egypt) 
which was very great and very powerful in 1876 when the 
Caisse de la Datte was established, has been immensely 
reduced,2 
The Liberals had no desire to champion the cause of 
the foreign creditors of Egypt, If the bondholders and 
the Cairo Government could settle their difficulties with-
out drawing in any Power, including London, and if the 
entente with Paris could be maintained, the Prime Minister 
would be well satisfied,3 Lord Granville strove for a 
compromise although admitting that a tour de force might 
be necessary at any moment.4 As has been indicated, the 
British Cabinet became less sympathetic towards Egyptian 
1Malet to Granville, Feb. 13 1 1882, Granville Papers 
PRO FO J0/29/160, 
2wilson to Granville, Nov. 5, 1882, ~·• 30/29/170, 
JRobinson and Gallagher, PP• lOJ-104, 
4Granville to Dicey, March 18, 1882, Grenville Papers 
PRO PO 30/29/149 (copy), 
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nationalism. In early February, Hardington, Harcourt, 
and a few others were willing to support a strong policy 
in Egypt, 1 and their number grew as Arabi's moderate 
guise evaporated. To avoid criticism, Granville kept 
discussions of Egypt to a minimum, which at last drew 
an irritated response from Hardington, the Secretary for 
India, on May 27r 
I wonder if any human being (out of Downing Street) 
would believe that not a word has been said in the 
Cabinet about Egypt for a fortnight, and I suppose 
will not be for another week--if then.2 
Granville's Egyptian experts generally held decided-
ly negative views on the Arabist movement, which colored 
their counsel. Wilson, for instance, provided the Foreign 
Secretary with information from his many financial connec-
tions, while personally viewing Arabi as a doubtful patriot 
and a disturber of the peace.3 In Egypt, Colvin was hostile 
to Arabi, a fact which Blunt later considered one of the 
prime causes for the British occupation.4 Even Malet. who 
had written early in the year, "I own to have a repugnance 
1Robinson and Gallagher, P• 100. 
2Hardington to Granville, May 27, 1882, Granville 
Papers PRO FO 30/29/132. 
3w11son to Sanderson (Granville's Private Secre-
tary), March 28, 1882, .ill.S,. J0/29/170. 
4Blunt, Secret Histo;:y, pp. 151-52. 
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to a war engaged on behalf of bondholders,"1 by May was 
agre:eable to the arrival of the fleet and the employment 
of Turkish troops. 
The letter-writing campaign to Downing Street, 
begun in early January. gained intensity, with numerous 
appraisals of the situation being proffered. Sir Samuel 
Baker, a steadfast Egyptian bondholder~ believed that 
Halim was behind the disturbances and advised that steps 
"should be taken without a day's delay to nip in the bud 
the pretensions of Arabi Bey before he should become the 
dictator of Egypt."J In May, Baker called for the punish-
ment of Arabi, and in early June, for the separation of 
Egypt from Turkey.4 Goschen expressed his fear that the 
ex-Khedive might somehow be reinstated,5 while the Roth-
schilds were confident that, whatever might come, some 
intervention in Egypt was inevitable. 6 
Papers 
1Malet to Granville, Jan. 11 1 1882, PRO FOCP 
No. 77, P• 41. 
2Murray and White, P• 264. 
;Baker to Granville, Feb. 10, 1882, Granville 
PRO FO J0/29/148. 
4Baker to Granville, May 181 and June 2, 1882, ibid. 
SGoschen to Granville, Feb. 16. 1882, ~· J0/29/510. 
6The Rothschild comment was sent to Francis Rowsell 
by cypher, and was communicated to the Foreign Office in a 
latter from Malet to Granville, Jan. 18, 1882 (Granville 
Papers PRO FO J0/29/160). 
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Dicey, in Egypt, repeated the theme that the 
threads of power in the new movement were being manipulated 
by persons abroad, and that Arabi was bent upon destroying 
the institutions which England had created since 1876. 1 
Richard Milnes, Baron Houghton (father-in-law of Gerald 
Fitzgerald, the head of the Egyptian Accounting Office) 
and one of the founders of the Royal Colonial Society, 2 
wrote. to Lord Granville advising the strengthening of 
the Control.J Members of Parliament also expressed their 
view in this period. Sir John Pender, M,P., who was deeply 
concerned in Middle Eastern affairs, passed on gloomy re-
ports to the Foreign Secretary, H. v. Stuart, M.P,, who 
fought the pro-Arabists in the press, likewise kept 
Downi.ng Street informed as to his viewss and E. Heneage, 
M.P., wrote Lord Granvillea 
I hold very strong views on the necessity of England 
remaining paramou.~t in Egypt. • • • and of our4duty to try and settle the land and debt questions. 
1Dicez to Granville, Feb, 27, 1882, Granville Papers 
PRO FO J0/29/!49r Wilson to Granville, March 13, 1882, 
ibid. 30/29/180, (enclosure). . 
2The Times, June 29, 1869, P• 5 • 
.)Houghton to Granville, Feb, 21, 1882, Granville 
Papers PRO FO 30/29/150. 
4Pender to Granville, Feb. 4, 1882, jiiJ• 30/29/152, 
Stuart to Gra.~ville, April 1, 1882, ibid. JO 9 1631 Heneage 
to Granville, June 2, 1882, ~. J072'97150, 
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The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, which had 
refrained from any action on the Egyptian matter, made 
its views known at the Foreign Office. Since Granville 
had assumed his office, Downing Street had been helpful 
to the Council in various ways, 1 Moorgate Street was kept 
abreast of developments in the Levant by its agent Captain 
Stab, and by General Goldsmid, who served as a commissioner 
of the Daira. 2 In March the chairman of the Council wrote 
to Granville, saying that the Sultan stood behind the so-
called nationalists in Cairo, and submitted a letter from 
Captain Stab which read in parts 
The choice of leaders for the movement was made 
in preference among the Arabs for a twofold reason. 
first not to awaken any suspicion among certain 
classes of the population--that the 'mot d'ordre' 
was given at Constantinople but principally to 
make it appear in the eyes of Europe that the 
movement was spontaneous and national,J 
The scheme had so far succeeded because of hopes, nurtured 
in Egypt, that its financial burdens might be lifted, as 
Captain Stab continueda 
1such assistance took the shape, for example, of 
letters of introduction (Bouverie to Granville, June 28, 
1882, ibid. J0/29/148), 
2corp For. Bondh, Rep., 1882, p. 8, The British 
Foreign Secretary also employed General Goldsmid as an 
agent (Granville to Childers (secretaryforWarJ, Sept, 24, 
1881, Granville Papers PRO FO J0/29/118). 
3Bouverie to Granville, March 11, 1882, ~· 
30/29/148. 
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I now come to the pith of the plot which is the 
foreign Debt. Regarding this question the pro-
moters prove to the national party that what was 
done in Turkey might be done in F.gypt, whose inter-
national agreements concerning the Debt are no more 
binding than the Berlin protocol was to Turkey.l 
As Bouverie later said, all the talk of Egyptian rights 
and national aspiration did not contradict the fact that 
the colonels had intended to sieze control of the finances 
of the country. 2 
The bondholders found in the press an unaccustomed 
though welcome ally. Anarchy was a live issue in England 
after the Phoenix Park murders in Ireland, and there seems 
to have been some transference to the Egyptian situation. 
Pro- and anti-Arabists utilized the journals to sway 
opinion, but the attitudes of the papers were biased against 
the Egyptian nationals for a number of reasons, not least 
of all the personal motives of newspaper men. 
Dwarfing all competition among English papers in 
1882 was the powerful Times of LondonJ which wielded great 
1Ibid. 
2Money Market Review, XLVI (March J, l88J). 357-58. 
3Hatton, p. 75. The estimated earnings of the 
major dailies in 1882 werea The Times of Loudon, £1,000,000s 
Daily Telegraph, e120,ooos standard, £g6,ooo, Dai].y News, 
ejo,ooo. 
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influence among both the European and the native popu-
lations of Egypt. 1 The editor of the "Thunderer" in 
this period was Thomas Chenery, an Arabic scholar, who 
was supposedly a holder of Egyptian bonds. 2 At the time 
of the September rising of 1881, Chener;y felt that despite 
the objections to evsry course of action, some policy must 
emerge, and should there be procrastination, the Dicey 
view--in favor of British annexation of Egypt--would grow 
in popularity.3 
From 1873 to 1882, Sir John Scott, the English 
representative to the International Court of Appeals, 
served as Egyptian correspondent for The Times. He was 
generally on good terms with Baring and others, and believed 
that British annexation of the Nile Valley would be best for 
all concerned.4 Scott was replaced in the spring of 1882 
by Charles Bell, who had worked in Alexandria as an agent 
for both merchants and insurance fir.ns since 1875. Blunt 
1Malet to Granville, Oct. 22, 1881, PRO FOCP 
407/18, No. 247, P• 137• 
2wilfred s. Blunt, Mr, Blunt and The Times (London1 Chiswick Press, 1907, p. 5. Chenery was a 
professor of Arabic at Oxford in 1868, and was the honor-
ary Secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society (Hatton. pp. 
8J-84). 
3chenery to Granville, Sept. 17, 1881, Granville 
Papers PRO PO J0/29/15). 
4scott to Lascelles, July 4, 1879, Lasoelles 
Papers PRO FO 800/4. 
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thought him the representative of the monied interests, 
and, in fact, The Times reporter was opposed to Arabi. 1 
His stories were not always appreciateds Mr. Cartwright, 
who replaced Malet, wrotea "We live in daily fear of the 
extravagan·t accounts which Bell, The Times correspondent• 
sends."2 In September of 1881 the paper recommended cir• 
cumspection,J but by May its attitude had altered1 
If Egypt is not reorganised with a regard to our 
interests, it will assuredly be so moulded4as to promote interests antagonistic to ours. 
The Daily Telegraph and the Standard, the largest 
Conservative papers, were both jingoist in outlook.5 The 
owner of the former was Edwin Arnold, another Orientalist, 
who had served as a school principal in India. He joined 
the newspaper in 1861 and brought with him a firm belief 
in the maintenance of British power in the East~6 In nor-
mal times the Telegraph received its Egyptian intelligence 
from Reuter•s in Alexandria, an agency whose reports did 
not always inspire full confidence.7 The representative 
1Blunt, Mr, Blunt and The Times, p. 6, Bell, P• 56. 
2cartwright to Sander~on, July 27, 1882, Granville 
Papers PRO FO 30729/161. 
3chenery to Granville, Sept. lO, 1881, ~. 
4The Times, May 15, 1882, quoted in Rothstein, p. 194. 
5Hatton, P• 161, 6 ~·• P• llJ, 
?Edward Vizetelly, From cJprus to Zanzibar b~ the 
tian Delta1 the Adventures o a Journalist (Lon ona 
Ar hur Pearson, 9 , Also, see be ow, p. 419, 
n. J. 
418 
for the Standard in Egypt was Albert Evans, the manager 
of the Oriental Telephone Company in Alexandria and an 
aspirant to a goveIT>.ment post with the Control.1 His 
paper supported strong action in Egypt beginning with 
the joint note of January1 
For ourselves, we can see no reason why the two 
Powers who as a matte~ of fact direct the policy 
of Egypt shoutd not give public notice of their 
intention to maintain their influence and to 2 support the Khedive so long as he submits to it. 
The largest of the Liberal papers was the Daily 
News, with two of its three proprietors involved in Egyp-
tian finance.J The jouIT>.al withheld an attack upon the 
Egyptian nationalists until the new constitution was 
issued, then called for Downing Street to fortnulate a 
policy independent of France in case that country's leaders 
should be struck with indecision. 4 Reporting for the 
!':!.!!!.!. were Hilary Skinner, who sought office on the Inter-
national Tribunal, and J. C, Chapman, the agent for the 
l~ •• P• 66. 
2standard, Jan. 17, 1882, ACFB, Eg.Ypt, xv, 232. 
3Henry Oppenheim was still interested in investing 
in Egyptian projects, possessing JOO shares in the Land 
and Mortgage Company of Egypt (BT 31/14647/13996), and 
Labouchere was a substantial bondholder also. 
4Daily News, Feb. 2, 1882, ACFB, Egypt, XVI, 1. 
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Peninsular and Oriental Steamship Company.1 The latter 
was also a representative for the Cridit Foncier of Egypt 
and a holder in the Land and Mortgage Company of Egypt. 2 
Once again, those on the scene accused the press of exag-
geration. In May the Foreign Secretary was told that, 
should a catastrophe occur in Egypt, it would be princi-
pally the fault of the news agencies and the Daily News.J 
The Pall Mal,l Gazette, which had changed hands, 
was a Liberal journal by 1882. Nonetheless, even here 
there was an unwillingness to allow British interests 
to be neglected in the Nile Valley. Its editor, John 
Morley, wrote in Januarya 
If Dizzy had had any pluck, he would have turned 
the French out of Egypt, and it is a great pity 
that it cannot be done now.4 
In February of 1882, the paper obtained the services of 
Auckland Colvin as their Egyptian correspondent. The 
1vizetelly, P• 66. 
2Land and MOrt$age Company of Egypt, Share list 
for 1881, BT Jl/14647/13996. 
JPender to Granville, May 12, 1882, Granville 
Papers PRO FO J0/29/152. Both the French and the British 
news agencies, Havas and Reuter, respectively, were accused 
of receiving a £1,000 annual subvention from the Control 
(Blunt, Secret ~sto~, P• 134). In a Cromer memorandum 
of 1891.1-, there s menion of such a sum having been paid 
to Havas, but nothing conclusive can be proven (Atkins, 
P• 332). 
4Morley to Chamberlain, Jan. 19, 1882, Chamberlain 
Papers. 5/54/439, quoted in Atkins, p. 337. 
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Morning Post, whose City editor, Charles G. Warren, owned 
stock in the Oriental Telephone Company, 1 wrote approvingly 
of Britain and France "affirming their rights of interfer-
ence in order to guard the interests of the bondholders, 
and share holders of the Suez Canal."2 Mr. Labouchere, 
owner and chief contributor to Truth (and a proprietor of 
the Daily News), urged the purchase of F.gyptian securities, 
and as a member of Parliament 'strongly supported the use of 
force in Egypt by the Government.3 Finally, in the finan-
cial press there was general agitation for actions one 
spokesman for intervention was the Bu1lionist. 4 
On June 11, 1882, a riot broke out in Alexandria 
and before the day was done, fifty Europeans were dead.5 
10riental Telephone Company, Share List, BT 
31/2748/14922. 
2Morn!ng Post, April 6, 1882, ACFB, Egypt, XVI, 116. 
JThorold, P• 196. For Labouchere•s views, see 
Truth, Feb. 16, 1882 (ACFB, Egypt, XVI, 35). 
4Bullion1st! March 18, and May 13, 1882, ibid., 
89 and 152, respect vely. · ---
5This figure was given at the time, and has been 
cited in most works on the subject. However, a newspaper 
reporter of the time estimated the death toll at 200 (Frank Scudamore, A Sheaf of Memories [Londona T. Fischer 
Unwin, Ltd., 1925], P• g2), 
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The London Cabinet was convinced that Arabi was responsible 
for this massacre and had now revealed his true oolors. 1 
Everywhere the hawks were on the wing, and as tempers rose, 
English citizens were speedily evacuated from Egypt. 2 
Many ministers desired action, although few wished to be 
tagged as bondholders• men. Unlike Dilke and Chamberlain, 
however, Hardington did not mind supporting the re-institu-
tion of bondholder control over Egyptian finance, yet the 
Suez Canal was of even higher priority to him.J The Secre-
tary for India. thoroughly annoyed with Paris, was the only 
minister prepared for unilateral intervention in Egypt, and 
urged a stiffer attitude toward the Porte .• 4 It was impos-
sible to hold the Prime Minister's attention upon Egypt for 
very long with the Irish question once again before the 
House, and there was talk within the Cabinet of a break-up,5 
1Robinson and Gallagher, P• 107. In time some with-
in the Government! such as Dilke, were to change their 
opinion upon Arab •s culpability in this affair (Gwynn and 
Tuckwell, I, 460). 
2riJJaJ.et to Granville, June 21, 1882, PRO FOCP 
407/20, No. 1334, P• 515. By this date, only 100 English-
men remained in Egypt outside of Port Said. 
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In the days previous to the bombardment of Alexandria, 
Hardington was as important as the Foreign Secretary in 
policy-making, for he and Northbrook (the First Lord of 
the Admiralty) worked behind the scene to prepare for 
any eventualities,1 An informal committee within the 
Government, including Granville, Hardington, Childers 
(Secretary for War), and northbrook, was established to 
act for the entire Cabinet, 
Gladstone and Granville still placed hope in the 
conference which opened in Constantinople on June 2J, On 
the twenty-first, the Cabinet decided that if the confer-
ence could not obtain a Turkish intervention, concerted 
action by Europe should be taken to pacify Egypt, 2 Assis-
tance from the conference, however, was not forthcoming. 
The Triple Alliance was meddling in Egyptian affairs at 
the Porte, and in Alexa...~d~ia the British agent had received 
hints from his German and Auatrian colleagues that he should 
depart with the fleet in order to avoid trouble,3 As for 
1Robinson and Gallagher, P• 106, Hardington alerted 
the troops in India without informing the Cabinet generally (Gwynn and Tuckwell, I, 46J). 
2Gladstone memorandum, June 21, 1882, Ramm, 
1876-86, r. 3a1. 
JDufferin to Granville, June 19, 1882 1 PRO FOCP 407/20, No. 1257, P• 486, Ma.let to Granville, June 14, 
1882, ibid,, No. 98), P• J82, 
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France, it appeared by early July that she was prepared 
to arrange some modus vive.ndi with Arabi. 1 
Fear lest the Suez Canal be damaged was certainly 
an important factor which aroused both the Government and 
the public. Still, concern over other matters such as 
trade was also voieed, 2 in Parliament, Chamberlain pointed 
out the necessity for protecting British trading interests, 
and many on hand were in agreement.3 Cross and Bright, 
M.P's who possessed large holdings in the Commercial Bank 
of Alexandria, urged upon Downing Street the protection of 
British property in Egypt. 4 Mr. J. Slagg, M.P. for Man-
chester, told the House how a delegation of his constituents 
had met with him and had asked for Government help in the 
1Lord Charles Beresford, former M.P. and commander 
of a gunboat in Alexandria, reported that French visits with 
Arabi had become a daily occurrence before the occupation (Beresford to Granville, Sept. 26, 1882, Granville Papers 
PRO FO 30/29/148). 
2Blunt, Segret ftstory, P• 255. This author suggested 
that poor economic eond~ions of the period were an important 
cause in the British occupation of Egypt• 
3Hansard, Vol. 272 1 July 26, 1882, col. 1801. 
4Dilke to Ma.let, June 13 1 1882, PRO FO 78/3462. In this case, as in that of the Cotton Pressing Company of 
Alexandria, requests for special protection for British 
property were passed on to the British agent in Egypt 
(Granville to Cartwright, Jl.ll'le 29 1 1882, PRO FOCP-407/20, 
No. 1563, P• 626). 
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present difficulties in Egypt. 1 The mills of Bolton had 
stockpiles of Egyptian cotton to last until October, but a 
week after the massacre of June 11, prices rose .75d. a 
pound. 2 Then, too, there was the destruction already 
done in Egypt, about which the Earl of Fife wished clari-
fication. 3 Upon this point the Foreign Secretary had 
decided that Egypt would bear all costs, for as he wroter 
"We shall require full reparation and satisfaction for 
the outrages committed during the recent disorders."4 
The bondholders, too, were in a most unpleasant 
position, and despite extensive purchases a panic gripped 
the Exchange, driving Egyptian securities down sharply. 
The payment of future coupons was doubtful and the weak 
holders, those who had borrowed to purchase, were being 
wiped out.5 There were many failures, with dealers in 
"Egyptians" placed under intense pressure. 6 All Egyptian 
1Hansard, Vol. 270, June 15, 1882, col. 1255· 
2Daily News, June 20, 1882, ACFB, EgYpt, XVI, 166. 
J ' Hansard, Vol. 271, June 2J, 1882, col. 185, 
4Granville to Malet, June 171 1882, PRO FOCP 407/20, 
No. 1145, P• 440. 
5Daily News, June 21, 1882, ACFB, .§gypt, XVI, 167. 
6For a list of the dealers in Egyptian securities, 
see the Statist, VII (May 28, 1881), 92-9J. 
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bonds including the tribute issues were affecteds on 
Monday, June 19, there was an eight-point drop in the 
"unifieds," and by week's end two jobbers had declared 
bankruptcy. 1 Since the uprising of September, the value 
of Egyptian investments had dropped 25 per cent, the 
largest decline occurring in June. 2 
For those institutions which could afford to clear 
Egyptian securities from their portfolios, the experience 
of June, 1882, was not wasted.J The largest holders, the 
banks, were paralyzed by the chaos and suspended payment 
of interest to their stockholders. They, like other or-
ganizations with investments in Egypt, did have members 
in the House who could speak on their behalf,4 Although 
the Leader of the Opposition in Commons was under pressure 
from his party to prod the Government with unpleasant 
1 ~·• IX (June, 24, 1882), 698. 
2Economist, XL (June 24, 1882), 77;. Despite an 
improvement In the situation by June 2J, Egyptian in-
vestments had declined collectively £23 1 041 1 000 in value 
since September 1, 1881. 
JFor example, the Poreign and Colonial Trust Fund 
sold off £6,350 in tribute loan of 18.54 £56,000 in 
"unifieds,_" £50,000 in tribute loan of !8711 ang £40,500 in ~ira ;:>anie.h stock (Bankers Magazine, XLIII LFeb., 
188jj. 202). 
4Atkins (p. 405) estimates that there were thirty-
two in Parliament who were in some way connected with 
Egyptian finance. 
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questions, he refused to do so on patriotic grounds. 1 
But those who had capital in the Nile Valley had no 
such scruples. The Economist wrote1 
To the City and to businessmen, the matter presents 
itself under an aspect not uncoloured by the in-
terests of trade, To them the question is rather of 
the prices of Egyptian securities, of rumours of 
possible embarrassments connected with the hurried 
closing of transactions in that country, of alarms 
about the unprotected condition of the canal. The 
eUlbarrassing the Government by putting in both 
Houses questions which never should be asked, and 
to which no reply2should be given, is most strongly to be deprecated. 
Of those who spoke for the bondholders, none had more 
weight than Goschen, who came out strongly in favor of 
the employment of troops in Egypt, despite the loss of 
political influence this friend~hip cost him among his 
erstwhile Liberal colleagues,3 Gladstone, who disliked 
Capel Court, surprised many investors and sent "unifieds" 
climbing 3.5 points when he told Parliament• 
1Northcote to Childers, July 4, 1882. Edmund Spencer 
Childers, The Life and Corres~ondence of the Right Hon. 
Hugh C, E, Childers, 1821-1§2 {Londont John Murray, l90l}, 
II, 90. 
2Eeonom&st, XL (June 24, 1882), 770. 
JHansard, Vol. 272, July 25, 1882, cols, 1872-1889. 
Chamberlain had expressed his unwillingness, in early July, 
to serve in the same Cabinet with Goschen (Garvin, I, 449). 
In September of 1882, Granville mentioned Gosehen as the 
best man to be sent to Egypt to assess the situation, but 
his bondholders "flavour" was a major objection (Granville 
to Gladstone, Sept, 21, 1882, Ramm, 1876-86, I, 427). 
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The ends we have in view • • • are well known to 
consist in the general maintenance of all estab-
lished rights in Egypt, whether they be those of 
the Sultan, those of the Khedive, those of the 
people of Egypt. or those of the foreign bond-
holders. 
The pro- and anti-interventionists swung into 
action, each side striving to drum up support in the 
public. The press remained jingoist in sympathy, and 
even the fall Mall Gazette and the EconopU,st (both ex-
tremely Liberal in outlook) found themselves in support 
of Ara.bi's removai. 2 
An anti-bondholder element was predominant in those 
organizations which opposed British involvement in Egypt. 
The International Arbitration and Peace Association, for 
example, sent Granville a memorandum in which they argued 
that the only valid interest England had in Egypt was the 
Suez Canal, which was not endangered.J An ad hoe group 
led by dissident Liberal M.P.'s set into motion the Anti-
Aggression League, which circulated a petition in which 
Gladstone's statement on the rights of the bondholders 
was sharply criticized.4 The League held a meeting with 
Wilfred Lawson, M,P., in the chair, flanked by eight of 
1Gwynn and Tuckwell, I, 460, 
2Pall Mall Gazette, June 15, 1882, p. St Economist. 
XL (July l, 1882), SOl. 
JThe Times, July 1, 1882, p. 10. 
4 ~ •• June 19, 1882, p. a. 
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his confreres from the House.1 
Finally, some of the most strident criticism came 
from the rJevvcastle Foreign Affairs Association, chaired 
by George Crawshay, an investor in Turkish scrip. In a 
circular of June, 1882, the gentlemen of the Newcastle 
group blamed the joint note of January, and British in-
volvement generally, upon the Egyptian bondholders. These 
observations sprang perhaps just as much from jealousy as 
from a concern for England's national interest, for as the 
circular stated, "the Egyptian bondholders should have been 
left to take care of themselves as the Turkish Bondholders 
were."2 The group•s efforts were focused upon the cir-
culation of petitions calling for the withdrawal of the 
fleet at Alexandria and the commencement of amicable dis-
cussions with the Sultan. 
The British people, however, were in an aggressive 
mood. The meeting of the Patriotic Society on July 8 drew 
a throng which was treated to an oratorical display by a 
platform crowded with peers and M,P.'s, including Robert 
Fowler, a member of the •council' of the Corporation of 
Foreign Bondholders. The Government was called upon to 
pursue a responsible and independent policy in the East 
ation, 
1 ~ •• June 
2circular of 
ACFB, Egypt, 
27, 1882, p. 10. 
f 
the Newcastle Foreign Affairs Associ-
XVI, 170 (enclosure), 
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and to protect the property of Englisrunen.1 
The chairman of the Council of Foreign Bondholders 
was not idle in advancing the cause of the Egyptian bond-
holders, A large non-partisan assembly was arranged to 
be held at Willie's Rooms "to invite the Government to 
adopt at once those strong and vigorous measures to which 
they have indeed already pledged themselves."2 In fact, 
the gathering was mainly a Conservative affair, and drew 
such dignitaries as Lord Salisbury and Sir Stafford North-
cote, Presiding over the event was E, P. Bouverie, sharing 
the rostrum on the evening of June 29 were many who had a 
financial stake in Egypta the Duke of Sutherland, Mr. 
Easton, Sir George Elliot, as well as fourteen others 
from Westminster, and an array of aristocrats, Bouverie 
opened the proceedings by stating that the importance 
of' the present issue was such that "the prosperity, the 
greatness, and, perhaps, the very existence" of the country 
were threatened,J He touched on England's interest, in-
cluding the Canal, and the administration which had been 
so carefully constructed, and added that the Government 
1The Times, July 10, 1882, p, 10, 
2!sh.2.1 June 27, 1882, ACFB, Egypt, XVI, 172, 
JAn account of the meeting may be :'ound in 
The Times, June JO, 1882, p. 8, 
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was like a "jellyfish" without a backbone. He completed 
his remarks by calling on the Libera.ls to act in the 
spirit of Palmerston and not bet:ray British imperial 
interests. Sir Richard Temple also addressed the 
meeting, and statedc 
We had £Js,ooo,ooo invested in thriving industries 
in Egypt, and we were bound to protect those who 
had made their investments in reliance upon the 
protection of the British Government,l 
Easton also stressed the investments by Britishers as 
well as the importance of the Nile Valley to the home 
cotton mills. EV'en Northcote in his speech acknowledged 
the plight of the numerous Englishmen who had placed 
capital in Egypt. 
Perhaps the hall had been packed, as was charged, 
since the tickets were distributed by the Duke of Suther-
lands still, the conclave served the Conservative ends 
while it gave the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders an 
opportunity to demonstrate their support of the holders. 
Thus, in the general agitation for intervention .the 
Council played its part. 
Events moved quickly in early July. Admiral Seymour, 
who commanded the British squadron at Alexandria. became 
disturbed over the construction of earthworks and the im-
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placement of' shore batteries which he claimed endangered 
his vessels. His request f'or permission to present an 
ultimatum to have these objects removed initiated heated 
Cabinet discussions. When Paris was questioned as to their 
attitude toward a bombardment, they replied that the French 
Chamber probably would not sanction such a step, and the 
French f'leet departed f'or Port Said. British troop strength 
in the Mediterranean was augmented and Dilke secretly in-
f'ormed Tewf'ik of these preparations so that the Khedive 
might take appropriate action.1 By July 7 the Cabinet 
had decided to run the risk of damage to the Canal, and 
to allow the bombardment, and, if necessary, a military 
expedition. 2 This decision has been described as a 
"compromise between cross purposes•"J since the ministers 
supporting the ultimatum did so for different reasons. 
The Radicals, for example, supported the invasion in part 
on the grounds that the f ellaheen would be freed from the 
foreign creditors, a position which was later to create 
problems after the collapse of Ara.bi, The Prime Minister 
submitted to the wishes of the Cabinet, whereupon Seymour 
was given permission to present the ultimatum. The 
1Gwynn and Tuokwell, I, 466. 
2Robinson and Gallagher, pp, 110-13. This para-
graph is drawn from the cited pages. 
3 . Ibid,• P• 111. 
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Admiral, however, went beyond these orders and demanded 
the surrender of the forts guarding the harbor. The 
British Government did nothing to contradict him, and 
on July 11 the English flotilla destroyed the defensive 
installations, and marines were sent ashore to secure 
the city. 
This operation did not intimidate Arabi and his 
followers, but rather aroused Egypt against all Europeans. 
Arabi declared a holy war on the foreigners and menaced 
their lifeline to the East by diverting salt water into 
the Sweetwater Canal. The British Cabinet was again i:n. 
turmoil as to what to do. Attempts to obtain a formal 
mandate from the Conference to restore order were not 
successful. Hardington, who still led "the forward 
party," told the Foreign Seeretary that England must 
act, alone if necessary.1 No one in the Government de-
sired a protectorate over Egypt, nor did they know how 
long an occupation might last, but on July 20 it was 
decided to place Sir Garnet Wolseley at the head of an 
expeditionary force, and to ask Parliament for £2,300,000 
to finance the expedition. On July 13, Freycinet had 
agreed to join with England for the protection of the 
1Hardington to Granville, July 18, 1882, Granville 
Papers PRO FO 30/29/132. 
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Canal, which greatly comforted Downing Street.1 The 
French Chamber, however, was not willing to grant the 
needed credits and, ignoring Gambetta•s plea to work 
with London, voted down the authorization on July 29. 2 · 
France did not react negatively to Britain's restoration 
of order,3 and only with the autumn did Paris begin to 
press London as to its future plans in the Nilotic. 
England sounded Italy as to her joining in the Egyptian 
campaign, but Rome declined, believing it would be better 
to work within the Conference at Constantinople.4 The 
Italiari response greatly relieved Lord Granville a 
I ha.ve just received from Menabrea the refusal, 
which delights me. We have done the right thingr 
we have shown our readiness to admit others.5 
The debate in Commons on the military bill was 
led by the Prime Minister, who after the bombardment was 
in a fighting mood. 6 Throughout the deb•tes the M.P.'s 
1Rob1nson and Gallagher, P• 113. 
2J. P. T. Bury, "Gambetta and England," in studies 
in ~o-French Historx Dur~ the E;ahteenth, Nineteenth 
and entreth Centuries, ed. y ll?re bovl11e and Harold 
Temperley (Cambr!dges Xt the University Press, 1935), 
PP• 122-23, 
3cromer, I, 302. 
4Roberts, "Italy," P• 326. 
SGranville to Paget (British Ambassador to Rome), 
July 28, 1882, Fitzmaurice, II, 271. 
6Gwynn and Tuokwell, I, 468. 
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shied away from specifying exactly what English interests 
were being served by the invasion. Gladstone believed 
the bondholders had rights, covered by the Law of Liquida-
tion, which England could not unilaterally disregard.1 
In no way did the Radicals wish to link national and 
bondholder interests, but so long as the job was being 
done,. investors seemed not to mind under what banner 
they marched. Sympathy for their cause we..s certainly 
very low in the general publio, 2 but this did nothing 
to dampen the ardor of the City, as the Economist ob-
served: 
There has never been a time when our commercial 
and financial interests have been so eager to 
embark in costly military operations as they 
are now. There is comparatively little appre-
hension as to the cost--if the Government had asked 
for twice £2,)00,000 the amount would have been 
quite as readily voted, and the extra amount regarded 
as an earnest of greater determination on the part 
of the Government to prosecute the campaign with 
vigour.3 
The bill was passed on July 27, 1882, by a vote of 27.5 
to 19, 336 M.P.'s not appearing. 4 Bondholder satis-
1Gladstone to Rev. Edwin Abbott, Sept. 13 1 1882, Gladstone Papers BM Add MSS 44545/198-98 (copy). 
2s1r Richard Temple, "Principle of British Policy 
in Egypt," Contemporary Review, XLII (Oct., 1882), 505. 
3Eoonomist, XL (July 29, 1882), 9J6-J7. 
of thos:~~a~teX0I~ ~~;·aJ~~~lv!~8!ixc~!~. 2!~6h!a08 • 
been, Council membersa Sir John Lubbock, Charles Ma.gniac, 
Henry B. Sheridan, General Sir George Balfour, George de 
Worms, and Robert Fowler. 
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faction in Parliament's action was evident. as stock 
prices slowly began a recovery which by mid-September 
would place them above the mark reached before the 
Paris crash.1 
The final scene of Arabi's revolt was played 
out at Tel-el-Kebir on September lJ, and with his 
defeat Khedivial authority was restored. With the 
sheathing of the sword came the return of the diplomats, 
who would once again attempt to solve Egypt's economic 
riddle1 prosperity for the inhabitants and payment 
for the bondholders. In pursuit of an answer to this 
conundrum, the bondholders continued to be assisted by 
the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders. 
1Economist, XL (Sept. 16, 1882), 1149. 
CONCLUSION 
By the autumn of 1882, the Corporation of 
Foreign Bondholders stood at a threshold. Before it 
lay a turbulent period which would end in Corporation 
reorganization by Parliamentary actt behind were years 
which, while agitated, were marked by significant 
achievements. The accomplishments of this interest 
group are all the more noteworthy considering the 
variety of difficulties encountered and the unpopu-
larity of such organizations at the time. Some of 
the problems were inherent to the concept of a bond-
holders• society operating for the public good, but 
others arose from the hostility of various factions 
of the investing community which felt threatened by 
Moorgate Street. 
Despite this situation, the Council was able 
to play an effective role in safeguarding the interests 
of British investors by serving as a rallying point, and 
by providing much needed information, legal assistance, 
and funds for missions on their behalf. Among the 
settlements arranged by the Corporation in its early 
4J6 
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history, none gave more satisfaction than that 
undertaken for the Egyptian bondholders. 
The guiding principles of the Corporation 
in defense of the Egyptian bondholders were the equit-
able treatment of creditors by the defaulting govern-
ment and the maintenance of the sanctity of contracts. 
From the initial contact between Councilhouse and the 
Cairo Government in 1870 when the Viceroy circumvented 
the bond of the loan of 1868, to Council Chairman 
Bouverie's activities .in 1882 when Arabi Bey threatened 
unilaterally to abrogate the Law of Liquidation, the 
Corporation was never intractable in its negotiations, 
but once a settlement was reached, a strict adherence 
was expected. 
Certain members of the Council possessed a per-
sonal interest in the Nile Valley and its future, which 
no doubt contributed to the organization's efforts toward 
an accommodation. These interests were quite varieda 
there were those who saw Egypt as an important point 
in imperial geometry between India and Britains others, 
involved in the investment trust business, wished to 
protect their firm's portfolios from erosions and there 
were those who had purchased stock in companies which 
would suffer by an Egyptian default. 
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The decisive action of the Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders came in 1876 after the Disraeli Government 
had turned its back upon the English investors, leaving 
the French bankers in control. Despite criticism from 
many quarters, the Council took up the matter in a pro-
fessional and efficient manner. Since the treatment of 
the recent Turkish default had shown the destructiveness 
of bickering bondholders• committees, the Corporation 
deliberately achieved the enlistment of the services of 
Mr. George Goschen with a maximum of goodwill on all 
sides. In successfully defending British interests, 
the M.P. for London also laid the base for eventual 
Anglo-French intervention. In a certain sense, there-
fore, the Council was responsible for the occupation of 
Egypt by General Wolseley six years later. 
In 1876 and 1877, the Council played a con-
spicuous part in the settlement of the Daira debt and 
also took in hand the cause of the Egyptian tribute 
bondholders. When all of these arrangements were com-
pleted, Councilhouse was content to leave matters in 
the hands of Mr. Gosohen and the representatives he 
had selected for the creditors. But the rule of the 
bondholders was short-lived. Both Major Baring and 
Mr. Romaine disappointed the Council. With Goschen 
beginning to disengage himself from Egyptian affairs, 
439 
the Decree of November 18 under attack, and the Western 
Powers increasing their authority in Egypt, the Corpora-
tion found that the British bondholders had little choice 
but to accept whatever terms the Khedive•s Government 
offered. The Commission of Inquiry and the Law of 
Liquidation reduced the interest to be paid the bond-
holders, and finally the Chairman of the Council was 
again forced into action to forestall the mutinous 
colonels from seizing power, through letters to the 
Foreign Off ice and participation in public demonstrations 
which called upon the Liberal Government to protect 
English interests. Throughout, Bouverie rarely spoke 
of the rights of the holders, preferring to justify 
British intervention by moral and political arguments. 
From the foregoing, it seems correct to say 
that the bondholders were certainly not the prime movers 
behind the occupation of Egypt, yet they cannot be dis-
missed as insignificant. Their welfare was a single 
but important component of the national interest, and 
there is little doubt that during the period discussed 
their affairs were well represented by the Corporation 




PARTICIPATION OF 'COUNCIL' MEMBERS 
ON MAJOR BONDHOLDER COMMITTEES 
Committee 'Co'lll'lcil' Members 
Name and Sta.ff (*) on the Committee 
Alabama and Francis Bennoch 
Chatanooga Augustus Abraham 
Bondholders• *Aubry Moriarty 
Committee Sir Philip Rose 
Maj. Gen. John 
Vaughan 
Bolivia Francis Bennoch 
Bondholders• Lionel Bonar 
Committee 
I· 
Costa Rica Roger Eykyn 
Bondholders• Francis Bennoch 
Committee 
Ecuador Francis Bennoch 
Bondholders• Lionel Bonar 
Committee Adm. Sir Provo Wallis 
Guatemala 1869 Maj. Gen, Sir George 
6 Per Cent Balfour 
Loan Com- George Taylor 
mittee 
Maj. Gen. John 
Vaughan 
George Wythes 
Sir Francis Lycett 
Joint Commit- Francis Bennoch 
tee for *Thomas Rumball 
Ottoman *Hyde Clarke 
Loans of 










Committee 'Council' Members Office Held 
Name and Staff (*) on (If Any) the Committee 
Louisiana Maj. Gen. Sir George 
Bondholders' Balfour 
Committee Francis Bennoch 
Mexican Henry B. Sheridan Chairman 
Bondholders' Francis Bennoch Deputy 
Committee Chairman 
Lionel Bonar 
Adm. Sir Provo Wallis 
Spanish Sir Philip Rose 
Bondholders' Cornelius Surgey 
Committee Maj. Gen. Sir George 
Balfour 
Augustus Abraham 






Sir John Lubbock 
Maj. Gen. John 
Vaughan 
George Wythes 
Turkish Loan Sir Francis Lycett 
of 1862 John Paterson 
Committee 
Venezuela Maj. Gen. Richard 
Bondholders' Beaumont 
Committee Maj. Gen. John 
Vaughan 
Adm. Sir Provo Wallis Chairman 
Virginia Sir Samuel Montagu 




Notes Certain names recur frequently on these com-
mittees1 this is not coincidental. These gentlemen 
were the officers of the Corporation and were members 
of the Executive Committee of the 'Council,' and in 
the last analysis it was in these half dozen that the 
real power of the association resided. In addition, 
the chairman of the Corporation (Isadore Gerstenberg, 
and later Edward Pleydell Bouverie) was the chairman 
ex officio of every committee, and Hyde Clarke, the 




MEMBERS OF TP..E 'COUNCIL' OF THE CORPORATION 
OF FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS, 1869-82 
Name 
Augustus B. Abraham 
Maj. Gen. Sir George 
Balfour, M.P. 
Maj. Gan. Richard 
H. I. B. Beaumont 
Charles Bell, M.P. 
Francis Bennoch (Acting Chairman 
of the 'Colmcil' 
1873-76) 

















Off ices Held in Financial 
Organizations 
Trustee--Foreign and Colo-






Bank of India 
Director--Atlantic and 
Great Westeni Railway 
Cha.irman--Tunisian Railways 








Director--City of Potsdam 
waterworks 
Director--Stanley Fire-
proof Lathing Company 
Director--Venezuela Tele-






Trustee--Omnium Stock Trust 
Membership in Nonprofit 
Organizations 
Royal Colonial Institute 






Royal Asiatic Society of 
Great Britain and 
Ireland 
• • • 
Royal Geographical 
Society 





George A. F. c. Bentinck, 
f,I. P. 
Lionel N. Donal." 
Robert Bourke, Baron 
Cannemara, M.P. 
Hon. Edward Pleydell 
Bouverie 
(Chairman of the 
'Council' 1876-82) 
E. Philip Cazenove 
Hyde Clarke (Secretary of the 
'Council' 1869-82) 
Henry Daniell 


































Off ices Held in Financial 
Organizations 
Director--English and Aus-
tralian Copper Co. 
Trustee--Foreign and Colo-
nial Government Trust 
• • • 
• • • 
President--Trust and Loan 
Co. of Canada 
Director--Berks and Hants 
Extension Railway Co. 
Director--Peninsular and 
Oriental Steamship Co. 
Chainnan--Colonial Co. 
Deputy Chainnan--Economic 
Life Assurance Society 
Director--Great Western 
Railway 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
Chairman--Alabama and Great 
Southern Railway Co. 
Membership in Nonprofit 
Organizations 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
Royal Society of Arts 
• • • 
Royal Colonial Institute 
Royal Society of Arts 
Royal Statistical Society 
• • • 




Walter R. Farquhar 
Sir Robert N'. Fowler, 
Bart, 
Isadore J. Garstenberg (Chairman of 'Council') 
F'rederick Allers Hankey 
Grosvenor Hodgkinson, M.P. 
H. R. Jameson 
Sir Arthur Kinnaird, Tenth 
Baron Kinnaird and First 
Baron Rossie, M. P. 



































Off ices Held in Financial 
Organizations 












and Dover Railway co. 
Director--Midland Railway 
Co. 










Royal Geographical Society 
Royal Society of Arts 
Royal Statistical Society 
Royal Geographical Society 
Royal Society of Arts 
Royal Society of Arts 
• • • 
• • • 
Royal Colonial Institute 
Royal Geographical Society 
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TABLE 2--Continued 




Sir John Lubbock. Baron 1873-82 Banker--
Avebury, M. P. Robarts & 
Lubbock 
Sir Francis Lycett 1869-79 Banker {retired, 
Dent & 
Allcroft) 
Charles Magniac, M.P. 1873-78 Merchant--
Matheson 
& co. 
Richard Biddulph Martin, 1875•82 Banker--
M.P. Messrs. 
l'f.artin & Co. 
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TABLE 2--continued 
Off ices Held in Financial 
Organizations 
Director--Madras Irriga-




ture Trust Co. 
Direotor--Railways Passen-
ger Assurance Society 
Chairman--Trust and Agency 
Co. of Australasia 
Deputy Governor--London 















of New Zealand 
Director--Municipal Trust 
Director--United States 
Land and Colonization 
Co. 





of Bankers (1879-83) 
President--London Chamber 
of Commerce (1888-95) 
Vice President-•Royal 
Society of Arts (1876) 
Royal Colonial Institute 
Royal Statistical Society 
Royal society of Arts 
President--London Chamber 
of Commerce (188J) 
Royal Society of Arts 
Treasurer--Royal Statis-
tical Society 









Alexander Melville. Earl 
of Leven and Melville 
Sir Samuel Montagu, First 
Baron Swaythling 
Thomas Moxon 










Martin & Co.) 
Banker--





Deacon & Co. 
Banker--
Samuel Mon-




Off ices Held in Financial 
Organizations 
Trustee--Railway Accident 












Electric Lighting Co. 
Director--Sun Fire Off ice 
• • • 
• • • 
Trustee--Reliance Mutual 
Life Assurance Society 
Director--Nevile Reid and 
Co. of Windsor 
• • • 
• • • 
Membership in Nonprofit 
Organizations 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
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TABLE 2--Continued 
Name Years on the Occupation 
•council' 
John Paterson, Alderman 1873-75 Merchant 
Simon Reuter 1873-75 Gentleman 
Sir John Rose, Bart. 1873-79 Banker--
Morton, 
Rose & Co. 
Sir Philip Rose, Bart. 1869-78 Iawyer--
Baxter, Rose I 
Norton & Co. 
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TABLE 2--continued 




• • • 
Governor--Hudson's Bay Co. 
Chairman--south Australian 
Co. 
Director--Bank of Montreal 







nial Government Trust 












and Mortgage Co. of 
England 
Director--Alabama and 
Great Southern Railway 
Co. 
Director--.Anglo-French 
Fire Insurance Co. 
Director--American In-
vestment Trust Co. 
Director--Railway Shares 
Investment Trust Co. 
Membership in Nonprofit 
Organizations 
• • • 
• • • 
Royal Colonial Institute 
Royal Geographical Society 
• • • 
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TABLE 2--Continued 
Name Years on the Occupation 
•council' 
Hon. H. Dudley Ryder 1880-82 Government 
Official (retired) 
George Schlotel 1869-73 Broker 
Sir Edward H. Scott, 1878-82 Banker--
Fifth Baronet Sir Samuel 
Scott & Co. 
Henry B. Sheridan, m.P. 1869-70 Gentleman 
Sir Thomas w. Snagge 1882 Lawyer (Legal Advisor 1874-81) 




George c. Taylor 1876-82 Gentleman 
William Trotter 187J-82 Broker--
Capel & co. 
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TABLE 2--Continued 
Offices Held in Financial 
Organizations 
Director--Coults and Co. 
• • • 
.. . ' 
• • • 
Director--north London 
Railway 






and Dover Railway Co, 









IfJembership in Nonprofit 
Organizations 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
Royal Statistical Society 
Royal Geographical Society 
Royal Asiatic Society of 
Great Britain and Ireland 
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TABLE 2--continued 
Name Years on the occupation 
'Council' 
Henry Tudor 1873-82 Broker-
Henry Tudor 
& Sons 
Captain Sir Henry w. Tyler, 1875-82 Wdlitary 
Bart., R.N., M.P. 
Major General John 1876-82 Military 
Luther Vaughan 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir 
Provo William ParryWallis 1869-78 Navy 
Thomas M. Weguelin, M.P. 1869-8~ Merchant Bank (Deputy Chairman of the er --Robarts 
'Council,' 1870-75) & Lubbock1 
later with 




Off ices Held in Flnancial 
Organizations 
. . ·• 
President--Grand Trunk 
Railway of Canada 
President--Chicago a.~d 
Cirand Trunk Railway 
Co. of Canada 
Chairman-~Rhymney Iron Co. 
Chairman-Buenos Aires and 
Campana Railway 
Deputy Chairman--Great 




Life Assurance Society 
Director--Bristol Port 
and Channel Dock and 
Warehouse Co. 
Director--Central Paci-
fic Coal and Coke Co. 
Director--Hamilton and 
Northwest Railway Co. 
Director--Tendring Hun-




Gold Mining Co. 
• • • 




Membership in Nonprofit 
Organizations 
• • • 
Royal Society of Arts 
• • • 
• • • 
Royal Geographical Society 
Royal Society of Arts 
Royal Statistical Society 
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TABLE 2--continued 
Name Years on the Occupation 
•council' 
Thomas M• Weguelin, M.P.--
continued 
George A. de Worms, Baron 1869 Banker--
.Messrs. de 
Worms & co. 




Offices Held in Financial 
Organizations 
Director--Trust and Loan 
Co. of Upper Canada 
Direotor--Indenmity Mutual 
Marine Assurance Co. 
Director--Peninsular 
Oriental Steamship co. 
Director--General credit 
and Discount Co. 
Director--Publio Works 
Construction Co. 
Director--Argentine Land Co. 
Director--Colohester, Stour 
Valley, Sudbury and Hal-





Membership in Nonprofit 
Organizations 
• • • 
• • • 
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TABLE .3 
THE MOST IMPORTANT FINANCIAL DJ'STITUTIONS 
IN EGYPT ON THE EVE OF DEFAULT 
Institution 
Cr6dit Lyonnaise 




Bank of Alexandria 
socie~ General ottoman 
Inda-European Bank 
Soci~t• 6gyptienne 



















INTEREST PAID BY ENGLISH BANKS IN EGYPT, 1869-75 
Price Per Cent Interest Paid Per Yeara 
Name of Bank Number of per Shares Share 
(£) 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 
Bank of Egypt io.ooo 25 16 16 18 19 20 16 
Bank of 
Alexandria ioo.ooo 10 •• • • • • •• 12.5 15 Anglo-~tian (1871Jb 80,000 20 18 10 15 20 18 15 
aFebruary for the Bank of F..gypt. and November for the y~her two banks 
was the month marking the and of the fiscal year* 
b\l'hen the Anglo-Egyptian Bank opened its doors in 1864. each share was 
priced at e;o, but this price was reduced when the bank was reorganized. 
Note1 Table 4 was compiled from various economic journals of the day. 
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1866 J,000,000 7 92 1874 Railroads 2,640,000 88 8 
seccni 
1867 2.080,000 9 90 1881 New estates l,700,000 82 ll 
and general 
revenue 




1870 7,142,860 7 75 1890 Dairas 5,000,000 70 10 
1873 32,000,000 7 84.5 1903 Railroads, 19,973,658 6J 11 
to customs, 
70 .Moukabala, 
etc •• and 
general 
revenue 













DECLINE OF BANK SHARE PRICES, 1875-76 
Price 
Bank 
Aug., •75 Nov., '75 Feb., '76 
Anglo-Egyptian Bank JS JO 1/2 28 1/4 
Ba11k of Alexandria 12 5/8 10 1/8 9 1/2 





















DEPRECIATION OF EGYPTIAN SECURITIESa OCTOBER 1875 TO MARCH 1876a 
Price Value of Stock outstanding Amol.ll'l.t of Depreciation 
(£) as of March. 1876 Oct. March (£) 1875 1876 Oct.' 1875 March, 1876 
73 52.5 1,860,000 1,337,000 523,000 
8J 70 2,120,000 1,785,000 335,000 
75 69.5 1,.385,000 1,274,ooo 111,000 
91 74.5 1,190,000 975,000 215,000 
65 57.5 7,945,000 5,573,000 1,472,000 
64.5 51 J,970,000 J,137,000 8JJ,OOO 
65 52.25 20,485,000 16,466,ooo 4,019,000 
• • • • • • 38,055,000 J0,547,000 7,508,000 











Agency and commission ••••• , ••••• J6,8J6 
Interest on stock held 
Subscriptions 
• • • • • 
Expenditures 
• • • • • • • • 





Ordinary expenditures, including salaries 
and testimonials •••••••••••• 25,610 
Losses and depreciation on investments 
Fifty certificates drawn and paid 
with interest , •••••• , • • • • 
• • 7,484 
• • 5,995 
House property ••••••••••••• , J,106 
Undivided profits •••••••••• , • • • 9,557 




Carnarvon Papers. Great Britain. Public Record Office, 
London. 
Cromer Papers. Great Britain. Public Record Office, 
London. 
Gladstone Papers. British Museum. Additional Manu-
scripts. 
Granville Papers, Great Britain. Public Record Office, 
London. 
Iddesleigh Papers. British Museum. Additional Manu-
scripts. 
Lascelles Papers, Great Britain. Public Record Office, 
London. 
Ripon Papers. British Museum. Additional Manuscripts. 
Tenterden Papers, Great Britain, Public Record Office, 
London. 
Government Documents 
Great Britain. Public Record Office. Board of Trade. 
Documents in this category consist of share 
lists and memoranda of association of organizations 
involved in Egypt and registered in Britain. 
Great Britain. Public Record Office. Foreign Office 
Confidential Prints. 
The Foreign Office Confidential Prints series 
407 is a collection of dispatches relating to Egypt, 
drawn together by the Foreign Office, and including 
relfvant d9cumeots which also appear in Foreign Office series 7~ and l~l. 
469 
470 
Great Britain. Parliament. Mansard's Parliamentary 
Debates. 
Great Britain. Parliament. Parliamentary Papers, 
House of Commons and Command. 
Reports and Pamphlets 
Clarke, Hyde. Sovereign and Quasi-Sovereign States1 
Their Debts to Foreign Countries. Londons 
Effingham Wilson, 1878. 
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders. Archives. 
Guildhall Library, London. 
The archives of the Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders held by the Guildhall Library are 
divided into series of volumes devoted to 
defaulting states. These volumes contain 
newspaper clippings, as well as an assort-
ment of pamphlets, notices, prospectuses, 
and related materials, organized chronologically 
and indexed by subject. Of the thirty-two volumes 
on Egypt, this work has utilized Volumes I-XVIII, 
ae well as Volumes I and II on Turkey. 
----· First Report of the Council of the COrPOration 
of Foreign Bondholders for 1873. London,~S74. 
• Annual Report of the Coun211 of the Corporation 
-----o-f Foreign Bondholders• London, 1874-1887. 
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Rules and Regulations. London, 18ZJ. 
Council of Foreign Bondholders. :Egypt, Daira Debt, 
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• Egyptian Debts Daira Creditors. Reports on 
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London, May, 18z7. 
------~· The Egyptian Debt. Mission of the Right Hon. 
G. J. Goschen, M.P. London, Dec,, 1876, 
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Bondholders• 
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"The Dissolution of the Egyptian Syndicate." 
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